24CA1047 Estate of Scott 04-03-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1047 Archuleta County District Court No. 18PR30059 Honorable Jeffrey R. Wilson, Judge
In re the Estate of Rodney Ray Scott, deceased.
Timothy Ray Scott and Jennifer Jay Scott,
Appellants,
v.
Rodney Ray Scott Family Trust, Valerie Ann Green, Personal Representative, and Cassandra Ann Scott,
Appellees.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Brown and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 3, 2025
Tonya J. Wales, Rowena, Texas, for Appellants
Holland & Hart LLP, Christopher M. Jackson, Kelsi B. White, Denver, Colorado, for Appellees ¶1 Timothy Ray Scott and Jennifer Ray Scott (together, the Scott
children) appeal the district court’s March 5, 2024, order denying
their objection to a hearing without appearance on the petition for
final settlement of the estate of the decedent, Rodney Ray Scott,
who was their father. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The decedent died in 2018. The Scott children filed claims
against the estate initially styled as “[b]reach of contracts,” and
later styled as requests for the imposition of “reciprocal constructive
trusts.” Their claims were based on two documents — which the
district court later referred to as “A1” and “A2.”
¶3 A1, dated March 26, 1990, is a one-page, handwritten
document in which the decedent and Timothy Scott promised not to
“liquidate” or “sell” specified parcels of real property. The decedent
promised not to “liquidate” specified parcels of real property “unless
an agreement between [the decedent and] Tim Scott arises.” It also
said, “This agreement is good for 1 year from date.” It was signed
by the decedent and Timothy Scott.
¶4 A2, also dated March 26, 1990, is a two-page, handwritten
document in which the decedent agreed that his real and personal
1 property would be divided equally between Timothy and Jennifer
Scott upon his death, except for a gun collection, which would go to
Timothy Scott. It was signed by the decedent, Timothy Scott, and
Jennifer Scott.
¶5 The Scott children claimed that the decedent had breached
those agreements by transferring property during his life. The
estate’s personal representative moved for summary judgment on
those claims, arguing that the first document — A1 — expired by its
terms one year after it was entered into and that the second
document — A2 — didn’t preclude the decedent from making inter
vivos transfers of his assets as a matter of law.
¶6 The Scott children’s response to the personal representative’s
motion didn’t meaningfully engage the motion on the merits.
Instead, their response merely discussed facts surrounding the
creation of the decedent’s will in 2016, recited general principles
applicable to motions for summary judgment, and asserted the
existence of disputed issues of material fact — without specifically
identifying any such issues.
¶7 The district court granted the personal representative’s motion
in large part. Its relevant conclusions were that (1) the Scott
2 children hadn’t responded to the argument in the motion, but had
instead put forth a time-barred challenge to the 2016 will; (2) A1
expired by its express terms in 1991; (3) Jennifer Scott wasn’t a
party to A1; (4) A2 concerned division of the decedent’s property
upon his death but didn’t prohibit the decedent from transferring
his assets while he was alive; and (5) under a settlement agreement
that Timothy Scott and the decedent entered into in 2006, Timothy
Scott released the decedent from any claims relating to the
decedent’s real property. But because the personal representative
hadn’t made any argument concerning A2 as to Jennifer Scott, the
court didn’t dismiss her claims based on that document, though it
did limit such claims to property owned by the decedent at the time
of his death.
¶8 The parties filed a stipulation requesting that “final judgment”
be entered on the Scott children’s claims. Therein, the parties
acknowledged that Jennifer Scott didn’t have any viable claims
following the court’s summary judgment order. And they stipulated
to a dismissal of Jennifer Scott’s claims with prejudice, subject to
the Scott children’s right to appeal. The court granted the motion.
3 ¶9 The Scott children appealed the judgment. But because they
filed their notice of appeal too late, a motions division of this court
dismissed their appeal with prejudice.
¶ 10 The personal representative filed a petition for final settlement
of the estate and a notice of a hearing on the petition without
appearance. The Scott children filed an objection to the notice,
claiming rights in the decedent’s property as heirs under A2 — one
of the very same documents the court had previously ruled didn’t
support any claim against the estate.
¶ 11 The personal representative responded to the objection,
arguing that the Scott children’s claims under A2 were barred by
“claim preclusion.” As a result, the Scott children weren’t
“interested persons” under section 15-10-201(27), C.R.S. 2024,
because they didn’t have a “claim against . . . the estate of a
decedent,” and therefore, according to the personal representative,
had “no standing” to object to closure of the estate.
¶ 12 The district court denied the Scott children’s objection. It
reasoned that, because it had previously rejected the claims on
which their objection was based, and the court of appeals had
dismissed their appeal of that order with prejudice, the Scott
4 children lacked “standing to object or otherwise participate in this
case.”
¶ 13 The Scott children filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
that as “heirs” they had standing to assert rights based on A2
under section 15-11-513, C.R.S. 2024. They didn’t make any
argument concerning the application of claim preclusion. Later, in
their reply in support of their motion, the Scott children asserted,
without citing any authority, that they could bring claims as “heirs”
even if they couldn’t do so as “claimants.”
¶ 14 The court denied the motion for reconsideration. It concluded
that the Scott children’s claims had been “completely litigated and
appealed,” and therefore claim preclusion barred their objection.
¶ 15 The Scott children appeal the order denying their objection.
II. Discussion
¶ 16 On appeal, the Scott children argue that the district court
failed to recognize their status as heirs, and not merely claimants,
and that as heirs they have standing to object to the final
settlement of the estate. For three reasons, we affirm. See Rush
Creek Sols., Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 406 (Colo.
5 App. 2004) (we may affirm on any grounds supported by the
record).
¶ 17 First, the Scott children don’t address the applicability of
claim preclusion to their objection, which was the basis on which
the court denied their objection. Their brief doesn’t include any
argument as to the elements of claim preclusion, much less any
argument as to why any element isn’t satisfied in this case.
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24CA1047 Estate of Scott 04-03-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1047 Archuleta County District Court No. 18PR30059 Honorable Jeffrey R. Wilson, Judge
In re the Estate of Rodney Ray Scott, deceased.
Timothy Ray Scott and Jennifer Jay Scott,
Appellants,
v.
Rodney Ray Scott Family Trust, Valerie Ann Green, Personal Representative, and Cassandra Ann Scott,
Appellees.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Brown and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 3, 2025
Tonya J. Wales, Rowena, Texas, for Appellants
Holland & Hart LLP, Christopher M. Jackson, Kelsi B. White, Denver, Colorado, for Appellees ¶1 Timothy Ray Scott and Jennifer Ray Scott (together, the Scott
children) appeal the district court’s March 5, 2024, order denying
their objection to a hearing without appearance on the petition for
final settlement of the estate of the decedent, Rodney Ray Scott,
who was their father. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The decedent died in 2018. The Scott children filed claims
against the estate initially styled as “[b]reach of contracts,” and
later styled as requests for the imposition of “reciprocal constructive
trusts.” Their claims were based on two documents — which the
district court later referred to as “A1” and “A2.”
¶3 A1, dated March 26, 1990, is a one-page, handwritten
document in which the decedent and Timothy Scott promised not to
“liquidate” or “sell” specified parcels of real property. The decedent
promised not to “liquidate” specified parcels of real property “unless
an agreement between [the decedent and] Tim Scott arises.” It also
said, “This agreement is good for 1 year from date.” It was signed
by the decedent and Timothy Scott.
¶4 A2, also dated March 26, 1990, is a two-page, handwritten
document in which the decedent agreed that his real and personal
1 property would be divided equally between Timothy and Jennifer
Scott upon his death, except for a gun collection, which would go to
Timothy Scott. It was signed by the decedent, Timothy Scott, and
Jennifer Scott.
¶5 The Scott children claimed that the decedent had breached
those agreements by transferring property during his life. The
estate’s personal representative moved for summary judgment on
those claims, arguing that the first document — A1 — expired by its
terms one year after it was entered into and that the second
document — A2 — didn’t preclude the decedent from making inter
vivos transfers of his assets as a matter of law.
¶6 The Scott children’s response to the personal representative’s
motion didn’t meaningfully engage the motion on the merits.
Instead, their response merely discussed facts surrounding the
creation of the decedent’s will in 2016, recited general principles
applicable to motions for summary judgment, and asserted the
existence of disputed issues of material fact — without specifically
identifying any such issues.
¶7 The district court granted the personal representative’s motion
in large part. Its relevant conclusions were that (1) the Scott
2 children hadn’t responded to the argument in the motion, but had
instead put forth a time-barred challenge to the 2016 will; (2) A1
expired by its express terms in 1991; (3) Jennifer Scott wasn’t a
party to A1; (4) A2 concerned division of the decedent’s property
upon his death but didn’t prohibit the decedent from transferring
his assets while he was alive; and (5) under a settlement agreement
that Timothy Scott and the decedent entered into in 2006, Timothy
Scott released the decedent from any claims relating to the
decedent’s real property. But because the personal representative
hadn’t made any argument concerning A2 as to Jennifer Scott, the
court didn’t dismiss her claims based on that document, though it
did limit such claims to property owned by the decedent at the time
of his death.
