[Cite as Euclid v. Hunter, 2025-Ohio-4466.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF EUCLID, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114662 v. :
ZION HUNTER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 25, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Euclid Municipal Court Case No. 24CRB01005
Appearances:
Mary Riley Casa, Euclid Prosecuting Attorney and Ashley M. Garrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Thomas T. Lampman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
Defendant-appellant Zion Hunter (“Hunter”) appeals his guilty plea
and sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The charges in this case stem from a video posted to social media that
was first viewed by the Seminole County Sheriff’s Crime Analyst in Florida on
September 18, 2024. In the video, Hunter is seen pointing a replica firearm at two
parked Euclid Police Department vehicles while driving past them. The video was
sent to Euclid police on the same day by the Seminole County Sheriff’s Department.
Euclid officers identified Hunter as the man in the video and arrested him later that
day.
Hunter was charged in the Euclid Municipal Court with one count of
inducing panic, in violation of R.C. 2917.31, a first-degree misdemeanor, and one
count of possessing a replica firearm, in violation of Euclid Cod.Ord. (“ECO”) 571.15,
also a first-degree misdemeanor.
On November 18, 2024, pursuant to a plea bargain, Hunter pled
guilty to one count of possession of a replica firearm and the inducing panic charge
was nolled. On that same day, Hunter was sentenced to 180 days in jail, which the
court suspended; a $150 fine; 80 hours of community service; mandatory
participation in a community orientation program and one year of community
control.
Hunter timely appeals, raising two assignments of error for our
review:
Assignment Of Error I: Hunter was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the plea stage because his trial counsel was demonstrably unaware of basic facts and weaknesses in the city’s case. Assignment Of Error II: Hunter’s sentence is unlawful because the trial court sentenced him because of the content of first amendment- protected expression instead of mandatory sentencing factors.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Assignment of Error I
Hunter alleges that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel
because his counsel was unaware of basic facts and weaknesses in the City of Euclid’s
(“City”) case against him. We disagree.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) a defendant must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation and (2) that they were prejudiced by that performance.
State v. Collier, 2020-Ohio-3033, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Hill, 2018-Ohio-
4327, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688
(1984).
For the second prong of this test, prejudice is established when the
defendant demonstrates “‘a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’” Collier at ¶ 18, quoting Strickland at 694.
“A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
alleged deficiencies.” State v. Marriott, 2021-Ohio-2845, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). “In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with a
guilty plea, an appellant must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.” State v. Harris, 2014-Ohio-925, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing State v.
Wright, 2013-Ohio-936, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
Here, Hunter claims that his defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance because his counsel was unaware of the facts of this case, which led his
counsel to recommend a plea bargain and to overstate the case against him. Hunter
argues that his defense counsel, by being unaware of the weaknesses in the City’s
case, created a more than reasonable probability that a competent attorney would
have counseled Hunter differently.
To support his claim that his defense counsel was ineffective, Hunter
alleges that his trial counsel was unaware of the basic facts of the case because he
failed to explain to the judge that the incident centered around a video Hunter made
and stated instead that Euclid police officers saw Hunter brandish the replica
firearm. Hunter also alleges his counsel was ineffective because he stated that
Hunter was a YouTube content creator rather than a video game developer.
Upon review of the transcript, we find that Hunter’s trial counsel was
adequately aware that the case centered around a video Hunter made in which he
brandished a replica firearm and aimed it at Euclid Police Department vehicles.
Counsel stated that, at the time of the incident in question, Hunter was creating a
YouTube video with his replica firearm to share with his YouTube followers. Hunter also stated at the hearing that he “was showing off the airsoft gun to [his] YouTube
channel.”
The fact that trial counsel called Hunter a content creator as opposed
to a game developer is inconsequential and does not change any of the operative
facts related to the crime. Counsel was aware of the basic facts of the case.
Hunter further alleges that his trial counsel did not understand that
there were no contemporaneous witnesses to, or victims of, the charged conduct,
which led him to recommend a plea instead of trying the case. On review, there is
nothing in the record to substantiate Hunter’s claim. Hunter puts forth no evidence
that he would have been offered a better plea bargain, that he would have made a
different plea bargain or that he would have tried the case had his trial counsel
known there were no contemporaneous witnesses or victims. There is nothing in
the record to show that his defense counsel was unaware that there were no
witnesses or victims.
