[293]*293OPINION
SAM BASS, Justice.
A jury found appellant, Esteves, guilty of aggravated robbery. Finding the enhancement allegations true, the jury assessed punishment for life.
We affirm.
Late one evening, Debois and Haba went to see a basketball game. Because they arrived late, they parked some distance from the stadium. As they walked toward the stadium, a blue car approached and stopped, blocking their path. Appellant opened the door and stepped in front of them with a pistol.
Appellant demanded their money and stated “Don’t jack with me or I’ll kill you,” pointing the pistol and waving it back and forth. Terrified, Debois and Haba began looking through their purses.
The driver told appellant to take the purses. Appellant grabbed Debois’s arm and took both Debois and Haba’s purses. Appellant got back into the car and left. Debois and Haba went to a nearby security guard, who called the police. Debois and Haba gave the police a description of the assailant and the car.
About seven hours later, appellant, along with Riles and Mayfield were arrested at a convenience store for having committed the offenses of criminal mischief and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The arresting police officers found several purses in the back seat of the car at the store. The purses were given to the Houston Police Robbery Division, and two were later identified as those stolen from Debois and Haba.
Appellant was placed in a five-man lineup. The lineup was videotaped. One day later, the videotape was separately shown to Debois and Haba. Haba positively identified appellant as the robber.
In point of error one, appellant argues he was denied a fair trial because the State peremptorily struck four black venire members on the basis of race.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution forbids a prosecutor from excluding venirepersons from jury service solely because of their race. Powers v. Ohio, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1870, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); U.S. Const, amend. 14. Our State constitution also prohibits Raison-type discrimination in the selection of a jury. Hill v. State, 775 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref’d); Tex. Const, art. I, § 3a.
In reviewing a Batson claim, an appellate court must determine if the State exercised its peremptory strikes in a purposefully discriminatory manner. Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 870 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). The standard of review for a Batson challenge is whether the fact findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous. Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 726 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (op. on reh’g) (specifically modifying the “supported by the record” standard adopted in Keeton, 749 S.W.2d at 870). A trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); Whitsey, 796 S.W.2d at 728.
Appellant complains the four black venirepersons were peremptorily struck by the State. Because the State’s overall conduct in jury selection is relevant in proving discrimination, however, we must review each peremptory strike of a black venire-person and the plausible, racially-neutral explanation offered by the State for each. Whitsey, 796 S.W.2d at 727.
The prosecutor testified she struck Reed because she was not responsive to her questions. Another prosecutor noted that Reed had yawned throughout the voir dire proceedings. This was a legitimate, race-neutral reason to strike. York v. State, 764 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).
[294]*294When neutral explanations are offered it becomes the defendant’s burden to persuade the court that such challenges were racially motivated. Lewis v. State, 815 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Jones v. State, 781 S.W.2d 415, 417-18 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref'd). Appellant offered no rebuttal.
The prosecutor testified she struck Simmons because she had indicated that she would need more than one witness before she could vote for conviction. Only after being repeatedly told by the trial judge did Simmons agree to follow the one-witness rule. Garrett v. State, 815 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d).
Simmons also stated she had a first cousin who was charged with aggravated robbery.
Other courts have recognized that kinship to a person who has trouble with the law can constitute a legitimate, racially-neutral reason for striking a venireperson. Sims v. State, 768 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1989) pet. dism’d, 792 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (citing Rijo v. State, 721 S.W.2d 562 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1986, no pet.). Appellant offered no rebuttal.
The prosecutor testified Harrison was struck because she had an uncle convicted for sexual assault of a child. Sims, 768 S.W.2d at 865. In response to the appellant’s rebuttal, the prosecutor explained she did not strike a white venireper-son who had a nephew in prison for armed robbery because the venireperson explained he was not close to his nephew and had completely forgotten about his nephew’s Louisiana conviction until he was questioned during voir dire. This explanation was. sufficient to explain the differences in the strikes of the two parties so as to show no racial basis.
The prosecutor explained she struck Ross because Ross had stared at her from the moment that she entered the courtroom. No other member stared at her to that degree. Again, appellant offered no rebuttal.
The trial court’s determination to accept the prosecutor’s explanations should be reviewed with great deference as they involve an evaluation of credibility. Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 202 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Here, the appellant has not shown that the trial court’s determination was “clearly erroneous.” Whitsey, 796 S.W.2d at 726.
We overrule appellant’s point of error one.
In point of error two, appellant argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce testimony of a pretrial lineup identification. Appellant contends the lineup shown was impermissibly suggestive and it resulted in irreparable misidentification.
Houston Police Sergeant McClane testified the lineup was held less than two days after the offense. The lineup consisted of five men wearing similar pants but different colored shirts. Appellant was allowed to chose his position in the lineup. The men had similar hair length and facial hair.
The next day, Debois and Haba were each shown a videotape of the lineup. Although Debois could not positively identify the appellant, Haba immediately picked appellant as her assailant. Sergeant McClane stated Debois and Haba viewed the videotape separately and were told the lineup may not include the persons that robbed them.
Appellant argues the lineup contained height, weight, and shirt disparities between the participants. Sergeant McClane testified the appellant was 6' 1" and weighed 180 pounds. The other four men were: 6' 4", 180 pounds; 6' 1", 150 pounds; 6' 2", 216 pounds; and 5' 10", 165 pounds. Appellant was the only participant wearing an orange shirt.1
We do not find the circumstances of the lineup impermissibly suggestive. It is not essential that all the individuals be [295]*295identical. Buxton v. State, 699 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). “[Njeither due process of law nor common sense” requires such exactitude. Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313, 319 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (citing Dickson v. State, 492 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)).
Even if we assume for purposes of argument that the procedure was suggestive, we find Haba’s identification reliable. Reliability is the “linchpin” in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Munguia v. State, 603 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)).
In determining the reliability, we consider: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the defendant during the commission of the offense; (2) the witness’ degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the prior description of the accused; (4) the level of certainty of the identification; and (5) the amount of time between the crime and the identification. Munguia, 603 S.W.2d at 878.
Here, Haba testified the area was well lit and she got a good look at appellant’s face. Haba had described appellant to the police as a black man with dark complexion, approximately 6' tall and 170 to 200 pounds. At trial, she expressed no doubt appellant was her assailant and stated she could have identified the appellant at trial even if she had not seen the videotaped lineup. In addition, less than 40 hours had elapsed between the offense and the showing of the lineup.
Unless it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the identification was irreparably tainted, this Court will not reverse a conviction on these grounds. Jackson v. State, 628 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
We overrule appellant’s point of error two.
In points of error three, four, and 12, the appellant argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony concerning the circumstances of his arrest as improper evidence of an extraneous offense.
To obtain a reversal on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show: (1) his counsel’s performance was so deficient that counsel was not functioning at the level of competence guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We presume counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be sustained only if it is firmly grounded in the record. Mercado v. State, 615 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Shepherd v. State, 673 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.). Appellant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).
Here, appellant complains of the testimony concerning the disturbance call and his later arrest at a convenience store for having committed the offense of criminal mischief. One officer testified appellant was inside yelling obscenities and kicking the bathroom door. Another officer, when asked where the purses were recovered from, stated:
According to the officer that made the arrest, the property was recovered in a stolen vehicle that the suspects had occupied.
Appellant contends the criminal mischief was unrelated to the offense of robbery and the mere mention of a stolen car allowed him to be convicted “for being a criminal generally.” Jones v. State, 587 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). We disagree.
Here, the identity of the complainants’ assailant was the primary contested issue. The recovery of the stolen purses, the recovery of the stolen car, and the acts of [296]*296criminal mischief all showed the appellant’s connection to the car which was relevant to why he was placed in the lineup. See Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 100-101 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). Extraneous offenses are admissible: (a) to show the context in which the criminal act occurred (sometimes called “res gestae”); (b) to circumstantially prove identity where the state lacks direct evidence; (c) to prove scienter, where intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of the State’s case and cannot be inferred from the act itself; (d) to prove malice or state of mind where malice is an essential element of the State’s case; (e) to show the accused’s motive, particularly where the commission of the offense at bar is either conditioned on the commission of the extraneous offense or is a part of a continuing’ plan or scheme of which the crime on trial is also a part; (f) to refute a defensive theory raised by the accused. Further, this list is not and was never intended to be exhaustive. Cantrell v. State, 731 S.W.2d 84 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
Relevant evidence is to be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to a defendant. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 403.
Appellant’s counsel was not deficient. Appellant has not met the first requirement of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
We overrule appellant’s points of error three, four, and 12.
In points of error five and six, appellant argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s introduction of “false evidence” before the jury. Relying on Luck v. State, 588 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), appellant contends he was denied a fair trial when, during direct examination of the arresting officer, the prosecutor stated appellant was the driver of the car found at the location of his arrest.
Appellant asserts that reversal must follow if the State presents a false picture of the facts by failing to correct its own testimony when it becomes apparent that it was false. 588 S.W.2d at 373 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79. S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959)). Appellant’s reliance on Luck is misplaced.
Here, the record clearly reflects appellant was not the driver. While questioning the officer, the prosecutor suggested the appellant had been the driver. Appellant’s counsel immediately objected. The trial court sustained counsel’s objection and the prosecutor rephrased the question. While examining another officer, the prosecutor referred to appellant as the driver of the car where the purses were found.2 The appellant’s counsel did not object.
This could be considered as an isolated failure to object to improper evidence or argument, which does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Ewing v. State, 549 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). Even assuming counsel’s errors qualify his performance as “deficient,” where there is “overwhelming evidence of [appellant’s] guilt ... there is no reasonable probability that the result of [appellant’s] trial would have been different.” Ex parte Walker, 777 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
To succeed under Strickland, appellant must show us there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s alleged deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Appellant has not met this burden.
We overrule appellant’s points of error five and six.
In points of error seven, eight, and nine, appellant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure the testimony of other witnesses material to his defense of mistaken identity.
Appellant contends counsel should have called Riles and Mayfield to testify. Appellant, however, cites nothing showing that [297]*297either were available or would testify favorably. Appellant must show, on the record, that these witnesses would have testified to his benefit. Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
Appellant also contends counsel should have investigated or secured the testimony or report of the officer who initially reported Haba’s and Debois’ description of their assailant. Appellant contends Haba’s initial description varied from the description given at trial.
Appellant, however, cites nothing showing counsel did not investigate. Nor is there any reasonable probability this evidence would have led to a different result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. at 2055.
We overrule appellant’s points of error seven, eight, and nine.
In points of error 10 and 11, appellant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the State bolstered Haba’s identification. Lyons v. State, 388 S.W.2d 950 (Tex.Crim.App.1965).
Appellant contends Haba gave unim-peached testimony that she identified appellant as the number two suspect in the lineup. The State called Sergeant McClane, who testified that Haba was able to make a positive identification. Sergeant McClane did not state who she identified, but later stated appellant was in the number two position.
Again, we are mindful that isolated failures to object to certain procedural mistakes or improper evidence or argument do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Ingham, 679 S.W.2d at 509; Ewing, 549 S.W.2d at 395. Whether the appellant received error-free representation is not the test; that appellant’s counsel made some mistakes at trial does not show ineffective assistance. Ex parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Ingham, 679 S.W.2d at 509. Strickland requires us to determine “whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.
Again, the appellant has not demonstrated any probability that this evidence would have led to a different result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. at 2055. After reviewing all of the alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude appellant’s counsel was not ineffective under the guidelines of Strickland.
We overrule appellant’s points of error 10 and 11.
In points of error 13, 14, and 15, appellant argues the pen packets are deficient and his counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object. Appellant contends the certifications that precede the packets are signed “Debra R. Margy, Deputy,” but that there is no indication of what she is deputy of. We disagree.
The “Deputy” designation follows the signature block “James D. Patton, Clerk, County Court, Walker County, Texas.” Clearly, Margy is a deputy clerk of Walker County.
Relying on Dingler v. State, 768 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), appellant also claims that the pen packets are deficient because they contain no certification by the convicting court.
Dingier, however, has been overruled. Reed v. State, 811 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Copies of judgments certified by the Department of Criminal Justice records custodian are admissible. Id.; see also Gann v. State, 818 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.) (this Court ruled an identical complaint moot in light of Reed).
We overrule appellant’s points of error 13, 14, and 15.
In points of error 16 and 17, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of true to the second enhancement allegation and counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s introduction of a prior conviction.
The pen packet offered to support enhancement paragraph two includes the photograph, fingerprints and commitments of [298]*298appellant in cause numbers 459,580 and 452,237. The judgment sheet in cause number 459,530 indicates a conviction for “Eric Victor Esteves.” The judgment sheet in cause number 452,376 indicates a conviction for “Aundra Dixon.”
Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to prove he is the same person as “Aundra Dixon,” ■ and, therefore, is also insufficient to support the jury’s finding of true.
Enhancement paragraph two of the indictment, however, does not mention cause number 452,376. Enhancement paragraph two relies on the conviction in cause number 459,530, a conviction for “Erie Victor Esteves.” Thus, we find the State properly linked appellant to the conviction used in the enhancement paragraphs.
As part of this argument, appellant argues his counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the admission of the “Aundra Dixon” conviction. This alleged omission occurred during the punishment stage of the trial.
The Strickland test applies only to the appellant’s allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt-innocent stage of the trial, not to the punishment stage. Ex parte Walker, 777 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). At the punishment stage, we judge counsel’s effectiveness by the standard of “reasonably effective assistance.” Cruz, 739 S.W.2d at 58. This standard requires a showing of harm due to the alleged ineffective assistance. Stone v. State, 751 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).
The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed similar facts in Rico v. State, 707 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (op. on reh’g). In Rico, at the punishment phase of trial the prosecutor introduced into evidence the defendant’s seven prior convictions. Id. at 556. There were valid grounds to object to two of the seven prior convictions, but the objection made by counsel was inadequate and failed to preserve the issue for review. Id. at 554. The court wrote that:
Even had defense counsel properly objected to the two prior convictions about which he complains on appeal and the two convictions excluded from evidence, the jury still would have had before them five prior convictions. Based upon this record, we are unable to say that there is a reasonable probability that the jury’s decision as to punishment would have been any different.
Id. at 556.
The same reasoning and result apply here. The record demonstrates that the prosecutor properly linked appellant to the conviction used in the second enhancement paragraph. The jury found two enhancement paragraphs true.
We overrule appellant’s points of error 16 and 17.
In point of error 18, appellant argues his trial counsel should have objected to the admission of the prior convictions because they did not contain evidence that he waived his right to trial by jury.
This same contention was raised and rejected in McCoy v. State, 529 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). The McCoy court held that because the judgment contained a recitation that the defendant had waived his right to trial by jury, there was a presumption of regularity that the trial court followed the proper rules of procedure. Id.
Here, the judgment contained similar language, and as in McCoy, appellant offers no evidence to show there was no written waiver of a jury trial in the prior convictions. Id.
We overrule appellant’s point of error 18.
In point of error 19, appellant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to put on mitigating facts to overcome the life sentence.
Nothing shows there was such evidence or that counsel knew or should have known of it at trial.
We overrule appellant’s point of error 19.
The judgment is affirmed.