SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc ETHEL BARRY MASTERS, ) Opinion issued April 1, 2025 ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SC100724 ) JACOB DAWSON, ) ) Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY The Honorable Joseph L. Walsh III, Judge
Jacob Dawson appeals the St. Louis County circuit court’s judgment ordering him
to pay actual and punitive damages to Ethel Barry Masters based on her replevin claim
against him. Finding Dawson’s constitutional claims are unpreserved and the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Dawson given his pattern of obstructive
behavior, this Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
Following his father’s death, Dawson assumed possession of four of his father’s
vehicles. 1 In 2019, Masters, who was the father’s long-term companion, filed a petition
1 Initially, Dawson possessed a fifth vehicle included in this dispute. Dawson later conceded Masters owned the fifth vehicle and released it to her. alleging replevin, conversion, and unjust enrichment resulting from Dawson’s refusal to
surrender possession of the vehicles. 2
Dawson moved to dismiss the replevin action, which the court overruled. In his
answer to the replevin action, Dawson disputed ownership of the vehicles. Masters
served Dawson with a request for admissions. Dawson did not respond.
In 2021, Masters moved for partial summary judgment on her right to possession
of the vehicles. Dawson did not timely respond to the summary judgment motion. He
then requested leave to file a response out of time, which the circuit court granted.
Dawson responded to Masters’ statement of uncontroverted facts in a document
purporting to respond to Masters’ request for admissions, but the document was not
supported by exhibits, so the statements in Masters’ request for admission were deemed
admitted. The circuit court entered partial summary judgment in Masters’ favor and
ordered Dawson to surrender the vehicles. Dawson did not surrender the vehicles and
barricaded them to prevent towing.
Dawson’s attorney then sought leave to withdraw. In his motion to withdraw,
Dawson’s attorney explained he could not continue the representation because it would
create an ethical dilemma due to Dawson’s willful violation of a court order. The circuit
court granted Dawson’s attorney leave to withdraw.
2 Masters initially filed a probate action but dismissed it after her counsel advised the proper means of relief was a replevin action in circuit court. Dawson filed a petition asking the director of revenue to declare him the owner of one of the vehicles.
2 Masters moved for the circuit court to find Dawson in contempt of court, alleging
Dawson made himself unavailable on the agreed dates to transfer possession, avoided
communication, blockaded the vehicles, and hid the keys. The circuit court overruled
Masters’ motion.
Dawson retained a second attorney. Masters obtained writs of replevin, which
were executed. After Dawson’s failure to pay his legal expenses, Dawson’s second
attorney sought, and was granted, leave to withdraw.
The circuit court scheduled a bench trial for damages on October 27, 2022. On
October 26, 2022, Dawson retained a third attorney, who entered his appearance and
moved for a continuance. The circuit court sustained the motion for continuance and set
a bench trial for December 8, 2022. The bench trial was again continued and reset for
January 19, 2023. On January 4, 2023, Dawson filed a demand for a jury trial. The
circuit court scheduled a jury trial for damages for February 27, 2023, with a pretrial
conference scheduled for February 23, 2023.
Dawson’s third attorney filed a motion for leave to withdraw due to Dawson’s
failure to pay. He sent Dawson an e-mail indicating his intention to withdraw from
representation, attaching to the e-mail his motion to withdraw, which noted the pretrial
and trial dates. Dawson claims he did not open the documents attached to the e-mail. On
the same day he filed the motion to withdraw, Dawson’s third attorney moved for a
continuance. Prior to trial, the circuit court sustained the third attorney’s motion to
withdraw but did not grant a continuance.
3 After Dawson failed to appear for the February 23 pretrial conference, the circuit
court issued a memorandum and order stating that, because Masters appeared and
Dawson failed to appear, Dawson was “adjudged in default” and “the jury trial . . . is
therefore cancelled.” The circuit court ordered Masters to file an affidavit as to damages
by the end of the next day, along with proposed findings for final judgment. The circuit
court entered final judgment for Masters on the replevin claim, awarding her $83,035.41
in actual damages and $83,035.41 in punitive damages. The circuit court noted there was
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to award punitive damages because Dawson’s
conduct during the proceedings was contemptuous and awarding damages would serve to
deter similar conduct.
Retaining a fourth attorney, Dawson sought a new trial or to vacate, amend, or
modify the final judgment. His motion did not raise a constitutional right to a jury trial
claim. In the memorandum supporting his motion for new trial, Dawson included a
reference to article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution in a footnote. The circuit
court overruled the motions. Dawson appeals. 3
Points II, III, and IV: Dawson preserved no constitutional claim of error
In points II, III, and IV, Dawson argues the circuit court denied his right to a jury
trial by misapplying article I, section 22(a) and Rule 62.01. Because Dawson failed to
raise these arguments in his motion for new trial or to vacate, amend, or modify the final
judgment, his claims are unpreserved.
3 This Court granted transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.
4 Dawson’s motion for new trial raised seven reasons the circuit court should grant a
new trial. None of them referenced article I, section 22(a) or the right to a jury trial.
Dawson also did not raise the issue in his argument supporting his motion for new trial
before the circuit court. Despite the absence of any argument related to the right to a jury
trial in his motion, Dawson argues he preserved his argument by incorporating his
memorandum in support of the motion for new trial, which included a footnote citing
article I, section 22(a).
“It is well recognized that a party should not be entitled on appeal to claim error
on the part of the trial court when the party did not call attention to the error at trial and
did not give the court the opportunity to rule on the question.” Mayes v. Saint Luke’s
Hosp. of Kan. City, 430 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Mo. banc 2014) (internal quotation omitted).
To preserve any claim in a motion for new trial, “the allegations in the motion must be
sufficient to give the trial court an opportunity to correct its errors, without requiring the
court to resort to aid extrinsic to the motion.” Brandt v. Csaki, 937 S.W.2d 268, 275
(Mo. App. 1996) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Sherrer v. Bos. Sci.
Corp., 609 S.W.3d 697 (Mo. banc 2020). Missouri courts have held a passing reference
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SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc ETHEL BARRY MASTERS, ) Opinion issued April 1, 2025 ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SC100724 ) JACOB DAWSON, ) ) Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY The Honorable Joseph L. Walsh III, Judge
Jacob Dawson appeals the St. Louis County circuit court’s judgment ordering him
to pay actual and punitive damages to Ethel Barry Masters based on her replevin claim
against him. Finding Dawson’s constitutional claims are unpreserved and the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Dawson given his pattern of obstructive
behavior, this Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
Following his father’s death, Dawson assumed possession of four of his father’s
vehicles. 1 In 2019, Masters, who was the father’s long-term companion, filed a petition
1 Initially, Dawson possessed a fifth vehicle included in this dispute. Dawson later conceded Masters owned the fifth vehicle and released it to her. alleging replevin, conversion, and unjust enrichment resulting from Dawson’s refusal to
surrender possession of the vehicles. 2
Dawson moved to dismiss the replevin action, which the court overruled. In his
answer to the replevin action, Dawson disputed ownership of the vehicles. Masters
served Dawson with a request for admissions. Dawson did not respond.
In 2021, Masters moved for partial summary judgment on her right to possession
of the vehicles. Dawson did not timely respond to the summary judgment motion. He
then requested leave to file a response out of time, which the circuit court granted.
Dawson responded to Masters’ statement of uncontroverted facts in a document
purporting to respond to Masters’ request for admissions, but the document was not
supported by exhibits, so the statements in Masters’ request for admission were deemed
admitted. The circuit court entered partial summary judgment in Masters’ favor and
ordered Dawson to surrender the vehicles. Dawson did not surrender the vehicles and
barricaded them to prevent towing.
Dawson’s attorney then sought leave to withdraw. In his motion to withdraw,
Dawson’s attorney explained he could not continue the representation because it would
create an ethical dilemma due to Dawson’s willful violation of a court order. The circuit
court granted Dawson’s attorney leave to withdraw.
2 Masters initially filed a probate action but dismissed it after her counsel advised the proper means of relief was a replevin action in circuit court. Dawson filed a petition asking the director of revenue to declare him the owner of one of the vehicles.
2 Masters moved for the circuit court to find Dawson in contempt of court, alleging
Dawson made himself unavailable on the agreed dates to transfer possession, avoided
communication, blockaded the vehicles, and hid the keys. The circuit court overruled
Masters’ motion.
Dawson retained a second attorney. Masters obtained writs of replevin, which
were executed. After Dawson’s failure to pay his legal expenses, Dawson’s second
attorney sought, and was granted, leave to withdraw.
The circuit court scheduled a bench trial for damages on October 27, 2022. On
October 26, 2022, Dawson retained a third attorney, who entered his appearance and
moved for a continuance. The circuit court sustained the motion for continuance and set
a bench trial for December 8, 2022. The bench trial was again continued and reset for
January 19, 2023. On January 4, 2023, Dawson filed a demand for a jury trial. The
circuit court scheduled a jury trial for damages for February 27, 2023, with a pretrial
conference scheduled for February 23, 2023.
Dawson’s third attorney filed a motion for leave to withdraw due to Dawson’s
failure to pay. He sent Dawson an e-mail indicating his intention to withdraw from
representation, attaching to the e-mail his motion to withdraw, which noted the pretrial
and trial dates. Dawson claims he did not open the documents attached to the e-mail. On
the same day he filed the motion to withdraw, Dawson’s third attorney moved for a
continuance. Prior to trial, the circuit court sustained the third attorney’s motion to
withdraw but did not grant a continuance.
3 After Dawson failed to appear for the February 23 pretrial conference, the circuit
court issued a memorandum and order stating that, because Masters appeared and
Dawson failed to appear, Dawson was “adjudged in default” and “the jury trial . . . is
therefore cancelled.” The circuit court ordered Masters to file an affidavit as to damages
by the end of the next day, along with proposed findings for final judgment. The circuit
court entered final judgment for Masters on the replevin claim, awarding her $83,035.41
in actual damages and $83,035.41 in punitive damages. The circuit court noted there was
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to award punitive damages because Dawson’s
conduct during the proceedings was contemptuous and awarding damages would serve to
deter similar conduct.
Retaining a fourth attorney, Dawson sought a new trial or to vacate, amend, or
modify the final judgment. His motion did not raise a constitutional right to a jury trial
claim. In the memorandum supporting his motion for new trial, Dawson included a
reference to article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution in a footnote. The circuit
court overruled the motions. Dawson appeals. 3
Points II, III, and IV: Dawson preserved no constitutional claim of error
In points II, III, and IV, Dawson argues the circuit court denied his right to a jury
trial by misapplying article I, section 22(a) and Rule 62.01. Because Dawson failed to
raise these arguments in his motion for new trial or to vacate, amend, or modify the final
judgment, his claims are unpreserved.
3 This Court granted transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.
4 Dawson’s motion for new trial raised seven reasons the circuit court should grant a
new trial. None of them referenced article I, section 22(a) or the right to a jury trial.
Dawson also did not raise the issue in his argument supporting his motion for new trial
before the circuit court. Despite the absence of any argument related to the right to a jury
trial in his motion, Dawson argues he preserved his argument by incorporating his
memorandum in support of the motion for new trial, which included a footnote citing
article I, section 22(a).
“It is well recognized that a party should not be entitled on appeal to claim error
on the part of the trial court when the party did not call attention to the error at trial and
did not give the court the opportunity to rule on the question.” Mayes v. Saint Luke’s
Hosp. of Kan. City, 430 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Mo. banc 2014) (internal quotation omitted).
To preserve any claim in a motion for new trial, “the allegations in the motion must be
sufficient to give the trial court an opportunity to correct its errors, without requiring the
court to resort to aid extrinsic to the motion.” Brandt v. Csaki, 937 S.W.2d 268, 275
(Mo. App. 1996) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Sherrer v. Bos. Sci.
Corp., 609 S.W.3d 697 (Mo. banc 2020). Missouri courts have held a passing reference
to an argument in the suggestions supporting a motion for new trial is insufficient to
bring the argument to the circuit court’s attention. See Sutton v. McCollum, 421 S.W.3d
477, 485 (Mo. App. 2013); Greco v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Mo. App. 1988).
5 Incorporating various documents into a motion for new trial results in a piecemeal
pleading, requiring the circuit court to hunt and pick through documents in an attempt to
ascertain the argument the litigant is endeavoring to make. This practice is insufficient to
call the circuit court’s attention to alleged errors and insufficient to allow the circuit court
an opportunity for meaningful review. Because Dawson failed to raise his constitutional
claims in his motion, Dawson’s arguments are unpreserved for appellate review. 4
Point I: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Dawson
In point I, Dawson claims the circuit court abused its discretion by cancelling his
jury trial due to his nonappearance for a pretrial conference.
Standard of Review
“[T]his Court will not overrule the trial court’s decision to impose sanctions unless
the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Holm v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.,
514 S.W.3d 590, 596 (Mo. banc 2017). “A trial court abuses its discretion only when its
ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful
consideration.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
4 Dawson also argues his failure to raise the argument during the motion hearing was due to the circuit court limiting his time. “It is well recognized that a party should not be entitled on appeal to claim error on the part of the trial court when the party did not call attention to the error at trial and did not give the court the opportunity to rule on the question.” Mayes, 430 S.W.3d at 267 (internal quotation omitted). It was Dawson’s burden to bring his arguments to the circuit court’s attention.
6 Analysis
“A trial court has a broad array of inherent powers.” Mitalovich v. Toomey, 217
S.W.3d 338, 340 (Mo. App. 2007). “A trial court has the inherent power to enforce
compliance with its reasonable orders and may, at its discretion, impose sanctions when
they are justified, considering the conduct of the parties and counsel.” Id. The question
is whether the sanctions against Dawson were justified.
Dawson argues the circuit court abused its discretion by cancelling his jury trial
due to his failure to appear for the pretrial conference. Dawson claims his failure to
appear was due to mistake because he did not open the e-mail attachments his third
attorney sent him, which contained the pretrial conference date.
This case has been pending for more than five years. In reviewing the record, it is
easy for this Court to ascertain that Dawson has developed a pattern of willfully
undermining any attempt at judicial efficiency. The docket is littered with entries
reflecting Dawson’s failure to answer discovery requests, failure to respond to motions,
failure to appear in court, failure to pay his attorneys, failure to comply with court orders,
and, most recently, failure to appear for a pretrial conference four days before the
rescheduled jury trial. Dawson’s failure to appear for the pretrial conference is only the
latest action he took to undermine the circuit court’s ability to finally resolve Masters’
case. By focusing his argument only on the latest example of his disregard for the
judicial system, Dawson makes light of his actions. Adopting Dawson’s argument would
result in this Court turning a blind eye to his pattern of contumacious conduct.
7 While this Court recognizes the inviolate right to a jury trial as memorialized in
article I, section 22(a), “[t]rial judges should have authority to move cases expeditiously
by controlling their courts . . ..” Foster v. Kohm, 661 S.W.2d 628, 632 (Mo. App. 1983).
Dawson failed to preserve any constitutional claim. 5 Given his persistent and egregious
disregard for the circuit court, this case presents the rare circumstance when the circuit
court cancelling Dawson’s jury trial was not against the logic of the circumstances,
arbitrary, or unreasonable. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning
Dawson.
Conclusion
This Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment.
___________________________________ KELLY C. BRONIEC, JUDGE
All concur.
5 This Court does not address whether the circuit court’s cancellation of the jury trial and entrance of a judgment violated Dawson’s right to jury trial, had he preserved the issue.