03/31/2026
DA 25-0246 Case Number: DA 25-0246
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 66
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF SEAN EDWARD THOMAS,
Decedent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District, In and For the County of Butte-Silver Bow, Cause No. DP-22-63 Honorable Robert J. Whelan, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Rachel H. Parkin, Gerald W. Steinbrenner, Milodragovich, Dale & Steinbrenner, P.C., Missoula, Montana
For Appellees:
David B. Cotner, Taylor N. Eisenzimer, Cotner Ryan Blackford, PLLC, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 25, 2026
Decided: March 31, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellant Jaimie Thomas (Jaimie), personal representative for Sean Edward
Thomas’ estate (the Estate), appeals the March 2025 order of the Montana Second Judicial
District Court, Butte-Silver Bow County, granting a “Preliminary Injunction” to Appellees
Paul Thomas, Thomas, Inc., and Teton Village, L.L.C. (collectively, Paul). We address
the following restated issues:
1. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction to restrain Jaimie’s conduct as personal representative.
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in restraining Jaimie’s conduct by requiring her to seek prior court approval for any estate distributions.
3. Whether the District Court was required to impose a bond.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Sean Thomas died on March 29, 2022. Jaimie is Sean’s widow; Paul is Sean’s
father. It is undisputed on the record here that Sean nominated Jaimie as personal
representative and named her as sole heir in his will. On April 26, 2022, Jaimie filed an
application for informal probate of Sean’s will and informal appointment as personal
representative in the Butte-Silver Bow County District Court. The clerk of court opened
an informal probate and informally appointed Jaime personal representative. After
appointment, Jaimie filed her statement of acceptance of appointment and
acknowledgement and acceptance of duties. In May 2022, Jaimie filed a notice of her
appointment as personal representative and published notice to creditors.
2 Background Facts/the Thomas Family Businesses
¶3 Paul’s family has been in the apparel business for over a century. In the mid-2010s,
in addition to his brick-and-mortar store in Butte, Paul began retailing online through
Amazon. In 2018-2019, Sean and Jaimie joined the family business and the three formed
Thomas Ent LLC (Thomas Ent) for the purposes of selling apparel at their entities, Victoria
Nicole’s Closet and Shoppelina, on Amazon. Separately, Paul owns Thomas, Inc.,
(Thomas Inc), Teton Village, L.L.C. (Teton Village), and VN Closet, LLC. The Amazon
stores generated millions of dollars in annual sales, which, according to the family’s
business plan, were directed into Thomas Ent.1
The Thomas Ent Litigation
¶4 On February 6, 2023, almost one year after Sean’s death, Paul initiated a civil action
in the Butte-Silver Bow County District Court as Cause No. DV 23-31. He named, as
plaintiffs, himself, Thomas Inc, and Teton Village; and named as defendants, Thomas Ent;
Shoppelina LLC; the Estate; and Jaimie, as personal representative and in her individual
capacity. Paul sought a declaratory judgment as to his ownership interest in Thomas Ent
and alleged numerous contract- and tort-based claims, including claims against Jaimie
personally. Jaimie, on behalf of herself, the Estate, and Thomas Ent, later filed a
counter-claim against VN Closet, LLC. At Paul’s request, the District Court granted a
1 We take these facts as alleged in Paul’s complaint and amended complaint in the Thomas Ent litigation, infra. 3 temporary restraining order barring any distributions or payments from the Thomas Ent
account without a court order.
Paul’s “Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction” in the Informal Probate Matter
¶5 On February 13, 2025, Paul filed a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction” in the probate matter, Cause No. DP 22-63, asking for injunctive
relief under § 27-19-314, MCA (temporary restraining orders), and § 27-19-201(1), MCA
(preliminary injunctions). He alleged that Jaimie had been “improperly taking and
depleting funds from the Estate, frustrating creditors’ ability to collect, and ultimately
dwindl[ing] what [was] left in the Estate in the event” of a likely judgment against the
Estate in the Thomas Ent litigation. Specifically, he alleged that Jaimie had paid out over
$700,000 in estate funds for non-estate purposes, including for her personal expenses
and defense in the Thomas Ent litigation, “rapidly depleting” the Estate. Paul claimed
“immediate steps should be taken to prevent Jaimie from further depleting Estate funds for
personal litigation and unrelated obligations” because, “if left unchecked, her actions could
result in significant financial harm” to estate creditors and beneficiaries. Paul identified
himself, his businesses, and Sean’s mother, Terry O’Keefe (Terry), as “legitimate
creditors.”2
¶6 The next day, the District Court issued a “Temporary Restraining Order” under
§ 27-19-314, MCA, based on the “significant risk” that Paul and any other estate creditors
2 Paul alleged that Terry’s creditor claims totaled over $887,000, and his creditor claims totaled over $2,000,000. 4 would “suffer immediate and irreparable injury” absent personal-representative restraint.
The court ordered that Jaimie, as personal representative, was prohibited from using or
distributing estate funds without all known creditors’ consent or a court order. The court
also set a hearing on the matter of injunctive relief for March 3, 2025, and ordered
responsive briefing.
¶7 Jaimie objected to issuance of a “preliminary injunction” on two grounds. First, she
said that Paul had not “followed the statutory probate procedures” to “convert[] the
informal probate into a formal probate” under Title 72, chapter 3, part 3, MCA, or to
“invoke supervised administration” of the Estate under Title 72, chapter 3, part 4, MCA.
And, in any event, Paul had no standing to do either because he was not an “interested
person” under the probate code because he failed to file a timely creditor claim against the
Estate.3 In the alternative, Jaimie argued that Paul had not established the elements
required for a “preliminary injunction” under § 27-19-201(1), MCA.
¶8 In reply, Paul argued that he was not required to petition for formal probate or
supervised administration of the Estate before asking the court to restrain Jaimie’s
conduct as personal representative under § 72-3-617, MCA (“order restraining personal
representative”). Paul explained that he was not asking for “a full administration and
settlement of the Estate under ongoing court supervision.” Rather, he only sought “to
prevent the Estate from making distributions for non-estate expenses,” particularly those
3 Jaimie denied that Paul’s February 2023 Thomas Ent lawsuit was a timely creditor claim under Title 72, chapter 3, part 8, MCA. 5 that benefitted Jaimie individually at the expense of estate creditors. He asserted that his
Thomas Ent lawsuit, which included the Estate as a defendant, entitled him to seek relief
under § 72-3-617, MCA.
¶9 At the March 3, 2025 hearing, Jaimie immediately objected to the proceedings as
exceeding the District Court’s jurisdiction in the informal probate matter. Paul answered
that § 72-3-617, MCA, authorized the court to restrain Jaimie’s conduct as personal
representative without a petition for formal probate or supervised administration and
without any formal determination as to his status as an estate creditor. The court concluded
that it had jurisdiction over the matter and “the ability to restrain” Jaimie “under the probate
statutes.” Then, the District Court “convert[ed]” the matter “to a formal probate” to “make
sure that any further distributions are appropriate.”
¶10 The record of the March 3, 2025 hearing establishes that the central issue was
whether Jaimie could or could not pay attorney fees incurred in the Thomas Ent litigation
out of the Estate. After hearing Jaimie’s testimony and counsels’ arguments, the court
decided to restrain Jaimie’s ability as personal representative to make estate distributions.
The court said it would authorize estate payments for reasonable attorney fees but that it
wanted “to take a look at them” first, to “make sure they look reasonable,” and would
expedite rulings on any objections.
¶11 On March 4, 2025, the District Court, “pursuant to MCA § 72-3-617,” issued a
“Preliminary Injunction” restraining Jaimie from “using and/or making any distributions
of Estate funds without consent of the court” based on its ruling that “Paul’s interests and
6 the interests of other creditors will be jeopardized” if Jaimie’s conduct as personal
representative were not so restrained. The court did not require a bond.
Resolution of the Thomas Ent Litigation
¶12 In April 2025, Jaimie immediately filed an “interlocutory appeal” of the March 4,
2025 “Preliminary Injunction” pursuant to M. R. App. P. (6)(3)(e). Since initiation of this
appeal, the Thomas Ent litigation in Cause No. DV 23-31 has resolved. Both parties call
our attention to the June 2025 jury verdict which, as of January 2026, Jaimie has appealed.
That appeal is also currently pending before this Court in Cause No. DA 26-0032.
¶13 Acknowledging these overlapping civil and probate proceedings, we nevertheless
limit our decision today strictly to the issues presented in this appeal. Paul’s status as an
estate creditor and the validity or timeliness of his creditor claims are not before this Court,
and we neither comment nor opine on those issues here. We decide only whether the
District Court had jurisdiction to restrain Jaimie’s conduct as personal representative,
whether it abused its discretion in doing so, and whether it was required to impose a bond.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14 We review a lower court’s factual findings for clear error, its conclusions of law
de novo for correctness, and its discretionary decisions for an abuse of discretion.
In re Estate of Hannum, 2012 MT 171, ¶¶ 18-19, 366 Mont. 1, 285 P.3d 463. A court
abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment or exceeding
the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. Hannum, ¶ 18. We review
7 questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo for correctness. In re Estate of Scott,
2023 MT 97, ¶ 9, 412 Mont. 303, 529 P.3d 867.
DISCUSSION
¶15 1. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction to restrain Jaimie’s conduct as personal representative.
¶16 Jaimie argues on appeal that the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction by
sua sponte “converting” the informal probate to “formal probate.” This assertion is
incorrect for numerous reasons. As will be explained below, “informal probate,” “formal
testacy,” and “supervised administration” are terms of art with specific statutory meaning.
Despite its use of imprecise terminology at the March 3, 2025 hearing, and in its March 4,
2025 order, for reasons explained below, the District Court did not convert the informal
probate to a formal probate and did not issue a “preliminary injunction.”
District Court Jurisdiction Over All Probate Matters
¶17 Montana’s probate code provides that district courts have jurisdiction over “all
subject matter relating to estates of decedents.” Sections 72-1-202(1)(a), 72-3-111, MCA.
“The court has full power to make orders, judgments, and decrees and take all other action
necessary and proper to administer justice in the matters which come before it.” Section
72-1-202(2), MCA. Though limited by the probate code, the district court nonetheless has
“broad jurisdictional powers in the handling of probates.” In re Estate of Barber,
239 Mont. 129, 135, 779 P.2d 477, 481 (1989). The court’s probate jurisdiction extends to
all matters related to a decedent’s estate, including construction of wills, determinations of
testacy, determinations of heirs and successors, and estate administration, including 8 settlement, distribution, and appointment and supervision of a personal representative.
See § 72-1-202, MCA; In re Estate of Cooney, 2019 MT 293, ¶ 7, 398 Mont. 166, 454 P.3d
1190.4
“Informal Probate” Versus “Formal Testacy Proceedings”
¶18 Title 72, chapter 3, part 2, MCA, governs “informal probate” of a will and
“informal appointment” of a personal representative. “Formal testacy and appointment
proceedings” are governed by Title 72, chapter 3, part 3, MCA. Informal probate is a
non-adjudicative proceeding conducted primarily by the clerk of court with only limited
notice to interested persons. In re Estate of Spencer, 2002 MT 304, ¶ 15, 313 Mont. 40,
59 P.3d 1160; In re Estate of Quirin, 2013 MT 231, ¶ 12, 371 Mont. 284, 309 P.3d 975;
§ 72-3-605, MCA. Formal testacy proceedings, by contrast, are adjudicative proceedings
initiated by petition and resolved by court order after notice and opportunity to be heard.
Sections 72-3-301, -302, -317, -1001, -1003, MCA; see also § 72-1-103(19), (24), MCA
(defining “informal” and “formal” proceedings).
Controlling the Personal Representative
¶19 Title 72, chapter 3, parts 5 and 6, MCA, generally govern a personal representative’s
administration of an estate and define the personal representative’s powers and duties.
4 This Court has previously recognized that probate jurisdiction does not extend to “matters equitable in nature” because probate is a “special proceeding,” not an “action at law” or “suit in equity.” See Cooney, ¶¶ 7, 10-16 (citing State ex rel. Reid v. Fifth Jud. Dist. Ct., 126 Mont. 586, 591-92, 256 P.2d 546, 549-50 (1953)); In re Estate of Haugen, 2008 MT 304, ¶¶ 9-13, 346 Mont. 1, 192 P.3d 1132; In re Estate of Colver, 2025 MT 146, ¶¶ 18-24, 423 Mont. 24, 574 P.3d 857; Scott, ¶¶ 10-11, 17. Compare Title 27, chapter 1, parts 1 and 4, MCA (defining types of “actions” and remedies). 9 “By accepting appointment, a personal representative submits personally to the jurisdiction
of the court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be instituted by any interested
person.” Sections 72-3-511, -521, MCA. Once appointed, the personal representative
takes possession and control of the estate and “shall . . . take all steps reasonably necessary
for the management, protection, and preservation of the estate in [her] possession.”
Section 72-3-606, MCA. She holds title to the estate property, but only “in trust . . . for
the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate.” Sections 72-3-619(1), -613,
-807, -808, MCA. A personal representative’s powers are constrained by her duties as a
fiduciary—she “is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the
decedent . . . consistent with the best interests of the estate” and must “use [her]
authority . . . for the best interests of successors to the estate.” Section 72-3-610, MCA.
She has a duty to avoid conflicts of interest and may be personally civilly liable for any
breaches of her fiduciary duties or other tortious conduct. Sections 72-3-612, -615, -616,
MCA.
¶20 Generally, “a personal representative shall proceed expeditiously with the
settlement and distribution of a decedent’s estate . . . without adjudication, order, or
direction of the court.” Section 72-3-605, MCA.5 However, the personal representative
is not exempt from court oversight. See § 72-3-605, MCA (qualifying personal
representative’s power to proceed unsupervised “except as otherwise specified under this
5 Although she may proceed generally unsupervised, a personal representative remains able to “invoke the jurisdiction of the court, in proceedings authorized by [the probate] code, to resolve questions concerning the estate or its administration.” Section 72-3-605, MCA. 10 code or [as] ordered . . .”). Accordingly, there are limited circumstances where the court
may intervene in her administration of an estate, whether probated informally or formally.
¶21 “Supervised administration” is one such means to limit and control a personal
representative’s power of estate administration.
Supervised administration is a single in rem proceeding to secure complete administration and settlement of a decedent’s estate under the continuing authority of the court, which extends until entry of an order approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative or other order terminating the proceeding.
A supervised personal representative is responsible to the court, as well as to the interested parties, and is subject to directions concerning the estate made by the court on its own motion or on the motion of any interested party.
Section 72-3-401, MCA. Like formal testacy proceedings, §§ 72-3-303, -304, MCA,
“supervised administration” is initiated by petition and stays any action in informal
probate. Sections 72-3-402, 403(1)-(2), MCA. Also like in formal testacy proceedings, a
previously-appointed personal representative subject to “supervised administration” “may
not exercise the power to distribute any estate” unless expressly authorized by the probate
court. Sections 72-3-401, -403(3), -405, MCA; compare § 72-3-304, MCA.
¶22 Separate from “formal testacy” and “supervised administration,” § 72-3-617, MCA,
provides court authority to restrain the personal representative, to wit:
On petition of any person who appears to have an interest in the estate, the court by temporary order may restrain a personal representative from performing specified acts of administration, disbursement, or distribution or exercise of any powers or discharge of any duties of the office or make any other order to secure proper performance of the personal representative’s duty if it appears to the court that the personal representative otherwise may take some action that would jeopardize unreasonably the interest of the
11 applicant or of some other interested person. Persons with whom the personal representative may transact business may be made parties.
Section 72-3-617(1), MCA (emphasis added); compare §§ 72-3-304, -403 (court’s
restraining authority in formal testacy and supervised administration). The statute further
requires that “the matter must be set for hearing within 10 days unless the parties otherwise
agree” and notice “must be given to the personal representative and the personal
representative’s attorney of record, if any, and to any other parties named defendant in the
petition.” Section 72-3-617(2), MCA.
¶23 Section 72-3-617, MCA, authorizes restraining the personal representative
regardless of whether the estate is being administered informally or formally.6 The court’s
power to restrain under § 72-3-617 is limited only by the statute’s express terms—it must
“appear[] to the court that the personal representative otherwise may take some action that
would jeopardize unreasonably the interest of the applicant or of some other interested
person.” (Emphasis added.) See also § 72-1-103(25), MCA (broadly defining “interested
person”).
The District Court Had Jurisdiction Under § 72-3-617, MCA, to Restrain Jaimie’s Conduct as Personal Representative
¶24 Jaimie frames the jurisdictional issue here as follows: the District Court lacked
jurisdiction to consider Paul’s motion for injunctive relief because no one formally
6 See § 72-3-617, MCA, Official Comments (Distinct from § 72-3-304, “which provides for a restraining order against a previously appointed personal representative incident to a formal testacy proceeding,” § 72-3-617 “describes a remedy which is available for any cause against a previously appointed personal representative, whether appointed formally or informally.”). 12 petitioned to “convert” the informal probate to “formal probate” or “supervised
administration.” This argument misapprehends the scope of the court’s probate
jurisdiction. When a contested matter invoking the district court’s jurisdiction is properly
before it, the probate code does not prohibit the court from exercising supervisory authority
necessary to resolve that dispute.
¶25 The parties rely on Spencer, where we held that the personal representative’s request
for court approval of settlement and distribution of the estate invoked the district court’s
jurisdiction and “converted” the informal proceedings to “formal proceedings” for the
limited purpose of resolving the issues raised.7 Spencer, ¶¶ 14-15, 23. Although this case
is not factually or procedurally identical, Spencer confirms the broader principle that
invoking court intervention does not transform “informal proceedings” to “formal
proceedings” except as necessary to resolve the matter presented. The District Court’s
authority arose from the dispute before it and did not depend on conversion of the probate
proceeding.
¶26 The record as a whole confirms that the District Court did not “convert” the
informal probate of Sean’s will to “formal testacy proceedings” under Title 72, chapter 3,
part 3, or to a “supervised administration” under Title 72, chapter 3, part 4, at the March 3,
7 Jaimie also relies on Spencer for the proposition that she was entitled to notice of “conversion” of the proceedings to “formal probate.” Her reliance on Spencer is misplaced. First, the estate creditor in Spencer received no notice of either the adjudicatory proceedings or subsequent court order adversely deciding its right of recovery. Jaimie, on the other hand, had over two weeks’ notice of the March 3, 2025 hearing on Paul’s motion, submitted briefing, and appeared at the hearing with counsel to argue against injunctive relief. Second, the March 3, 2025 proceeding did not adjudicate Jaimie’s rights—it only limited her power as personal representative to make estate distributions without court oversight. 13 2025 hearing on Paul’s motion for injunctive relief. “Formal testacy proceedings” and
“supervised administration” are terms of art with specific statutory meaning.
Sections 72-3-301, -302, -401, MCA. As Paul explained, he was not asking the court
for a testacy determination, formal appointment of a different personal representative, or a
“complete administration and settlement” of the Estate. Compare §§ 72-3-617, -302,
-401, MCA.
¶27 Instead, Paul claimed that Jaimie, in violation of her fiduciary duties as personal
representative, had so far paid $700,000 out of the Estate for non-estate purposes,
jeopardizing the Estate’s ability to satisfy creditor claims being concurrently litigated in
separate civil proceedings. To preserve the Estate for creditors, Paul asked the court to
restrain Jaimie’s ability to distribute estate funds, by subjecting them to court oversight
and approval. As in Spencer, the previously “informal proceedings” became “formal
proceedings,” not formal probate, upon Paul’s request for court intervention and only for
the limited purpose of determining whether to restrain Jaimie’s conduct as personal
representative.
¶28 Montana’s probate code does not preclude a district court from intervening in
informal probate when its jurisdiction is properly invoked. Paul’s motion sought court
control over Jaimie’s conduct as personal representative. That request fell squarely within
§ 72-3-617, MCA. Even if Paul did not expressly seek relief under § 72-3-617 in his
motion, he eventually invoked that statute in briefing. The gravamen of Paul’s request was
for the court to control and restrain Jaimie’s conduct as personal representative. We hold
14 that, under these circumstances, the District Court had jurisdiction to restrain Jaimie’s
conduct as personal representative of the Estate pursuant to § 72-3-617, MCA. We turn
next to whether the court abused its discretion in restraining her conduct.
¶29 2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in restraining Jaimie’s conduct by requiring her to seek prior court approval for any estate distributions.
