Cite as 2026 Ark. 1 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-24-604
Opinion Delivered: January 15, 2026
EUREKA GUN AND PAWN, LLC; AND KEELING GRUBB APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE CARROLL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 08WCV-23-70]
THE CITY OF EUREKA SPRINGS HONORABLE CHARLES SCOTT VIA MAYOR ROBERT D. BERRY, JACKSON, JUDGE IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF EUREKA SPRINGS APPELLEE APPEAL DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice
Appellants, Eureka Gun and Pawn, LLC (“Eureka Gun”), and Keeling Grubb
(collectively, “appellants”), appeal from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s May 16 and
May 31, 2024, orders granting the motion for directed verdict filed by appellee, the City of
Eureka Springs (“City”). On appeal, appellants present five points: (1) the circuit court erred
in deferring to the decision of the Eureka Springs City Council rather than conducting a de
novo review of Eureka Gun’s permit application; and (2) the circuit court did not view the
evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to Eureka Gun as required in
considering a motion for directed verdict; (3) the circuit court erred in determining that
Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-54-1411 (Supp. 2025) did not apply to the commerce
of firearms; (4) the circuit court erred in determining that the City’s ordinance was not void
for vagueness as it was applied to Eureka Gun; and (5) the circuit court erred in denying its constitutional claims based on the City’s directed-verdict motion. We dismiss the appeal for
lack of a final order.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Keeling Grubb is the president and CEO of Eureka Gun. The appeal before us stems
from Grubb’s pursuit of a conditional-use permit (“CUP”) to operate his sporting goods
store, Eureka Gun, as a gun and pawn shop in Eureka Springs, Arkansas. On May 8, 2023,
Grubb submitted a CUP application to the City on behalf of Eureka Gun. On May 23, the
City’s Planning Commission denied the application at a special meeting. Grubb
subsequently appealed the Planning Commission’s decision to the Eureka Springs City
Council. On June 12, the City Council also denied the CUP application.
On July 11, appellants filed a complaint in the Carroll County Circuit Court raising
numerous claims against the City. Count one was an appeal from the City Council’s
administrative decision denying Eureka Gun’s CUP application pursuant to Arkansas Code
Annotated section 14-56-4251. The remaining counts in the complaint included the
following allegations against the City: count two, a violation of the Arkansas Constitution’s
guarantee of due process as a result of the City’s prohibition of arms-proliferation businesses
and pawn shops; count three, a violation of the guarantees of equal protection pursuant to
article 2, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution as a result of the City’s ordinance permitting
the disparate treatment of similarly situated businesses; count four, a violation of the right
1 Relevant here, section 14-56-425 provides that appeals from the final administrative or quasi-judicial municipal-planning decisions by a municipal body in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated sections 14-56-401 et seq. shall be taken to the circuit court. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425(a)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2025).
2 to acquire, protect, and possess property pursuant to article 2, section 2 of the Arkansas
Constitution; count five, a violation of the freedom of association to the extent that the City
denied Eureka Gun’s CUP application in contravention of Grubb’s right to form a
corporation for the purpose of selling guns and pawn in Eureka Springs; count six, a
violation of the right to bear arms; count seven, a violation of the unenumerated rights
guaranteed by article 2, section 29 of the Arkansas Constitution as a result of the City’s
encroachment on Grubb’s right to earn a living and the right to work a trade; and count
eight, a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of speech as a result of the City’s
mandate that Eureka Gun remove its sign representing that it is a gun and pawn shop.2
Further, the complaint alleged that by denying Eureka Gun’s CUP application, the City
had interfered with the exercise of “at least six” of Grubb’s rights in violation of the Arkansas
Civil Rights Act. The complaint also alleged that the City was prohibited from enacting an
ordinance regulating the ownership, transfer, transportation, carrying, or possession of
firearms pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-16-504.3
On January 29, 2024, appellants filed a motion for partial summary judgment “solely
on the issues of whether or not it was illegal [for the City] to grant Keeling Grubb and
Eureka Gun and Pawn a business license but restrain him from buying, selling, and pawning
2 Eureka Gun conducts business under the name “Eureka Gun and Pawn.” 3 Section 14-16-504 states in relevant part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in state or federal law, a local unit of government shall not enact an ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner, the ownership, transfer, transportation, carrying, or possession of . . . firearms.” Ark. Code Ann. § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2025). There is a nearly identical statute that is cited interchangeably in the record. See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-1411(b)(1)(A)(i).
3 firearms.” The motion further explained that “[t]his summary judgment would only partially
satisfy count 1 and the remaining 7 counts would be generally unaffected, except summary
judgement for count VI, the count alleging an interference with the right to bear arms could
also be assumed to be partially granted depending on this Court’s order[,]” and “[t]his
motion is a partial motion for summary judgment as it is only requesting partial relief to
count one and is not requesting a finding of damages.”
On March 12, the circuit court scheduled a bench trial “on count one of [appellants’]
Complaint, which solely concerns the issue of business licensure through a conditional use
permit[.]” The circuit court’s order specified that “[t]he other counts [identified in the
complaint] shall be resolved by another order or set for trial at a later date.”
On May 16, the bench trial was held. At the outset of the trial, counsel for appellants
reiterated that the scope of the bench trial was limited to a de novo review of whether
Eureka Gun was entitled to a CUP pursuant to the City’s ordinance. Counsel further
explained that the trial would involve arguments regarding “the facts as they are applied to
the ordinance” and that the parties were “not really discussing [whether] the decision made
by the Planning Commission or Zoning Commission or The City was illegal or was
somehow wrong[.]” At trial, the circuit court heard testimony from numerous witnesses
regarding matters including the nature of Eureka Gun’s business, the nature of nearby
businesses, opinions of Eureka Springs community members concerning the suitability of a
gun and pawn shop in the City, and the bases for votes cast for and against Eureka Gun’s
CUP application by members of the City’s Planning Commission and the City Council. At
the close of all the evidence, the City moved for a directed verdict, arguing that appellants
4 had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate entitlement to a CUP. After hearing
arguments from both parties, the circuit court denied appellants’ motion for partial summary
judgment and granted the City’s motion for directed verdict.
On May 31, the circuit court entered an order memorializing its rulings from the
May 16 bench trial. In granting the City’s motion for directed verdict, the circuit court
reasoned that, having considered the evidence, testimony, and arguments presented at the
bench trial, Eureka Gun was not entitled to a CUP to operate a gun and pawn shop. The
circuit court further ruled that “[i]n reaching the above stated finding, the Court holds that
Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) does not apply to the commercial sale of
firearms. . . . In addition, the Court denies the [appellants’] Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.”
On June 10, appellants filed an amended complaint that reasserted many of the same
claims as the initial complaint. However, the amended complaint included a new claim
under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act alleging that the City had illegally and arbitrarily denied
appellants’ right to buy, sell, and pawn firearms or otherwise operate a pawn shop, which
amounted to an illegal taking in violation of article 2, section 22 of the Arkansas
Constitution.
This appeal followed.
II. Points on Appeal
As stated above, appellants present five points on appeal. However, as an initial
matter, we must determine whether the orders from which appellants appeal are final or
otherwise appealable.
5 Although neither party raises the issue, whether an order is final and subject to appeal
is a jurisdictional question, which the court will raise sua sponte. Crafton, Tull, Sparks &
Assocs. v. Ruskin Heights, LLC, 2013 Ark. 85, at 2; see also Hotels.com, L.P. v. Pine Bluff
Advert. & Promotion Comm’n, 2021 Ark. 196, at 4, 632 S.W.3d 742, 745. Rule 2(a)(1) of the
Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure –Civil provides that an appeal may be taken only
from a final judgment or decree entered by the circuit court with certain enumerated
exceptions. Ark. R. App. P. –Civ. 2(a)(1). “For an order to be final and appealable, it must
dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights
to the subject matter in controversy. In contrast, an order that contemplates further action
by a party or the court is not a final, appealable order.” Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. v.
Naturalis Health, LLC, 2018 Ark. 224, at 5, 549 S.W.3d 901, 905 (internal citations omitted).
Under Rule 54(b), an order that fails to adjudicate all of the claims as to all of the parties,
whether presented as claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims, is not final
for purposes of appeal. Crafton, supra; see also Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1). Although the purpose
of requiring a final order is to avoid piecemeal litigation, a circuit court may certify an
otherwise nonfinal order for an immediate appeal by executing a certificate pursuant to
Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Gray v. White River Health Sys., Inc., 2016 Ark. 73,
at 3, 483 S.W.3d 293, 294.4
4 Rule 54(b)(1) provides that “[w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim . . . the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination, supported by specific factual findings, that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the event the court so finds, it shall execute [a] certificate, which shall appear immediately
6 Here, the orders from which appellants appeal are not final orders. To start, consistent
with the scope of appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment, the circuit court made
clear in its March 12 scheduling order that the upcoming bench trial would address only
count one of appellants’ complaint with the remaining counts to be resolved at some point
in the future. In keeping with this blueprint, counsel for appellants acknowledged at trial
that the circuit court’s review would be limited to a determination of whether Eureka Gun
was entitled to a CUP pursuant to the City’s ordinance. Counsel clarified that the parties
would not be delving into whether the prior denials of Eureka Gun’s application were
somehow illegal at trial, thereby acknowledging that the intent was to hold appellants’
remaining claims in abeyance. Consequently, the circuit court’s May 16 and May 31 orders
adjudicated fewer than all the claims in appellants’ initial complaint. In their notice of appeal,
appellants contend that
[a]lthough the Court only issued a ruling as to the first count of [appellants’] complaint, [appellants] believe and assert that that denial effectively dismisses the remaining five (5) counts. The remaining five (5) counts hinge upon success of the first count. Those counts are Count 2 violation of Due Process, Count 3 Right to Acquire Property and pursue happiness through lawful occupation, Count 4 Right to Bear Arms, Count 5 Unenumerated Rights violations, and Count 6 Right to be Free from Illegal Takings. If those counts are not resolved, [appellants] have NOT abandoned them.
However, we disagree with appellants’ position that the remaining counts alleged in
the complaint were “effectively dismissed” as a result of the circuit court’s ruling on count
one. The circuit court’s orders granting the City’s motion for directed verdict and denying
appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment constituted a denial of Eureka Gun’s CUP
after the court’s signature on the judgment, and which shall set forth the factual findings upon which the determination to enter the judgment as final is based[.]”
7 application but left the remainder of appellants’ separate claims pending. Moreover,
appellants’ assertion that the claim involving the right to be free from illegal takings was
effectively dismissed is particularly unpersuasive, as this claim was raised for the first time in
the amended complaint—which was filed after the bench trial had already occurred and
after the circuit court’s orders were entered. It is clear from a review of the record that the
bulk of appellants’ claims remain pending before the circuit court awaiting final disposition,
and appellants’ notice of appeal expressly states that those pending claims have not been
abandoned. Finally, there was no attempt to obtain certification in compliance with Rule
54(b)(1). Therefore, without a final order or a Rule 54(b) certificate, we do not have
jurisdiction to address the merits on appeal. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed without prejudice.
WOMACK, WEBB, and BRONNI, JJ., concur.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority that we
lack a final, appealable order and that the appeal must be dismissed. I write separately to
highlight how the case went off track below and to explain why, had the matter proceeded
in its proper posture, Eureka Gun should have prevailed on the merits.
I. Discussion
Administrative appeals and original civil actions are materially different—from how
they are perfected, to the issues properly presented, to how finality works for appellate
jurisdiction and the standards of review utilized to review those decisions. Counsel and the
8 circuit court failed to grapple with those distinctions. And, as the majority explains, that
ended up being fatal to our jurisdiction.
As the majority recounts, Eureka Gun filed in circuit court a single pleading that
operated both as a notice of appeal under Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-56-425 and
as an original civil complaint asserting multiple constitutional and statutory claims.1
Ultimately, the circuit court set a bench trial “solely” on count one—the administrative
appeal of the City’s conditional-use decision—leaving the remaining claims to be resolved
later.2 After trial, Eureka Gun filed an amended complaint adding yet another claim. Just
days after that, it filed a notice of appeal. At no point did the circuit court dispose of all
claims or certify a partial judgment under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). This
was fatal to our jurisdiction. However, two points about what happened in the circuit court
warrant separate comment.
First, Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-56-425 requires these administrative
appeals to be tried de novo.3 When, as here, there is a bench trial, that means the court
hears the evidence anew and independently decides whether the applicant is entitled to the
1 Maj. Opin. at 2–3. 2 Id. at 4. 3 Section 14-56-425 provides that appeals from the final administrative or quasi- judicial municipal-planning decisions by a municipal body in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated sections 14-56-401 et seq. shall be taken to the circuit court. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (Supp. 2025).
9 conditional-use permit (CUP) under the governing ordinance.4 It does not review the
City’s decision for “abuse.” Yet at the close of the evidence, the circuit court expressly
declined to “substitute its views” for those of the Planning Commission and City Council
and announced that it could not find their vote to be an “absolute abuse.” That is deferential
review, not de novo review.5
At the close of evidence, Appellee moved for a directed verdict in an apparent Rule
50 posture. That motion was based on Appellee’s clam that Appellants had not presented
evidence that they were entitled to a CUP. However, Eureka Gun presented substantial
evidence—including from the City’s own planning-commission members and nearby
commercial owners—that its application satisfied the ordinance’s factors and that the
proposed use was compatible with the surrounding district. And, other than testimony from
City officials that they would not approve a CUP for any business to sell firearms anywhere
in the city, there was no real evidence identifying an ordinance factor that weighed against
the CUP. In this apparent Rule 50 posture, that evidence should have been taken in the
light most favorable to Eureka Gun.6 On this record, a reasonable fact-finder certainly could
4 See, e.g., Combs v. City of Springdale, 366 Ark. 31, 33, 233 S.W.3d 130, 132 (2006) (citing the rule that these administrative appeals are “tried de novo according to the same procedure which applies to appeals in civil actions from decisions of inferior courts”). 5 The circuit court said at the May 16 trial, “This Court cannot find that the vote of the Planning and Zoning and the City Council was an absolute abuse, and the Court is going to decline to substitute its views or decision for what has already been decided.” 6 Section 14-56-425 provides that appeals from the final administrative or quasi- judicial municipal-planning decisions by a municipal body in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated sections 14-56-401 et seq. shall be taken to the circuit court. The statute also incorporates the procedures for administrative appeals under the District Court Rules and provides that the decision “shall be tried de novo with the right to a trial by jury.” In
10 have found that Appellants were entitled to a CUP; indeed, the proof strongly pointed that
way. The directed verdict was possible only because the circuit court erroneously gave
deference to the City’s prior decision, which section 14-56-425 does not contemplate.
Second, the circuit court’s error is further underscored by its ruling on a perceived
statutory issue even though the parties framed the bench trial as purely a de novo zoning
appeal. It held that Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-16-504(b)(1)(A)—and the nearly
identical section 14-54-14117—“does not apply to the commercial sale of firearms” because
reading “transfer” to include commercial sales would produce an “absurd result.” 8 Even
assuming that issue was properly before the circuit court, that reading is inconsistent with
other words, the statute gives an aggrieved applicant a de novo judicial determination of the same land-use dispute that was before the municipal body; it does not create a free-standing vehicle to litigate new causes of action. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (Supp. 2025). 7 Section 14-16-504 states in relevant part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in state or federal law, a local unit of government shall not enact an ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner, the ownership, transfer, transportation, carrying, or possession of . . . firearms.” Ark. Code Ann. § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2025). There is a nearly identical statute that is cited interchangeably in the record. See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-1411(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2025). 8 The circuit court said at the May 16 trial, “I’m going to address some things, and then at that – there’s been argument that 14-54-1411 applies that a municipality can’t restrict the transfer -- let me find -- the ownership, transfer, transportation, carrying, possession of firearms or ammunition, the Court has not been asked to address that yet, at least, in this hearing, but the Court’s going to find that this statute does not affect the commerce of firearms; it cannot. Otherwise, the city could not prohibit an arms dealer from setting up in a residential area. There would be no restriction; it would be a carved-out exception for only guns, and that is an absurd result. I – I just -- it does not -- is not applicable in this case.”
11 basic principles of statutory interpretation. Indeed, the circuit court’s perceived “absurdity”
disappears once the zoning authority and firearms preemption statutes are read in harmony.9
“Transfer” is not a technical term, and nothing in section 14-54-1411 suggests a
specialized or more narrow definition. It naturally includes the conveyance of property
from one person to another, whether by gift, sale, consignment, or otherwise. 10 Thus, a
commercial sale of a firearm is a transfer of a firearm. Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-
54-1411 forbids local regulation of such transfers unless state or federal law provides
otherwise. If the General Assembly intended to exclude commercial firearms transactions
from the statute’s scope, or to protect only noncommercial transfers, it knew how to say so.
It did not. The plain text therefore encompasses all transfers of firearms, including those
occurring through licensed dealers. Yet that preemption can coexist with municipal zoning
authority
Section 14-56-416 empowers municipalities to regulate where particular land uses—
such as gun stores—may be located. Section 14-54-1411 regulates what conditions a city
may impose on the ownership, possession, or transfer of firearms. Harmonizing the statutes
gives full effect to each: a city may designate commercial districts for firearms commerce but
9 Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts: Harmonious Reading Canon, 180 (2012) (the harmonious-reading canon requires that the provisions of texts should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory). 10 Conveyance, Wex, Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/conveyance (last visited Dec. 4, 2025) (archived at https://perma.cc/L9SA-YWL8).
12 may not impose substantive burdens or prohibitions that regulate the transfer itself. The
City’s actions here illustrate the point.
Although Eureka Gun satisfied all ordinance factors and occupied the only zone
where firearms commerce was allowed, council members testified that they would not
approve a gun or pawn shop anywhere in the city. A zoning regime that functionally
eliminates all firearm transfers is, in substance, a municipal regulation of those transfers and
thus forbidden absent state authorization. The circuit court blurred the line between zoning
and regulation, invoking hypothetical “absurdities” that vanish once the statutes are read
harmoniously. Nothing in section 14-54-1411 strips municipalities of zoning power; it
simply bars them from regulating firearm transfers themselves.
The circuit court’s interpretation, which relied on the absurdity doctrine to narrow
an unambiguous statute, effectively rewrote section 14-54-1411. Properly interpreted, the
statute applies to commercial firearms transactions no less than to noncommercial transfers,
and it operates alongside—not in opposition to—municipal zoning authority. Because the
City may decide where firearms commerce may occur but may not decide whether it may
occur, the court’s contrary reasoning was legally incorrect.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
WEBB, J., joins.
NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Justice, concurring. I join Justice Womack’s
concurrence. But I write separately to emphasize that—applying that analysis—on remand,
there is nothing for the circuit court to do but grant Eureka Gun and Pawn and Keeling
Grubb’s application for a conditional use permit. As Justice Womack correctly explains,
13 Eureka Gun and Grubb met their burden of showing they are entitled to a conditional use
permit and that Eureka Springs’ decision to the contrary violated Arkansas law. So on
remand, the circuit court should immediately enter a final order granting Eureka Gun’s
application.
W. Whitfield Hyman; and Bradley Hull, for appellant.
Sara Monaghan, for appellee.