MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 15 Docket: Lin-24-235 Argued: December 12, 2024 Decided: February 11, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
ESTATE OF PATRICIA M. SPOFFORD
CONNORS, J.
[¶1] Michael Zani and Peter Zani are the sons of Patricia M. Spofford, who
passed away on June 7, 2020. The Zanis appeal from the order of summary
judgment entered by the Probate Court (Lincoln County, Avantaggio, J.) finding
that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning Spofford’s
testamentary capacity when she executed her will on March 1, 2018. On appeal,
the Zanis argue that the court erred and that there is a genuine issue concerning
her testamentary capacity. While the Zanis concede that they have “no direct
evidence regarding the events that took place on March 1, 2018,” they argue
that other evidence “from before and after the date the will was
executed . . . puts [Spofford’s] testamentary capacity on March 1, 2018, into
serious doubt.” Examining the issue de novo and viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Zanis, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether Spofford possessed the requisite testamentary 2
capacity when she executed her will, and we thus affirm the judgment.
See Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2016 ME 85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242.
[¶2] The summary judgment record contains significant evidence of
Spofford’s testamentary capacity on March 1, 2018. This evidence includes
videos of the will’s execution recorded by Spofford’s attorney. These videos
show that Spofford understood “the business [she] was engaged in”; possessed
knowledge of the makeup and general extent of her estate; could identify her
family members and her relationships to them; knew how she wished to
dispose of her estate; and had clear wishes about the persons she wanted “to
participate in [her] bounty” and whom she wished to exclude. In re Loomis’ Will,
133 Me. 81, 85, 174 A. 38, 41 (1934); see also Est. of Washburn, 2020 ME 18,
¶ 10, 225 A.3d 761. The videos also establish that Spofford reviewed her will
with her attorney, that Spofford confirmed that the drafted will accurately
reflected her wishes, and that she signed her will in the presence of two
witnesses and a notary.1
1 Additional evidence of Spofford’s testamentary capacity includes an affidavit signed by Spofford’s attorney stating that she believed that Spofford was competent to execute her will on March 1, 2018, and an affidavit signed by one of the witnesses attesting that she “had no reason to believe that [Spofford] was not acting of her own free will or that she lacked a ‘sound mind’ during the will signing.” The witness added that on the day that Spofford executed her will, she appeared “present, alert, and aware of her surroundings and actions.” 3
[¶3] Testimony by Spofford’s primary care physician further supports
the conclusion that Spofford possessed testamentary capacity when she
executed her will. In an affidavit, the physician stated that he had examined
Spofford on the day that she executed her will and had concluded, based on that
examination “as well as [his] review of [Spofford’s] medical history,” that she
“possessed the capacity and intention to execute a testamentary will on
March 1, 2018.”2 See In re Waning’s Appeal, 151 Me. 239, 252, 117 A.2d 347,
354 (1955) (“An attending or family physician’s opinion as to the mental health
of his patient is competent [evidence of that patient’s testamentary capacity].”);
Est. of Mitchell, 443 A.2d 961, 963 (Me. 1982) (relying on an examination by a
neurologist conducted “on the day before” the decedent executed her will in
assessing whether the decedent possessed sufficient testamentary capacity “at
the time when [s]he execute[d] [her] will”).
[¶4] In contrast, the evidence on which the Zanis rely is too remote from
the issue of Spofford’s testamentary capacity at the time that she executed her
2 The physician found that “[Spofford] was alert and oriented to person, place, and time of day”; that she said “she understood the nature of her testamentary will, the extent of her possessions, and the purpose and consequences of executing the will”; that she gave him no “reason to suspect that she was under any duress”; and that “[w]hile [Spofford] had been previously diagnosed with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, during the examination she was neither confused nor disoriented, and she was not presenting with delusional thought or altered thinking.” He added that “[t]hough [Spofford] presented with mild cognitive dysfunction and memory impairment, she completed a cognitive assessment with little difficulty.” 4
will to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Zani v. Zani, 2023 ME 42,
¶ 12, 299 A.3d 9; 18-C M.R.S. § 3-407 (2024). The Zanis reference, for example,
an incident that occurred a year before the execution of Spofford’s will in which
she assaulted her caregivers and drove erratically through town. They also
reference notes in Spofford’s medical records regarding her cognitive issues
written by the same doctor who determined that she was of sound mind on the
day she executed her will. The Zanis specifically discuss a February 15, 2018,
note in which Spofford’s physician wrote that she displayed “[s]ignificant
cognitive dysfunction” and a June 4, 2018, note in which he described Spofford
as “uncooperative,” “not able to listen,” and “aggressive and reactive.” The
Zanis also reference a report by another doctor, based on two examinations of
Spofford conducted in the summer of 2017, in which that doctor diagnosed
Spofford with cognitive impairment and recommended the appointment of a
guardian and conservator.
[¶5] This evidence does not create a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding whether Spofford lacked testamentary capacity on the day that she
executed her will. See Appeal of Royal, 152 Me. 242, 247, 127 A.2d 484, 487
(1956) (“The want of capacity, when urged as a ground for invalidating a
testamentary act, must relate to the time of the act. Incompetency may exist 5
before or after, and still the will be valid.” (quotation marks omitted)); In re
Loomis’ Will, 133 Me. at 87, 174 A. at 41–42 (“Except in so far as it may tend to
show the quality of [the] testator’s mind at the time of executing the will, the
condition of his mind before or after that time is unimportant. If he was then
rational and acting rationally, or, in popular phrase, knew and understood what
he was about, the will is valid.”); cf. In re Leonard, 321 A.2d 486, 489 (Me. 1974)
(“[E]vidence of testator’s conduct, emotions, methods of thought, and the like,
for a very considerable period before and after the execution of the will, is
admissible to show his capacity at the moment of making the will. The evidence
must be restricted to a reasonable time on either side of the execution of the
will.” (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶6] Additionally, the Zanis challenge their mother’s capacity partly on
the ground that she had been diagnosed with dementia and Alzheimer’s
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 15 Docket: Lin-24-235 Argued: December 12, 2024 Decided: February 11, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
ESTATE OF PATRICIA M. SPOFFORD
CONNORS, J.
[¶1] Michael Zani and Peter Zani are the sons of Patricia M. Spofford, who
passed away on June 7, 2020. The Zanis appeal from the order of summary
judgment entered by the Probate Court (Lincoln County, Avantaggio, J.) finding
that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning Spofford’s
testamentary capacity when she executed her will on March 1, 2018. On appeal,
the Zanis argue that the court erred and that there is a genuine issue concerning
her testamentary capacity. While the Zanis concede that they have “no direct
evidence regarding the events that took place on March 1, 2018,” they argue
that other evidence “from before and after the date the will was
executed . . . puts [Spofford’s] testamentary capacity on March 1, 2018, into
serious doubt.” Examining the issue de novo and viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Zanis, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether Spofford possessed the requisite testamentary 2
capacity when she executed her will, and we thus affirm the judgment.
See Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2016 ME 85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242.
[¶2] The summary judgment record contains significant evidence of
Spofford’s testamentary capacity on March 1, 2018. This evidence includes
videos of the will’s execution recorded by Spofford’s attorney. These videos
show that Spofford understood “the business [she] was engaged in”; possessed
knowledge of the makeup and general extent of her estate; could identify her
family members and her relationships to them; knew how she wished to
dispose of her estate; and had clear wishes about the persons she wanted “to
participate in [her] bounty” and whom she wished to exclude. In re Loomis’ Will,
133 Me. 81, 85, 174 A. 38, 41 (1934); see also Est. of Washburn, 2020 ME 18,
¶ 10, 225 A.3d 761. The videos also establish that Spofford reviewed her will
with her attorney, that Spofford confirmed that the drafted will accurately
reflected her wishes, and that she signed her will in the presence of two
witnesses and a notary.1
1 Additional evidence of Spofford’s testamentary capacity includes an affidavit signed by Spofford’s attorney stating that she believed that Spofford was competent to execute her will on March 1, 2018, and an affidavit signed by one of the witnesses attesting that she “had no reason to believe that [Spofford] was not acting of her own free will or that she lacked a ‘sound mind’ during the will signing.” The witness added that on the day that Spofford executed her will, she appeared “present, alert, and aware of her surroundings and actions.” 3
[¶3] Testimony by Spofford’s primary care physician further supports
the conclusion that Spofford possessed testamentary capacity when she
executed her will. In an affidavit, the physician stated that he had examined
Spofford on the day that she executed her will and had concluded, based on that
examination “as well as [his] review of [Spofford’s] medical history,” that she
“possessed the capacity and intention to execute a testamentary will on
March 1, 2018.”2 See In re Waning’s Appeal, 151 Me. 239, 252, 117 A.2d 347,
354 (1955) (“An attending or family physician’s opinion as to the mental health
of his patient is competent [evidence of that patient’s testamentary capacity].”);
Est. of Mitchell, 443 A.2d 961, 963 (Me. 1982) (relying on an examination by a
neurologist conducted “on the day before” the decedent executed her will in
assessing whether the decedent possessed sufficient testamentary capacity “at
the time when [s]he execute[d] [her] will”).
[¶4] In contrast, the evidence on which the Zanis rely is too remote from
the issue of Spofford’s testamentary capacity at the time that she executed her
2 The physician found that “[Spofford] was alert and oriented to person, place, and time of day”; that she said “she understood the nature of her testamentary will, the extent of her possessions, and the purpose and consequences of executing the will”; that she gave him no “reason to suspect that she was under any duress”; and that “[w]hile [Spofford] had been previously diagnosed with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, during the examination she was neither confused nor disoriented, and she was not presenting with delusional thought or altered thinking.” He added that “[t]hough [Spofford] presented with mild cognitive dysfunction and memory impairment, she completed a cognitive assessment with little difficulty.” 4
will to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Zani v. Zani, 2023 ME 42,
¶ 12, 299 A.3d 9; 18-C M.R.S. § 3-407 (2024). The Zanis reference, for example,
an incident that occurred a year before the execution of Spofford’s will in which
she assaulted her caregivers and drove erratically through town. They also
reference notes in Spofford’s medical records regarding her cognitive issues
written by the same doctor who determined that she was of sound mind on the
day she executed her will. The Zanis specifically discuss a February 15, 2018,
note in which Spofford’s physician wrote that she displayed “[s]ignificant
cognitive dysfunction” and a June 4, 2018, note in which he described Spofford
as “uncooperative,” “not able to listen,” and “aggressive and reactive.” The
Zanis also reference a report by another doctor, based on two examinations of
Spofford conducted in the summer of 2017, in which that doctor diagnosed
Spofford with cognitive impairment and recommended the appointment of a
guardian and conservator.
[¶5] This evidence does not create a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding whether Spofford lacked testamentary capacity on the day that she
executed her will. See Appeal of Royal, 152 Me. 242, 247, 127 A.2d 484, 487
(1956) (“The want of capacity, when urged as a ground for invalidating a
testamentary act, must relate to the time of the act. Incompetency may exist 5
before or after, and still the will be valid.” (quotation marks omitted)); In re
Loomis’ Will, 133 Me. at 87, 174 A. at 41–42 (“Except in so far as it may tend to
show the quality of [the] testator’s mind at the time of executing the will, the
condition of his mind before or after that time is unimportant. If he was then
rational and acting rationally, or, in popular phrase, knew and understood what
he was about, the will is valid.”); cf. In re Leonard, 321 A.2d 486, 489 (Me. 1974)
(“[E]vidence of testator’s conduct, emotions, methods of thought, and the like,
for a very considerable period before and after the execution of the will, is
admissible to show his capacity at the moment of making the will. The evidence
must be restricted to a reasonable time on either side of the execution of the
will.” (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶6] Additionally, the Zanis challenge their mother’s capacity partly on
the ground that she had been diagnosed with dementia and Alzheimer’s
disease; however, we have established that some degree of cognitive
impairment, including dementia, does not preclude testamentary capacity. E.g.,
In re Loomis’ Will, 133 Me. at 87, 174 A. at 42 (“Although fixed insanity has been
established, it may be shown that execution was during a lucid interval. There
may, in a case of senile dementia, be such a thing as a ‘lucid interval,’ during
which the person is qualified to will.”). 6
[¶7] Also, while the Zanis argue that “the fact that [Spofford] was under
a guardianship and conservatorship at the time the will was executed . . . is
certainly persuasive evidence that testamentary capacity did not exist,” we
have established that someone under guardianship and conservatorship may
have the requisite testamentary capacity to execute a will. E.g., In re Am. Bd. of
Comm’rs for Foreign Missions, 102 Me. 72, 101, 66 A. 215, 226 (1906) (“[T]he
incapacity of guardianship is simply a fact which may be proven like any other
fact tending to establish mental incapacity, but it does not work an estoppel
upon the proponents. The law recognizes that a person may require a guardian
by reason of incapacity in one particular, while, in other respects, he may be
entirely competent. It is well settled . . . that there may be partial insanity of the
testator, some unsoundness of mind, that does not in any way relate to his
property or disposition of the same by will.”); Est. of Turf, 435 A.2d 1087, 1089
n.4 (Me. 1981) (concluding that a testator possessed testamentary capacity
despite having been assigned a guardian in an unrelated conservatorship
proceeding in another state).
[¶8] Because we find that there was no genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Spofford had the requisite testamentary capacity when she 7
executed her will, we affirm the Probate Court’s judgment. See Grant, 2016 ME
85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Christopher K. MacLean, Esq. (orally), Camden, for appellants Michael Zani and Peter Zani
Oliver M. Walton, Esq. (orally), and Amy K. Olfene, Esq., Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for appellee St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital
Lincoln County Probate Court docket number 2020-0149 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY