Estate of Piper v. United States

9 Cl. Ct. 475, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1521, 1986 U.S. Claims LEXIS 910
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedFebruary 3, 1986
DocketNo. 379-82T
StatusPublished

This text of 9 Cl. Ct. 475 (Estate of Piper v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Piper v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 475, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1521, 1986 U.S. Claims LEXIS 910 (cc 1986).

Opinion

OPINION ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

PHILIP R. MILLER, Judge:

In this suit, plaintiff sought interest of $104,461 on overpayments of estate and gift taxes. The government counterclaimed for $125,201 in unpaid gift taxes and $1,217,613 in erroneously refunded estate taxes, plus statutory interest. On May 14, 1985, the court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Piper v. United States, 8 Cl.Ct. 243 (1985).

Defendant now moves for an order entering judgment on its counterclaim against plaintiff of $125,201 for gift taxes owed, plus statutory interest from April 15, 1970, and $1,217,613 for recovery of the erroneous refund, plus statutory interest from May 27, 1981.

Plaintiff opposes the amount sought by defendant, contending its liability for the erroneous refund is only $844,476, plus statutory interest. Plaintiff also contests the figures used by defendant for calculating offsetting statutory interest owed plaintiff.

Statement

The facts upon which liability was determined are presented in the prior opinion of this court. Piper, supra. The court held that a 1981 cash refund made to plaintiff and a credit against gift taxes owed by plaintiff, resulting from an overpayment of estate taxes in 1975, were erroneous, where plaintiff had paid such estate taxes by redeeming unmatured United States “flower bonds” at their par values rather than by paying cash. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, the refund should have been made by reinstating and returning the bonds rather than by cash and [477]*477credit, and pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or the Code) § 7405 the government was entitled to recover the cash refund and reverse the gift tax credit. Id., at 249.

The parties dispute the amount of the judgment, taking different positions as to extent to which the May 1981 refund was erroneous. Defendant contends that the entire refund was erroneous, and asks for its return ($1,217,613 plus statutory interest) and reversal of the credit against plaintiff’s gift tax liability ($125,201 plus statutory interest). Defendant concedes that it is obligated to return to plaintiff the flower bonds in kind, plus statutory interest on the fair market value of such bonds from September 29, 1975 to the approximate date of return. Defendant also concedes that it owes plaintiff a refund with interest of a supplemental $5,094 cash payment made by plaintiff on September 29, 1975, in addition to the bonds.

Plaintiff has two objections to defendant’s proposed judgment. First, it claims that only $844,476 of the 1981 cash refund was erroneous. The remaining $373,137, according to plaintiff, was not erroneous, because defendant owed plaintiff a cash refund of the $5,094 supplemental payment and a cash payment of $368,043 for statutory interest on the $5,094 and the bonds. It avers that its liability should be only for that portion that was in error.1 Thus the interest due the government on the erroneous refund would be computed on a $844,-476 base rather than on $1,217,613.

Plaintiff also objects to the base upon which defendant calculates the interest due plaintiff on the bonds. Assuming the validity of its prior argument that it received interest on the bonds to 1981, plaintiff fashions an additional contention that by not returning the bonds in 1981, as this court determined it should have, the government “took or kept” the bonds from plaintiff anew. Plaintiff thus claims it is entitled to statutory interest based on the fair market value of the bonds from that date, May 27, 1981 ($886,518), and not their value at the 1975 redemption ($814,675).

Discussion

I.

Consideration is given first to plaintiff’s contention that a portion of the 1981 refund (plus $5,094) was not erroneous, because it represented the payment of interest owed to plaintiff on its overpayment of bonds.

Plaintiff argues first that the interest received by it in 1981 was actually intended as interest on the fair market value of the bonds rather than on the mistaken cash refund. But since in 1981 the Internal Revenue Service mistakenly assumed that plaintiff had overpaid cash rather than bonds, there is no basis for any inference that the Service ever determined the fair market value of the bonds, let alone the interest due thereon, prior to the instant litigation. Thus, the 1981 interest payment could not have been intended to be interest on the overpayment of bonds, and the only reasonable inference is that such sum was interest on an overpayment of tax assumed to have been made in cash.

Second, plaintiff argues that, irrespective of what was intended by the 1981 interest payment, since plaintiff was owed interest on the bonds in any event, to the same extent that portion of the cash refund may not be deemed erroneous.

This argument is without statutory support. Internal Revenue Code § 6611 authorizes the payment of interest on a refund of an overpayment as follows:

(a) Rate.—Interest shall be allowed and paid upon any overpayment in respect of any internal revenue tax at an annual rate established under section 6621.
(b) Period.—Such interest shall be allowed and paid as follows:
*****.*
[478]*478(1) Refunds.—In the ease of a refund, from the date of the overpayment to a date (to be determined by the Secretary or his delegate) preceding the date of the refund check by not more than 30 days # * # *

While interest on an overpayment of tax is allowable from the date of overpayment and increases with each day that passes, it is apparent from the face of the statute that the interest is not actually allowed until after the Secretary or his delegate recognizes the overpayment and fixes a date for the issuance of the refund check. For, until that time, the amount of the interest is not ascertained and cannot be refunded or credited against any other liability. The mere accrual of interest in favor of a taxpayer does not mean that it has been refunded or credited to him.

This result also is required by I.R.C. § 6602. Insofar as pertinent, this section provides:

§ 6602. Interest on erroneous refund recoverable by suit
Any portion of an internal revenue tax (or any interest * * *) which has been erroneously refunded, and which is recoverable by suit pursuant to section 7405, shall bear interest * * * from the date of the payment of the refund.

The “erroneously refunded” interest to which § 6602 refers is that received by the taxpayer on the principal of the erroneous refund; and the entire amount which is recoverable, consisting of both principal and interest received thereon, is to bear interest. The section makes no provision for the reduction of the recovery because plaintiff is owed interest on some other debt. It provides merely for the correction of a single transaction between the taxpayer and the government, and not for an overall balancing of liabilities owing between the parties. Accordingly, interest allowable

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Related

Estate of Piper v. United States
8 Cl. Ct. 243 (Court of Claims, 1985)

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9 Cl. Ct. 475, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1521, 1986 U.S. Claims LEXIS 910, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-piper-v-united-states-cc-1986.