Eurho Joe v. Supreme Court of California

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 21, 2023
• Docket: 22-16224
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EURHO JOE, No. 22-16224

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:22-cv-03155-SVK

v. MEMORANDUM* SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Susan G. Van Keulen, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted August 15, 2023***

Before: TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Eurho Joe appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims arising out of his state court custody

proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Arrington v. Wong, 237

F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Joe’s action because his claims are

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-

78 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars district

courts from exercising jurisdiction over actual or de facto appeals of state court

decisions).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Joe’s action

without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.

Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth

standard of review and explaining that a district court may deny leave to amend if

amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Joe’s application

for entry of default because defendant filed a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 55 (a) (providing for entry of default when a defendant “has failed to plead or

otherwise defend”); Speiser, Krause & Madole P.C. v. Ortiz, 271 F.3d 884, 886

(9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review).

Joe’s request for default judgment, set forth in the reply brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

2 22-16224