Europa Maritime S.A. v. Manganese Trans Atlantic Corp.

Second Circuit

Europa Maritime S.A. v. Manganese Trans Atlantic Corp.

441 F. App'x 814

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·Decided December 19, 2011·No. 11-1256-cv·Unpublished·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

*815 SUMMARY ORDER

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court’s jurisdiction over appeals from a district court is limited to “final decisions.” Defendant-Appellant Manganese Trans Atlantic Corporation appeals from a district court order denying its motion to vacate a Rule B maritime attachment as moot, and denying its motion to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The order, without question, is not a “final order” for the purposes of appellate review, because it did not “end[ ] the litigation on the merits and leave[ ] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Wabtec Corp. v. Faiveley Trans. Malmo AB, 525 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not certify its order for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The order is not within the limited class of “[ijnterlocutory decrees ... determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases” under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). See Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Exp. Serv., 767 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam). And this interlocutory appeal does not fall within the narrow “collateral order” doctrine, because the district court’s order is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) (quotation marks omitted). Unlike, for example, claims of sovereign or governmental immunity, which are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because immunity grants a “right not to stand trial,” In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 521 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted), a claim that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant is simply a claimed right on the part of the defendant not to be subject to the judgment of a particular forum. Denial of that claim, therefore, cannot be immediately appealed. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988) (“[T]he denial of a claim of lack of [personal] jurisdiction is not an immediately appealable collateral order.”); see also Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 501, 109 S.Ct. 1976, 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989).

For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

*815 SUMMARY ORDER

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court’s jurisdiction over appeals from a district court is limited to “final decisions.” Defendant-Appellant Manganese Trans Atlantic Corporation appeals from a district court order denying its motion to vacate a Rule B maritime attachment as moot, and denying its motion to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The order, without question, is not a “final order” for the purposes of appellate review, because it did not “end[ ] the litigation on the merits and leave[ ] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Wabtec Corp. v. Faiveley Trans. Malmo AB, 525 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not certify its order for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The order is not within the limited class of “[ijnterlocutory decrees ... determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases” under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). See Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Exp. Serv., 767 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam). And this interlocutory appeal does not fall within the narrow “collateral order” doctrine, because the district court’s order is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) (quotation marks omitted). Unlike, for example, claims of sovereign or governmental immunity, which are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because immunity grants a “right not to stand trial,” In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 521 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted), a claim that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant is simply a claimed right on the part of the defendant not to be subject to the judgment of a particular forum. Denial of that claim, therefore, cannot be immediately appealed. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988) (“[T]he denial of a claim of lack of [personal] jurisdiction is not an immediately appealable collateral order.”); see also Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 501, 109 S.Ct. 1976, 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989).

For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Europa Maritime S.A. v. Manganese Trans Atlantic Corp., 441 F. App'x 814 (2d Cir. 2011).

Pincite

441 F. App'x 814 (Europa Maritime S.A. v. Manganese Trans Atlantic Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

Related