We find that Hunter has not established that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for his trial counsel’s above-described “errors,” Hunter would
have not pled guilty. Harris, 2014-Ohio-925, at ¶ 29. Upon our review of the record,
we find that trial counsel provided adequate representation during the proceedings.
Based on the foregoing, we overrule Hunter’s first assignment of error.
Assignment of Error II
In Hunter’s second assignment of error, he alleges that his sentence
is unlawful because the trial court’s sentencing considerations were contrary to law and prejudicial. Specifically, Hunter argues the trial court impermissibly considered
the violent nature of the video game he created when sentencing him in violation of
his First Amendment rights. We disagree.
Hunter properly states that he did not object to the trial court’s
sentencing below and, because he did not raise the issue at sentencing, he has
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as Euclid v. Hunter, 2025-Ohio-4466.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF EUCLID, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114662 v. :
ZION HUNTER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 25, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Euclid Municipal Court Case No. 24CRB01005
Appearances:
Mary Riley Casa, Euclid Prosecuting Attorney and Ashley M. Garrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Thomas T. Lampman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
Defendant-appellant Zion Hunter (“Hunter”) appeals his guilty plea
and sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The charges in this case stem from a video posted to social media that
was first viewed by the Seminole County Sheriff’s Crime Analyst in Florida on
September 18, 2024. In the video, Hunter is seen pointing a replica firearm at two
parked Euclid Police Department vehicles while driving past them. The video was
sent to Euclid police on the same day by the Seminole County Sheriff’s Department.
Euclid officers identified Hunter as the man in the video and arrested him later that
day.
Hunter was charged in the Euclid Municipal Court with one count of
inducing panic, in violation of R.C. 2917.31, a first-degree misdemeanor, and one
count of possessing a replica firearm, in violation of Euclid Cod.Ord. (“ECO”) 571.15,
also a first-degree misdemeanor.
On November 18, 2024, pursuant to a plea bargain, Hunter pled
guilty to one count of possession of a replica firearm and the inducing panic charge
was nolled. On that same day, Hunter was sentenced to 180 days in jail, which the
court suspended; a $150 fine; 80 hours of community service; mandatory
participation in a community orientation program and one year of community
control.
Hunter timely appeals, raising two assignments of error for our
review:
Assignment Of Error I: Hunter was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the plea stage because his trial counsel was demonstrably unaware of basic facts and weaknesses in the city’s case. Assignment Of Error II: Hunter’s sentence is unlawful because the trial court sentenced him because of the content of first amendment- protected expression instead of mandatory sentencing factors.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Assignment of Error I
Hunter alleges that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel
because his counsel was unaware of basic facts and weaknesses in the City of Euclid’s
(“City”) case against him. We disagree.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) a defendant must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation and (2) that they were prejudiced by that performance.
State v. Collier, 2020-Ohio-3033, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Hill, 2018-Ohio-
4327, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688
(1984).
For the second prong of this test, prejudice is established when the
defendant demonstrates “‘a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’” Collier at ¶ 18, quoting Strickland at 694.
“A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
alleged deficiencies.” State v. Marriott, 2021-Ohio-2845, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). “In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with a
guilty plea, an appellant must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.” State v. Harris, 2014-Ohio-925, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing State v.
Wright, 2013-Ohio-936, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
Here, Hunter claims that his defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance because his counsel was unaware of the facts of this case, which led his
counsel to recommend a plea bargain and to overstate the case against him. Hunter
argues that his defense counsel, by being unaware of the weaknesses in the City’s
case, created a more than reasonable probability that a competent attorney would
have counseled Hunter differently.
To support his claim that his defense counsel was ineffective, Hunter
alleges that his trial counsel was unaware of the basic facts of the case because he
failed to explain to the judge that the incident centered around a video Hunter made
and stated instead that Euclid police officers saw Hunter brandish the replica
firearm. Hunter also alleges his counsel was ineffective because he stated that
Hunter was a YouTube content creator rather than a video game developer.
Upon review of the transcript, we find that Hunter’s trial counsel was
adequately aware that the case centered around a video Hunter made in which he
brandished a replica firearm and aimed it at Euclid Police Department vehicles.
Counsel stated that, at the time of the incident in question, Hunter was creating a
YouTube video with his replica firearm to share with his YouTube followers. Hunter also stated at the hearing that he “was showing off the airsoft gun to [his] YouTube
channel.”
The fact that trial counsel called Hunter a content creator as opposed
to a game developer is inconsequential and does not change any of the operative
facts related to the crime. Counsel was aware of the basic facts of the case.
