Estate of Trentadue v. United States

560 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 2008 WL 906210
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedMarch 31, 2008
DocketCIV-97-849-L
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 560 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (Estate of Trentadue v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Trentadue v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 2008 WL 906210 (W.D. Okla. 2008).

Opinion

SECOND ORDER ON REMAND

TIM LEONARD, District Judge.

Background and Scope of Remand

This matter is before the court on a second remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Estate of Trentadue, et al. v. United States of America, et al., 244 Fed.Appx. 874 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (Trentadue II). Plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises from the August 1995 death of Kenneth Michael Trentadue, a 44 year old inmate of the Special Housing Unit (SHU) at the Federal Transfer Center (FTC) in Oklahoma City. The parties are familiar with the proceedings. Briefly stated, the court previously ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and awarded a total amount of $1.1 million in damages to the individual plaintiffs, stating, in part:

Evidence at trial established that the plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the reckless way in which they were treated by the United States in the aftermath of Trentadue’s death. The court finds that plaintiffs’ understandable emotional reaction to Trentadue’s death was needlessly and recklessly intensified by the United States’ failure to inform the family in advance as to the existence of the extensive injuries on Trentadue’s body and that an autopsy had been performed. Throughout the trial, the court heard no explanation for defendant’s silence in this regard.

Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 857 (10th Cir.2005) (Trentadue I) (quoting Order, *1126 No. CIV-97-849-L at 23 (W.D.Okla. May 1, 2001)). The court awarded $250,000 to Trentadue’s wife, $200,000 each to his mother, two brothers, and sister, and $50,000 to his father’s estate.

In order to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant’s conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe. Tren-tadue /, 397 F.3d at 855-56. In the first appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the court properly determined that plaintiffs proved the first, second, and third elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 857. According to the Tenth Circuit,

We agree with the district court that the government acted in deliberate disregard of a high probability that its actions would cause the Trentadues emotional distress. The Trentadues were a grieving family searching for answers in the wake of Kenneth Trenta-due’s untimely death. BOP’s overall treatment of the Trentadue family, including its initial nondisclosure of the unusual circumstances of death, its ob-stinance concerning authorization for an autopsy, and its failure to inform the Trentadues of the body’s battered condition amounted to outrageous conduct that “needlessly and recklessly” intensified the family’s emotional distress.

Id. at 857.

On remand, this court is to make certain additional findings specific to each individual plaintiff to support the court’s earlier determination that the emotional distress suffered by each plaintiff was severe under Oklahoma law. The Tenth Circuit’s remand orders are limited to further analysis of the fourth element of the tort, namely, whether each individual plaintiffs emotional distress was severe under Oklahoma law. An individualized severity analysis for the differently situated plaintiffs is called for because:

... [F]amily members experienced the death and its aftermath from different vantage points. For example, the decedent’s wife, mother, and sister personally witnessed the unveiling of the unexpectedly bruised and lacerated body of Mr. Trentadue at the California funeral home, while other family members were orally informed of the body’s condition. Trentadue I, 397 F.3d at 850. It has always been the government’s position that this is a distinction with a difference. Although all plaintiffs may have suffered “severe” distress in light of the government’s actions, the family members were subjected to different stresses and the severity of each plaintiffs distress therefore requires individualized evaluation.

Trentadue II, 244 Fed.Appx. at 876-877 (footnote omitted). According to the Tenth Circuit, “[further specificity as to the nature and severity of the harm suffered by each individual plaintiff will satisfy both our original remand and this present mandate for additional findings.” Id. at 877.

In Trentadue I, 397 F.3d at 856, the Tenth Circuit specifically addressed the requirements of the fourth element as follows:

... [T]he fourth element requires proof that the plaintiffs emotional distress was “so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.” Computer Publ’n, [Inc. v. Welton], 49 P.3d [732,] 736 [ (Okla.2002) ] (quoting Breeden [v. League Services CorpJ, 575 P.2d [1374,] 1377 n. 6 [ (Okla.1978) ]). While emotional distress includes “all highly unpleasant mental reactions,” it is only where the emotional distress is ex *1127 treme that liability arises. Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887, 901 n. 44 (Okla. 1998). “The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.” Bree-den, 575 P.2d at 1378 n. 6 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j). Moreover, although severe distress must be proved, “in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant’s conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed.” Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated:
Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.

Breeden, 575 P.2d at 1378, n. 6 (quoting Restatement of Torts (Second), § 46 cmt. j). It has long been established that the right to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not dependent on physical injury. Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855, 867 (Okla.1987) (citation omitted). Expert medical testimony ordinarily is not required where damages for emotional distress are present, rather, in most cases jurors, from their own experience, are aware of the extent and character of the disagreeable emotions that may result from a defendant’s outrageous conduct. Id.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
560 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 2008 WL 906210, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-trentadue-v-united-states-okwd-2008.