Estep v. Baker

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMarch 5, 2018
Docket1:16-cv-12346
StatusUnknown

This text of Estep v. Baker (Estep v. Baker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estep v. Baker, (D. Mass. 2018).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ____________________________________ ) THOMAS ESTEP, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 16-12346-LTS ) GOVERNOR CHARLES BAKER, ) DANIEL BENNETT, MASSACHUSETTS ) PAROLE BOARD, PAUL TRESELER, ) CHARLENE BONNER, TONOMEY ) COLEMAN, SHEILA DUPRE, INA ) HOWARD-HOGAN, TINA HURLEY, and ) LUCY SOTO-ABBE, ) ) Defendants. ) )

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 41)

March 5, 2018

SOROKIN, J. Thomas Estep, a pro se plaintiff, filed a Complaint bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out his failure to receive parole. The defendants have moved to dismiss. Plaintiff’s claims against Governor Baker and Secretary Bennett are DISMISSED. The Complaint contains no factual allegations setting forth conduct on the part of either defendant sufficient to make out a “plausible entitlement to relief” under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). Indeed, nothing in the Complaint alleges that either defendant had any part in any of Plaintiff’s parole hearings. Plaintiff’s claims against the Parole Board are also DISMISSED. The Parole Board is an agency of the Commonwealth; it is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). Further, the claims against the members of the Parole Board are DISMISSED. Section 1983 bars injunctive relief “against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity […] unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks injunctive

relief arising from actions the Board Members took in their quasi-judicial roles—specifically, their considered denial of parole to Plaintiff. Johnson v. R.I. Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[P]arole board members are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages in a § 1983 action for actions taken within the proper scope of their official duties.”); Phillips v. Conrad, 2011 WL 309677 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2011) (“[P]arole board members and officers performing quasi-adjudicative functions” are “judicial officers […] generally immune from actions seeking injunctive relief” under § 1983.). The quasi-judicial immunity of these defendants results in dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.1 In light of the foregoing, the Court need not consider the other arguments that defendants advance in support of dismissal. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 41) is

ALLOWED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Leo T. Sorokin Leo T. Sorokin United States District Judge

1 The Court takes no position on whether Plaintiff may file a habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of his confinement in light of the allegations of misconduct he levels against the Parole Board and its members.

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Related

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
Estep v. Baker, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estep-v-baker-mad-2018.