Hunter further alleges that his trial counsel did not understand that
there were no contemporaneous witnesses to, or victims of, the charged conduct,
which led him to recommend a plea instead of trying the case. On review, there is
nothing in the record to substantiate Hunter’s claim. Hunter puts forth no evidence
that he would have been offered a better plea bargain, that he would have made a
different plea bargain or that he would have tried the case had his trial counsel
known there were no contemporaneous witnesses or victims. There is nothing in
the record to show that his defense counsel was unaware that there were no
witnesses or victims.
We find that Hunter has not established that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for his trial counsel’s above-described “errors,” Hunter would
have not pled guilty. Harris, 2014-Ohio-925, at ¶ 29. Upon our review of the record,
we find that trial counsel provided adequate representation during the proceedings.
Based on the foregoing, we overrule Hunter’s first assignment of error.
Assignment of Error II
In Hunter’s second assignment of error, he alleges that his sentence
is unlawful because the trial court’s sentencing considerations were contrary to law and prejudicial. Specifically, Hunter argues the trial court impermissibly considered
the violent nature of the video game he created when sentencing him in violation of
his First Amendment rights. We disagree.
Hunter properly states that he did not object to the trial court’s
sentencing below and, because he did not raise the issue at sentencing, he has
waived all but plain error on appeal. State v. Miller, 2015-Ohio-3880, ¶ 6 (8th
Dist.); see also State v. Friscone, 2019-Ohio-1781, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.) (“It is well-settled
that failure to object waives all but plain error on appeal.”); citing State v. St. Martin,
2012-Ohio-1633, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).
Under Crim.R. 52(B), the appellate court has the power to recognize plain errors or defects involving substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. However, this rule may be invoked only in rare cases. Thus, an alleged error does not constitute a plain error or defect under Crim.R. 52(B) unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.
Miller at ¶ 6, citing State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 41 (1994). An error rises to
the level of plain error only if, but for the error, the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different. State v. Eisermann, 2015-Ohio-591, ¶ 71 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Becker, 2014-Ohio-4565 (8th Dist.).
The sentencing in this case is governed by ECO 599.02 and 599.03.
These ordinances mirror the requirements contained in R.C. 2929.21 and 2929.22
providing that a sentencing court must consider certain factors in misdemeanor
sentencing. Under both frameworks, sentencing courts “shall be guided by the
overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing”— protecting the public and punishing the offender — and must consider “all of” the specific statutory factors.
R.C. 2929.21(A), 2929.22(B)(1); ECO 599.02(a)(1), 599.03(b)(1).
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.22, the trial court must consider several
aggravating factors, including such things as the risk that the offender would commit
another offense, the need to protect the public and the nature and circumstances
surrounding the offense.
“[T]he court is not required to iterate exactly which factors warranted
appellant’s sentence. So long as the sentence is within the statutory range and,
absent a showing to the contrary, we must presume the trial court considered the
statutory factors.” State v. Moore, 2011-Ohio-454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.); citing State v.
Hughley, 2009-Ohio-5824, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); State v. Hunter, 2006-Ohio-6440, ¶ 1
(8th Dist.). As long as a sentence is within the statutory guidelines, the trial court is
“presumed to” have considered these statutory factors even if the record is silent.
Lakewood v. Dobra, 2018-Ohio-960, ¶ 9-10 (8th Dist.), citing Maple Hts. v.
Sweeney, 2005-Ohio-2820, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).
Upon review, we find that Hunter pled guilty to a first-degree
misdemeanor, which permitted the trial court to impose: a jail term of not more
than 180 days; community control, not to exceed five years; a term of community
service of up to 500 hours or a fine, not more than $1,000 dollars. R.C. 2929.24;
2929.25; 2929.27. After Hunter pled guilty, the trial court discussed on the record
its concerns for the public regarding the violent nature of Hunter’s video game,
which is meant for children to play. Despite Hunter’s contention that the trial court allegedly improperly
considered the nature of Hunter’s video game when sentencing Hunter, the record
reflects that the trial court sentenced Hunter to 180 days in jail, suspended upon his
completion of 80 hours of community service, with one year of community-control
sanctions and a $150 fine. This sentence is within the statutory range and there is
no showing to the contrary, so we must presume the trial court considered the
appropriate statutory factors when sentencing. Moore at ¶ 15. The trial court’s
sentence is not contrary to law.
We do not find that there was any error in the trial court’s sentence.
Hunter’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Euclid
Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions
having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________ EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR