Estate of Omotayo France v. Valentine

Opinion

Estate of Omotayo France v Valentine

2026 NY Slip Op 04747

July 29, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Estate of Omotayo France, etc., et al., plaintiffs-respondents,

v

Mark L. Valentine, et al., defendants-respondents, Puro Javier Gonzalez-Rodriguez, et al., appellants, et al., defendant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 29, 2026

2024-12936, (Index No. 524860/20)

Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.

William G. Ford

Lourdes M. Ventura

Susan Quirk, JJ.

Bartlett LLP, Melville, NY (Anne Marie Garcia and Corey Pugliese of counsel), for appellants.

Held & Hines, LLP, New York, NY (Carl E. Zapffe of counsel), for plaintiffs-respondents.

Chartwell Law, New York, NY (Keith A. Raven of counsel), for defendants-respondents Mark L. Valentine and Inzone Logistics, LLC.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death, etc., the defendants Puro Javier Gonzalez-Rodriguez, United Natural Foods, Inc., UNFI Transport, LLC, and PLM Fleet, LLC, appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Francois A. Rivera, J.), dated November 7, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

In August 2020, the plaintiffs' decedent, Omotayo France, was a passenger in a vehicle operated by the defendant Mark L. Valentine when it collided with a tractor-trailer operated by the defendant Puro Javier Gonzalez-Rodriguez. The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death against Gonzalez-Rodriguez, United Natural Foods, Inc., UNFI Transport, LLC, and PLM Fleet, LLC (hereinafter collectively the moving defendants), among others. Prior to the parties taking any depositions, the moving defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them. The plaintiffs, among others, opposed the motion, arguing that it was premature. In an order dated November 7, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the motion as premature. The moving defendants appeal.

"A party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the determination of a motion for summary judgment" (Malester v Rampil, 118 AD3d 855, 856; see Harrinarain v Sisters of St. Joseph, 205 AD3d 893, 894). "A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party's position may exist but cannot then be stated" (Salameh v Yarkovski, 156 AD3d 659, 660; see CPLR 3212[f]).

Here, the moving defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint [*2]and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them before any depositions had been taken. Since the plaintiffs have no personal knowledge of the relevant facts, they should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery, including depositions of the drivers involved in the subject accident (see Bohanan v Goller, 241 AD3d 627, 628; Johnson v Richardson, 120 AD3d 767, 768). Moreover, the record reflects that discovery might lead to relevant evidence pertaining to the circumstances of the accident (see Guo Ping Gu v Malaxos, 192 AD3d 1087, 1087). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, the moving defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them.

Alternatively, the moving defendants contend that PLM Fleet, LLC (hereinafter PLM), was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against it pursuant to the Graves Amendment (49 USC § 30106). The Graves Amendment provides "that the owner of a leased or rented motor vehicle cannot be held liable for personal injuries resulting from the use of such vehicle by reason of being the owner of the vehicle for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease if: (1) the owner is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, and (2) 'there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)'" (Cioffi v S.M. Foods, Inc., 129 AD3d 888, 892, quoting 49 USC § 30106[a][2]).

Here, although PLM demonstrated that it owned the trailer involved in the accident and that it was engaged in the business of leasing or renting motor vehicles, PLM failed to establish, prima facie, that there is no triable issue of fact as to the plaintiffs' allegation that PLM's negligent maintenance of the trailer contributed to the accident (see Caldeira v EAN Holdings, LLC, 240 AD3d 654, 655; Couchman v Nunez, 180 AD3d 645, 646).

IANNACCI, J.P., FORD, VENTURA and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court