Eteghaei v. County of Alameda

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 16, 2024
• Docket: 4:22-cv-04298
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 Case No. 22-cv-04298-KAW ARASH ETEGHAEI, et al., 8 ORDER GRANTING UNIVERSITY Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 9 SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING v. IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 10 ALAMEDA DEFENDANTS’ MOTION COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al., FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11 Defendants. Re: Dkt. Nos. 114, 117 12 13 Plaintiffs Arash Eteghaei and Mitra Zade filed the instant case, alleging violations of their 14 civil rights by Defendants County of Alameda, Matthew Farruggia, Scott Brandon, Riley Walter, 15 Ahmad Mateen, Joshua Dormer, Marvin Moncada, and Joshua Armijo (collectively, “Alameda 16 Defendants”), as well as the Regents of the University of California (“UC Regents”), Gherrett 17 Levette, Kovena Avila, and Arlene Samaniego (collectively, “University Defendants”). Pending 18 before the Court are: (1) the University Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and (2) the 19 Alameda Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (University Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. 20 No. 114; Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 117.) 21 Having considered the parties’ filings, the relevant legal authorities, and the arguments 22 made at the October 3, 2024 hearing, the Court GRANTS the University Defendants’ motion for 23 summary judgment and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Alameda Defendants’ 24 motion for summary judgment. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 The instant case concerns Defendants’ execution of an arrest warrant for Plaintiff’s adult 27 son, Arian Eteghaei, and a related search warrant for Plaintiffs’ home in November 2021. (Fourth 1 women while a student at the University of California, Santa Barbara. (See Alameda Req. for 2 Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exh. A (affidavit in support of Oct. 29, 2021 search and arrest warrant) at 3 COUNTY000023-26).1) Several of the charged assaults involved the use of violence, including 4 strangulation. (Id. at COUNTY000024-25.) 5 On August 13, 2021, Defendants Avila and Samaniego -- the investigating detectives – 6 first arrested Arian at the Oakland Airport. (Bernal Decl., Exh. 11 (“Samaniego Dep.”) at 16:22- 7 17:16; Exh. 12 (“Avila Dep.”) at 13:7-15:1.) During the arrest, Plaintiff Zade started yelling and 8 screaming, falling to the floor. (Samaniego Dep. at 18:21-23, 65:11-14; Avila Dep. at 16:14- 9 17:5.) Arian was released on bail and placed on house arrest, residing in Plaintiffs’ home in 10 Dublin, California. (Bernal Decl., Exh. 1 (“Zade Dep. Part I”) at 21:4-10; Exh. 2 (“Eteghaei Dep. 11 Part I”) at 21:17-22.) 12 Following Arian’s arrest, Defendants Avila and Samaniego continued investigating and 13 learned of other victims; on October 29, 2021, they obtained a search warrant for Plaintiffs’ home 14 and an arrest warrant for Arian. (See Alameda RJN, Exh. A; Avila Dep. at 57:13-19.) That same 15 day, Defendant Samaniego contacted the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office to coordinate the 16 execution of the warrants, as Dublin is within Defendant Alameda County’s jurisdiction. (Bernal 17 Decl., Exh. 4 (“Moncada Dep.”) at 10:11-11:2; Moncada Decl. ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 117-2.) Defendant 18 Samaniego sent a draft operations plan, which included the following background information: 19 “Sexual assault suspect of 11 Victims; Prior arrest for sexual assault on 8/13/21. Lives with 20 parents and possibly elderly grandparents. Father is JAMSHID ARASH ETEGHAEI DOB: 21 08/10/1970, and Mother Mitra Zade DOB: 08/07/1969.” (Moncada Decl., Exh. F at F-03.) The 22 draft operations plan stated that a records check on Arian and Plaintiffs indicated “NO 23 WEAPONS,” and that “[n]o weapons registered to the suspect and parents.” (Moncada Decl., 24 Exh. F at F-03.) Defendant Samaniego also included the warrants, which had a picture of Arian. 25 1 The Court takes judicial notice of the search warrant and supporting affidavit. “Courts regularly 26 find that search warrants are public records properly subject to judicial notice.” Ferguson v. Cal. DOJ, No. 16-cv-06627-HSG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103094, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2017); see 27 also Leubner v. Cty. of Lake, No. 18-cv-05654-PJH, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108920, at *5 n.2 1 (Moncada Decl., Exh. F at F-41.) 2 On November 2, 2021, the officers attended a planning meeting at Dublin Police Services. 3 (Bernal Decl., Exh. 5 (“Farruggia Dep.”) at 8:18-9:23; Samaniego Dep. at 50:2-9.) At the 4 planning meeting, the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office presented a risk assessment and 5 operations plan, which had been drafted by Defendant Moncada. (Bernal Decl., Exh. 4 6 (“Moncada Dep.”) at 74:20-75:1, 76:7-10; Exh. 13 (“Levette Dep.”) at 23:3-7; Samaniego Dep. at 7 50:22-24.) Defendant Moncada based the risk assessment and operations plan on Defendant 8 Samaniego’s draft operations plan; the risk assessment characterized the operation as “Low” risk. 9 (Moncada Dep. at 75:17-23; Moncada Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. G at 1.) Defendant Moncada’s operations 10 plan included personnel assignments, which placed the individual University Defendants on the 11 perimeter, as well as equipment use, such as rifles, a ram, and cutters. (Moncada Decl., Exh. G at 12 6-8.) The individual University Defendants did not provide comments on the operations plan. 13 (Moncada Dep. at 76:11-15; Levette Dep. at 26:8-25.) 14 Following the operational meeting, the individual Defendants executed the warrants. 15 (Moncada Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendants Walter, Brandon, Dormer, Farruggia, and Moncada, along with 16 Officers White and Mangano, gathered around the corner from Plaintiffs’ residence. (Moncada 17 Decl. ¶ 5; Mangano Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 117-3.) They were then joined by Defendants Mateen and 18 Armijo, as well as Deputy Gore. (Mateen Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 117-3; Armijo Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 19 117-3.) The individual University Defendants were stationed at the back of the house. (Avila 20 Dep. at 30:12-17 (stating she was located to the rear of the residence, about one house back); 21 Samaniego Dep. at 43:13-19 (stating she was behind the house, about a block away); Levette Dep. 22 at 11:10-15 (stating he was located at the rear of the residence). 23 While arriving at Plaintiffs’ residence, Defendant Mateen called Plaintiff Eteghaei’s cell 24 phone, informed him that the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office was executing a search warrant, 25 and instructed him to have all occupants exit the residence with nothing in their hands. (Mateen 26 Decl. ¶ 3; Armijo Decl., Exh. M (“Armijo Body Camera”) at 16:35-16:36.2) Around this time, the 27 1 officers began to approach Plaintiffs’ residence. (Walter Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 117-3; Moncada 2 Decl. ¶ 6.) Defendant Armijo also used a bullhorn to instruct the occupants to exit with nothing in 3 their hands. (Armijo Decl. ¶ 4; Armijo Body Camera at 16:35-36.) During Defendant Armijo’s 4 first announcement, an airhorn went off in another vehicle.3 (Armijo Decl. ¶ 4.) After the airhorn 5 was turned off, Defendant Armijo made a second announcement, instructing the occupants to exit 6 with nothing in their hands. (Armijo Decl. ¶ 4; Armijo Body Camera at 16:35-36.) 7 At approximately 9:36 a.m., Plaintiff Eteghaei exited the home, with a cell phone in his 8 hand; Plaintiff Zade was not far behind him, recording the interaction on her cell phone. (Walter 9 Decl. ¶ 5, Dkt. No. 117-3, Exh. L (“Walter Body Camera”) at 16:36; Moncada Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. 10 (“Moncada Body Camera”) at 16:36.) Defendant Walter had his rifle pointed in Plaintiffs’ 11 direction as he and Defendant Moncada gave them instructions, including to put their hands up, to 12 stop, and to put down their phone. (Moncada Body Camera at 16:36.) During this time, 13 Defendant Dormer and Officer White were holding pistols, which were pointed upwards, while 14 Defendant Mateen had his rifle pointed at the residence’s second story windows. (See Dormer 15 Decl., Exh. O (“Dormer Body Camera”)at 16:35-36; Mateen Decl., Exh. J (“Mateen Body 16 Camera”) at 16:35-36.) The officers backed up as Plaintiff Eteghaei followed their instructions to 17 walk towards them. When Plaintiff Eteghaei got closer to the officers, Defendant Walter lowered 18 his rifle for several seconds before bringing it back up to point at Plaintiff Eteghaei’s head. 19 (Moncada Body Camera at 16:36; Rahman Decl., Exh. 1 (“Security Footage”), Dkt. No. 122-1.) 20 At the end of the driveway, Defendant Walter again lowered his weapon and Defendant Dormer 21 handcuffed Plaintiff Eteghaei. (Moncada Body Camera at 16:36; Dormer Decl. ¶ 7, Dkt. No. 117- 22 3.) Officer Mangano led him away towards the police vehicles. (Mangano Decl. ¶ 5, Dkt. No. 23 117-3.) Arian then exited the residence and walked towards the officers, where he was handcuffed 24 and escorted away. (Moncada Decl. ¶ 10; Moncada Body Camera at 16:37.) 25 During this time, Plaintiff Zade was still on the porch. (Moncada Decl. ¶ 9; Moncada 26

27 3 The Alameda Defendants assert that an equipment malfunction in Deputy Gore’s vehicle caused 1 Body Camera at 16:36-38.) Although officers repeatedly ordered Plaintiff Zade to come towards 2 them, Plaintiff Zade stayed on the porch, tried to make a phone call, and made to go back in the 3 house. (Moncada Decl. ¶ 9; Moncada Body Camera at 16:36-39.) Detective Mateen, a Farsi 4 speaker, tried to get her to comply by speaking to her in both English and in Farsi, but she did not. 5 (Mateen Decl. ¶ 4; Mateen Body Camera at 16:38.) The officers ultimately approached Plaintiff 6 Zade on the porch, and Defendant Brandon handcuffed her. (Moncada Decl. ¶ 11, Moncada Body 7 Camera at 16:38-39; Mateen Decl. ¶ 5; Mateen Body Camera at 16:38-39; Brandon Decl. ¶ 5, Dkt. 8 No. 117-3, Exh. P (“Brandon Body Camera”) at 16:39.) 9 Defendants Brandon and Mateen escorted Plaintiff Zade down the driveway, during which 10 she briefly sat back on the ground before being taken to the patrol vehicle. (Mateen Decl. ¶ 5; 11 Mateen Body Camera at 16:39; Brandon Decl. ¶ 5; Brandon Body Camera at 16:39.) There, 12 Plaintiff Zade gasped for air as she yelled at the officers. (Mateen Decl. ¶ 6; Mateen Body 13 Camera at 16:39-40.) She was taken to the patrol vehicle that Plaintiff Eteghaei was in; she 14 refused to sit inside of the vehicle, claiming she was claustrophobic and that the vehicle was too 15 hot, yelled at the officers, slipped out of her cuffs (requiring Defendant Mateen to reapply them), 16 repeatedly cried out that she could not breathe, begged the officers to bring her dog to the vehicle 17 after the dog got out of the house (which they did), and got out of the car and fell to the ground, 18 crying for her son. (Mateen Decl. ¶ 6; Exh. J (“Mateen Body Camera 2”) at 16:43-48; Mangano 19 Decl. ¶ 6; Exh. I (“Mangano Body Camera”) at 16:39-53.) 20 Around 9:52 a.m., the individual University Defendants arrived at the front of the house. 21 (Mateen Body Camera 2 at 16:52.) None of the individual University Defendants had seen any 22 rifles being pointed at Plaintiffs. (Samaniego Dep. at 68:21-23, 71:8-12; Avila Dep. at 98:15-18; 23 Levette Dep. at 33:17-23, 36:15-25.) They observed Plaintiff Zade in handcuffs; Defendant 24 Samaniego observed Plaintiff Zade making threats towards Defendant Avila, saying at least three 25 to four times: “You’re going to pay, Kovena Avila.” (Samaniego Dep. at 61:23-62:6.) When 26 Plaintiff Zade was escorted towards Defendant Samaniego, Defendant Avila, and Sergeant 27 Levette, she was still in an agitated state; when somebody asked if the handcuffs should be 1 was making and her familiarity with Plaintiff Zade from the airport. (Samaniego Dep. at 62:7-18.) 2 After the officers cleared the house, Plaintiff Eteghaei was escorted to the house and 3 uncuffed, and permitted to sit on the sofa; Plaintiff Eteghaei was handcuffed for approximately 4 eighteen minutes. (Mateen Decl. ¶ 7; Moncada Decl. ¶ 13; Moncada Body Camera at 16:54-56.) 5 Defendant Mateen asked Plaintiff Zade if she wanted to sit in the vehicle, but she replied, “I want 6 to be with my son.” (Mateen Decl. ¶ 7.) The officers kept Plaintiff Zade in handcuffs so that she 7 could be close to Arian and not obstruct the search. (Mateen Decl. ¶ 8; Mangano Decl. ¶ 8.) She 8 eventually sat in the driveway of a neighbor’s home crying, where she complained the handcuffs 9 were “so tight.” (Mateen Decl. ¶ 8; Mangano Decl. ¶ 8; Mangano Body Camera at 16:59.) 10 Defendant Mateen checked the handcuffs, demonstrating that he could put a finger through them. 11 (Mateen Decl. ¶ 8; Mangano Decl. ¶ 8; Mangano Body Camera at 16:59-17:00.) 12 At approximately 10:15 a.m., Plaintiff Zade was permitted to return to her residence, 13 where she yelled at the officers about their failure to show them the search warrant. (Mangano 14 Decl. ¶ 9; Mangano Body Camera at 17:15-21.) Around 10:21 a.m., after the University 15 Defendants had concluded their search, Plaintiff Zade was uncuffed. (Mangano Decl. ¶ 10; 16 Brandon Body Camera at 17:21.) In total, Plaintiff Zade was handcuffed for approximately forty- 17 three minutes. (Brandon Decl. ¶ 7.) Ultimately, the execution of the warrants at Plaintiffs’ 18 residence took less than fifty minutes. (See Dormer Body Camera (showing approach of residence 19 at 9:34 a.m. and departure at 10:22 a.m.).) 20 On June 21, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the instant action. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Following multiple 21 motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint on July 20, 2023, alleging the 22 following claims: (1) § 1983 claim for excessive force, (2) supervisory liability as to Defendants 23 Farruggia, Levette, Samaniego, and Avila, (3) § 1983 claim for unreasonable seizure, (4) violation 24 of California Constitution, article 1, § 13, (5) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, (6) 25 conspiracy to violate California Civil Code § 52.1, (7) negligent hiring, training, and supervision 26 as to Defendants Farruggia and Mateen, (8) assault, (9) battery as to Defendants Dormer and 27 Brandon, (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (11) negligent infliction of emotional 1 California Government Code § 7286(b)(5) as to Defendant County of Alameda. On July 22, 2024, 2 Defendants filed their motions for summary judgment. 4 On August 6, 2024, Plaintiffs late-filed 3 their opposition, which included only a single, unsigned declaration by Muhammed F. Rahman, 4 attaching security camera footage of the incident.5 (Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 122.) On August 12, 5 2024, Defendants filed their replies. (University Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 125; Alameda Defs.’ 6 Reply, Dkt. No. 126.) 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 A party may move for summary judgment on a “claim or defense” or “part of... a claim or 9 defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when, after adequate 10 discovery, there is no genuine issue as to material facts and the moving party is entitled to 11 judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 12 Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 13 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient 14 evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 15 A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the 16 basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses 17 that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where 18 the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 19 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Southern Calif. Gas. Co. v. City 20 of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003). 21 4 In support of their motion, the University Defendants provided over 2,200 pages of exhibits, 22 including the entirety of thirteen deposition transcripts and the 531-page University of California, Santa Barbara Policy Department Policy Manual (of which the University Defendants cite exactly 23 two pages). Such overlarge exhibits are wholly unnecessary, and the Court will not review any page that is not specifically cited in the University Defendants’ briefs. 24

5 On August 11, 2024, one day before the replies were due, Plaintiffs purported to file a 25 “corrected” opposition. (Dkt. No. 124.) The opposition included eight additional exhibits. (Dkt. No. 124-2.) The Court subsequently ordered Plaintiff to file a redline version of the “corrected” 26 opposition, comparing it to the original opposition. (Dkt. No. 127.) The redline version made apparent that there were numerous changes to the brief. (Dkt. No. 128-1.) As the Court 27 previously stated, it will not consider any new arguments or evidence in the “corrected” 1 On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving 2 party may discharge its burden of production by either (1) “produc[ing] evidence negating an 3 essential element of the nonmoving party's case” or (2) after suitable discovery “show[ing] that the 4 nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to 5 discharge its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz 6 Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. 324-25. 7 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth 8 specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “A party opposing summary judgment may not 10 simply question the credibility of the movant to foreclose summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. 11 at 254. “Instead, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence set 12 forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 13 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). The non-moving party must 14 produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the 15 dispute exists.” Bhan v. NMS Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). Conclusory or 16 speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 17 material fact to defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics 18 Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). 19 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light 20 most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 21 477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 A. Additional Discovery 24 Plaintiffs argue that if the Court intends to grant Defendants’ motions for summary 25 judgment, Plaintiffs request time to conduct discovery about: (1) whether the forensic analysis by 26 videographer Marsh is accurate, and (2) whether the psychiatric report of Dr. Yanofski is accurate. 27 (Pls.’ Opp’n at 25.) Plaintiffs provide no explanation for why this proposed discovery is necessary 1 videographer “Marsh” or the psychiatric report of Dr. Yanofski; it is not clear what these exhibits 2 are or if they were even provided by the parties.6 The Court finds there is no need for the 3 requested discovery to decide the motions for summary judgment. 4 B. Claims 1 and 3: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights 5 i. Unreasonable Seizure 6 Here, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants committed an unreasonable seizure when: (1) the 7 Alameda Defendants detained Plaintiffs in handcuffs outside their home, and (2) Defendant 8 Samaniego told the other officers to keep Plaintiff Zade in handcuffs. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 4, 22-23.) 9 a. Alameda Defendants 10 In general, “[p]olice may detain persons without probable cause while executing a search 11 warrant if justified by the circumstances.” Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) 12 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704-05 (1981)). A detention, however, “may be 13 unlawful under the Fourth Amendment either because the detention itself is unreasonable or 14 because it is carried out in an unreasonable manner.” Id. Thus, “[b]ecause handcuffing 15 substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of a detention, it follows that circumstances which 16 would justify a detention will not necessarily justify a detention by handcuffing.” Id. at 1063. 17 Instead, handcuffing must be “justified by the totality of the circumstances.” Id. 18 Plaintiffs argue that per Meredith, there is a factual dispute as to whether the Alameda 19 Defendants’ decision to handcuff Plaintiffs was reasonable. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 4-5.) In Meredith, 20 thirteen officers were executing a warrant to search a three-story building for evidence of income 21 tax violations. 342 F.3d at 1059. During the search, several officers encountered the plaintiff, 22 who told the officers that the search was illegal and asked to see the search warrant. Id. at 1060. 23 The Ninth Circuit found that these circumstances did not justify the plaintiff’s handcuffing 24 because there was no reason to believe that the occupants were dangerous, the investigation was 25 for nonviolent felonies, and the plaintiff was not a serious impediment to the search or a threat to 26 6 The Alameda Defendants appear to believe the “Marsh” forensic analysis may refer to the video 27 created by Parris Ward, which synchronizes together Mr. Rahman’s security camera footage, 1 the officers. Id. at 1063. 2 The Alameda Defendants, in turn, point to Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). 3 (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.) There, the officers were investigating a gang-related 4 drive-by shooting, and were executing a search warrant for deadly weapons and evidence of gang 5 membership. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 95-96. During the search, officers encountered the plaintiff, 6 placing her and three other individuals in handcuffs. Id. at 96. They remained handcuffed during 7 the search, guarded by one or two officers. Id. The Supreme Court found that the use of 8 handcuffs was warranted because “the case involved the detention of four detainees by two 9 officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons.” Id. at 100. 10 Likewise, in Injeyan v. City of Laguna Beach, the officers were investigating the plaintiff’s 11 son in relation to an acid attack, which had injured a policeman. No. CV 12-00790 BRO (JPRx), 12 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201977, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2013). The district court found that the 13 handcuffing of the plaintiff, a seventy-one year old woman, was justified because the officers were 14 investigating an act of domestic terrorism and there was the potential presence of chemical 15 weapons on the premises. Id. at *18. 16 1. Plaintiff Eteghaei 17 The Court first considers the handcuffing of Plaintiff Eteghaei. As an initial matter, the 18 Alameda Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiffs fail to explain in their opposition how any 19 Defendant other than Defendant Dormer -- the officer who handcuffed Plaintiff Eteghaei -- was 20 involved in the handcuffing of Plaintiff Eteghaei, and thus liable for the unreasonable seizure.7 21 (See Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 17; Alameda Defs.’ Reply at 4.) As the Court 22 previously explained, the Ninth Circuit has found that “‘a plaintiff cannot hold an officer liable 23 because of his membership in a group without a showing of individual participation in the 24 unlawful conduct.’ Mere presence is insufficient; rather, either integral participation or personal 25 involvement is required before’ an officer can be found liable.” (6/29/23 Dismissal Order at 5, 26 7 Indeed, Plaintiffs fail to even identify Defendant Dormer as the officer who handcuffed Plaintiff 27 Eteghaei; a text search of Plaintiffs’ opposition fails to yield any discussion of Defendant Dormer 1 Dkt. No. 74 (quoting Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934, 936 (9th Cir. 2002)).) Plaintiff fails to 2 provide any explanation for how the other officers participated in, or are otherwise liable for, the 3 handcuffing of Plaintiff Eteghaei, and the Court is not responsible for making arguments for 4 Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court concludes that all other officers are entitled to summary 5 judgment as to whether Plaintiff Eteghaei was unreasonably seized. 6 As to Defendant Dormer, the Court finds there is a jury question as to whether Plaintiff 7 Eteghaei was unreasonably seized when he was handcuffed. At the hearing, the Alameda 8 Defendants argued that the handcuffing was appropriate because per Summers, there is authority to 9 detain the occupants of premises while a search warrant is executed. See 452 U.S. at 705. In so 10 arguing, the Alameda Defendants effectively conflated detaining with handcuffing, arguing that it 11 is always appropriate to handcuff individuals during a search. Meredith, however, clearly 12 distinguishes between detention and handcuffing, explaining that “handcuffing substantially 13 aggravates the intrusiveness of a detention,” such that “circumstances which would justify a 14 detention will not necessarily justify a detention by handcuffing.” 342 F.3d at 1063; see also 15 Muehler, 544 U.S. 93 (“The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs . . . was undoubtedly a 16 separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted garage. The detention was thus more 17 intrusive than that which we upheld in Summers.”) (emphasis added). Thus, it is simply not the 18 law that the authority to detain under Summers also includes blanket authorization to handcuff. 19 The Court finds this case is akin to Meredith; while Arian was accused of violent sexual 20 crimes, there was no indication of weapons on the premises. A records check found no weapons 21 registered to Plaintiffs or Arian, no deadly weapons were used in the course of Arian’s accused 22 crimes, and even Defendant Moncada’s risk assessment characterized the operation as “Low” risk. 23 (Moncada Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. F at F-03, Exh. G at 1.) Unlike Muehler and Injeyan, the search was not 24 for deadly weapons or acid, but for electronic devices that could contain evidence of Arian’s 25 crimes. (Moncada Decl., Exh. F at F-40-41.) Given that Defendants had a picture of Arian, there 26 was no mistaking Plaintiff Eteghaei for his teenage son. (See Moncada Decl., Exh. F at F-41.) 27 There was also no suggestion that there were a disproportionate number of officers to watch over 1 disobeyed their instructions to come out with nothing in their hands, Plaintiff Eteghaei was 2 otherwise relatively cooperative and did not appear to take any actions that would make him a 3 serious impediment to the search. Under the totality of the circumstances, a jury could reasonably 4 find that Defendant Dormer’s handcuffing of Plaintiff Eteghaei was an unreasonable seizure. 5 The Alameda Defendants also argue that qualified immunity applies in this case. 6 (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 23.) “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects 7 government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 8 clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 9 known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). In 10 determining whether qualified immunity applies, a court must first “decide whether the fact that a 11 plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Id. at 232. A court 12 then “must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s 13 alleged misconduct. Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a 14 clearly established constitutional right.” Id. 15 The Court finds that qualified immunity is not warranted. Rather, Meredith would put a 16 reasonable person on notice that their conduct violated a constitutional right. Indeed, the only 17 meaningful distinction between Meredith and the instant case was that Arian was accused of 18 violent sexual assault, as opposed to non-violent tax crimes. But again, there is no assertion that 19 Arian’s crimes involved the use of deadly weapons, such that there was any specific reason why 20 the officers would have believed there to be weapons. The Alameda Defendants also argue that 21 Meredith is “entirely distinguishable” because there was no arrest warrant, but it is unclear why 22 the presence of an arrest warrant would change the analysis, particularly when Defendants do not 23 suggest that they mistook Plaintiff Eteghaei for his son. 24 The Alameda Defendants’ reliance on Hartmann v. Hanson, No. C 09-03227 WHA, 2010 25 LEXIS 5111 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010), is unpersuasive. There, the officers were investigating the 26 plaintiff’s roommate, a convicted, non-violent sex offender, for failing to properly register his new 27 residence. No. C 09-03227 WHA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5111, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010). 1 plaintiff identified himself as not being the target of the arrest warrant, he was led away from the 2 door and handcuffed while his identity was verified and a warrant check performed. Id. at *4, 6. 3 The district court concluded that qualified immunity applied. Id. at *25. Importantly, however, 4 Hartmann did not consider Meredith in the qualified immunity finding, and it is not apparent that 5 the district court would have come to the same conclusion if it was considering Meredith.8 6 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant Dormer is not entitled to summary 7 judgment as to the handcuffing of Plaintiff Eteghaei. 8 2. Plaintiff Zade 9 A different conclusion applies to Plaintiff Zade, who was handcuffed by Defendant 10 Brandon, with assistance by Defendant Mateen. Again, the Alameda Defendants correctly 11 observe that Plaintiffs fail to explain how any other Alameda Defendant participated in the 12 handcuffing, and thus they are entitled to summary judgment. (See Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for 13 Summ. J. at 17; Alameda Defs.’ Reply at 6.) 14 Plaintiffs do not dispute that Plaintiff Zade was uncooperative prior to being handcuffed, 15 including failing to comply with commands to come towards the officers, trying to make a phone 16 call, and attempting to go back in the house. (Moncada Decl. ¶ 9; Moncada Body Camera at 17 16:36-39.) Plaintiffs also do not dispute that after being handcuffed, Plaintiff Zade continued to 18 be uncooperative, refusing to follow commands, yelling at the officers, threatening Defendant 19 Avila, slipping out of her cuffs, and falling to the ground repeatedly. (Mateen Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; 20 Brandon Decl. ¶ 5; Mangano Decl. ¶ 6; Mateen Body Camera at 16:39-40, Mateen Body Camera 2 21 at 16:43-48; Mangano Body Camera at 16:39-53; Samaniego Dep. at 61:23-62:6.) Instead, 22 Plaintiffs argued at the hearing that Plaintiff Zade was very distressed and emotional, but that she 23 did not intend to be uncooperative even if her actions could be “confused” by law enforcement as 24 being uncooperative. Plaintiff Zade’s subjective state of mind, however, is not the standard; the 25 reasonableness of the forced used to effect the seizure “must be judged from the perspective of a 26

27 8 Notably, Hartmann had a “bizarre” procedural history where the plaintiff and his counsel 1 reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. 2 Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Unlike her husband, the officers could reasonably find under 3 these circumstances that handcuffing was necessary to prevent her from impeding the search or 4 attempting to destroy evidence, particularly given the electronic nature of the evidence being 5 sought. 6 Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants Brandon and Mateen would be entitled to 7 qualified immunity. Here, Plaintiff Zade was uncooperative and exhibited erratic behavior both 8 before and during her handcuffing; thus, the burden is on Plaintiffs to “identify a case that put[s 9 the defendant] on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 10 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021). Plaintiffs have not. Again, Plaintiff Zade’s behavior is meaningfully 11 distinct from Meredith, such that Meredith would not put a reasonable person on notice that their 12 behavior violated a constitutional right. Plaintiffs also cite Franklin v. Foxworth, where the Ninth 13 Circuit found that the officers executed a warrant in an unreasonable manner by removing a 14 gravely ill and semi-naked man from his sickbed without providing any covering, before forcing 15 him to sit handcuffed in his living room for two hours even after his room had been searched. 31 16 F.3d 873, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff presented little 17 risk of danger, was absolutely no risk of flight, and was highly unlikely to interfere with their 18 search in any way. Id. at 877. Here, Plaintiff was neither gravely ill nor semi-naked, and she was 19 uncooperative and able to interfere with the search. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they were outside 20 their home when they were handcuffed, and that the Alameda Defendants cannot cite any cases 21 permitting handcuffing under such circumstances. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 12.) This is not the burden for 22 qualified immunity; it is Plaintiffs who must identify a relevant case that would put Defendants on 23 notice. Because Plaintiffs have not, the Alameda Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as 24 to the handcuffing of Plaintiff Zade. See Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6 (finding that qualified 25 immunity applied where the plaintiff failed to identify any binding authority “that addresses facts 26 like the one at issue here”). 27 b. University Defendants 1 Defendants’ handcuffing of Plaintiffs when executing the warrants because they obtained the 2 search warrant. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 22.) In so arguing, Plaintiffs suggest that the University 3 Defendants have “supervisory control” of the Alameda Defendants pursuant to Ogborn v. City of 4 Lancaster, 101 Cal. App. 4th 448 (2002). (Id.) The Court previously rejected this argument, 5 explaining that Ogborn “did not speak to supervisory liability. Rather, Ogborn held that ‘officers 6 who lead the team that executes a warrant are responsible for ensuring that they have lawful 7 authority for their actions. A key aspect of this responsibility is making sure that they have a 8 proper warrant that in fact authorizes the search and seizure they are about to conduct.’” (6/29/23 9 Dismissal Order at 9 (quoting Ogborn, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 459).) The Court thus found that 10 “[t]he fact that the individual University Defendants were responsible for ensuring an adequate 11 search warrant . . . does not mean that the individual University Defendants automatically became 12 the supervisor of all individuals involved in the execution of the search warrant[.]” (Id.) Plaintiffs 13 fail to acknowledge the Court’s prior ruling, let alone explain why it was incorrect. Accordingly, 14 the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the University Defendants are liable for the 15 Alameda Defendants’ alleged constitutional violations simply because they obtained the 16 underlying search warrant. 17 Second, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Samaniego violated Plaintiff Zade’s constitutional 18 rights by directing the officers to keep Plaintiff Zade in handcuffs, even though she “knew, or 19 should have known, that this was a constitutional violation.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 22-23.) As discussed 20 above, there was no constitutional violation. Further, Defendant Samaniego would be entitled to 21 qualified immunity because Plaintiffs fail to identify any case law where an officer was found 22 liable for a constitutional violation where they ordered an individual remain handcuffed after 23 hearing the individual make threats towards another officer, causing them to feel it was unsafe to 24 uncuff the individual. (See Samaniego Dep. at 61:23-62:18.) 25 Accordingly, the University Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the 26 unreasonable seizure claim. 27 ii. Unreasonable Force 1 rifles and other weapons at them. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 7.) Plaintiffs make no arguments as to the 2 University Defendants, nor do they provide any evidence that contradicts the University 3 Defendants’ evidence that they were not even present when the rifles were pointed at Plaintiffs. 4 (Samaniego Dep. at 68:21-23, 71:8-12; Avila Dep. at 98:15-18; Levette Dep. at 33:17-23, 36:15- 5 25.) Accordingly, the University Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the 6 unreasonable force claim. 7 The Alameda Defendants first argue that the evidence shows that the only officer who 8 pointed a weapon at Plaintiffs was Defendant Walter. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 19.) 9 Plaintiffs respond that Defendants Moncada and Mateen also pointed their weapons at Plaintiff 10 Eteghaei, citing to Defendant Dormer’s body camera footage. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3.) The Court has 11 reviewed this portion of the body camera footage, and it does not appear to show either 12 Defendants Moncada or Mateen pointing their weapons at Plaintiffs’ direction. Likewise, review 13 of Defendant Mateen’s body camera footage shows no time where either Defendant pointed their 14 weapons at Plaintiffs; rather, it shows Defendant Mateen pointing his rifle as the residence’s upper 15 floor windows when Defendant Walter was confronting Plaintiff Eteghaei, and with his rifle not 16 being held up when he was speaking to Plaintiff Zade. (See Mateen Body Camera at 16:36-38.) 17 Plaintiffs also assert that Defendant Walter’s body camera footage supports their position, but 18 provides no citation except “supra.” (Id. at 7.) This is not sufficient; the Court is not required to 19 review the entirety of body camera footage to see if it supports Plaintiffs’ position. In any case, 20 the Court did review the relevant Walter footage, which only shows Defendant Walter pointing an 21 assault rifle in Plaintiffs’ direction. (Walter Body Camera at 16:36.) Accordingly, the Court finds 22 that except for Defendant Walter, the other individual Alameda Defendants are entitled to 23 summary judgment as to the unreasonable force claim. 24 The Alameda Defendants argue that law enforcement may use reasonable force while 25 executing a search warrant, again citing to Muehler. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 19.) 26 The Court finds that with respect to Defendant Walter’s initial pointing of the rifle in both 27 Plaintiffs’ direction, the Alameda Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. At that point, 1 assess the situation before lowering his weapon, including whether Plaintiffs were the target of the 2 arrest warrant or a potential threat. See Injeyan, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201977, at *17-18 3 (“Requiring [the use of] less force would have demanded that [the officer] exercise ‘superhuman 4 judgment’ in a tense and uncertain situation, which the U.S. Constitution does not require.”). 5 That said, the Court finds a different conclusion applies after Defendant Walter first 6 lowered his weapon. (See Walter Body Camera at 16:36:33.) At that point, Defendant Walter had 7 presumably found that Plaintiffs were not a threat, or he would not have found it safe enough to 8 lower his weapon for several seconds. Yet Defendant Walter then continued to orient his weapon 9 at Plaintiff Eteghaei’s head until Plaintiff Eteghaei was handcuffed. Again, the Court must 10 consider all of the circumstances that were known by the officers at this time. While the Alameda 11 Defendants continue to point to Arian being a suspect in multiple rapes, there was no evidence of 12 weapons and the search warrant was for electronic devices. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 13 19.) The Alameda Defendants also assert that both Plaintiffs exited the home with cell phones in 14 their hands, but it is unclear this would increase the danger to the point that Defendant Walter 15 would find it necessary to again point his gun at Plaintiff Eteghaei after lowering it. (Id. at 20.) 16 Further, the Alameda Defendants contend that Plaintiffs exited the home before Arian did, but fail 17 to explain why this would warrant pointing a gun at Plaintiff Eteghaei once they determined that 18 he was clearly not their teenage son. (Id.) In short, whether this constitutes unreasonable force is 19 a question of fact for a jury. 20 As to qualified immunity, again, the Court previously pointed to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling 21 in Robinson v. Solano County, where the officers were responding to a report that the plaintiff was 22 carrying a shotgun and had just shot two dogs, and was yelling in the middle of the street. 278 23 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). When the plaintiff came out, the officers unholstered their guns, with 24 one officer pointing a gun at the plaintiff’s head. Id. The Ninth Circuit found: “The development 25 of the law with respect to arrests and detentions now allows us to recognize as a general principle 26 that pointing a gun to the head of an apparently unarmed suspect during an investigation can be a 27 violation of the Fourth Amendment, especially where the individual poses no particular danger.” 1 gun at the head of an unarmed individual -- not even the suspect -- would constitute a 2 constitutional violation, particularly when the individual was generally compliant. Indeed, 3 Plaintiff Eteghaei’s actions were arguably less threatening than in Robinson, as there was no 4 suggestion that he had personally been violent or was carrying any weapons. Notably, even in 5 Hartmann (which the Alameda Defendants heavily rely upon), the district court observed “that if 6 sworn facts had demonstrated that defendant Hanson had kept his weapon drawn and pointed at 7 plaintiff after it was determined that plaintiff was unarmed, cooperative, and not a serious threat to 8 officer safety,” its finding that there was no excessive force “would likely be different under 9 Robinson.” 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5111, at *30 n.6; see also Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 10 587 (9th Cir. 2018) (“pointing guns at persons who are compliant and present no danger is a 11 constitutional violation”). Such is the case here. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant 12 Walter is not entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff Eteghaei’s unreasonable force claim. 13 iii. Monell Claims 14 To the extent Plaintiffs purport to bring any Monell claims in the operative complaint, 15 these claims were previously dismissed with prejudice. (2/17/23 Dismissal Order at 4-5 16 (dismissing Monell claim against Defendant UC Regents because it is not a municipal entity); 17 9/25/23 Dismissal Order at 9 (dismissing Monell claim against Defendant Alameda County 18 because Plaintiffs “cite no facts connecting the policy with the violation).) Plaintiffs do not 19 acknowledge this dismissal, let alone dispute it.9 20 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants County of Alameda and UC Regents are 21 entitled to summary judgment on the Monell claims (which should never have been pled in the 22 operative complaint). 23 C. Claim 2: Supervisory Liability 24 Plaintiff brings a claim for § 1983 “supervisory liability” against Defendants Farruggia, 25

26 9 In any case, Plaintiffs’ argument on this issue is incomprehensible, citing to Dkt. No. 25 (a stipulation to extend the time to file an opposition to a motion to dismiss) and asserting without 27 any authority that the University Defendants’ claim that they did not witness a constitutional 1 Levette, Samaniego, and Avila. “Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for 2 actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645- 3 46 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, “[a] supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his 4 subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations 5 and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 6 i. Defendant Farruggia 7 With respect to Defendant Farruggia, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Farruggia also 8 engaged in excessive force because he displayed a firearm at Plaintiffs. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 14.) In 9 support, Plaintiffs point to video footage of officers on Plaintiffs’ porch pointing guns at their 10 residence, but this footage is from after Plaintiffs were removed from the area. (See Moncada 11 Body Camera at 16:40.) This does not support a finding of liability. 12 In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Farruggia planned and supervised the 13 raid, and that he was the highest ranking officer at the execution of the warrants but that he did 14 nothing to stop the unconstitutional actions of his subordinates, such as Defendant Walter. (Pls.’ 15 Opp’n at 14.) The Alameda Defendants, in turn, respond that there is no underlying constitutional 16 violation, Defendant Farruggia is entitled to qualified immunity, and that there is no Monell claim. 17 (Alameda Defs.’ Reply at 14.) As discussed above, however, there is a viable claim for 18 unreasonable seizure and unreasonable force as to Plaintiff Eteghaei. There is no dispute that 19 Defendant Farruggia was the operational commander for executing the search warrant, that he was 20 present at the scene, and that he was in a position to witness the alleged constitutional violations at 21 issue. (Farruggia Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, 6, Dkt. No. 117-3.) There is also no dispute that he did not 22 intervene to stop the unconstitutional actions of his subordinates. Accordingly, the Court 23 concludes that Defendant Farruggia is not entitled to summary judgment as to supervisory 24 liability. 25 ii. University Defendants 26 To the extent Plaintiffs assert that the University Defendants had supervisory liability over 27 officers in a different police department based on their obtaining the search warrant, the Court has 1 Defendant Levette had supervisory control over Defendants Samaniego and Avila, but did nothing 2 to prevent Defendant Samaniego from stating that Plaintiff Zade should remain handcuffed. (Pls.’ 3 Opp’n at 23.) As discussed above, Plaintiffs cannot establish a constitutional violation as to 4 Defendant Samaniego’s decision to keep Plaintiff Zade handcuffed. Further, Plaintiffs cite no 5 evidence that Defendant Levette was present when Defendant Samaniego made this decision. 6 Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendant Levette knew of a violation but failed to 7 prevent it. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the individual University Defendants are entitled 8 to summary judgment as to supervisory liability. 9 D. Violation of California Constitution, Article I, § 13 10 “Article I, section 13 guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 11 seizures.” Roy v. Cnty. of L.A., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2015). This provision 12 “parallels the Fourth Amendment inquiry[.]” Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 928- 13 29 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1329 (1987) (“The touchstone 14 for all issues under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 13 of the California Constitution 15 is reasonableness.”). 16 The Alameda Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim fails because they were acting on a 17 proper warrant. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 29.) The Court previously rejected this 18 argument because Plaintiffs did not appear to bring a claim based on an unreasonable search or a 19 defective warrant. (9/25/23 Order at 10.) Rather, Plaintiffs rely on how the search warrant was 20 executed, including whether the Alameda Defendants impermissibly detained Plaintiffs. (Pls.’ 21 Opp’n at 15.) As the Court has found that Plaintiff Eteghaei’s claim for unreasonable seizure 22 survives summary judgment, this claim survives as to Defendant Dormer. In contrast, because 23 Plaintiffs identify no other individual involved in the handcuffing of Plaintiff Eteghaei, and fail to 24 explain how Defendant County of Alameda would be held liable for Defendant Dormer’s actions, 25 summary judgment is appropriate as to all other Defendants. 26 In the alternative, the Alameda Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ damages claim fails 27 because Article I, § 13 does not permit money damages. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 would be available. See also Ordonez v. Stanley, 495 F. Supp. 3d 855, 866-67 (C.D. Cal. 2020) 2 (explaining that the California Supreme Court in Katzberg v. Regents of the University of 3 California, 29 Cal. 4th 300 (2002), “recognized the history of Section 13 supported a damages 4 action”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff Eteghaei can seek money damages under 5 Article I, § 13. 6 E. Claims 5 and 6: Violation of Bane Act and Conspiracy to Violate Bane Act 7 “The Bane Act civilly protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights 8 that are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out by threats, 9 intimidation or coercion.” Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018). 10 i. University Defendants 11 Plaintiffs have not established a constitutional violation by the University Defendants. 12 Thus, the Bane Act claim against the University Defendants necessarily fails. See Williamson v. 13 City of Nat’l City, 23 F.4th 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2022). For the conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs appear 14 to assert that there is a factual dispute as to whether the individual University Defendants had 15 input on how the County planned to execute the warrants. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 23-24.) In support, 16 Plaintiffs point to the fact that Defendant Samaniego sent a draft operations plan to Defendant 17 Moncada. (Id. at 24.) While this is undisputed, this does not necessarily mean that the Alameda 18 Defendants used Defendant Samaniego’s draft operations plan. Indeed, Defendant Moncada 19 stated that he had drafted the operations plan, which included the use of rifles, a ram, and cutters. 20 (Moncada Decl., Exh. G at 6-8.) Plaintiffs cite no evidence disputing that the individual 21 University Defendants did not provide comments on this operations plan, nor do they explain how 22 either the Defendant Samaniego’s draft operations plan or Defendant Moncada’s operations plan 23 necessarily resulted in a constitutional violation. It does not appear that Defendant Samaniego’s 24 draft operations plan included the use of any weapons, while Defendant Moncada’s operations 25 plan does not appear to detail how the weapons would be used. Plaintiffs do not point to any 26 evidence that the individual University Defendants discussed the level of force that would actually 27 be used at the operations meeting. In short, Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that would 1 would point a rifle at Plaintiff Eteghaei or that Defendant Dormer would handcuff Plaintiff 2 Eteghaei, regardless of his compliance or whether he posed a threat. Accordingly, the Court 3 concludes that the University Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the Bane Act 4 claims. 5 ii. Alameda Defendants 6 First, the Alameda Defendants seek summary judgment as to the Bane Act claims because 7 there is no constitutional violation. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 30.) As discussed 8 above, the Court finds that Plaintiff Eteghaei has raised a triable issue as to whether his 9 constitutional rights were violated. 10 Second, the Alameda Defendants argue there is no evidence showing that the individual 11 Defendants acted with specific intent. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 30-31.) In the 12 context of an excessive force claim, “a mere intention to use force that the jury ultimately finds 13 unreasonable . . . is insufficient. Rather, the jury must find that the defendants intended not only 14 the force, but its unreasonableness, its character as more than necessary under the circumstances.” 15 Reese, 888 F.3d at 1045. In Reaza v. County of Riverside, four officers responded to a 911 call at 16 the plaintiff’s home, during which they handcuffed and used force on the plaintiff’s son, resulting 17 in his death. No. 5:20-cv-01188-MEMF (SPx), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198653, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. 18 Oct. 26, 2022). The district court found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the 19 defendants had a specific intent to violate the son’s Fourth Amendment rights, which would 20 require a jury to consider the amount of force used, the nature of the force, and the nature of the 21 dialogue by the individual defendants. Id. at *59. Likewise, the Court here has found that 22 Plaintiff Eteghaei has raised a triable issue as to whether Defendant Walter violated his Fourth 23 Amendment rights, requiring a jury to consider whether the amount of force used and the nature of 24 the force was more than necessary under the circumstances. See also Reese, 888 F.3d at 1035, 25 1045 (finding that a reasonable jury could find that the defendant had a specific intent to violate 26 the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights where the defendant shot the plaintiff). Accordingly, the 27 Court concludes that Defendant Walter is not entitled to summary judgment on the Bane Act 1 Finally, as to conspiracy, the Alameda Defendants provide no legal argument. Instead, 2 their entire argument is as follows: “There is absolutely no evidence to support the argument that 3 [the Alameda Defendants] acted with the specific intent or conspired with UCSB PD to interfere 4 or attempt to interfere with the Plaintiff’s constitutional right by threats, intimidation, or coercion. 5 Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim against the [Alameda Defendants] for violating and conspiring to violate 6 the Tom Bane Act fail.” (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 30-31.) This conclusory 7 statement, which fails to explain what is required to establish conspiracy, is insufficient to satisfy 8 the Alameda Defendants’ burden at summary judgment. 9 In the absence of any legal argument or analysis by the Alameda Defendants, it is not 10 apparent to the Court that the Alameda Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the 11 conspiracy claim. While the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs (as discussed above) that attendance 12 at the operational meeting is sufficient to establish conspiracy, the Alameda Defendants were 13 working alongside Defendant Walter when he pointed his assault rifle at Plaintiff Eteghaei, but did 14 nothing to stop him. This participation in the operation, during which many of the officers were 15 pointing weapons, giving instructions to one another, and cooperating to execute the warrants, 16 may be sufficient for a jury to find conspiracy. See Allen v. Cnty. of Lake, Case No. 14-cv-3934- 17 TEH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12091, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015) (finding sufficient 18 allegations of conspiracy because the defendants were “allegedly either present (plausibly 19 inferring involvement . . . ) or directly took part in the searches of Plaintiffs’ properties and the 20 eradication of their marijuana”). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Alameda Defendants 21 are not entitled to summary judgment as to the Bane Act conspiracy claim. 22 F. Claim 7: Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision 23 Plaintiffs bring negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims as to Defendants 24 Farruggia and Mateen. Under this claim, Plaintiffs must establish that these Defendants’ 25 negligence in either hiring or supervising resulted in the constitution violation at issue. Doe v. 26 Capital Cities, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 1054 (1996). 27 With respect to Defendant Farruggia, the Court has found that Plaintiff Eteghaei has raised 1 to the complained of acts. To be clear, this is not a finding of liability based on vicarious liability; 2 liability would be based on Defendant Farruggia’s own actions. Thus, Cal. Gov. Code § 820.8’s 3 prohibition on vicarious liability does not apply. (See Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 31.) 4 As to Defendant Mateen, however, Plaintiffs fail to provide any explanation for how Defendant 5 Mateen was responsible for hiring, training, or supervising the other officers. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at 6 18.) Thus, it is unclear why he would be liable for their actions. Accordingly, the Court 7 concludes that Defendant Mateen is entitled to summary judgment as to the negligent hiring, 8 training, and supervision claim, but that Defendant Farruggia is not. 9 G. Claims 8 and 9: Assault and Battery 10 “Assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury 11 on another.” Finley v. City of Oakland, No. C 04-5102 MEJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6623, at *39 12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2006). Battery, in turn, “is any willful or unlawful use of force or violence 13 upon another that causes injury.” Id. “Where a police officer is the defendant, the plaintiff must 14 prove unreasonable force as an additional element of these torts.” Id. at *40 (citing Edson v. City 15 of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272 (1998); see also Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 16 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A prima facie case for battery is not established under California law unless 17 the plaintiff proves that an officer used unreasonable force against him to make a lawful arrest or 18 detention.”). 19 The Alameda Defendants argue that because they used reasonable force, the state law 20 claims for assault and battery must be dismissed. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 32.) The 21 University Defendants, in turn, argue that they did not use any unreasonable force against 22 Plaintiffs. (University Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 31.) As discussed above, the Court finds there 23 is a triable issue as to whether Defendant Walter used unreasonable force against Plaintiff 24 Eteghaei, as well as whether Defendant Dormer’s handcuffing of Plaintiff Eteghaei was 25 unreasonable. Thus, the Court finds that all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the 26 assault and battery claims except Defendant Walter as to Plaintiff Eteghaei’s assault claim and 27 Defendant Dormer as to Plaintiff Eteghaei’s battery claim. H. Claim 10: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 1 To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) 2 extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 3 disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or 4 extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 5 defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 6 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). To constitute outrageous conduct, the conduct “must be so 7 extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. 8 With respect to the University Defendants, the Court finds that summary judgment is 9 warranted. As the University Defendants point out, their only interaction with Plaintiffs at the 10 scene was Defendant Samaniego’s decision to keep Plaintiff Zade in handcuffs, a decision that 11 was reasonable under the circumstances. (University Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 32.) Plaintiffs 12 provide no response to this. 13 As to the Alameda Defendants, the parties dispute whether there is any evidence that they 14 intended on causing or acting with reckless disregard to causing Plaintiffs to suffer emotional 15 distress. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 32.) Plaintiffs argue that “[b]ased on the 16 defendants’ consistent citations to Arian’s case, even when he is not a party to this action, strongly 17 suggest that this execution of the warrants was intentionally designed to embarrass and humiliate 18 his parents.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 20.) Plaintiffs cite no legal authority in support, nor do they cite 19 evidence. It is not clear how the Court can simply assume that citations to Arian’s case -- the very 20 reason for the warrants at issue and why Defendants were at Plaintiffs’ residence -- demonstrates 21 an intent to cause Plaintiffs emotional distress. Unsupported arguments in a brief are insufficient 22 to demonstrate intent. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Alameda Defendants are entitled to 23 summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 24 I. Claims 11 and 12: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligence 25 “Unlike the intentional formulation, [negligent infliction of emotional distress] ‘is a form 26 of the tort of negligence, to which the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages 27 apply.” Burnell v. Marin Humane Soc’y, Case No. 14-cv-5635-JSC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 150607, at *65 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2015) (quoting Huggins v. Longs Drugs Stores Cal, Inc., 6 Cal. 2 4th 124, 129 (1993).) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to identify a breach of duty. (Alameda 3 Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 33; University Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 32.) In response, Plaintiffs 4 state: “Aside from the fact that it is the announced policy of the Alameda County police to ‘protect 5 and serve’ its population, cite, which should answer the duty of care, they clearly breached that 6 duty in this case.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 20.) Plaintiffs cite no legal authority that “the announced 7 policy” of a police department (for which Plaintiff also includes no evidentiary support) creates a 8 duty of care. In the alternative, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants cite no evidence of the lack of 9 a breach of duty of care. (Id.) This misapprehends the summary judgment standard; as the party 10 with the burden of proving the claim, it is Plaintiffs who are obliged to identify the relevant 11 evidence. As Plaintiffs have not, the Court concludes that summary judgment is warranted on this 12 claim. 13 J. Claims 13 and 14: False Imprisonment and False Arrest 14 “False arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts; rather, false arrest is one way to 15 commit a false imprisonment.” Finley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6623, at *37. “Under California 16 law, the elements of a claim for false imprisonment are: (1) the nonconsensual, intentional 17 confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, 18 however brief.” Young v. Cnty. of L.A., 655 F.3d 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 Here, the question is whether the detention was reasonable. As discussed above, there is a 20 triable issue as to whether Plaintiff Eteghaei was unreasonably seized based on the use of 21 handcuffs. Alameda Defendants assert immunity under California Government Code § 820.210 22 based on an exercise of discretion, but the Ninth Circuit has specifically found that “section 820.2 23 immunity does not apply to an officer’s decision to detain or arrest a suspect.” Liberal v. Estrada, 24 632 F.3d 1064, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011). Rather, immunity under § 820.2 “is reserved for those basic 25

26 10 At the hearing, Alameda Defendants asserted that they are entitled to immunity under various state statutes. In their briefing, however, the only discussion of such immunity was the application 27 of § 820.8 (vicarious liability for the actions of others) to the negligent training, hiring, and 1 policy decisions which have been expressly committed to coordinate branches of government.” 2 Id. (internal quotation omitted). Thus, “[a] police officer’s decision to detain or arrest a suspect is 3 not a basic policy decision, but only an operational decision by the police purporting to apply the 4 law.” Id. at 1084-85 (finding that § 820.2 did not apply to false imprisonment or false arrest 5 claims based on an officer detaining a suspect without reasonable suspicion or probable cause). 6 Here, the decision to handcuff Plaintiff Eteghaei was not a basic policy decision, but an 7 application of the law. Thus, there is a claim for false imprisonment/false arrest as to Defendant 8 Dormer. Otherwise, the Court finds that the other Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 9 on these claims. 10 K. Claim 15: Violation of California Government Code § 7286(b)(5) 11 Plaintiffs bring a claim for violation of California Government Code § 7286(b)(5) against 12 Defendant County of Alameda. California Government Code § 7286(b)(5) requires that law 13 enforcement agencies maintain a policy providing a minimum standard on the use of force, 14 including clear and specific guidelines regarding situations in which officers may or may not draw 15 or point a firearm. Defendant County of Alameda argues that the claim is moot because its current 16 use of force policy is in compliance. (Alameda Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 35.) 17 Plaintiffs do not respond in any meaningful way. Instead, the entirety of Plaintiffs’ 18 argument reads: “The California Legislature enacted Government Code Section 7286 precisely for 19 situations such as this one, to prevent armed officers from brandishing their firearms at persons 20 with the possibility of killing them. The Alameda County’s refusal to recognize this issue does 21 not shroud them with summary judgment.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 21-22.) 22 In short, there does not appear to be any dispute that Defendant County of Alameda is in 23 compliance with § 7286(b)(5). Nor do Plaintiffs provide any legal authority that the correction of 24 past non-compliance would defeat this claim. Accordingly, the Court concludes that summary 25 judgment is warranted. 26 IV. CONCLUSION 27 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the University Defendants’ motion for 1 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court DENIES summary judgment 2 as to the following: 3 (1) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure against 4 Defendant Dormer based on the handcuffing; 5 (2) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable force against 6 Defendant Walter based on the pointing of the rifle at him; 7 (3) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s supervisory liability claim against Defendant Farruggia; 8 (4) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s California Constitution, Article I, § 13 claim against Defendant 9 Dormer; 10 (5) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s Bane Act claim against Defendant Walter; 11 (6) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s conspiracy to commit a Bane Act violation against Alameda 12 Defendants; 13 (7) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim against 14 Defendant Farruggia; 15 (8) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s assault claim against Defendant Walter; a 16 (9) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s battery claim against Defendant Dormer; and 3 17 (10) Plaintiff Eteghaei’s false imprisonment/false arrest claim against Defendant Dormer. 18 The Court finds that the Alameda Defendants are otherwise entitled to summary judgment 19 || on the remaining claims, including all claims brought by Plaintiff Zade. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: October 16, 2024 :

23 United States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28