J-A09008-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ESTATE OF CONSTANCE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GRACE PATTERSON : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: DEBORAH REID : : : : : No. 1173 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 7, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Orphans' Court at No(s): 63-23-721
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: JULY 22, 2024
Appellant Deborah Reid appeals from the September 7, 2023 decree
entered by the Washington County Orphans’ Court denying her petition to
retain property of the estate of her mother Contance Grace Patterson
(“Decedent”). The court, instead, granted the petition of her sister, Rebecca
Anderson, administrator of Decedent’s estate (“Administrator”), to sell the
property to a third party. After careful review, we affirm.
The following are the relevant facts and procedural history. On April 7,
2023, Decedent died intestate, leaving Appellant and Administrator as her
only heirs. The primary asset of the estate is Decedent’s residence at 81 Old
Farm Road in Canonsburg (“the Property”). At the time of Decedent’s death,
Appellant had been living at the Property since February 2023.
On May 3, 2023, Appellant renounced her right to administer the estate,
allowing for the appointment of Administrator. Administrator sought to sell J-A09008-24
the Property to pay the debts, expenses, and taxes of the estate.1 Initially,
Administrator offered to sell her share of the Property to Appellant for
$95,000, half of the appraised value of $190,000. Appellant did not accept
the offer prior to its expiration on July 3, 2023. Subsequently, Appellant
“made a counter-offer to purchase the property for $80,000, paid in
installments of $1,000 per month.” Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Administrator rejected
this offer, concluding that it was not “feasible to pay the estate’s bills receiving
only $1,000 per month.” Id. Instead, Administrator accepted a cash offer
from Craftsman Capital, LLC to purchase the property “as is” for $150,000.
Administrator testified that “she was pleased with the $150,000 offer
considering the deplorable condition of the house,” which the court described
as “uninhabitable” and “commensurate of a ‘hoarder’ living there.” Id.
On August 25, 2023, Appellant filed a petition to retain the Property and
prevent the sale to Craftsman Capital. Subsequently, Administrator filed a
petition to sell the Property, seeking “an order compelling appellant to vacate
the premises before the closing and not to interfere with the sale[.]” Id. at
2.
The orphans’ court held a hearing on September 7, 2023. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Appellant’s petition to retain and
____________________________________________
1 As detailed by the trial court, Decedent’s personal property had a total value
of $9,667.22; Decedent’s checking account had a balance of approximately $10,000; and the estate had estimated expenses of $29,803.92, debts of approximately $37,000, and an estimated inheritance tax of $5,473,70. Trial Ct. Op., 11/1/23, at 4.
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granted Administrator’s petition to sell the Property to Craftsman Capital,
ordering Appellant to vacate the Property by September 29, 2023, and not
interfere with the sale of the Property.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 26, 2023. Appellant
and the Orphans’ Court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Appellant raises the following issues before this Court:
1. Whether the [c]ourt erred in granting the [Administrator’s] Petition to [Sell] the Property when the [Administrator] was acting in her own self[-]interest and not the best interest of all of the heirs[?]
2. Whether the [c]ourt erred in denying [Appellant’s] Petition to remain at the property as an heir who took possession with the consent of [Decedent?]
3. Whether the court erred in rejecting [Appellant’s] proposal to purchase the property from the other heir, the [Administrator?]
Appellant’s Br. at 2.2 While phrased as three overlapping questions,
Appellant’s argument raises the single issue of whether the orphans’ court
erred in granting the petition to sell the Property rather than allowing
Appellant to remain in the Property.
A.
When reviewing an orphans’ court’s decree, we grant deference to that
court, which sits as factfinder, determining the credibility of the witnesses. In
re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 206 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
2 As noted by the orphans’ court, Appellant phrased her issues using the terms
“Executor” and “testator,” which are inapplicable in the absence of a will. Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.1.
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We are not constrained, however, “to give the same deference to any resulting
legal conclusions.” Id. at 207 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we will not
reverse the orphans’ court decision absent an “abuse of discretion or a
fundamental error in applying the correct principles of law.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code (“the Code”) governs the
authority of an estate’s personal representative, such as Administrator, and
specifically addresses the representative’s duty and authority in regard to an
estate’s real property when occupied by an heir at the time of the decedent’s
death. 20 Pa.C.S. § 3311(a). Section 3311(a) provides in relevant part as
follows:
A personal representative shall have the right to and shall take possession of, maintain and administer all the real and personal estate of the decedent, except real estate occupied at the time of death by an heir or devisee with the consent of the decedent. . . . Nothing in this section shall affect the personal representative’s power to sell real estate occupied by an heir or devisee.
Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, Section 3353 of the Code permits a court
to order the sale of property “whenever the court shall find such sale . . . to
be desirable for the proper administration and distribution of the estate.” Id.
at § 3353.
B.
Appellant asserts that the orphans’ court erred in denying Appellant’s
petition to retain the Property and granting Administrator’s petition to sell the
property to a third party. Appellant’s Br. at 3-6. She argues that the decree
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permits Administrator to violate her fiduciary duty to Appellant by selling the
Property to a third party for less than the appraised value and less than
Appellant’s purchase offer. Appellant avers that she “would become homeless
if the property is sold[,]” and claims that it was not necessary to sell the
Property in order to administer the estate.3 Id. at 5. She further maintains
that Administrator improperly rejected “reasonable options” suggested by
Appellant, such as granting Appellant a life-estate and applying for a home
equity loan. Id. Finally, Appellant contends that Administrator “is prohibited
from taking possession of the property because [Appellant] lived there with
the permission of their mother[,]” citing 20 Pa.C.S. § 3311(a). Id. at 6.
After careful review, we conclude the Code and the record support the
court’s decision to grant Administrator’s petition to sell the Property and to
deny Appellant’s petition to retain the Property. In addressing Appellant’s
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J-A09008-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ESTATE OF CONSTANCE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GRACE PATTERSON : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: DEBORAH REID : : : : : No. 1173 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 7, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Orphans' Court at No(s): 63-23-721
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: JULY 22, 2024
Appellant Deborah Reid appeals from the September 7, 2023 decree
entered by the Washington County Orphans’ Court denying her petition to
retain property of the estate of her mother Contance Grace Patterson
(“Decedent”). The court, instead, granted the petition of her sister, Rebecca
Anderson, administrator of Decedent’s estate (“Administrator”), to sell the
property to a third party. After careful review, we affirm.
The following are the relevant facts and procedural history. On April 7,
2023, Decedent died intestate, leaving Appellant and Administrator as her
only heirs. The primary asset of the estate is Decedent’s residence at 81 Old
Farm Road in Canonsburg (“the Property”). At the time of Decedent’s death,
Appellant had been living at the Property since February 2023.
On May 3, 2023, Appellant renounced her right to administer the estate,
allowing for the appointment of Administrator. Administrator sought to sell J-A09008-24
the Property to pay the debts, expenses, and taxes of the estate.1 Initially,
Administrator offered to sell her share of the Property to Appellant for
$95,000, half of the appraised value of $190,000. Appellant did not accept
the offer prior to its expiration on July 3, 2023. Subsequently, Appellant
“made a counter-offer to purchase the property for $80,000, paid in
installments of $1,000 per month.” Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Administrator rejected
this offer, concluding that it was not “feasible to pay the estate’s bills receiving
only $1,000 per month.” Id. Instead, Administrator accepted a cash offer
from Craftsman Capital, LLC to purchase the property “as is” for $150,000.
Administrator testified that “she was pleased with the $150,000 offer
considering the deplorable condition of the house,” which the court described
as “uninhabitable” and “commensurate of a ‘hoarder’ living there.” Id.
On August 25, 2023, Appellant filed a petition to retain the Property and
prevent the sale to Craftsman Capital. Subsequently, Administrator filed a
petition to sell the Property, seeking “an order compelling appellant to vacate
the premises before the closing and not to interfere with the sale[.]” Id. at
2.
The orphans’ court held a hearing on September 7, 2023. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Appellant’s petition to retain and
____________________________________________
1 As detailed by the trial court, Decedent’s personal property had a total value
of $9,667.22; Decedent’s checking account had a balance of approximately $10,000; and the estate had estimated expenses of $29,803.92, debts of approximately $37,000, and an estimated inheritance tax of $5,473,70. Trial Ct. Op., 11/1/23, at 4.
-2- J-A09008-24
granted Administrator’s petition to sell the Property to Craftsman Capital,
ordering Appellant to vacate the Property by September 29, 2023, and not
interfere with the sale of the Property.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 26, 2023. Appellant
and the Orphans’ Court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Appellant raises the following issues before this Court:
1. Whether the [c]ourt erred in granting the [Administrator’s] Petition to [Sell] the Property when the [Administrator] was acting in her own self[-]interest and not the best interest of all of the heirs[?]
2. Whether the [c]ourt erred in denying [Appellant’s] Petition to remain at the property as an heir who took possession with the consent of [Decedent?]
3. Whether the court erred in rejecting [Appellant’s] proposal to purchase the property from the other heir, the [Administrator?]
Appellant’s Br. at 2.2 While phrased as three overlapping questions,
Appellant’s argument raises the single issue of whether the orphans’ court
erred in granting the petition to sell the Property rather than allowing
Appellant to remain in the Property.
A.
When reviewing an orphans’ court’s decree, we grant deference to that
court, which sits as factfinder, determining the credibility of the witnesses. In
re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 206 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
2 As noted by the orphans’ court, Appellant phrased her issues using the terms
“Executor” and “testator,” which are inapplicable in the absence of a will. Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.1.
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We are not constrained, however, “to give the same deference to any resulting
legal conclusions.” Id. at 207 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we will not
reverse the orphans’ court decision absent an “abuse of discretion or a
fundamental error in applying the correct principles of law.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code (“the Code”) governs the
authority of an estate’s personal representative, such as Administrator, and
specifically addresses the representative’s duty and authority in regard to an
estate’s real property when occupied by an heir at the time of the decedent’s
death. 20 Pa.C.S. § 3311(a). Section 3311(a) provides in relevant part as
follows:
A personal representative shall have the right to and shall take possession of, maintain and administer all the real and personal estate of the decedent, except real estate occupied at the time of death by an heir or devisee with the consent of the decedent. . . . Nothing in this section shall affect the personal representative’s power to sell real estate occupied by an heir or devisee.
Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, Section 3353 of the Code permits a court
to order the sale of property “whenever the court shall find such sale . . . to
be desirable for the proper administration and distribution of the estate.” Id.
at § 3353.
B.
Appellant asserts that the orphans’ court erred in denying Appellant’s
petition to retain the Property and granting Administrator’s petition to sell the
property to a third party. Appellant’s Br. at 3-6. She argues that the decree
-4- J-A09008-24
permits Administrator to violate her fiduciary duty to Appellant by selling the
Property to a third party for less than the appraised value and less than
Appellant’s purchase offer. Appellant avers that she “would become homeless
if the property is sold[,]” and claims that it was not necessary to sell the
Property in order to administer the estate.3 Id. at 5. She further maintains
that Administrator improperly rejected “reasonable options” suggested by
Appellant, such as granting Appellant a life-estate and applying for a home
equity loan. Id. Finally, Appellant contends that Administrator “is prohibited
from taking possession of the property because [Appellant] lived there with
the permission of their mother[,]” citing 20 Pa.C.S. § 3311(a). Id. at 6.
After careful review, we conclude the Code and the record support the
court’s decision to grant Administrator’s petition to sell the Property and to
deny Appellant’s petition to retain the Property. In addressing Appellant’s
invocation of Section 3311, the court correctly opined that Section 3311(a)
permits a personal representative to sell property, even when occupied by an
heir, as it states: “Nothing in this section shall affect the personal
3 In claiming that the sale was not necessary, Appellant appears to dispute
the court’s finding that the estate had $37,000 of debts. She asserts that “[t]he alleged debt in the form of a judgment no longer exists[, as it] has not been revived since 2004.” Appellant’s Br. at 5-6. While Appellant cites the Reproduced Record which includes documents from a 1996 case involving Decedent, Appellant fails to provide any context for this assertion. Accordingly, Appellant waived this aspect of her claim by “fail[ing] to develop an adequate argument” as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018). Moreover, the absence of the $37,000 of debts would not undermine the orphans’ court’s analysis.
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representative’s power to sell real estate occupied by an heir or devisee.” Trial
Ct. Op. at 7 (quoting 20 Pa.C.S. § 3311(a)).
Additionally, the record supports the court’s rejection of Appellant’s
contention that Administrator violated her fiduciary duties to Appellant in
selling the Property to Craftsman Capital’s rather than accepting Appellant’s
offer and proposals. Id. at 5. The court found that “[t]here was no evidence
of any relationship with the third-party buyer or any other inference that the
proposed sale of the [Property] was anything other than an arms-length
transaction.” Id. at 5-6.
Moreover, the orphans’ court found that Craftsman Capital’s cash offer
of $150,000 “represented the most reasonable disposition of the Decedent’s
property, conducive to serving the best interests of the estate and all parties
concerned.” Id. at 7. The court contrasted the immediate receipt of $150,000
in cash with Appellant’s offer to buy her sister’s half of the Property for 80,000,
payable in monthly installments of $1,000.4 The court reasoned that the
immediate receipt of cash would allow Administrator “to alleviate the ongoing
expenses of the residence, to settle the debts of the estate, to pay the
inheritance tax, and to make appropriate distribution of the remaining balance
of the estate funds to the heirs, all within a reasonable time.” Id. at 6.
Appellant fails to refute the orphans’ court well-reasoned determination
that is supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s decision to ____________________________________________
4 The court rejected Appellant’s other proposals, finding that her proposal to
obtain a home equity loan “speculative at best.” Id. at 8.
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deny Appellant’s petition to retain the Property, to grant Administrator’s
requests to sell the Property, and to reject Appellant’s offer to purchase the
property.
Decree affirmed.
DATE: 7/22/2024
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