Etifwork Badada v. U.S. Attorney General

574 F. App'x 888
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedAugust 8, 2014
Docket13-13749
StatusUnpublished

This text of 574 F. App'x 888 (Etifwork Badada v. U.S. Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Etifwork Badada v. U.S. Attorney General, 574 F. App'x 888 (11th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Etifwork Badada, an Ethiopian national, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order affirming the Immi *889 gration Judge’s denial of her application for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). 1 Badada challenges the BIA’s and Id’s determination that she failed to establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, as required to establish eligibility for asylum.

I.

Badada entered the United States in May 2006 without being admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. To prevent her deportation, she applied for asylum based on her political opinion and membership in a particular social group. She claimed that she had been imprisoned and interrogated by Ethiopia’s ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, because of her support for the Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUD), an opposition party.

In May 2008 an IJ denied Badada’s application for asylum, finding that she was not credible because her testimony was vague, inconsistent, and implausible in certain respects. The IJ also found that Ba-dada had not provided enough evidence to corroborate her story. Badada appealed, and a divided panel of the BIA dismissed that appeal. It determined that Badada could not carry her burden of proof regardless of whether she was found to be credible. The dissenting member of the panel insisted that the BIA should not have reached a conclusion about Badada’s ability to meet her burden of proof if she were credible; such a determination had to be made by the IJ in the first instance.

Badada petitioned this Court for review of the BIA’s decision. Before we could hear the appeal, the government filed an unopposed motion to remand her case to the BIA so that it could reconsider its decision. The government asked that the IJ be allowed to decide in the first instance whether Badada, if credible, had carried her burden of proof. We granted that motion. See Docket No. 09-15951 (Apr. 21, 2010).

In December 2011 another IJ considered Badada’s application for asylum. The IJ conducted a full merits hearing during which Badada testified and the parties were allowed to submit additional documentary evidence. At the end of the hearing, the IJ denied Badada’s application. The IJ found that Badada, even if credible, had not proven that she suffered past persecution or that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ noted that: “[Badada’s] testimony, taken as true, establishes that she was arrested and detained once for about two and a half months. During the detention, she was questioned on two occasions. The more serious questioning occurred about three weeks in. She said that she was hit by soldiers with rubber batons on her legs and back. She was struck four or five times. They also pushed her roughly.” The IJ nonetheless concluded that the harm Badada suffered “does not rise to the level of persecution.” The IJ explained: “[Badada] was not harmed in such a way that would lead the Court to find that the one period of detention during which she was beaten four or five times on her legs and back and pushed roughly constitutes persecution. There’s no indication that [Badada] needed to be hospitalized after the incident. She remained in detention several more weeks, and there’s no indication that the harm that she suffered was so severe so as to *890 rise to the level of persecution.” The IJ further found that Badada had not presented enough evidence to show that she had an objective basis to fear future persecution. Although the IJ expressed doubts about Badada’s credibility, he did not make an adverse credibility finding.

The BIA dismissed Badada’s appeal. Assuming her credibility, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Badada’s “account of being detained and mistreated by the authorities did not rise to the level of persecution.” It also agreed with the IJ’s determination that Badada could not show that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution.

II.

“We review only the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision.” Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 745 F.3d 1140, 1153 (11th Cir.2014) (brackets and quotation marks omitted). We review factual determinations under the substantial evidence test, “viewing] the record evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and drawing] all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (11th Cir.2004). We must affirm the decision if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. Id. at 1027. To reverse the IJ’s and BIA’s factfindings, we must find that the record not only supports reversal, but compels it. Id. When the BIA assumes an alien’s credibility, so must we. Shi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 707 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir.2013)

To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground, including political opinion. See Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir.2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b). A showing of past persecution gives rise to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, which can be rebutted if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the conditions in the alien’s country have changed or (2) the alien can avoid future persecution by relocating within the country if, “under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the [alien] to do so.” De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1012 (11th Cir.2008); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Absent past persecution, an alien can qualify for asylum by proving that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution, which requires that she show that her fear is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1257; 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2).

At issue here is whether the record compels the conclusion that Badada suffered past persecution or that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. What is not at issue is whether Badada’s claimed persecution is based on a protected ground. The parties agree that it is — her political opinion. 2 Nor is Badada’s credibility at issue. Because the BIA assumed her credibility, so must we. Shi, 707 F.3d at 1234.

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Jaime Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney General
440 F.3d 1247 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Ramon Antonio Delgado v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
487 F.3d 855 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Jiaren Shi v. U.S. Attorney General
707 F.3d 1231 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
De Santamaria v. U.S. Attorney General
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745 F.3d 1140 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
574 F. App'x 888, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/etifwork-badada-v-us-attorney-general-ca11-2014.