¶30 Jaimie’s primary argument on appeal is that Paul was not entitled to a “preliminary
injunction” because he could not meet all four requirements of § 27-19-201(1), MCA.
She only briefly addresses § 72-3-617, MCA, in reply, arguing that Paul was not an
“interested person” entitled to a restraining order under that statute. We need not address
whether Paul met the § 27-19-201(1) factors, however, because this case turns not on the
preliminary injunction statute, § 27-19-201, MCA, but on the probate court’s independent
statutory authority under § 72-3-617, MCA, to supervise and restrain a personal
representative. We conclude that, despite the parties’ and court’s imprecise language,
the District Court restrained Jaimie’s conduct as personal representative pursuant to
§ 72-3-617, MCA, not under Title 27, chapter 19, MCA.
Section 72-3-617 “Order Restraining Personal Representative”—Not § 27-19-201 or § 27-19-314—is the Applicable Statute
¶31 In contrast to the “preventative relief” of a “preliminary injunction” available in
“civil actions,” under Title 27, chapter 19, MCA,8 § 72-3-617, MCA, authorizes a specific
form of restraint on personal representative conduct available exclusively in proceedings
8 See §§ 27-1-102, -103, -104, -107, -401, -403, 27-19-101, -201, MCA. 15 under Montana’s probate code. See § 1-3-225, MCA (“particular expressions qualify those
which are general”).
¶32 We have consistently recognized that a court “sitting in probate” has jurisdiction
only as provided in Title 72. Although probate may be quasi-“civil” for certain purposes,9
it is a proceeding whereby a will is proved and an estate administered and is therefore not
adversarial in the same sense as “civil actions,” i.e., claims prosecuted by one party against
another.10 Compare § 72-1-101, MCA (purposes of probate are to “discover and make
effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of the decedent’s property” and “promote
a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making
distribution to the decedent’s successors”); §§ 27-1-102, -103, -104, -107, MCA (purposes
of “civil actions”); M. R. Civ. P. 2(a) (“a civil action is begun by filing a complaint”).
9 The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to “formal proceedings,” as specifically defined under the probate code, unless they conflict with specific procedural rules provided in the code. Section 72-1-207, MCA; In re Estate of Erickson, 2017 MT 260, ¶¶ 14-21, 389 Mont. 147, 406 P.3d 1. We have also said that, for purposes of § 3-1-804, MCA, substitution rules, a petition for “supervised administration” brings informal probate “under the supervision of the district court and sufficiently partakes the elements of a civil action to trigger application of § 3-1-804, MCA.” In re Estate of Greene, 2013 MT 174, ¶¶ 9-15, 370 Mont. 490, 305 P.3d 52. We qualified in Greene, however, that “all of the attributes of an ordinary civil action referred to in § 3-1-804(1), MCA, may not be present in a supervised administration of an estate.” 10 Accord State ex rel. Biering v. Dist. Ct., 115 Mont. 174, 181, 140 P.2d 583, 586-87 (1943) (“A probate proceeding is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and the entire world is brought before the court by the process provided therefor. The estate itself is taken into custodia legis. The assets of an estate are thus secured as against the entire world, in the hands of an executor or administrator . . . .” (citations omitted)).
16 Accordingly, probate is a “special proceeding,” not an “action at law” or a “suit in equity.”
Cooney, ¶ 7; In re Estate of Williams, 2023 MT 72, ¶ 21, 412 Mont. 58, 528 P.3d 1087.11
¶33 Moreover, “orders restraining a personal representative” issued under § 72-3-617,
MCA, have express proof requirements distinct from the proof requirements for
“preliminary injunctions” or “temporary restraining orders” issued in “actions” under
§§ 27-19-201(1) and -314, MCA. For example, § 27-19-201(1), MCA, requires a showing
of likely “success on the merits” and “irreparable harm” absent injunctive relief. As such,
“preliminary injunctions” serve “to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a
trial on the merits can be held.” Cross v. State, 2024 MT 303, ¶ 52, 419 Mont. 290,
560 P.3d 637 (citing United States Supreme Court cases and the legislative requirement of
§ 27-19-201(4) that the -201(1) preliminary injunction standard follows federal law)
(emphasis added)).12 See also Meine v. Hren Ranches, Inc., 2020 MT 284, ¶ 26, 402 Mont.
92, 475 P.3d 748 (“a preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that terminates
and is superseded by the final judgment on the merits of the underlying claim(s)” (emphasis
added)). By comparison, “orders restraining personal representatives” require only a
11 See also Neal v. State, 2003 MT 53, ¶¶ 15-19, 314 Mont. 357, 66 P.3d 280 (proceedings initiated by filing a petition “invok[ing] a specific statutory procedure” are “special proceedings,” such as driver’s license suspension or revocation contests, temporary guardianships, or proceedings regarding trusts). 12 Section 27-19-201(4), MCA, specifically provides that the standard for entitlement to a “preliminary injunction” is meant to “mirror the federal preliminary injunction standard.” Because there is no equivalent “federal probate,” it is apparent on its face that § 27-19-201(1) is not intended to apply to probate proceedings; to construe it as such would render § 27-19-201(4) meaningless. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308-12, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1746-48 (2006) (federal courts have no jurisdiction over “the probate or annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate”—that jurisdiction is reserved to the states). 17 showing that “it appears to the court that the personal representative otherwise may take
some action that would jeopardize unreasonably the interest of the applicant or of some
other interested person” if her conduct is not restrained. Showings of entitlement to relief
under § 72-3-617 and § 27-19-201 therefore look very different, with § 72-3-617 having
unique requirements applicable only in the probate and estate administration context.
¶34 Also, the broad scope of a “preliminary injunction” is distinct from the narrow
scope of an “order restraining a personal representative” under § 72-3-617, MCA. Title 27
defines a “preliminary injunction” broadly as “an order requiring a person to refrain from
a particular act.” Sections 27-19-101, 27-1-403, MCA. By contrast, an order issued under
§ 72-3-617 is limited to restraining “a personal representative from performing specified
acts of administration, disbursement, or distribution or exercis[ing] any powers or
discharge of any duties of the office” or to “secur[ing] proper performance of the personal
representative’s duty.” In other words, § 72-3-617 specifically authorizes the probate court
to control a personal representative’s administration of an estate. The relief available under
§ 72-3-617 is thus specifically tailored to the probate court’s sole and exclusive
jurisdiction, unlike the general relief available under Title 27 for “civil actions” over which
a district court has no jurisdiction under the probate code.
¶35 “Preliminary injunctions” and “orders restraining a personal representative” also
have different notice and time requirements. While Title 27, chapter 19, provides that a
court may, without notice, issue a “temporary restraining order” pending adjudication of
the application for a “preliminary injunction,” § 72-3-617, MCA, does not provide for such
18 a bifurcated procedure. Instead, when requesting an order under § 72-3-617, the party
seeking restraint must give notice to the personal representative and her attorney and the
court must set a hearing on the request within 10 days. Section 72-3-617 does not provide
for a provisional order pending the hearing on and disposition of a request to restrain the
personal representative. Compare §§ 27-19-314 through -318, MCA.
The Court was Within its Discretion to Restrain Jaimie’s Conduct as Personal Representative Under § 72-3-617, MCA
¶36 While we have not previously considered the standard of review for an order issued
pursuant to § 72-3-617, MCA, we conclude that, like other court determinations regarding
supervision, management, or removal of a personal representative, an order restraining a
personal representative’s conduct under § 72-3-617, MCA, is discretionary and therefore
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Section 72-3-617, MCA (the court “may restrain”);
accord Williams, ¶¶ 17, 34; Hannum, ¶¶ 27-28, 33. We now consider whether the District
Court abused its discretionary authority under § 72-3-617, MCA.
¶37 Jaimie’s limited arguments against application of § 72-3-617, MCA, pertain solely
to her claim that Paul was not an “interested person” and therefore not entitled to injunctive
relief under § 72-3-617. Montana’s probate code defines an “interested person” to mean,
as pertinent here:
creditors . . . and any others having a property right in or claim against . . . the estate of a decedent.
Section 72-1-103(25), MCA. The meaning of “interested persons” “as it relates to
particular persons may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the
19 particular purposes of and matter involved in any proceeding.” Section 72-1-103(25),
¶38 Section 72-3-617, MCA, provides for court restraint “on petition of any person who
appears to have an interest in the estate.” This standard is explicitly broad; it does not limit
requests to restrain a personal representative to actual “interested persons,” but only to
those who “appear to have an interest in the estate.” The District Court could reasonably
conclude that Paul “appeared” to have an interest in the Estate because he asserted
(1) an ownership interest in Thomas Ent, a defendant in his separate civil lawsuit which
Jaimie testified was an “estate asset” at the March 3, 2025 hearing; and (2) a creditor claim
of almost $2,000,000 against the Estate. Paul therefore had standing under § 72-3-617,
MCA, to request an order restraining Jaimie’s conduct as personal representative.
¶39 The standard for entitlement to relief under § 72-3-617, MCA, is also intentionally
broad. The court may restrain the personal representative “if it appears to the court that
the personal representative otherwise may take some action that would jeopardize
unreasonably the interest of the applicant or of some other interested person.” This
standard does not require definitive proof of a creditor claim or of actual mismanagement;
it requires only a reasonable basis for concern.
¶40 Paul and Sean’s mother, Terry, asserted combined creditor claims approaching
$3,000,000, giving rise to at least an apparent interest in the Estate.13 At the same time,
13 Jaimie also testified at the March 3, 2025 hearing that Terry co-owned several Merrill Lynch accounts with Sean. 20 Jaimie—serving both as a defendant in the Thomas Ent litigation and as personal
representative for the Estate—was alleged to have paid approximately $700,000 in estate
funds for non-estate purposes. On this record, the District Court could reasonably
determine that continued distributions without court oversight risked jeopardizing the
Estate’s ability to satisfy potential creditor claims.
¶41 Nothing in the express language of § 72-3-617, MCA, required the District Court to
resolve Paul’s creditor status or to determine that Jaimie had in fact breached her fiduciary
duties before acting. Rather, the statute authorizes preventative intervention where the risk
of improper administration appears and regardless of whether that administration occurs
in informal or formal probate. Read in the context of the probate code as a whole,
§ 72-3-617, MCA, functions as a supervisory tool, permitting a district court to supervise
and control a personal representative’s “specified acts of administration, disbursement, or
distribution” to ensure proper performance and protect the estate for all interested parties.
That is what occurred here. The District Court did not prohibit administration of the Estate;
it required oversight.
¶42 Although the court labeled its order a “Preliminary Injunction,” the substance of the
order, and the court’s express reliance on § 72-3-617, MCA, controls. The March 4, 2025
order was not a “preliminary injunction” under Title 27, chapter 19; it was an “order
restraining a personal representative” issued pursuant to § 72-3-617, MCA. We hold that
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in restraining Jaimie’s conduct under
§ 72-3-617, MCA.
21 ¶43 3. Whether the District Court was required to impose a bond.
¶44 Finally, Jaimie contends that the District Court was required to impose a bond under
§ 27-19-306, MCA, when granting Paul a “preliminary injunction.” Section 27-19-306(1),
MCA, provides:
on granting an injunction or restraining order, the judge shall require a written undertaking to be given by the applicant for the payment of the costs and damages that may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
Section 27-19-306(1)(b)(ii), MCA, provides that the undertaking “may be waived in the
interest of justice.”
¶45 In contrast, § 72-3-617, MCA, has no bond requirement. Montana’s probate code
provides for bond in specific circumstances, none of which were implicated here.14 For all
the reasons stated above, the District Court’s March 4, 2025 order restraining Jaimie’s
conduct as personal representative was issued under § 72-3-617, not § 27-19-201.
Accordingly, neither the bond requirements nor waiver provisions of § 27-19-306, MCA,
applied and the court was not required by any law to impose a bond incident to its March
4, 2025 order.
CONCLUSION
¶46 We hold that the District Court had jurisdiction to restrain Jaimie’s conduct as
personal representative of the Estate under § 72-3-617, MCA, and did not abuse its
discretion in requiring Jaimie to obtain court approval before making estate distributions.
14 See §§ 72-3-513 through -516, MCA (bond requirements for personal representatives). 22 Finally, we hold that the court was not required to impose any bond incident to its
March 4, 2025 order.
¶47 Affirmed.
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE