Ethel Enoch v. Esther Jean

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: December 24, 2024
• Docket: A-1764-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1764-23

ETHEL ENOCH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ESTHER JEAN,

Defendant-Respondent. __________________________

Submitted December 10, 2024 – Decided December 24, 2024

Before Judges Perez Friscia and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-0735-21.

Rinaldo and Rinaldo Associates, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Matthew T. Rinaldo, of counsel and on the briefs).

McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP, attorneys for respondent (H. George Avery, of counsel and on the brief; Erica E. Bross, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Plaintiff Ethel Enoch appeals from the January 8, 2024 Law Division

order granting defendant Esther Jean summary judgment and dismissing Enoch's

complaint with prejudice. After reviewing the record in light of the parties'

arguments and governing legal principles, we reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

I.

We view the following facts established in the summary judgment record

in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party. See Crisitello v.

St. Theresa Sch., 255 N.J. 200, 218 (2023). On November 4, 2019, Enoch was

in an automobile accident while driving in East Orange. Enoch alleged she

sustained severe and permanent injuries because Jean negligently drove into her

vehicle. On March 1, 2021, Enoch filed an automobile negligence complaint

against Jean in Union County. Enoch's complaint included a Rule 4:5-1

certification, asserting that "[n]o other action . . . [wa]s contemplated." On July

28, Jean filed an answer denying negligence. Jean's answer also included a Rule

4:5-1 certification, asserting that "the matter in controversy [wa]s not the subject

of any other pending action in any other court."

On August 18, Jean, a resident of Pennsylvania, filed an automobile

negligence complaint in federal district court, alleging Enoch had negligently

A-1764-23 2 caused the accident. Jean maintained she suffered severe and permanent

injuries. Jean's civil complaint cover sheet failed to include, in the section

regarding related cases, that Enoch had a pending state action. Jean also did not

reference the pending state action in her complaint. On February 11, 2022,

Enoch filed an answer denying negligence. Enoch's answer also failed to

disclose the pending state action.

In September 2023, Jean moved to intervene in the Union County action,

which she withdrew shortly after filing. Contemporaneously, Jean settled her

federal lawsuit with Enoch's insurance carrier, Palisades Insurance Company,

for $15,000. On October 12, Jean signed a release, which provided that "th[e]

settlement [wa]s a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and that the

payment [wa]s not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the

persons, firms and corporations hereby released by whom liability [wa]s

expressly denied." Enoch did not sign the release. Thereafter, the federal court

administratively dismissed Jean's complaint. On November 11, the federal court

entered a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.

Subsequently, Jean moved for summary judgment to dismiss Enoch's

complaint. On January 8, 2024, after argument, the trial court issued an order

accompanied by a written statement of reasons granting Jean's motion for

A-1764-23 3 summary judgment. The court found, "Enoch turned into the path of . . . Jean."

It determined Enoch's settlement resulted in a payment to Jean in the federal

court action, which "was an acknowledgement that . . . Enoch was responsible

and legally liable." The court concluded Enoch's state action was "identical" to

the federal action and that res judicata barred the state action because "the

second action [wa]s merely a repetition of the first." The court also found

dismissal of Enoch's claims was warranted under the entire controversy doctrine.

Finally, it found judicial estoppel barred the state action because Enoch

"assert[ed] a contradictory position as compared with the [d]istrict [c]ourt case."

The court reasoned Enoch "chose to admit liability" in the federal action and

"that [wa]s a final judgment on the merits preventing litigation."

On appeal, Enoch contends reversal is warranted because the court

erroneously granted Jean summary judgment pursuant to: res judicata; the entire

controversy doctrine; and judicial estoppel.

II.

Our review of a trial court's summary judgment decision is de novo.

DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 180 (2024). "The

court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios v. Meda

A-1764-23 4 Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). We "accord no 'special deference' to the 'trial

court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow

from established facts.'" Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Plan. Bd.,

234 N.J. 403, 415-16 (2018) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.

of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

III.

We first address Enoch's contentions that the court erred in granting

summary judgment and dismissing her complaint under the entire controversy

doctrine because: she had filed the first action; made no admission of negligence

in Jean's subsequent federal action; never released her claims against Jean; and

received no adjudication on the merits. After reviewing the record under the

entire controversy doctrine's principles, we agree.

The entire controversy doctrine "has three fundamental purposes: '(1) the

need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal

decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those with a material interest

in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of

delay.'" Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218, 227 (2020) (quoting DiTrolio

v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267 (1995)). "[B]ecause the entire controversy doctrine

A-1764-23 5 is an equitable principle, its applicability is left to judicial discretion . . . ."

Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171, 179 (App. Div.

2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie &

Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310, 323 (1995)). The application of the doctrine "is fact

sensitive and dependent upon the particular circumstances of a given case." 700

Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 2011). "The

entire controversy doctrine 'stems directly from the principles underlying the

doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion.'" Bank Leumi, 243 N.J. at 227

(quoting Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 180, 187 (1996)); see also Long v. Lewis,

318 N.J. Super. 449, 459 (App. Div. 1999) ("The claim preclusion aspect of the

entire controversy doctrine is essentially res judicata by another name.").

Rule 4:30A codifies the entire controversy doctrine, stating in relevant

part that "[n]on-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy

doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required

by the entire controversy doctrine." Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) provides that "[e]ach party

shall include with the first pleading a certification as to whether the matter in

controversy is the subject of any other action pending in any court or . . . whether

any other action . . . is contemplated." The Rule provides "a continuing

obligation . . . to file and serve on all other parties and with the court an amended

A-1764-23 6 certification if there is a change." R. 4:5-1(b)(2). "If a party fails to comply . . . ,

the court may impose an appropriate sanction." Ibid.

"Because a violation of the entire controversy doctrine may result in the

preclusion of a claim, a court must consider whether the party against whom the

doctrine is sought to be invoked has had a fair and reasonable opportunity to

litigate the claim." Hobart Bros. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 354 N.J. Super.

229, 241 (App. Div. 2002). Rule 4:30A grants a court the authority to create a

safe harbor in appropriate cases. The doctrine is relaxed where requiring joinder

is unfair.

It is undisputed Enoch filed the state action first, and Jean, approximately

six months later, filed the subsequent federal action while the state lawsuit was

pending. Jean failed to comply with Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) because she did not amend

her state court answer to provide notice of her federal complaint and did not

disclose this action in her federal pleading. The record demonstrates Enoch did

not violate the entire controversy doctrine by failing to join a claim; thus, she

should not be precluded from a fair opportunity to adjudicate her negligence

claim on the merits.

The doctrine "does not require dismissal when multiple actions involving

the same or related claims are pending simultaneously." Kaselaan & D'Angelo

A-1764-23 7 Assocs. v. Soffian, 290 N.J. Super. 293, 299 (App. Div. 1996). "Although

efficient judicial management may be more complex when a related case is

pending in a federal court or in the court of another state, our courts also have

appropriate means to address those situations." Id. at 300. In fact, where it

would be inappropriate for both cases to proceed simultaneously, "New Jersey

has long adhered to 'the general rule that the court which first acquires

jurisdiction has precedence in the absence of special equities.'" Sensient Colors

Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 373, 386 (2008) (quoting Yancoskie v. Del.

River Port Auth., 78 N.J. 321, 324 (1978)).

We note Enoch highlights that Jean cites no authority that required Enoch

to have joined or consolidated her first-filed state claims in the federal action.

Jean's assertion that Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1) required Enoch to assert her

negligence claim as a counterclaim in the federal action is unsupported, as an

exception to the compulsory claim requirement exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(2)(A)

specifically states that "[t]he pleader need not state the claim . . . if . . . when the

action was commenced, the claim was the subject of another pending action."

Thus, the federal rules do not support the preclusion of Enoch's negligence

action for failing to file a counterclaim, as her state action was filed and pending.

A-1764-23 8 Further, Jean does not refute that she failed to disclose Enoch's pending state

action in the federal action.

Arguably, Jean's failure to comply with Rule 4:5-1(b)(2), the timing of her

September 2023 motion to intervene and subsequent withdrawal shortly

thereafter on October 2, and her settlement of the federal action on October 12,

indicate sharp litigation practice by Jean. Such practice is in direct contradiction

with the entire controversy doctrine's equitable principles. We recognize that

"there should not be a mechanistic application of the entire controversy

doctrine." J-M Mfg. Co. v. Phillips & Cohen, LLP, 443 N.J. Super. 447, 459

(App. Div. 2015). "Rather, courts should carefully examine the interests of the

parties, expenditure of judicial resources, and any procedural mechanisms

available to achieve a just result." Ibid. The record does not reflect that Enoch

engaged in calculated, manipulative claim splitting. We, therefore, agree with

Enoch that the entire controversy doctrine's principles of fairness dictate

reinstatement of her claims. See R. 4:5-1(b)(2). For these reasons, we part ways

with the court's decision granting Jean summary judgment under the entire

controversy doctrine and conclude reinstatement of Enoch's negligence action is

warranted for a resolution on the merits.

A-1764-23 9 We next turn to address Enoch's related res judicata argument that the

federal court's entered stipulation of dismissal was not an adjudication of the

parties' claims on the merits that would bar the present action. The record

reveals the federal court did not substantively adjudicate Jean's negligence

claim. As the Palisades' settlement release specifically provided, it "[wa]s not

to be construed as an admission of liability." Further, Enoch did not sign the

release, and Jean does not contend Enoch controlled or consented to the

settlement.

We recognize "[t]he doctrine of res judicata 'contemplates that when a

controversy between parties is once fairly litigated and determined it is no longer

open to relitigation.'" Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 172

(App. Div. 2000) (italicization omitted) (quoting Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic

Beverage Control 33 N.J. 428, 435 (1960)). "[F]or res judicata to apply, there

must be (1) a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of

issues, (3) identity of parties, and (4) identity of the cause of action." Brookshire

Equities, LLC v. Montaquiza, 346 N.J. Super. 310, 318 (App. Div. 2002). "[A]

consent judgment has the same res judicata effect as any other judgment."

Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc. v. State, by Transp. Dep't, 175 N.J. Super. 384, 395

(App. Div. 1980) (italicization omitted), appeal dismissed, 87 N.J. 321 (1981).

A-1764-23 10 "A consent judgment has been defined as an agreement of the parties under the

sanction of the court as to what the decision shall be." Midland Funding, L.L.C.

v. Giambanco, 422 N.J. Super. 301, 310-11 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting

Stonehurst at Freehold, Section One, Inc. v. Twp. Comm. of Freehold, 139 N.J.

Super. 311, 313 (Law Div. 1976)).

The doctrine of res judicata fosters "the important policy goals of 'finality

and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication;

reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts,

confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness.'" First Union Nat'l Bank v. Penn

Salem Marina, Inc., 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007) (quoting Hackensack v. Winner,

82 N.J. 1, 32-33 (1980)). The doctrine also "maintain[s] judicial integrity by

minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions regarding the same matter."

Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991). Pursuant to res judicata, "a cause

of action between parties that has been finally determined on the merits by a

tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those parties or their privies

in a new proceeding." Ibid. Privity "is merely a word used to say that the

relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another is close

enough to include that other within the res judicata." Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc.,

A-1764-23 11 208 N.J. 114, 139 (2011) (quoting Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J.

327, 338 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the context of the federal court settlement is relevant to our

application of res judicata's equitable principles. Cf. Ditrolio, 142 N.J. at 279

(finding when applying equitable tenets to barring a claim, it is "sound policy"

to review the circumstances surrounding a settlement and concluding "a

settlement or a dismissal without prejudice is a factor a court should consider.").

Palisades' $15,000 settlement did not include a stipulation of Enoch's liability,

and at no point in the federal action did Enoch accept responsibility for causing

the accident. We are also unpersuaded by Jean's argument that Palisades'

settlement for Enoch's policy limit sufficiently "implied" Enoch's liability and

acts as an adjudication under res judicata. See Muralo Co., Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of

Wausau, 334 N.J. Super. 282, 294 (App. Div. 2000) (recognizing that a party

may agree to settle meritless claims for "nuisance value" and noting that "juries

sometimes do strange things—another factor to consider in the making of the

overall settlement"). Res judicata is inapplicable under the present facts because

the settlement of the successive federal action cannot fairly be viewed as a final

determination of Jean's negligence claim on the merits.

A-1764-23 12 Jean has cited no authority for the proposition that an insurance carrier's

decision to settle a subsequent lawsuit, with no admission of liability by its

insured, equates to a resolution on the merits. Further, our research has not

revealed authority dictating that Palisades' monetary settlement alone bars

Enoch's first-filed action. Therefore, the court's application of res judicata to

preclude Enoch from proceeding to fairly litigate Jean's liability is unsupported.

As we conclude judicial integrity is not offended by the present case proceeding

on the merits, reversal of the court's decision granting Jean summary judgment

under res judicata is warranted.

Finally, we turn to address Enoch's argument that the court erroneously

applied judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel serves to preserve the "integrity of

the judicial process," Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 387 (App. Div.

1996), by prohibiting a party from advocating "a position contrary to a position

it successfully asserted in the same or a prior proceeding." Kimball Int'l, Inc. v.

Northfield Metal Prods., 334 N.J. Super. 596, 606 (App. Div. 2000). It is

considered "an 'extraordinary remedy,' which should be invoked only 'when a

party's inconsistent behavior will otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice.'"

Ali v. Rutgers, 166 N.J. 280, 287-88 (2000) (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v.

Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir.1996)). We agree

A-1764-23 13 judicial estoppel does not bar Enoch's present action and add only the following

limited comments. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Unquestionably, the parties were permitted to maintain negligence claims

against each other. Here, the parties brought their negligence claims in separate

courts. Again, in the federal settlement, Enoch made no admission of liability,

and her insurance carrier controlled the resolution. The record does not support

a finding that Enoch successfully advanced her negligence claim in the federal

action for judicial acceptance solely because Palisades decided to settle for

$15,000. Therefore, the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable.

To the extent that we have not addressed plaintiff's remaining contentions,

it is because they lack sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1764-23 14