Estevez v. Lendy Electric Equipment & Supply Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Estevez v. Lendy Electric Equipment & Supply Corp.

280 A.D.2d 640, 721 N.Y.S.2d 543, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1865

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 26, 2001

StatusPublished

This text of 280 A.D.2d 640 (Estevez v. Lendy Electric Equipment & Supply Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Estevez v. Lendy Electric Equipment & Supply Corp., 280 A.D.2d 640, 721 N.Y.S.2d 543, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1865 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jackson, J.), dated June 9, 2000, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The doctor’s affirmation submitted by the defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment made out a prima facie case (see, CPLR 3212 [b]) that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The burden therefore shifted to the plaintiff to come forward with sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that he sustained a serious injury (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955). Since the plaintiff’s submissions failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the defendants’ motion was properly granted (see, Grossman v Wright, 268 AD2d 79). Ritter, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jackson, J.), dated June 9, 2000, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The doctor’s affirmation submitted by the defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment made out a prima facie case (see, CPLR 3212 [b]) that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The burden therefore shifted to the plaintiff to come forward with sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that he sustained a serious injury (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955). Since the plaintiff’s submissions failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the defendants’ motion was properly granted (see, Grossman v Wright, 268 AD2d 79). Ritter, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

280 A.D.2d 640, 721 N.Y.S.2d 543, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1865, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estevez-v-lendy-electric-equipment-supply-corp-nyappdiv-2001.

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