Etter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

2008 WI App 168, 761 N.W.2d 26, 314 Wis. 2d 678, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 802
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 15, 2008
Docket2008AP113
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2008 WI App 168 (Etter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Etter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 2008 WI App 168, 761 N.W.2d 26, 314 Wis. 2d 678, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 802 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

PETERSON, J.

¶ 1. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company appeal a summary judgment against them totaling $483,064.17. State Farm argues the circuit court erred by holding that Robert and Antoinette Etters' (collectively, with the Estate of Robert Etter, "the Etters") personal liability umbrella policy provided uninsured motorist coverage. We agree and reverse the judgment.

*681 BACKGROUND

¶ 2. Robert Etter was a police officer for the Village of Hobart. While on duty on July 22, 2002, he was in a parked squad car with another officer when Tyson Kreuscher drove his truck directly into the squad car, killing both officers. Kreuscher was subsequently convicted of two counts of intentional homicide. In January 2003, Kreuscher's insurer, American Standard Insurance, commenced a declaratory judgment action. It sought a judgment declaring there was no coverage under Kreuscher's automobile liability policy due to an intentional act exclusion. The circuit court agreed with American Standard and granted the judgment declaring the policy provided no coverage. Kreuscher thus became an uninsured motorist.

¶ 3. At the time of the collision, the Etters had automobile liability policies as well as a $1,000,000 personal liability umbrella policy with State Farm. 1 After the court declared Kreuscher was an uninsured motorist, the Etters cross-claimed for declaratory judgment against State Farm.

¶ 4. As relevant to this appeal, the Etters sought uninsured motorist (UM) coverage under their umbrella policy. State Farm moved for summary judgment, claiming that the unambiguous language of the umbrella policy did not provide UM coverage. The Etters argued the policy was ambiguous. The umbrella policy required them to maintain automobile liability insurance, which in Wisconsin must also include UM cover *682 age. They argued a reasonable insured would conclude that when an umbrella policy requires the underlying policy to include UM coverage it is because the umbrella policy also provides this coverage.

¶ 5. The circuit court agreed the policy was ambiguous. 2 The court construed the policy against State Farm and held that the Etters were entitled to a declaration that the umbrella policy provided UM coverage up to the policy limit.

¶ 6. The Etters and State Farm stipulated that the Etters were legally entitled to collect $800,000 from Kreuscher. The Etters then moved for summary judgment. The court reaffirmed its earlier decision that the Etters were entitled to UM coverage under the State Farm umbrella policy. 3 It granted summary judgment against State Farm for the amount of the stipulated damages less the total amount the Etters had already received from other sources. 4

*683 DISCUSSION

¶ 7. This appeal raises two issues: (1) whether the umbrella policy is ambiguous; and (2) whether Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) 5 requires personal liability umbrella policies to include UM coverage. We review grants of summary judgment independently, using the same methodology as the circuit court. Liebovich v. Minnesota Ins. Co., 2008 WI 75, ¶ 14, 310 Wis. 2d 751, 751 N.W.2d 764. Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).

I. Whether the policy is ambiguous.

¶ 8. Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law that we review independently. Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶ 12, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 750 N.W.2d 817. We will not rewrite the policy if its language is unambiguous. When determining whether it is ambiguous, we will accord the policy "its plain and ordinary meaning to avoid imposing contract obligations the parties did not undertake." Frost v. Whitbeck, 2002 WI 129, ¶ 17, 257 Wis. 2d 80, 654 N.W.2d 225.

¶ 9. The Etters argue the umbrella policy is ambiguous for two reasons. First, they contend the definition of automobile liability in the policy could reasonably be interpreted to include UM coverage. The declarations page lists automobile liability as a required underlying policy. The endorsement that defines automobile liability contains the following direction: "The *684 policy must include [UM] Coverage if this coverage is shown on the Declarations." The Etters interpret the sentence to mean the policy must include UM coverage if automobile liability is shown on the declarations page as a required underlying coverage. Similarly, they assert that State Farm, in effect, mandated UM coverage because it required they maintain an underlying policy that had to include UM coverage by law. Accordingly, they contend that a reasonable insured would believe that State Farm had required UM coverage in the underlying policy and that such coverage was therefore also included in the umbrella policy.

¶ 10. Second, the Etters contend that an exception to one of the policy's exclusions creates additional ambiguity. Exclusion 10 precludes coverage for personal injury to the insured. The amendatory endorsement clarifies that this exclusion does not apply to the insured "when covered under the 'Required Underlying Insurance Policies....'" Because UM coverage is included in the required underlying policy, the Etters contend an insured could reasonably conclude this endorsement affirms the existence of UM coverage under the umbrella policy.

¶ 11. State Farm responds that the umbrella policy unambiguously promises only liability coverage. The umbrella policy lists only one type of coverage— personal liability. 6 Even if it was not clear from the list of coverages that UM was not included, State Farm argues all doubt should have been erased by the Etters' *685 explicit refusal of this coverage. The Etters' application included a section entitled "Rejection of Uninsured/ Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage," which stated:

In keeping with the laws of my state, I have been offered the opportunity to purchase Uninsured/Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage, and I hereby reject the opportunity to purchase this option as part of this application.

Antoinette Etter placed an "x" in the box next to the statement "I reject Uninsured/Underinsured Motor Vehicle coverage on all vehicles[,]" and signed her name.

¶ 12. State Farm further argues that the policy's amendatory endorsement is irrelevant to the claim that the policy provided UM coverage. An exception to an exclusion, State Farm asserts, "does not...

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Insurance
2012 WI 75 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2012)
Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Insurance
2011 WI App 47 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2008 WI App 168, 761 N.W.2d 26, 314 Wis. 2d 678, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 802, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/etter-v-state-farm-mutual-automobile-insurance-wisctapp-2008.