Cite as 2021 Ark. App. 335 Elizabeth Perry ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document 2023.07.10 11:03:14 -05'00' DIVISION II 2023.003.20215 No. CV-21-30
EVA BREWER AND JONATHAN Opinion Delivered September 15, 2021 BREWER APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE SCOTT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 64JV-19-52]
HONORABLE TERRY SULLIVAN, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILDREN APPELLEES AFFIRMED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellants Eva Brewer and Jonathan Brewer appeal separately from an order
terminating their parental rights to their daughter V.B. (DOB 3-16-2015), daughter O.B.
(DOB 8-26-2016), and son E.B. (DOB 9-1-2019). In Eva’s appeal, she argues that there
was insufficient evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. Eva specifically
claims that there was no proof that the children could achieve permanency through
adoption; that she does not pose a risk of harm to the children; and that there was no
consideration given to the effect that termination would have on the sibling relationship.
In Jonathan’s appeal, he argues that there was insufficient evidence that termination was in
the children’s best interest because he did not pose a risk of harm to the children. Jonathan
also contends that appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) did not make reasonable efforts to provide him services. We affirm the trial court’s order as to both Eva’s
appeal and Jonathan’s appeal.
I. Standard of Review
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1)
the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and
(2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child,
caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii) (Supp. 2021). The order terminating parental rights must also be based
on a showing by clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for
termination listed in section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). However, only one ground must be proved
to support termination. Best v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 485, 611 S.W.3d
690.
A trial court’s order terminating parental rights must be based upon findings proved
by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3). Clear and convincing
evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm
conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal, the appellate court reviews
termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the trial court’s ruling
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a
2 finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.
II. Relevant Facts
This case began on October 15, 2019, when DHS filed a petition for emergency
custody of V.B. and O.B. When the petition was filed, V.B. and O.B. were in Jonathan’s
care, and V.B. disclosed that Jonathan had hit her in the face with his fist and grabbed the
back of her neck. V.B. had a black eye, a scratch on her cheek, and a faint bruise that
appeared to be in the shape of a thumb near the back of her neck. The house was dirty and
cluttered. Jonathan refused to speak with DHS or take a drug screen. At this time, Eva was
staying in the hospital with the parties’ son, E.B., who had been born prematurely with
complications six weeks earlier. The affidavit of the caseworker noted that DHS had a
previous history with Jonathan that included a true finding of striking an unrelated child’s
face with his fist several years ago. It was also noted in the affidavit that Eva had her parental
rights involuntary terminated to an older child in 2013. Based on these facts, the trial court
entered an ex parte order for emergency custody on October 15, 2019. A probable-cause
order followed on November 6, 2019. Eva and Jonathan were married when these orders
were entered, but they subsequently divorced on December 12, 2019.
On January 28, 2020, the trial court entered an adjudication order finding V.B. and
O.B. dependent-neglected due to Jonathan’s parental unfitness, the condition of the home,
and the condition of the children. 1 The trial court found that Eva did not contribute to the
1 Although E.B. was not included in the caption of the adjudication order, he was later included as a party to the case.
3 dependency-neglect of the children at that time and that she was fit to allow the children to
begin a trial home placement with her. The goal of the case was reunification. Both parents
were ordered to maintain stable and appropriate housing, maintain reliable transportation,
complete parenting classes, and comply with random drug screens. In addition, Jonathan
was ordered to complete a psychological evaluation, complete domestic-violence and anger-
management classes, and obtain and maintain sobriety. 2
A review order was entered on March 10, 2020. In the review order, the trial court
found Eva to be fit and ordered the children returned to her custody. The trial court noted
that DHS had made reasonable efforts to provide family services. Eva was found to be in
compliance with the case plan, having maintained appropriate and clean housing and having
provided for the children. Jonathan was found to have made progress toward the case plan,
although he had obtained drug charges and needed to comply with a drug-and-alcohol
assessment and any required counseling. The goal of the case remained reunification.
On April 17, 2020, DHS filed an ex parte petition for an emergency change of
custody as well as a petition for dependency-neglect. 3 DHS asserted that Jonathan continued
to use drugs and that the children alleged that he had physically and sexually abused them.
DHS further asserted that Eva had allowed Jonathan access to the children and had failed to
protect them from his abuse. An attached affidavit alleged that although Eva had assured
DHS that Jonathan would not be living with her and the children, he was found to be living
2 Jonathan had tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine on a December 10, 2019 drug screen. 3 E.B. was added to the caption of the case in these petitions, and he was named as a party in the remainder of the trial court’s orders, including the termination order.
4 with them on April 14, 2020, and that Eva had previously divorced Jonathan only to regain
custody of her children from DHS. The affidavit alleged that upon investigation of a
domestic-violence dispute, it was learned that Jonathan had injured and bruised Eva and had
threatened to kill her. It was also reported that V.B. and O.B. had facial bruising and that
both children alleged that Jonathan had choked them until they were breathless. V.B. had
disclosed that “daddy stuck his big no no in my mouth.” It was alleged that E.B. had not
been receiving proper feeding through his GI tube and had not been receiving necessary
breathing treatments. All three children were filthy and smelled as if they had not been
bathed in several days. Both parents were drug screened, and Jonathan tested positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC. The drug-screen sample provided by Eva was
cool to the touch and invalid. Based on these allegations, the trial court entered an
emergency order on April 17, 2020, placing all three children in DHS custody.
After holding a probable-cause hearing, the trial court entered a probable-cause order
on May 4, 2020, wherein the trial court found:
The Court finds that the Department has been involved with this family since October 2019 and that the following services as outlined in the affidavit were provided to the family: case management, foster care, medical care, referrals for parenting, homemaker services, drug screening, counseling, drug and alcohol assessment, and psychological evaluation. Despite the services offered or provided, due to the emergency, the need for removal could not be prevented. These services did not prevent removal because: On April 14, 2020, the Department responded to allegations of physical abuse, drug use, and domestic violence in the home. The Department observed the juvenile O.B. (3 years old) with a large black left eye with a triangle scrape under it and abrasions on her nose. Both girls were dirty and unkempt. The girls were taken to the Hamilton House where V.B. disclosed that her daddy choked her, pulled her hair, and slung her to the floor, and he stuck his big “no-no” in her mouth and O.B. licks her no-no and her butt. O.B. disclosed that her daddy has a gun and says he was going to shoot her mom, and that he chokes her a lot. The juvenile E.B. was seen by a physician, where it was found he had not
5 been receiving proper feeding through his GI tube, not receiving necessary breathing treatments, and was described as having not been bathed for at least a week.
On June 15, 2020, DHS filed a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights,
asserting numerous statutory grounds and alleging that the children would be at significant
risk of harm if returned to their parents’ custody. On June 25, 2020, the trial court entered
an adjudication order finding the children dependent-neglected and changing the case goal
to the concurrent goal of reunification and termination of parental rights. In the
adjudication order, the trial court found:
The Court finds, and the parents stipulate by preponderance of the evidence that the juveniles are dependent-neglected as defined in the Arkansas Juvenile Code and that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, specifically, the Court finds the juveniles were neglected by both Eva Brewer and Jonathan Brewer due to parental unfitness and inadequate supervision because of the domestic violence and drug use in the home.
The case proceeded to a termination hearing on September 22 and 29, 2020.
Deputy Sheriff Joey Carnahan was the first witness to testify at the termination
hearing. Deputy Carnahan testified about a hit-and-run incident that occurred in May 2020
that resulted in a seventeen-year-old boy being hospitalized with severe injuries. The boy’s
dirt bike had been struck from behind by a car later determined to belong to Eva Brewer.
Deputy Carnahan interviewed Eva, and she stated that Jonathan had been driving her car
that day and that she was a passenger. Eva stated that after Jonathan struck the boy with his
car, Jonathan got out of the vehicle and moved the boy to the side of the road. The boy
was asking for help and Eva wanted to help him, but Jonathan threatened Eva and insisted
that they leave the scene. Jonathan was criminally charged in connection with the hit-and-
run incident.
6 Deputy Carnahan also testified about a search of Eva’s residence that occurred in
May 2020. Deputy Carnahan stated that Jonathan was known to stay at the house, and that
during the search, the police discovered fourteen grams of a green leafy substance, digital
scales with a white crystal residue, a broken glass smoking device, and another glass smoking
device containing white crystal residue. Jonathan denied knowledge of the contraband,
stating that it was Eva’s house and that anything there belonged to her. Jonathan was taken
to jail, and in a recorded phone conversation, Eva told Jonathan that she had driven by the
house during the police search and that she kept driving. During this phone conversation,
Eva told Jonathan that she would not be returning to the house and that “they’re not going
to get me tonight.” Deputy Carnahan stated that both Eva and Jonathan were charged with
felony possession of drug paraphernalia and misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance.
Courtney McPherson is a trauma therapist for V.B. and O.B. Ms. McPherson
diagnosed both girls with posttraumatic stress disorder and stated that they are both
significantly emotionally delayed. Ms. McPherson testified that both girls had been sexually
acting out and exhibiting behavior consistent with sexual-abuse victims. Ms. McPherson
stated that V.B. and O.B. would make spontaneous comments demonstrating knowledge of
sexual activity beyond their age. When speaking of her father, V.B. stated that he told V.B
to tell him he has a “big d**k,” and then “he pulled his no-no out of my mouth and put it
back in after I said it.” Regarding this incident, V.B. stated that her “mommy said we
couldn’t tell anyone because it’s a secret.”
7 Ms. McPherson also testified that V.B. and O.B. reported being physically abused by
their father. O.B. stated that “I saw daddy get mad and I hid behind the couch” but that
“daddy hit me in the face” with his fist. O.B. then punched herself in the face to
demonstrate how it happened. O.B. also stated that “one time I was running away from
daddy with mommy” and then “daddy caught me, he choked me, I couldn’t breathe.”
O.B. stated that she, her mother, and her sister frequently had to hide from her father so he
would not hurt them. Both girls indicated that their mother was sometimes present when
their father physically abused them, and that their mother was being physically abused as
well. Ms. McPherson indicated that the statements by V.B. and O.B. were always consistent
and that she found them to be credible.
Tabitha Colquitt testified that she is O.B.’s foster parent and was formerly V.B.’s
foster parent. Ms. Colquitt stated that in many instances while the girls were playing, they
would display sexualized behavior as well as physically aggressive behavior.
DHS caseworker Bobbie Alfonzo testified next. Ms. Alfonzo stated that during the
children’s trial home placement with Eva, Eva had initially been doing well and was
providing a clean and appropriate home for the children. Eva was supposed to be
supervising Jonathan’s visitation with the children, and Eva was not to allow Jonathan in
her home. However, reports of domestic violence resulted in a CACD investigation on
April 14, 2020, which indicated that Jonathan was staying at Eva’s home and was abusing
the children. The April 14 investigation also revealed that Eva’s home was in a deplorable
condition.
8 During that investigation, Jonathan and Eva were seen “trying to run off into the
woods on a four-wheeler” with all three children aboard. The investigation revealed
numerous injuries to V.B. and O.B., including fresh bruises as well as other bruises of various
stages. It was also discovered that E.B. was underweight and was not being fed properly
through his feeding tube. The children were unkempt, and the house was dirty and full of
bugs. After the children were removed, O.B. and V.B. disclosed physical and sexual abuse
committed by their father. Ms. Alfonzo stated that, at the time of her investigation, it
appeared that Jonathan was living in the home because some of his belongings were there,
and there had been numerous reports of domestic violence in the home, including extreme
altercations between Jonathan and Eva. Jonathan tested positive for methamphetamine, and
the urine sample submitted by Eva was cool and invalid. Ms. Alfonzo stated that there were
true findings against Eva for environmental neglect and failure to protect and true findings
against Jonathan for environmental neglect and sexual abuse.
Ms. Alfonzo indicated that numerous DHS services had been offered to the parents,
including random drug screens, counseling referrals, psychological-evaluation referrals,
parenting classes, homemaker services, and transportation. Ms. Alfonzo thought that,
despite these services, the children would be at risk of harm if returned to their parents.
Ms. Alfonzo stated that O.B. and V.B. had been severely and chronically abused and that
their parents could not provide the children a safe home. Ms. Alfonzo stated that although
Eva demonstrated the ability to care for her children during the trial placement, after she
regained custody, she placed the children back in the same harmful situation they were in
before. Ms. Alfonzo indicated that Eva lacks the ability to protect the children.
9 As to the adoptability of the children, Ms. Alfonzo acknowledged that O.B. and V.B.
are “very difficult girls with the trauma they’ve had.” She stated, “I do believe they are
adoptable, but they will need somebody very special that can love them and address the
trauma that has occurred.” Ms. Alfonzo testified that there are no physical conditions that
would impede the children’s adoption, that they are at an age that would increase the
likelihood of being adopted, and that they have “lots of room to grow.” Ms. Alfonzo
further asserted that, even if there is an adoptability issue, the risk of harm in returning the
children to their parents was so great as to outweigh the adoptability issue. Ms. Alfonzo
stated, “Due to the sexual and physical abuse that they’ve had to deal with for their short
little lives, to put them back into . . . that environment . . . would do nothing but greater
harm.” Ms. Alfonzo stated that the children need permanency and a life free from drugs,
sexual abuse, and physical abuse, and she recommended termination of both parents’
parental rights.
Another DHS employee, Gayla Baker, testified about her observations during the
investigation of Eva’s home on April 14, 2020. Ms. Baker said the home was
just tore apart. Very messy. It was just—you couldn’t walk through the home. It had a bad odor. Old food in all the rooms. There was an ashtray that looked like it had buds, pot, you know, from marijuana in it. It didn’t look like a place that you could live in.
Ms. Baker further testified that the children “were all filthy and had a bad odor.”
After the children were removed from the home for the second time in April 2020,
V.B. and O.B. were interviewed by a forensic interviewer, Elsa Jasso. Ms. Jasso
10 characterized these interviews as “very non-leading.” Portions of these interviews were
played at the termination hearing. 4
In V.B.’s interview, she stated that her father, Jonathan, grabbed her by the neck,
choked her, and slung her down. V.B. stated that this happened “yesterday at home when
momma went to the doctor.” V.B. also stated that her father has a “big no-no” and that he
stuck it in her mouth, and it tasted nasty. V.B. stated that this happened at the “gray house”
and that “we’re at the trailer now.”
In O.B.’s interview, she stated that her father has a gun and “always says he’s gonna
shoot our momma.” O.B. also indicated that her father chokes her to where she cannot
breathe.
There was also a forensic interview of a third child, A.H., who is not a party to the
case. A.H. was staying with the family when the dependency-neglect proceedings began,
and she alleged that Jonathan had choked her to where she could not breathe. She stated
that this happened more than once. A.H. also indicated in her interview that Jonathan had
sexually abused her and told her to keep it a secret.
Eva Brewer testified on her own behalf. Eva confirmed that prior to this case, she
had a dependency-neglect case involving her older daughter that resulted in the termination
of her parental rights to that child. Eva explained that the issues in that case were her drug
use and failure to comply with the case plan. Eva stated, however, that she was complying
with the current case plan and was consistently testing negative on her drug screens.
4 These interviews were admitted over Eva’s and Jonathan’s objections. Neither party challenges the admissibility of these interviews on appeal.
11 Eva stated that Jonathan was never violent toward her, nor had she ever seen him
violent toward their children. Eva maintained that she had no knowledge of any physical
or sexual abuse being committed against her children, and she stated that she would not
subject her children to such abuse. With respect to her daughters’ allegations of physical
and sexual abuse committed by Jonathan, Eva stated that all children lie and that she had no
personal knowledge of any of these things happening. Eva also stated that after the children
were removed and she regained temporary custody, she allowed Jonathan only supervised
visitation, and Jonathan was not staying in their home.
Eva did, however, acknowledge that Jonathan was present when DHS investigated
her home on April 14, 2020, and removed the children for the second time. Moreover,
Eva was a passenger in her car being driven by Jonathan the following month when the hit-
and-run incident involving the seventeen-year-old boy occurred. Eva stated that she
wanted to stop and render assistance to the boy but that Jonathan insisted on leaving. After
initially testifying that Jonathan did not threaten her on that occasion, Eva eventually
acknowledged that she had truthfully told the police that Jonathan had threatened to “beat
the skin off [her] face.” Eva also acknowledged the police search of her house that occurred
that same month where the police found drugs and drug paraphernalia. Despite Eva’s claim
that Jonathan did not live there, Eva stated that all the contraband belonged to Jonathan.
Eva was jailed for three months as a result of the search and seizure, and at the time of the
termination hearing she was still facing felony and misdemeanor charges.
12 Eva stated that she loves her children and is tightly bonded with them. She pleaded
with the court not to terminate her parental rights, emphasizing her lack of knowledge of
any abuse and stating that she is willing to do everything DHS asked toward reunification.
Eva’s mother, Cathleen Hampton, testified next. She confirmed that Eva’s
parental rights to her older daughter had been terminated due to drugs and other issues.
Ms. Hampton stated, however, that she believed Eva had turned her life around and is now
a different person. Ms. Hampton thought that Eva cares about her children and would
protect them.
Jonathan Brewer was the last witness to testify. He stated that after the children were
returned to Eva following their removal, he had only supervised visitation with the children
and did not live in Eva’s home. Jonathan denied ever physically or sexually abusing his
children. At the time of the termination hearing, Jonathan was facing criminal charges in
connection with the hit-and-run incident as well as the drugs and drug paraphernalia found
in Eva’s home. DHS also introduced evidence that Jonathan had numerous prior
convictions that included possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia,
leaving the scene of a personal-injury accident, fleeing apprehension, and two counts of
first-degree terroristic threatening. Jonathan stated that he would like to retain his parental
rights but that if his parental rights are terminated, he wanted Eva to have the children, and
he would agree to a lifetime restraining order. Jonathan thought that Eva could protect the
children and keep them safe.
On November 13, 2020, the trial court entered an order terminating Eva’s and
Jonathan’s parental rights to V.B., O.B., and E.B. The trial court found by clear and
13 convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest,
and the court specifically considered the likelihood that the children would be adopted, as
well as the potential harm of returning them to the custody of their parents as required by
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The trial court found the statements by V.B.
and O.B. concerning the physical and sexual abuse committed by Jonathan to be credible,
and the trial court found that Eva, Eva’s mother, and Jonathan lacked credibility. The trial
court found that Jonathan chronically abused his daughters, and that Eva permitted the abuse
and lied to DHS about keeping Jonathan out of the home. The trial court also found that
Eva actively concealed the sexual abuse by telling V.B. to keep it a secret. The trial court
noted the caseworker’s testimony that the children are adoptable, and further found that the
risk of potential harm in returning them to their parents is so great that it far outweighs any
potential issue regarding adoptability. The trial court also found clear and convincing
evidence of these three statutory grounds under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B):
(vi)(a) The court has found the juvenile or a sibling dependent-neglected as a result of neglect or abuse that could endanger the life of the child, sexual abuse, or sexual exploitation, any of which was perpetrated by the juvenile’s parent or parents or stepparent or stepparents.
....
(vii)(a) That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances that prevent the placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent.