¶8 The parties filed a stipulation requesting that “final judgment”
be entered on the Scott children’s claims. Therein, the parties
acknowledged that Jennifer Scott didn’t have any viable claims
following the court’s summary judgment order. And they stipulated
to a dismissal of Jennifer Scott’s claims with prejudice, subject to
the Scott children’s right to appeal. The court granted the motion.
3 ¶9 The Scott children appealed the judgment. But because they
filed their notice of appeal too late, a motions division of this court
dismissed their appeal with prejudice.
¶ 10 The personal representative filed a petition for final settlement
of the estate and a notice of a hearing on the petition without
appearance. The Scott children filed an objection to the notice,
claiming rights in the decedent’s property as heirs under A2 — one
of the very same documents the court had previously ruled didn’t
support any claim against the estate.
¶ 11 The personal representative responded to the objection,
arguing that the Scott children’s claims under A2 were barred by
“claim preclusion.” As a result, the Scott children weren’t
“interested persons” under section 15-10-201(27), C.R.S. 2024,
because they didn’t have a “claim against . . . the estate of a
decedent,” and therefore, according to the personal representative,
had “no standing” to object to closure of the estate.
¶ 12 The district court denied the Scott children’s objection. It
reasoned that, because it had previously rejected the claims on
which their objection was based, and the court of appeals had
dismissed their appeal of that order with prejudice, the Scott
4 children lacked “standing to object or otherwise participate in this
case.”
¶ 13 The Scott children filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
that as “heirs” they had standing to assert rights based on A2
under section 15-11-513, C.R.S. 2024. They didn’t make any
argument concerning the application of claim preclusion. Later, in
their reply in support of their motion, the Scott children asserted,
without citing any authority, that they could bring claims as “heirs”
even if they couldn’t do so as “claimants.”
¶ 14 The court denied the motion for reconsideration. It concluded
that the Scott children’s claims had been “completely litigated and
appealed,” and therefore claim preclusion barred their objection.
¶ 15 The Scott children appeal the order denying their objection.
II. Discussion
¶ 16 On appeal, the Scott children argue that the district court
failed to recognize their status as heirs, and not merely claimants,
and that as heirs they have standing to object to the final
settlement of the estate. For three reasons, we affirm. See Rush
Creek Sols., Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 406 (Colo.
5 App. 2004) (we may affirm on any grounds supported by the
record).
¶ 17 First, the Scott children don’t address the applicability of
claim preclusion to their objection, which was the basis on which
the court denied their objection. Their brief doesn’t include any
argument as to the elements of claim preclusion, much less any
argument as to why any element isn’t satisfied in this case.
Because the Scott children haven’t challenged the foundational
basis for the court’s ruling, we must affirm. See IBC Denver II, LLC
v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d 714, 717-18 (Colo. App. 2008) (an
appellant’s failure to challenge all bases for the lower court’s
decision requires affirmance).
¶ 18 Second, if the Scott children intend to challenge the district
court’s application of claim preclusion, they didn’t preserve that
challenge. As noted above, when the personal representative raised
claim preclusion, the Scott children didn’t address that argument.
Therefore, we won’t consider any such challenge for the first time
on appeal. Good Life Colo., LLC v. WLCO, LLC, 2025 COA 8M,
¶¶ 31-39; Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Tr.
Co., 2014 COA 151, ¶ 25.
6 ¶ 19 Third, the district court’s initial ruling that the Scott children
had no claim against the estate based on A1 or A2 was the law of
the case. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
321 F.3d 950, 992 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[A] legal decision made at one
stage of litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the
opportunity to do so existed, becomes the law of the case for future
stages of the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have
waived the right to challenge that decision at a later time.” (quoting
Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 353 (10th Cir. 1993))). There are
circumstances in which a court may disregard the law of the case.
See Lobato v. State, 2013 CO 30, ¶ 12; People v. Allen, 885 P.2d
207, 212 (Colo. 1994). But the Scott children don’t argue that any
such circumstances exist. Thus, we can’t conclude that the district
court erred by adhering to its prior ruling.
III. Conclusion
¶ 20 The district court’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE YUN concur.