Eulando Hayes v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJune 24, 2026
DocketAT-3330-25-0005-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Eulando Hayes v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Eulando Hayes v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eulando Hayes v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

EULANDO HAYES, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-3330-25-0005-I-1

v.

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND DATE: June 24, 2026 SPACE ADMINISTRATION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Eulando Hayes , Marietta, Georgia, pro se.

Griffin Farris , Esquire, and James C. McGlinchy , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant and the agency have each filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied the appellant’s request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the appellant’s petition for review and GRANT the

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

agency’s petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to find that the appellant did not establish that he was a preference eligible, we AFFIRM the initial decision. On review, the agency contends that, contrary to the initial decision, the appellant has not shown that he was a preference eligible. We agree. As relevant here, the definition of a “preference eligible” includes a “disabled veteran.” 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3)(C). A “disabled veteran” is in turn defined as “an individual who has served on active duty in the armed forces, . . . has been separated therefrom under honorable conditions, and has established the present existence of a service-connected disability or is receiving compensation . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 2108(2) (emphasis added). The Office of Personnel Management has promulgated regulations further defining the above terms for purposes of preference in Federal employment. 5 C.F.R. § 211.102(g). That regulation indicates that “[t]he Department of Defense is responsible for administering and defining military discharges.” 5 C.F.R. § 211.102(g); see Golden v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 19, ¶ 6. Here, the appellant’s DD Form 214 Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty shows that he served on active duty from February 18, 2003, to July 10, 2003, and reflects the character of the appellant’s service as “uncharacterized.” Initial Appeal File, Tab 9 at 10. Although an “uncharacterized” discharge is not necessarily one that occurred under other than honorable conditions, and we make no such characterization of the appellant’s service here, a designation of “uncharacterized” does not indicate that the discharge at issue was under honorable conditions for the purpose of veterans’ preference statutes and regulations. See Golden, 2023 MSPB 19, ¶ 7. While we are mindful that the appellant’s documentation from the Department of Veterans Affairs reflects a discharge under honorable conditions, we defer to the 3

determination of the Department of Defense, which, as noted above, is responsible for administering and defining military discharges. 2 Moreover, even if we were to find that the appellant was preference eligible, it is undisputed that he was already employed in the Federal service at the time he applied for the position at issue. Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s finding the appellant is not entitled to relief under VEOA. See Kerner v. Department of the Interior, 778 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The legislative history of the VEOA confirms that Congress did not intend for [5 U.S.C.] § 3304 to apply when a veteran or other preference-eligible applicant is already employed in the [F]ederal civil service.”).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

2 Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(l)(1), the Department of Veterans Affairs classifies “uncharacterized” separations as other than dishonorable when such a separation is an entry level separation. This, however, is for Department of Veterans Affairs purposes only and does not change the service characterization of “uncharacterized” provided by the Department of Defense. According to the Department of Defense, “uncharacterized” is one of several possible service characterizations. See Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations, para. 4.3 (Aug. 1, 2024), available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD /issuances/dodi/133214p.pdf; DoDI No. 1336.01, Certificate of Uniformed Service (DD Form 214/5 Series), Table 1(26) (Feb. 17, 2022), available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/ Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/133601p.pdf. 3 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter. 4

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). If you submit a petition for review to the U.S.

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Related

Kerner v. Department of the Interior
778 F.3d 1336 (Federal Circuit, 2015)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Marnie Golden v. Department of Veterans Affairs
2023 MSPB 19 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)

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Eulando Hayes v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eulando-hayes-v-national-aeronautics-and-space-administration-mspb-2026.