14 (ix)(a) The parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction, including the juvenile division of the circuit court, to:
(3)(A) Have subjected any juvenile to aggravated circumstances.
(B) “Aggravated circumstances” means:
(i) A juvenile has been abandoned, chronically abused, subjected to extreme or repeated cruelty, sexually abused, or a determination has been or is made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification[.]
The trial court found that an additional statutory ground was met with respect to Eva
because Eva had her parental rights involuntarily terminated as to another child. See Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4)(A).
III. Eva’s Appeal
On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, Eva does not challenge the
statutory grounds supporting termination. Only one statutory ground is necessary to support
termination, and Eva concedes that DHS conclusively proved a ground because her parental
rights had been involuntarily terminated to an older child several years ago. Eva instead
challenges the trial court’s best-interest finding, arguing that (1) there was a lack of evidence
that the children are likely to be adopted; (2) there was no proof that Eva poses a potential
harm to her children; and (3) there was no consideration given to the effect of termination
on the sibling relationship.
On the adoptability issue, Eva acknowledges that DHS caseworker Bobbie Alfonzo
testified that the children are adoptable. However, Eva contends that the remaining
evidence did not support this conclusion because V.B. and O.B. have significant behavioral
15 and emotional issues, and E.B. is a medically fragile child. Eva claims that the caseworker’s
generalized testimony was insufficient to meet the adoptability prong of the best-interest
analysis.
Eva also argues that there was a lack of proof that she posed a risk of harm to the
children if they were returned to her custody. Eva argues that although there was evidence
that Jonathan abused the children, there was an absence of evidence that she was aware of
the abuse. Eva notes that she was never accused of abusing her children and asserts that she
divorced Jonathan and never reconciled with him. Eva also asserts that in O.B.’s and V.B.’s
disclosures of abuse by Jonathan neither child gave a time frame as to when the abuse
occurred. Eva contends that she was committed to protecting her children and remains
committed to protecting them.
Finally, Eva argues that the best-interest analysis was flawed because it failed to
address the effect termination would have on the sibling relationship. Eva relies on Clark v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2019 Ark. App. 223, 575 S.W.3d 578, a case in which
we considered the sibling relationship when reviewing whether termination was in the
children’s best interest. Eva states that the children had been separated in foster care and
that there was no evidence that they could remain an intact sibling unit following
termination and adoption.
The best-interest analysis in a termination case includes the consideration of the
likelihood the juvenile will be adopted and of the potential harm caused by returning
custody of the child to the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii); Brown v.
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 370, 584 S.W.3d 276. However, there is no
16 requirement that these factors be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Renfro v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 419, 385 S.W.3d 285. Rather, after consideration of
all the factors, the evidence must be clear and convincing that termination is in the best
interest of the children. Id. Considering all the evidence presented in this case, we conclude
that the trial court did not clearly err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Eva’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.
The termination statute does not mandate that the trial court make a specific finding
that the children are adoptable, nor must the trial court find the children are “likely” to be
adopted. Hensley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 78, 595 S.W.3d 68. The
statute mandates only “consideration” of the likelihood of adoptability. In this case, the trial
court clearly considered the likelihood that the children would be adopted, stating that it
specifically considered the caseworker’s testimony that the children are adoptable and that
their adoptability was increased by their personalities, ages, placements, and health. We
have held that generally a caseworker’s testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to
support an adoptability finding, Kerr v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 271, 493
S.W.3d 342, and in this case the trial court relied on testimony to this effect. The trial court
went on to find that any potential issue regarding adoptability was far outweighed by the
risk of harm of returning the children to either parent’s custody. This leads us into Eva’s
claim that she posed no risk of harm to the children.
In considering potential harm by returning the child to the parent, the trial court is
not required to find that actual harm would result or affirmatively identify a potential harm.
Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 193, 625 S.W.3d 374. Potential-harm
17 evidence must be viewed in a forward-looking manner and considered in broad terms. Id.
In determining potential harm, the court may consider past behavior as a predictor of likely
potential harm should the child be returned to the parent’s care and custody. Simmons v.
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 233.
Contrary to Eva’s argument, there was evidence that she had knowledge of the abuse
being committed by Jonathan and that she had failed to protect her children from harm.
The children were first removed as a result of physical abuse committed by Jonathan against
V.B. The children were subsequently returned to Eva’s custody. Despite Eva’s claim that
she was keeping Jonathan out of her home during the custody placement, Jonathan was
present along with the children when DHS investigated the home in April 2020 following
a report of domestic abuse. At that time, V.B. and O.B. were observed to have bruises of
varying stages—some of which were fresh—and both children subsequently disclosed
having been choked and physically abused by Jonathan. There were also disclosures by the
children that Eva had observed some of the physical abuse committed against them and was
herself being abused by Jonathan. Moreover, V.B. disclosed to her therapist sexual abuse
committed by Jonathan and reportedly stated, “[M]omma said we couldn’t tell anyone
because it’s a secret.”
In addition to the physical and sexual abuse committed against the children, there
was testimony that during the April 2020 investigation, Eva’s home was in a deplorable and
virtually unlivable condition and that all three children were filthy and had not been bathed
in several days. The youngest child, E.B., who has special needs, was underweight and was
not being properly fed through his feeding tube. When the children were removed this
18 second time, Jonathan tested positive for methamphetamine and Eva gave a cool and invalid
urine sample. Just a month later, a police search of Eva’s home uncovered suspected drugs
and drug paraphernalia for which Eva was facing felony charges. The distressing condition
of Eva’s home and the children belies her argument that she posed no threat of harm to the
children.
Finally, although Eva contends that the termination of her parental rights may result
in the severing of the sibling relationship, we conclude that this factor is an insufficient basis
upon which to reverse the termination of Eva’s parental rights considering the remaining
evidence. On the totality of this record, leaving the credibility decisions to the trial court,
we hold that the trial court’s finding that the termination of Eva’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm the termination of
Eva’s parental rights.
IV. Jonathan’s Appeal
In Jonathan’s appeal, he does not challenge the statutory grounds supporting
termination of his parental rights. Jonathan concedes that he would be unable to overcome
the statutory ground of aggravated circumstances because of the evidence that he had
committed sexual abuse against a child.
Jonathan, instead, challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental
rights was in the children’s best interest and that the children would be at risk of harm if
returned to his custody. Under this point, Jonathan also complains that DHS did not make
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him or make him a safe placement for the children.
19 Asserting that DHS had “unclean hands” 5 by failing to offer appropriate services, Jonathan
asks that the termination of his parental rights be reversed.
We reject Jonathan’s argument. As Jonathan recognizes, he cannot challenge the
statutory grounds supporting termination. Despite Jonathan’s claim that DHS services were
not provided, the aggravated-circumstances ground found by the trial court does not require
DHS to prove that meaningful services toward reunification were provided. Willis v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 559, 538 S.W.3d 842. Nevertheless, the testimony of
the caseworker indicated that DHS did offer numerous services to Jonathan during the case.
But regardless of the extent of DHS services, there was evidence that Jonathan
sexually and physically abused his children. Jonathan also tested positive for
methamphetamine on multiple occasions during the case and faced felony drug charges at
the time of the termination hearing. These factors bear directly on the best interest of the
children. In light of this evidence, we have no hesitation in concluding that Jonathan posed
a risk of harm to his children and that the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental
rights was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm the termination order as to Jonathan
as well.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding
that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the best interest of the children.
Accordingly, we affirm both Eva’s termination and Jonathan’s termination.
5 Jonathan offers no case in which a termination of parental rights was reversed on appeal based on DHS’s alleged “unclean hands.”
20 Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and VIRDEN, JJ., agree.
Tabitha McNulty, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant
Eva Brewer.
Dusti Standridge, for separate appellant Jonathan Brewer.
Andrew Firth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.