Eugene J. Burrell and Alice W. Burrell v. John L. Fahs, United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Florida

232 F.2d 163, 49 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 879, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 5314
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedApril 12, 1956
Docket15807
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 232 F.2d 163 (Eugene J. Burrell and Alice W. Burrell v. John L. Fahs, United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eugene J. Burrell and Alice W. Burrell v. John L. Fahs, United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Florida, 232 F.2d 163, 49 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 879, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 5314 (5th Cir. 1956).

Opinion

JONES, Circuit Judge.

The appellants, husband and wife, who will herein be called the taxpayers, owned and operated a citrus grove and the equipment required in the operation of it. The grove and equipment were sold on July 2, 1945, for $299,000. The sales price exceeded the adjusted cost basis by $129,551, as was shown by a partnership income tax return filed by the taxpayers. They reported this excess of sales price over cost in their Federal income tax returns as capital gain. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue made a determination that $94,006 of the sales price should be allocated to the value of green fruit and treated as ordinary income. Tax deficiencies resulting from this determination were assessed and paid, claims for refund were filed and rejected, and a suit was brought against the then Collector of Internal Revenue for refunds.

In the claims for refund the taxpayers recited the sale, the filing of the partnership and individual tax returns, and the reporting of the profit on the sale as capital gain. In the claims for refund each of the taxpayers then set forth the following:

“Thereafter the Commissioner of Internal Revenue approved the cost basis and sales price of said property, as reported by said partnership in its aforesaid information return, and by taxpayer in his individual return, but he erroneously determined that $94,006.05 of the aforesaid sales price of $299,000.00 represented profit realized from the sale of fruit on the trees in, said grove or groves and that the balance, or $204,993.95, represented the sale price of the aforementioned real and personal property. The Commissioner further determined that said sum of $94,006.05 was ordinary income and that there was a profit of $35,545.-44 from the sale of the aforesaid real and personal property which was taxable as long-term capital gain.
Taxpayer alleges that the property which was sold as aforesaid for the sum of $299,000.00 did not include property of a kind which would properly be includible in the inventory of the taxpayer or said partnership if on hand at the close of the taxable year, and that said sale did not include property held by the taxpayer or said partnership primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of taxpayer’s trade or business or the trade or business of said partnership. Accordingly, taxpayer alleges that his entire gain from said sale was properly reportable as long-term capital gain.”

The defendant Collector filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment. Affidavits were filed. The District Court entered a summary judgment for the Collector and gave its reasons therefor in a memorandum citing Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544, 73 S.Ct. 848, 97 L.Ed. 1232; rehearing denied 345 U.S. 1003, 73 S.Ct. 1128, 97 L.Ed. 1408. In the Watson case the Supreme Court held unmatured citrus fruit on the trees at the time of the sale of a grove was property held primarily for sale to customers in the course of the taxpayers’ trade or business within the meaning of the income tax statutes.

The question presented, as the District Court saw it, and the reasons found by it for its decision are set forth by the District Judge with brevity and clarity in the aforementioned memorandum. From it we quote:

“The basis of the taxpayers’ claim for refund was that the property sold for said sum did not in- *165 elude property of a kind which would properly be includible in the inventory of the taxpayers if on hand at the close of the taxable year, and that the sale did not include property held by the taxpayers primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayers’ trade or business (producing and selling mature citrus fruit). The statement contained in the claim for refund closes: ‘Accordingly, taxpayer alleges that his entire gain from said sale was properly reportable as long-term capital gain.’ The Commissioner determined that $94,006.05 of the sale price of $299,000.00 represented profit realized from sale of fruit on the trees in the grove and that the balance, $204,993.95, represented the sale price of the grove. The Commissioner further determined that the said sum of $94,006.05 was ordinary income. Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544, 73 S.Ct. 848, 97 L.Ed. 1232 determined this question adversely to the taxpayers.
“As I read the claims for refund attached to the complaint, and the complaint, this was the basis, and the sole basis of the taxpayers’ contentions, and the defendant Collector is entitled to summary judgment.
“Now, however, the taxpayers’ counsel urges that there are additional issues of fact raised, viz., the question of whether or not the Commissioner’s finding that $94,006.05 was the sale price of the fruit — that is, whether there was a proper factual allocation within the sum of $299,000.00 of the sale price of the grove on the one hand, and the green fruit on the other hand — is correct. It is my conclusion, after careful study of the complaint and the claims for refund, that this position is simply an afterthought, a straw now clutched at by the taxpayers since their original position is rendered untenable by Watson v. Commissioner, supra. Neither the pleadings nor the claims for refund raise this issue. It follows that the defendant Collector’s motion for summary judgment should be and is granted, and judgment now entered in favor of the defendant.”

Before us the taxpayers contend that the claims for refund and the complaint raised the question as to the correctness of the amount allocated to the value of the green fruit as well as the question of whether a profit realized from the sale of growing citrus fruit was entitled to capital gains treatment; and that Watson v. Commissioner, supra, foreclosed only the last of these two questions. If the claim for refund was adequate to present the first of the questions, and if a claim predicated thereon was set forth in the complaint, there was an issue of fact raised and the granting of a summary judgment was error.

The statute requires:

“No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.” Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 3772, 26 U.S.C. 1952 ed. § 3772.

The pertinent regulation provides:

“Claims by the taxpayer for the refunding of taxes, interest, penalties, and additions to tax erroneously or illegally collected shall be made on Form 843, * * * and should be filed with the collector of internal revenue. A separate claim shall be made for each taxable year or period.
“No refund or credit will be allowed after the expiration of the statutory period of limitation applic

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Bluebook (online)
232 F.2d 163, 49 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 879, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 5314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eugene-j-burrell-and-alice-w-burrell-v-john-l-fahs-united-states-ca5-1956.