Estrada v. Inman

2024 Ohio 1390

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 12, 2024
• Docket: 29977
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Estrada v. Inman, 2024-Ohio-1390.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

SARAH ESTRADA : : Appellee : C.A. No. 29977 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 DV 00194 : DOUGLAS INMAN : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- : Domestic Relations) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on April 12, 2024

CHRISTOPHER L. TROLINGER, Attorney for Appellant

MICKENZIE R. GRUBB, Attorney for Appellee

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Respondent-Appellant Douglas Inman appeals from the trial court’s

judgment granting a domestic violence civil protection order in favor of Petitioner-Appellee

Sarah Estrada. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} According to Appellee’s testimony at the hearing before the magistrate on

her petition for a domestic violence civil protection order, the parties in this matter were -2-

married and had two children. In 2015, prior to their divorce, Appellant grabbed Appellee

by the throat and threatened to kill her and take their children. The parties reconciled after

that incident but later divorced in Hamilton County Domestic Relations Court in January

2018.

{¶ 3} During the COVID-19 pandemic, Appellant had limited contact with Appellee

and the children; he had infrequent parenting visits over approximately two years, and the

parties did not following the parenting time schedule. In October 2022, Appellee sought

to relocate and modify the parenting time order in the Hamilton County court.

{¶ 4} In February 2023, when the parties appeared in Hamilton County on the post-

decree motion regarding parenting time, Appellant was argumentative and stared at

Appellee during the hearing. After the hearing concluded, Appellee spoke to her attorney

in the courtroom and waited for approximately 15 minutes to leave in an effort to ensure

that she and Appellant would not cross paths leaving the courthouse. Appellee eventually

exited the building, went to her car, and then texted her attorney to inform the attorney

that she was safely in her car and was leaving with plans to meet a friend for lunch. She

then drove away, heading west toward Western Hills. While driving, she noticed that

Appellant was following her. She became scared and nervous and took a picture of his

car. She also noticed that he changed lanes as she did, so she decided to drive to the

nearest police station and called the police from her cell phone. Appellant followed her

there. The police advised Appellee that, if she desired a protection order, she would need

to seek one in Montgomery County, where she lived.

{¶ 5} Appellee then filed a petition for a domestic violence civil protection order -3-

against Appellant in Montgomery County on February 10, 2023. That same day, the trial

court granted an ex parte temporary civil protection order, ordering Appellant to stay away

from Appellee and to not be within 500 feet of her. The full hearing on the petition was

scheduled for February 27, 2023, but was postponed due to a weather event; the hearing

was rescheduled for May 15, 2023.

{¶ 6} On April 11, 2023, Appellee filed a motion to show cause, alleging that,

instead of having his mother facilitate the parenting time exchange, Appellant intentionally

showed up for the exchange despite the court’s ex parte order and failed to stay 500 feet

away from Appellee in an effort to intimidate her and put her in an unsafe position.

{¶ 7} Appellant’s petition proceeded to a hearing before the magistrate on May 15,

2023, during which both parties testified.

{¶ 8} According to Appellee’s additional testimony at the hearing, after the ex parte

order was issued, the parties used the parenting application, AppClose. Appellant first

messaged through AppClose on February 10, 2023, and then messaged again on

February 11. On February 12, Appellant sent a message to Appellee at 11:58 a.m. and

then messaged her that same day another 17 times. Appellant then sent nine messages

on February 13, nine messages on February 14, nine messages on February 15, and

three messages on February 16. In his multiple messages to Appellee, Appellant

appeared to become more and more frustrated with what he believed was Appellee’s

unwillingness to communicate with him. Appellant’s messages were demanding and

argumentative, but he did not explicitly threaten Appellee. Thereafter, Appellant had the

children for visitation and was supposed to return them at their designated location but, -4-

instead, he took them to Appellee’s home, causing her to become fearful and contact her

therapist.

{¶ 9} Appellee also testified that Appellant’s past and recent behavior had been

intimidating and unpredictable. Appellee sought the protection order because Appellant’s

threatening behavior was escalating and "ramping up again" as it had in the past, causing

her to feel unsafe all over again given their history. Appellee testified that Appellant’s

behavior escalates in a cycle and that the cycle had started again, as Appellant had

followed her in his car after the parenting time hearing, was angrily texting her, and was

ignoring the ex parte order.

{¶ 10} During the hearing, Appellant was argumentative, and his demeanor was

hostile. The magistrate admonished Appellant for staring at Appellee, making faces at

her, and laughing at her testimony, resulting in a recess. Appellant initially denied ever

grabbing Appellee’s throat in 2015 or 2016 but then said that he could not recall. With

respect to the incident in which he followed Appellee in his car, he testified that, when he

was driving home from the parenting time hearing, he noticed Appellee’s car pull in front

of him, so he, too, decided to drive to the nearest police station to have witnesses and to

ask about obtaining a protection order against Appellee.

{¶ 11} On July 11, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision granting Appellee’s

petition for a protection order for a period of two years. Based on the parties’ testimony,

the magistrate found that, even though the 2015 incident took place eight years prior to

Appellee’s filing her petition, that incident had colored all future interactions between the

parties. The magistrate found that Appellant’s actions during and after the parenting time -5-

hearing (when he followed Appellee) were concerning and did not find Appellant’s

explanation for following Appellee to the police station to be credible. The magistrate also

found that Appellee credibly testified that she had seen Appellant’s behaviors before and

that she was genuinely afraid and believed his actions were “escalating.” The magistrate

concluded that Appellant’s actions during and after the parenting time hearing, his

incessant texting, his argumentative posture toward Appellee, and his demeanor in court

suggested that his actions were escalating and that he posed a threat to the safety of

Appellee. The magistrate explained that, although Appellant’s actions alone would

generally not be enough to grant a protection order, his escalating actions, coupled with

Appellant’s having grabbed Appellee by the throat and threatened to kill her in 2015,

indicated that Appellant posed a significant risk to Appellee’s safety.

{¶ 12} Appellant timely filed his objections to the magistrate’s decision on July 24,

2023. On October 23, 2023, the trial court issued its decision overruling Appellant’s

objections and ordered that the two-year protection order granted by the magistrate

remain in effect. In its decision and judgment, the court stated that the parties had had a

problematic relationship in past years, resulting in the domestic violence incident in 2015.

The court stated that Appellant’s communication with Appellee through AppClose had

been antagonistic and badgering. The court noted that the magistrate had admonished

Appellant’s intimidating behavior during the hearing, resulting in a recess, and had found

that Appellee credibly testified that Appellant followed her in his vehicle following the

parenting time hearing. The court further noted that Appellee had testified that she was

afraid of Appellant and was visibly shaken at the hearing. In finding that Appellee met her -6-

burden of proof for the civil protection order, the court explained that it was reasonable

for Appellee to be in fear of Appellant based on the totality of the circumstances,

specifically noting Appellant’s badgering and voluminous texts and the prior incidents in

which Appellant had grabbed Appellee by the neck and threatened to kill her and had

followed Appellee in his car.

{¶ 13} Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 14} Appellant asserts the following two assignments of error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS

THE GRANTING OF A CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER WAS NOT

SUPPORTED BY THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

GRANTING A CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER AS THERE WAS NO

EVIDENCE OF THREATS OF FORCE OR COMMITTING A VIOLATION

OF R.C. 2903.211 OR 2911.211.

{¶ 15} Appellant argues that the trial court’s decision to grant the petition for a civil

protection order was not supported by the record and was against the manifest weight of

the evidence. Appellant asserts that no threats were made against Appellee and the only

act of alleged domestic violence occurred in 2015. Appellant also argues that his actions

were not threatening and thus failed to establish any threats of domestic violence. We will

consider Appellant’s assignments of error together.

{¶ 16} “The decision whether to grant a protection order is within the sound -7-

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that

discretion.” Parrish v. Parrish, 95 Ohio St.3d 1201, 765 N.E.2d 359 (2002), citing Albers

v. Albers, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2011-CA-60, 2012-Ohio-3838, ¶ 11. To constitute an abuse

of discretion, a trial court’s action must be arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.

Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 12 Ohio St.3d 230, 232, 466 N.E.2d 875

(1984). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio

St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993). Rather, a reviewing court “must be guided by a

presumption that the findings of the trial court are correct.” Focke v. Focke, 83 Ohio

App.3d 552, 555, 615 N.E.2d 327 (2d Dist.1992).

{¶ 17} To obtain a civil protection order, “a petitioner must demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that the persons seeking protection are in danger of

domestic violence.” Tyler v. Tyler, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26875, 2016-Ohio-7419,

¶ 18, citing Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34, 679 N.E.2d 672 (1997), paragraph two of

the syllabus. “Domestic violence” against a family or household member means “(i)

attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury, (ii) placing another person by the

threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm, or committing either menacing

by stalking or aggravated trespass, (iii) committing any act with respect to a child that

would result in the child being an abused child, or (iv) committing a sexually oriented

offense.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3113.31(A)(1). “The statutory criterion to determine

whether or not to grant a civil protection order pursuant to R.C. 3113.31 is the existence

or threatened existence of domestic violence.” Tyler at ¶ 18, quoting Thomas v. -8-

Thomas, 44 Ohio App.3d 6, 8, 540 N.E.2d 745 (10th Dist.1988). Contrary to the

arguments of Appellant, explicit threats of domestic violence are not required in order to

support the issuance of a civil protection order. Instead, statements, conduct, and

actions, taken with all surrounding facts and circumstances, can constitute a threat.

See J.S. v. L.S., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-571, 2022-Ohio-2485.

{¶ 18} As used in R.C. 3113.31, “ ‘imminence’ does not require an offender to carry

out a threat immediately, or be in the process of carrying it out.” Tyler at ¶ 21, citing Strong

v. Bauman, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 17256, 17414, 1999 WL 317432, *4 (May 21,

1999). “[T]he critical inquiry under the statute is whether a reasonable person would be

placed in fear of imminent (in the sense of unconditional, non-contingent), serious

physical harm. This inquiry necessarily involves both subjective and objective elements.

* * * Therefore, we must determine whether [the petitioner] * * * had a reasonable belief

that * * * [the offender] would cause her imminent, serious physical harm.” Id., quoting

Strong v. Bauman, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17256, 1999 WL 317432, *4 (May 21, 1999).

{¶ 19} Civil protection orders are intended to prevent violence before it happens.

Id.. Although no part of R.C. 3113.31 refers to the consideration of past acts of domestic

violence in present cases, “courts have held that it is permissible in certain circumstances

for a court to consider past behaviors when determining whether there is a present threat

of domestic violence” because “in a situation where the alleged offending act is one that

places the assumed victim in fear of harm, ‘[t]he fear * * * and the reasonableness of that

fear could and should be determined with reference to [a petitioner’s] history with [the

respondent].’ ” Id. at ¶ 20, citing Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 82 Ohio App.3d 809, 816, -9-

613 N.E.2d 678 (10th Dist.1992). In Parrish, 95 Ohio St. 3d 1201, 1207-08, 765 N.E.2d

359, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated, in commenting upon the dynamic of domestic

violence:

Courts cannot look at incidents of domestic violence in a vacuum. Domestic

violence is almost always a series of incidents that gradually escalate into

increasing acts of brutality, repeating themselves in cycles. Thus, in a

petition for a civil protection order, evidence of respondent’s prior acts of

violence toward the petitioner or the respondent’s family or other household

members should be admissible to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that petitioner and her children are in danger of domestic violence.

{¶ 20} In the instant matter, Appellee filed the petition for protection after Appellant

became increasingly argumentative and visibly angry and followed her in his car after the

parenting time hearing. The parties had been divorced for approximately five years

following an incident in which Appellant grabbed Appellee by the throat and threatened

to kill her, and Appellee recognized Appellant’s behavior as escalating in a similar fashion

as she had previously experienced from him, resulting in an act of domestic violence.

Appellee had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she was

placed in fear of imminent serious physical harm and thus was entitled to the protection

order. R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a)(ii); see Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34, 679 N.E.2d 672, at

paragraph two of the syllabus. Resolving that issue here requires us to decide whether

there was sufficient credible evidence to support the finding that Appellant had engaged

in acts or threats of domestic violence, thereby entitling Appellee to a protection order. -10-

{¶ 21} The trial court specified several grounds upon which it determined that

Appellee had been placed in fear of imminent serious physical harm by the threat of force

and, thus, that Appellant had engaged in acts or threats of domestic violence: (1) the

parties’ problematic relationship in past years, resulting in the domestic violence incident

in 2015; (2) Appellant’s antagonistic and badgering communication with Appellee through

AppClose; (3) Appellant’s intimidating behavior during the hearing resulting in the

magistrate’s admonishment and taking a recess; (4) Appellant’s escalating actions and

behavior; (5) Appellee’s visible fear and shakiness at the hearing; and (6) Appellee’s

credible testimony that Appellant had followed her in his vehicle after the parenting time

hearing.

{¶ 22} As set forth above, the critical inquiries here, involving both subjective and

objective elements, were whether a reasonable person would have been placed in fear

of imminent serious physical harm and whether the trial court abused its discretion in

finding there was sufficient credible evidence that Appellee had a reasonable belief that

Appellant would cause her imminent serious physical harm. In finding that Appellee met

her burden of proof for the civil protection order, the trial court explained that it had been

reasonable for Appellee to be in fear of Appellant based on the totality of the

circumstances. We agree.

{¶ 23} The magistrate found Appellee’s testimony to be the most credible.

Appellee testified that she had observed Appellant’s past behaviors and that she was

genuinely afraid upon filing the petition for a protection order, believing that his actions

were “escalating” as they had in the past. She described how Appellant's past and most -11-

recent behavior was intimidating and unpredictable, causing her to feel unsafe all over

again given Appellant’s history of choking and threatening her and emphasizing that

Appellant’s behavior escalates in a cycle and that the cycle had started again. Because

the trial court was in the best position to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor

when weighing the credibility of their testimony, we give deference to its

findings. Abuhamda-Sliman v. Sliman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85174, 2005-Ohio-2836,

¶ 13, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 79-80, 461 N.E.2d

1273 (1984). Appellee’s testimony regarding Appellant’s history of violence directed

toward her, his escalating angry behavior, and his following her in his car after the

parenting time hearing supported the trial court’s conclusion that substantial competent

and credible evidence was presented that Appellant had placed Appellee in fear of

imminent serious physical harm.

{¶ 24} Finally, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s actions during and after

the parenting time hearing, his incessant texting, his argumentative posture toward

Appellee, and his demeanor in court suggested that his actions were escalating and that

he posed a threat to the safety of Appellee. As stated in Parrish, “domestic violence is

almost always a series of incidents that gradually escalate into increasing acts of brutality,

repeating themselves in cycles.” Based on our review of the record, and considering the

substantial evidence of Appellant’s prior acts of violence toward Appellee, his escalating

behavior, and all of the facts and circumstances surrounding his statements, conduct and

actions, we conclude that Appellant placed Appellee, by the threat of force, in fear of

imminent serious physical harm, and that not only would a reasonable person be placed -12-

in fear of imminent serious physical harm based on Appellant’s threats, but that Appellee

sufficiently demonstrated that she had a reasonable belief that Appellant would cause her

{¶ 25} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

granting the civil protection order, and Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 26} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

EPLEY, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.