Esteva v. Esteva, No. Fa99 0173926 S (May 4, 2001)

2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 5894
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedMay 4, 2001
DocketNo. FA99 0173926 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 5894 (Esteva v. Esteva, No. Fa99 0173926 S (May 4, 2001)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Esteva v. Esteva, No. Fa99 0173926 S (May 4, 2001), 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 5894 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The parties were married in New York City on October 24, 1980. They have one child, a daughter, Michelle born November 3, 1989. By agreement and stipulation of the parties prior to the start of trial, the court limited the hearing to testimony with regard to the financial aspects of the case. Custody and visitation were referred to Family Relations Office for an evaluation and report. The minor child currently resides with the defendant wife ("wife") at the marital home located at 60 Compo Mill Cove in Westport, Connecticut. In spite of the limitation with regard to the scope of issues, the trial took place over a period of eight days.

The wife is 45 years old. She suffers from asthma for which she takes some medications and inhalation therapy. Otherwise, she indicated that her health was good. She studied for two years at Albany University and worked as an account executive for Clinique Labs in New York. Her salary was $30,000 per year together with bonuses and commissions. Sometime CT Page 5895 prior to the marriage she resigned that position to work with the plaintiff husband ("husband") in his occupation — the operation of parking lots and garages. At the time of the hearing she indicated that she had brought some funds to the marriage, however, she did not introduce any credible evidence of specific dollar amounts.

The plaintiff husband is 58 years old. His health is apparently very good. He had two years of post high school education at Brooklyn College and six years in the military as an enlisted man. He was involved in the parking garage business for sometime prior to when the parties met and married.

The operation of parking garages and lots together with the related lease transactions can be quite profitable, and from what the court could glean from the testimony of the parties, it is a business that has as many layers as an onion, in addition to the obvious paper trail of leases, options, mortgages and other publicly recorded documents. According to the husband, there are relatively few major players in the industry, well known to each other and with whom informal dealings are fairly frequent and from whom reciprocity is expected. Significantly, in general, the leaseholds are relatively difficult to value and can be generally obtained for relatively little money down. No credible evidence was introduced regarding the fair market value of the leasehold interests held by the parties. The money to be made is in the cash flow associated with the operation of the garages and lots themselves. According to the husband's testimony, he has been at one time or another involved with approximately two dozen leases. In addition to the leasehold interests themselves, there are various corporate entities, the most important of which is the management company to which the individual lease operating companies are subordinate. It is into this Byzantime world that the parties entered, first the husband, and later the wife. Throughout most of the marriage, while the wife played an active role, the husband played the principal role in the obtaining and the management of these various business entities. According to the wife, she was not even aware of the fact that stock in the various corporations had been placed in her name. In addition, some of the leasehold interests were not wholly owned by the parties themselves but rather were shared interests with others.

Sometime prior to February of 1984 the husband established a foreign corporation by the name of Hamniermill Business Corporation, Inc., under the laws of Panama having its principal place of business in Geneva, Switzerland, the purpose of which was to purchase the real estate at 60 Compo Mill Cove in Westport and to keep any present and potential creditors of the husband at bay. The wife was made a 100% stock holder. The wife testified that it was the husband's idea, and that she concurred in the decision. From February 1984 until the fall of 1986, the parties CT Page 5896 spent more than $250,000 in renovating the property. The funds for the renovation came from their family income.

In March of 1997 as the marriage started to come unraveled, the wife arranged for the transfer of the Compo Mill property to her sole name. There is a dispute as to whether or not the husband had foreknowledge and consented to the transfer. The court heard from various witnesses and finds that the husband in fact had some knowledge of the pending transfer, but that he did not concede to said transfer which ultimately took place. At the time of the transfer, the wife immediately obtained a mortgage in her name in the amount of $800,000 the proceeds from which were placed in an escrow account with Allan Spirer a Westport attorney. The following day, a $10,000 check was drawn from the escrow account and paid to the law firm of Schoomaker and George as a retainer for legal services to commence divorce proceedings. Other disbursements from the escrow account took place over a period of time and were made almost exclusively for the benefit of the wife. Later, in December of 1997, the wife turned around and again refinanced the mortgage for $1,000,000, and the difference between the old mortgage and the new mortgage, amounting to approximately $200,000, was deposited into her personal checking account for which the husband had no access.

The court notes that a previous court held the wife in contempt for her failure to account for the proceeds for the million-dollar mortgage, and as part of that contempt provided the husband with a sum of $10,000 for an investigation into the wife's use of business funds and mortgage proceeds. According to the accounting introduced by the wife at the time of trial, from March 1997, when the house was transferred to her name, and September 2000, shortly before the trial, the wife had total cash inflows of over $1,700,000 out of which she spent $1,400,000 for her own living expenses and legal fees, and the rest in connection with the business. These expenditures included $56,912.00 for clothing, $43,035.00 for furniture, $39,005.00 for vacations, $405,000.00 in mortgage payments, and $256,874.00 in personal attorneys fees. Also, while she was living in the house, the wife used some of the mortgage proceeds to make mortgage payments in advance of their normal schedule, again, in an effort to further deplete family assets prior to trial. In addition to the foregoing disbursements, there was evidence that many thousands of dollars were spent for her "legal and accounting fees, "outside of the matrimonial action for which no credible itemized evidence of services performed was ever produced. The court finds this to be very suspicious, and it raises questions as to whether or not some of the mortgage proceeds have, in fact, been fairly or accurately accounted for.

Testimony was offered by a Westport broker regarding the wife's repeated listings of the property for far in excess of the obvious fair CT Page 5897 market value. According to her testimony, the property has limitations not the least of which is that access to it is over a private way and that the car cannot be driven to the house but must be parked some distance away. The court believes that the wife's repeated efforts to list the property for far in excess of the fair market value were part of an ill-disguised effort to remain in the house during the pendency of the present action and have resulted in further depletion of the marital assets. The court finds that fair market value of the property to be $1,900,000, based upon the stipulation of the parties.

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Billington v. Billington
595 A.2d 1377 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1991)
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Bluebook (online)
2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 5894, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/esteva-v-esteva-no-fa99-0173926-s-may-4-2001-connsuperct-2001.