Estrada v. Berryhill

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedMarch 4, 2024
Docket3:18-cv-05362
StatusUnknown

This text of Estrada v. Berryhill (Estrada v. Berryhill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estrada v. Berryhill, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE

8 CINDY M. ESTRADA, CASE NO. C18-5362RSM 9 ORDER GRANTING 10 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION AND CROSS MOTION FOR 11 v. ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) 12 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 13 Defendant. 14 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to 15 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), Dkt. #68, on behalf of Attorney Jeanette Laffoon. Plaintiff also filed a Cross 16 Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), Dkt. #72, on behalf of Attorney Eitan 17 Yanich. Attorney Laffoon seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $13,090.34. Dkt. #68 at 1. 18 This amount comes from 25% of Plaintiff’s retroactive benefits, $41,864.25, minus the previous 19 fees ordered under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), $4,736.70 to attorney Laffoon, 20 $24,037.21 to attorney Yanich. The Commissioner requests that the Court issue one order clearly 21 indicating the amount of § 406(b) fees entitled to each counsel. Dkt. #83 at 2. 22 Attorney’s fees may be awarded to a successful social security claimant’s lawyer for his 23 or her representation before a court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(b). Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 24 1 1167 (9th Cir.1989). Plaintiff must apply to the Social Security Administration for an award of fees for representation at the administrative level. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a); Stenswick v. Bowen, 815 2 F.2d 519 (9th Cir.1987). Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), the Court may allow a reasonable fee for an 3 attorney who represented a Social Security Title II claimant before the Court and obtained a 4 favorable judgment, as long as such fee is not in excess of 25% of the total past-due benefits. See 5 Grisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002). Fee awards may be made under both the EAJA 6 and § 406(b), but the claimant’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller 7 fee. See Gisbrecht at 796. 8 Both attorney Laffoon and attorney Yanich defer to this Court’s discretion on the 9 potential splitting of the § 406(b) fee. Twenty-five percent of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits was 10 withheld for potential fees, amounting to $41,864.25. Dkt. #69-2. Plaintiff and counsel have 11 subsequently agreed to a twenty-five percent fee from total past-due benefits, i.e. $41,864.25. 12 Dkts. #69-1, #72-3. The Court concludes this amount is reasonable within the meaning of § 13 406(b). The awarded EAJA fees of $28,773.91 ($4,736.70 to attorney Laffoon in 2016, 14 $24,037.21 to attorney Yanich in 2023) were less than twenty-five percent of Plaintiff’s past-due 15 benefits. Because the awarded EAJA fees were lesser than $41,864.25, Plaintiff’s counsel is due 16 the net amount of $41,864.25 minus the $28,773.91 in EAJA fees that were previously 17 awarded—$13,090.34—which will be split evenly between attorney Laffoon and attorney 18 Yanich. See Gisbrecht at 796. 19 CONCLUSION 20 Accordingly, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion and Cross Motion, the Commissioner’s 21 Response, the exhibits and declarations attached thereto, and the remainder of the record, the 22 Court ORDERS as follows: 23 24 1 1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 406(b), Dkt. #68, is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff’s attorney, Jeanette Laffoon, is awarded reasonable fees 2 in the sum of $6,545.17; 3 2) Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 406(b), Dkt. #72, 4 is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff’s attorney, Eitan Yanich, is awarded reasonable fees 5 in the sum of $6,545.17; 6 3) This net payment of fees comprises 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits minus the 7 previously awarded EAJA fees; 8 4) Any payment of fees is from the claimant’s withheld past-due benefits. If the 9 Commissioner has not withheld past-due benefits sufficient to satisfy this order and 10 Plaintiffs’ attorneys report they are unable to collect the fee from the claimant, the 11 Commissioner will satisfy this order via the procedures in the Program Operation 12 Manual System (POMS) GN 03920.055.C. 13

14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

16 Dated this 4th day of March, 2024. 17 18 A 19 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20

23 24

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Related

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart
535 U.S. 789 (Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Matter of Anne Pilsbury
866 F.2d 22 (Second Circuit, 1989)
Nebraska Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Stromsburg
2 F.2d 518 (Eighth Circuit, 1924)

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Bluebook (online)
Estrada v. Berryhill, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estrada-v-berryhill-wawd-2024.