Estate of Peola Wingfield v. Freund

364 F. App'x 816

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: February 12, 2010
• Docket: 09-1503
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Vacated and remanded by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

The Estate of Peola Wingfield appeals the magistrate judge’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants Dr. Jack Freund, Medical Director for the Division of Medical Services for the Richmond City Jail (“the Jail”); Dr. Robert Curtis, a psychiatrist under contract with the Jail; Dr. William Rhoades, a psychologist employed by the Jail; Captain James Womack, Medical Director of the Jail’s medical department; and Nurse Derrick McGee, a physician’s assistant and licensed practical nurse for the Jail. Wingfield raises numerous issues on appeal. Because we find that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to enter a final order, however, we decline to address the merits at this time. Rather, we vacate the magistrate judge’s order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

A magistrate judge may enter a final appealable judgment only if the district court has properly referred the case to the magistrate judge and the parties consent to have the magistrate judge enter a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2006). “[C]onsent to proceed before a magistrate judge must be clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous.” United States v. Bryson, 981 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir.1992). Though this case was referred to a magistrate judge by the district court, we have found no evidence in the record establishing that the parties consented to final disposition by a magistrate judge, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Thus, the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to enter a final, appeal-able order. See Bryson, 981 F.2d at 726; see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 870, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (“A critical limitation on [the magistrate judge’s] expanded jurisdiction is consent.”). Accordingly, we vacate the dispo-sitional order entered by the magistrate judge and remand this case for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED.