Eugene Leon Price v. San Joaquin County, et al.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided December 1, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-02809·Unknown

Opinion

EUGENE LEON PRICE, Case No. 2:25-cv-2809-JDP (P) Plaintiff, v. ORDER SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, brings an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against attorney Emily Chrim and further alleges that San Joaquin County is responsible for providing him with an ineffective attorney. The allegations fail to state a claim. Plaintiff may, if he chooses, file an amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies noted herein. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, makes the required showing and will be granted. Screening and Pleading Requirements A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). Analysis Plaintiff alleges that his court-appointed criminal defense attorney, defendant Emily Chrim, provided him ineffective counsel. He also claims that San Joaquin County is responsible for appointing him an ineffective attorney. ECF No. 1 at 4-5. A threshold requirement for proceeding with any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is that the defendant must have acted “under color of state law” with respect to the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, plaintiff asserts claims against Chrim, a court-appointed defense attorney. But it is settled law that a court- appointed criminal defense attorney does not act under color of state law. See Miranda v. Clark Cnty., 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)). But more importantly, plaintiff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not properly brought as claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are not generally recognized under § 1983. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody—either the fact of confinement or the duration of confinement—and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Because plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983, this action should be dismissed so plaintiff can seek whatever relief may be available to him through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff’s claim against San Joaquin County fails, too. A municipality can be sued under § 1983 where the challenged action was implemented or executed under a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that has been adopted or promulgated by that body’s officers. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The first question in this analysis is whether a constitutional violation occurred. See Lockett v. Cnty. of L.A., 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that Monell claims are “contingent on a violation of constitutional rights”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Then, a court looks to the legal framework on which plaintiff bases his Monell claim. Monell, 436 U.S. at 708. Importantly, “[p]laintiff must do more than allege in a conclusory fashion that the County maintains an unwritten policy or custom of permitting the types of wrongs Plaintiff experienced.” Segura v. City of La Mesa, 647 F. Supp. 3d 926, 936 (S.D. Cal. 2022). Here, plaintiff fails to state a sufficient Monell claim against the County because plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. I will allow plaintiff a final chance to amend his complaint before recommending that this action be dismissed. Plaintiff should take care to add specific factual allegations against each defendant. If plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint will supersede the current one. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This means that the amended complaint will need to be complete on its face without reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. Cal. L

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Eugene Leon Price v. San Joaquin County, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Polk County v. Dodson
454 U.S. 312 (Supreme Court, 1981)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Nelson v. Campbell
541 U.S. 637 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bartlett v. Strickland
556 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Raymond Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa
49 F.3d 583 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Kobold v. Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center
832 F.3d 1024 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Michael Hayes v. Idaho Correctional Center
849 F.3d 1204 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Sheldon Lockett v. County of Los Angeles
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