Euclid v. R.C.

2026 Ohio 457

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 115182
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Euclid v. R.C., 2026-Ohio-457.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF EUCLID, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115182

v. :

R.C., :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 12, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Euclid Municipal Court Case No. 23 CRB 00522

Appearances:

Mary Riley Casa, City of Euclid Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Catherine Mason, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Berkman, Gordon, Murray & DeVan and William C. Livingston, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant R.C. appeals from the trial court’s denial of his

application to expunge the record of his minor-misdemeanor conviction. Upon review, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On September 20, 2023, appellant was convicted of attempted

disorderly conduct, a minor misdemeanor in violation of Euclid Cod.Ord.

545.04(a)(1) and 501.21. The trial court imposed a fine and costs, which were paid

by appellant the same day.

On August 22, 2024, appellant filed an application to seal and

expunge record pursuant to R.C. 2953.32. A hearing was held October 22, 2024,

whereupon the trial court concluded that appellant was eligible for “sealing” of the

record, but the court questioned whether “expungement” is permitted. The trial

court allowed supplemental briefing on the issue to be filed, and appellant amended

his application to solely request an expungement of his record of conviction.

Following further hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s application in a

judgment entry issued on May 2, 2025.

In the judgment entry, the trial court determined that because

appellant’s application is premised upon R.C. 2953.32, the definition of “expunge”

under R.C. 2953.31(B)(1) applies, which the trial court found “means the

expungement process described [in R.C. 2953.32] and does not permit the physical

destruction of records.” The trial court further found that a conflict exists and

because expungement is not a substantive right, “the Ohio Rules of Superintendence

provisions mandating the retention of records prevail over the Ohio Revised Code

Provisions permitting expungement”; and “[t]herefore, the records at issue in this matter may not be expunged in violation of the Ohio Rules of Superintendence.”

Finally, the trial court found an expungement of appellant’s record would be against

public policy, referencing the public’s interest in the right of access to the record of

proceedings.

Appellant timely appealed. Under his sole assignment of error,

appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to expunge the record of

his minor-misdemeanor conviction.

We apply a de novo review to issues involving statutory interpretation

of the relevant statutes. See State v. VanWey, 2023-Ohio-3116, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.). The

Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “the statutory law in effect at the time of the

filing of an R.C. 2953.32 application to seal a record of conviction is controlling.”

State v. Lasalle, 2002-Ohio-4009, ¶ 19. As such, the version of R.C. 2953.32 that

was effective from October 3, 2023, to March 19, 2025 (“former R.C. 2953.32”) is

applicable in this matter.

R.C. 2953.32 governs the “sealing or expungement” of a record of

conviction in Ohio. As provided under former R.C. 2953.32(B)(1), “an eligible

offender may apply to the sentencing court if convicted in this state . . . for the

sealing or expungement of the record of the case that pertains to the convictions,

except for convictions listed in division (A)(1) of this section.” (Emphasis added.)

Upon the filing of a proper application at the time specified under former R.C.

2953.32(B), the trial court must hold a hearing in compliance with former R.C.

2953.32(C) and make the requisite determinations and considerations under former R.C. 2953.32(D)(1). Pursuant to former R.C. 2953.32(D)(2), if the trial court makes

certain determinations after complying with former R.C. 2953.32(D)(1), then the

trial court, with limited exception, “shall order all official records of the case that

pertain to the conviction . . . expunged . . . and . . . all index references to the case

that pertain to the conviction . . . deleted[,]” and “[t]he proceedings in the case that

pertain to the conviction . . . shall be considered not to have occurred and the

conviction . . . shall be . . . expunged[.]” Former R.C. 2953.32(D)(2)(a) and (b).

The term “expunge” is defined under R.C. 2953.31(B)(1) to mean “the

expungement process described in [R.C. 2953.32], including the authority

described in division (D)(5) of that section.” (Emphasis added.) Former R.C.

2953.32(D)(5) provides as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of the Revised Code to the contrary, when the bureau of criminal identification and investigation receives notice from a court that the record of a conviction or bail forfeiture has been expunged under this section, the bureau of criminal identification and investigation shall maintain a record of the expunged conviction record for the limited purpose of determining an individual’s qualification or disqualification for employment in law enforcement. The bureau of criminal identification and investigation shall not be compelled by the court to destroy, delete, or erase those records so that the records are permanently irretrievable. These records may only be disclosed or provided to law enforcement for the limited purpose of determining an individual’s qualification or disqualification for employment in law enforcement.

When any other entity other than the bureau of criminal identification and investigation receives notice from a court that the record of a conviction or bail forfeiture has been expunged under this section, the entity shall destroy, delete, and erase the record as appropriate for the record’s physical or electronic form or characteristic so that the record is permanently irretrievable.

(Emphasis added.) The plain and unambiguous language of former R.C. 2953.32 shows

that the expungement process described therein results in the deletion of all official

records of the case and requires the entities receiving notice, other than the bureau

of criminal investigation, to “destroy, delete, and erase the record[s]” so that the

records are “permanently irretrievable.” As recently explained by the First District

Court of Appeals in State v. N.S., 2025-Ohio-5166, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.):

Expungement and record sealing are both governed by R.C. 2953.32 but provide different forms of relief. Expungement “results in deletion, making all case records ‘permanently irretrievable.’” [State v. R.S., 2022-Ohio-1108, ¶ 9], quoting State v. Aguirre, 144 Ohio St.3d 179, [181, fn. 2.] There is an exception to this permanent irretrievability; if the court grants expungement, the bureau of criminal investigation is the only entity entitled to maintain a record “for the limited purpose of determining an individual’s qualification or disqualification for employment in law enforcement.” R.C. 2953.32(D)(5). Sealing records, in contrast, “simply provides a shield from the public’s gaze [and limits] inspection of sealed records of conviction to certain persons for certain purposes.” R.S. at ¶ 9; see R.C. 2953.32(D).

In this case, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that R.C.

2953.32 does not permit the physical destruction of records was contrary to the plain

and unambiguous language of R.C. 2953.32. The trial court failed to apply the

statute as written.

Further, the trial court erred in determining that the Ohio Rules of

Superintendence provisions relating to the retention of records prevail over the

statutory provision. As this court has previously recognized, the “rules of

superintendence are merely guidelines and do not have the force and effect of

statutory law.” M.K. v. R.K., 2023-Ohio-3475, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting O’Malley v. O’Malley, 2013-Ohio-5238, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.); see also State v. Ventura, 2016-Ohio-

5151, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.). Indeed, as argued by appellant, the Ohio Rules of

Superintendence, which are promulgated under the authority of Section 5(A)(1),

Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, do not have the same force or effect as the rules

of practice and procedure, which are promulgated under Section 5(B), Article IV of

the Ohio Constitution. See State v. Smith, 47 Ohio App.2d 317, 328 (8th Dist. 1976).

Thus, though the sealing or expungement of a record of conviction is a privilege, not

a right, a trial court has the authority to grant an expungement when an applicant

meets all the requirements for eligibility set forth in R.C. 2953.32 and the court

makes the requisite determinations.

We also find the trial court erred in finding that an expungement of

appellant’s record is per se against public policy. Pursuant to former R.C.

2953.32(D)(1)(f), the trial court was required to “[w]eigh the interests of the

applicant in having the records pertaining to the applicant’s conviction . . . expunged

against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain those records[.]”

As the Supreme Court of Ohio has expressed, “[I]t is the role of the legislature to

address the statutory scheme on sealing records,” and “[a] court may not deviate

from the requirements of a statute simply because it would prefer that the statute

had been written differently.” (Cleaned up.) State v. G.K., 2022-Ohio-2858, ¶ 27.

Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying

appellant’s application to expunge the record of his minor-misdemeanor conviction.

We are not persuaded by the city’s arguments otherwise. If we followed the misguided logic of the city and the trial court, no expungement would be valid until

the records retention time had lapsed under the Ohio Rules of Superintendence.

That clearly was not the legislative intent under R.C. 2953.32, which is controlling.

The first assignment of error is sustained. Since the trial court’s

determination was based on an improper interpretation of the statute, we remand

the matter to the trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with this

opinion and to engage in the required analysis under R.C. 2953.32.

Judgment vacated, and case remanded.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

municipal court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)