Estate of Unterweiser v. Town of Hempstead

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Estate of Unterweiser v. Town of Hempstead

262 A.D.2d 351, 691 N.Y.S.2d 314, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6360

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 7, 1999

StatusPublished

This text of 262 A.D.2d 351 (Estate of Unterweiser v. Town of Hempstead) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Estate of Unterweiser v. Town of Hempstead, 262 A.D.2d 351, 691 N.Y.S.2d 314, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6360 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death, the defendant Dennis Noskin appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Levitt, J.), dated September 28, 1998, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The proponent of a motion for summary judgment “must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the [352]*352absence of any material issues of fact” (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324). The appellant failed to meet this burden, since material issues of fact exist regarding whether the letter dated February 25, 1991, that he sent to the Building Department of the Town of Hempstead, which erroneously states that he inspected the entire length of the roof soffit, and that a drainage problem had been corrected, was a contributing factor to the accident. Therefore, the appellant was not entitled to summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [b]), regardless of the insufficiency of the opposing papers (see, Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851). Bracken, J. P., Thompson, Sullivan and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death, the defendant Dennis Noskin appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Levitt, J.), dated September 28, 1998, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The proponent of a motion for summary judgment “must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the [352]*352absence of any material issues of fact” (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324). The appellant failed to meet this burden, since material issues of fact exist regarding whether the letter dated February 25, 1991, that he sent to the Building Department of the Town of Hempstead, which erroneously states that he inspected the entire length of the roof soffit, and that a drainage problem had been corrected, was a contributing factor to the accident. Therefore, the appellant was not entitled to summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [b]), regardless of the insufficiency of the opposing papers (see, Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851). Bracken, J. P., Thompson, Sullivan and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

262 A.D.2d 351, 691 N.Y.S.2d 314, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6360, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-unterweiser-v-town-of-hempstead-nyappdiv-1999.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack