25CA2130 Estate of Olivares 09-03-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2130 Jefferson County District Court No. 20PR30226 Honorable Todd L. Vriesman, Judge
In re the Estate of Susanna C. Olivares, deceased. Raul Olivares, Appellant, v. Jeanette Goodwin, Appellee.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART
AND ORDERS AFFIRMED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Welling, J., concurs
Bernard*, J., concurs in part and dissents in part
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 3, 2026
Raul Olivares, Pro Se No Appearance for Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026.
¶1 This probate proceeding concerns the administration of the estate of Susanna Olivares. Raul Olivares, Susanna’s father and an heir to her estate,1 appeals multiple orders entered by the district court after the final settlement and decree of final discharge. We dismiss the appeal in part and affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After Susanna’s death, contentious litigation arose between Olivares; Susanna’s mother, Karin Muller; and Susanna’s romantic partner, Max Ethridge, regarding her estate. The district court appointed Jeanette Goodwin as special administrator for the estate. In September 2020, after a hearing, the court issued an “Order of Intestacy [and] Determination of Heirs,” concluding that Susanna died without a will and that Olivares and Muller were her only heirs.2 ¶3 Eventually, Ethridge, Muller, Olivares, and Goodwin signed a stipulation containing agreements about how the estate would be
1 Because Susanna and Raul Olivares share the same last name, we
refer to Susanna by her first name. We mean no disrespect in doing so. 2 Ethridge later pleaded guilty to one count of forgery in connection
with a forged will he initially submitted to the district court.
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divided. The court approved the stipulation. Goodwin then filed a petition for final settlement of the estate and a final accounting with the court. The accounting included the following ledger line: “TBD – Reserve for Final Administration Fees and Costs – $10,000” ($10,000 holdback). Olivares didn’t object to the final accounting. The court issued an order for final settlement in December 2021. A month later, it issued a decree of final discharge, finding that Goodwin had complied with the order for final settlement and releasing her from service as the special administrator. ¶4 Three years later, Olivares filed multiple motions in which he generally asked the court to reopen the estate and investigate or issue sanctions against Goodwin and her attorney. The following proceedings are relevant to this appeal.
A. Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation and Reopen the Estate ¶5 Olivares filed a motion to set aside the parties’ stipulation “on the basis of fraud and misrepresentation” (motion to set aside). He asserted that Susanna had owned “valuable jewelry and personal property” at the time of her death, which Ethridge and Muller had concealed by filing “knowingly false affidavits” saying that Susanna had no such property. He asked the court to set aside the
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stipulation and, in essence, reopen the estate to investigate and distribute the concealed assets. ¶6 The court denied the motion to set aside. It explained that the estate was closed and that Olivares’s requested relief was barred. Olivares then filed a motion to reconsider (first motion to reconsider), along with multiple “supplemental statements” detailing further facts that he asserted supported his allegations of fraud. ¶7 The court denied the first motion to reconsider because, as relevant here, (1) Olivares hadn’t demonstrated any errors in its prior ruling; and (2) he filed it without first conferring with the other parties as required by C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(8). In its denial, the court expressly declined to consider the supplemental statements. ¶8 Olivares then filed a second motion to reconsider. In this motion, Olivares asserted that the district court erred by denying his first motion to reconsider because (1) it didn’t “reference[], acknowledge[], or consider[]” his multiple supplements; and (2) the expectation of conferral was “unreasonable” because of difficulty communicating with opposing parties, some of whom had moved
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out of state. (This motion was combined with a motion to reconsider the court’s denial of a motion for sanctions, as described below.) The court denied the second motion to reconsider.
B. Motion for Sanctions ¶9 Around the same time that he filed his motion to set aside, Olivares also filed a motion requesting a “final accounting” of the $10,000 holdback. The court granted his motion. Goodwin then filed an accounting showing that, in early 2022, approximately $5,800 of the holdback was used to pay the law firm that had represented her in her capacity as the special administrator and for “tax services.” Around the same time she filed the accounting, she disbursed the remaining funds equally to Olivares and Muller, as required by the stipulation. ¶ 10 After Goodwin disbursed the remaining funds, Olivares filed a motion for sanctions against Goodwin and her attorney. He contended that (1) the use of a portion of the $10,000 holdback for legal fees and taxes was “unauthorized” and unapproved; (2) Goodwin’s counsel wrongfully “conceal[ed]” the funds; and (3) discrepances between the accounting Goodwin filed to close the estate and the accounting she filed regarding the $10,000 holdback
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“indicate possible alteration of records and financial concealment.” Olivares requested wide-ranging relief, including sanctions, the reporting of Goodwin’s counsel to the office of attorney regulation, the return of the used portion of the holdback to the estate, damages, and an independent forensic accounting. ¶ 11 The district court denied the motion for sanctions, concluding that Goodwin had accounted for the holdback and that none of Olivares’s allegations amounted to any ethical violation or breach of fiduciary duty. ¶ 12 In his second motion to reconsider — which the court denied — Olivares included a request for the court to reconsider the order denying the motion for sanctions.
C. Appellate Contentions ¶ 13 Olivares appeals the court’s orders denying the motion to set aside, the first and second motions to reconsider, and the motion
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for sanctions.3 He contends that the district court erred by (1) not reopening the estate; (2) declining to consider the information contained in the supplements; (3) denying the first motion to reconsider based on his lack of conferral; and (4) denying the motion for sanctions. He also contends that the court was biased based on statements in some of the orders regarding his pro se status.
II. Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law ¶ 14 We review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the governing law. In re Estate of Colby, 2021 COA 31, ¶ 12. ¶ 15 Because Olivares is pro se, “we liberally construe his filings while applying the same law and procedural rules applicable to a party represented by counsel.” Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA 118,
3 Olivares’s notice of appeal also referenced an order denying his
request for subpoenas for information from TCF Bank and Farmers Insurance. To the extent Olivares appeals that order, we don’t address his contention because he doesn’t raise any specific arguments regarding how or why the court erred by denying his subpoenas request. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (where appellant broadly asserts an error but doesn’t make specific arguments, the issue is not properly before the appellate court, and we will not address it).
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¶ 8. But it is not our role to rewrite his briefs or to act as his advocate. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10.
III. Reopening the Estate ¶ 16 We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider Olivares’s appeal. See Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 22 (“An appellate court must always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction to hear an appeal.”). ¶ 17 Olivares argues that the district court erred by declining to reopen the estate to investigate his allegations that Ethridge and Muller committed fraud by concealing valuable jewelry and other assets. This is essentially an argument appealing the court’s denial of his motion to set aside. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this portion of the appeal because it is untimely. ¶ 18 The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review. In re Marriage of James, 2023 COA 51, ¶ 8. Under C.A.R. 4(a)(1), a party must file an appeal within forty-nine days after the entry of the judgment or order. If a party timely files a motion for amendment of findings or judgment under C.R.C.P. 59, the notice of appeal is due within forty-nine
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days of the court’s ruling on that motion. C.R.C.P. 59(k); C.A.R. 4(a). ¶ 19 The court’s order denying the motion to set aside was a final order because it denied Olivares’s requested relief on its merits and left nothing further for the court to do to determine the rights of the parties. See Chavez, ¶ 24 (“[A] final judgment is ‘one that ends the particular action in which it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in the proceedings.’” (citation omitted)). ¶ 20 Nine days after the court denied the motion to set aside, Olivares filed his first motion to reconsider. We construe this as a timely filed C.R.C.P. 59 motion. The court denied the first motion to reconsider on July 14, 2025. Thus, Olivares’s appeal was due on September 2, 2025. See C.R.C.P. 59(k). However, Olivares didn’t file his appeal until November 3, 2025 — more than sixty days late.4 ¶ 21 Olivares’s second motion to reconsider didn’t extend his appellate window because that motion was based on the court
4 A motions division of this court previously permitted this appeal to
proceed in its entirety. However, while we may defer to the decisions of other divisions, we aren’t bound by them. See Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13.
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declining to consider the supplemental information that Olivares filed around the time he filed his first motion to reconsider. We see no reason why Olivares couldn’t have filed such information with his first motion to reconsider or with the initial motion to set aside the stipulation. Cf. Wright Farms, Inc. v. Weninger, 669 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Colo. App. 1983) (“A subsequent motion for new trial that raises issues that either were or could have been raised in the movant’s prior motion does not affect the running of the time for filing the notice of appeal.”). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider Olivares’s contentions about setting aside the stipulation and reopening the estate.
IV. Supplemental Information and Conferral ¶ 22 Olivares contends that the district court erred by (1) declining to consider supplemental information about Ethridge’s and Muller’s alleged concealments of estate assets when it denied his first motion to reconsider and (2) denying his first motion to reconsider due to his failure to confer. ¶ 23 We broadly construe these contentions — raised in the second motion to reconsider — as a request for relief under C.R.C.P. 60. See Gandy, ¶ 8 (noting that we liberally construe pro se filings).
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A. Jurisdiction
¶ 24 The district court denied the second motion to reconsider on August 26, 2025, so the appellate clock began running on that date. Thus, Olivares’s deadline to file his notice of appeal from that order was October 14, 2025. C.A.R. 4(a)(1). He didn’t file his notice of appeal until November 3, 2025 — twenty days past the October 14 deadline. However, upon a showing of excusable neglect, we may extend the time to file the notice of appeal for up to thirty-five days past the deadline. C.A.R. 4(a)(4). A motions division of this court previously determined that Olivares showed excusable neglect because he mistakenly filed a timely notice of appeal in the district court instead of this court. Although not bound to do so, we defer to that division’s determination of excusable neglect and accept the appeal. See Chavez, ¶ 13.
B. Supplemental Information Regarding Fraudulently Concealed Assets
¶ 25 Olivares filed his supplements after the court issued its order denying the motion to set aside. Most of those were filed after he filed the first motion to reconsider. Olivares points us to no legal authority — and we aren’t aware of any — that permits him to
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continually add information to already-filed motions, much less that requires a court to consider such materials. Cf. People v. Hubbard, 519 P.2d 945, 947 (Colo. 1974) (defendants may not “file successive motions based upon the same or similar allegations in the hope that a sympathetic judicial ear may eventually be found”). Thus, the district court didn’t err by declining to consider the supplements. ¶ 26 Furthermore, even if we read Olivares’s supplements together with his first motion to reconsider, the court didn’t err by denying the motion. For a court to reconsider a judgment based on new evidence, the evidence must have (1) been unknown at the time of the judgment and (2) been unable to be discovered through reasonable diligence. C.R.C.P. 59(d)(4). That means Olivares needed to explain to the court why he couldn’t have provided the supplemental information with his original motion to set aside. None of Olivares’s supplements (1) indicate that he didn’t know the information when he filed the motion to set aside or (2) explain why he couldn’t have discovered the information through reasonable efforts. Thus, even if the court had reviewed the supplemental information, it didn’t err by declining to reconsider its ruling.
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C. Conferral Requirement ¶ 27 Olivares next argues that the court abused its discretion by denying relief based on his failure to confer with the other parties. ¶ 28 “Unless a statute or rule governing [a particular] motion provides that it may be filed without notice, moving counsel and any self-represented party shall confer with opposing counsel and any self-represented parties before filing a motion.” C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(8) (emphasis added). The purpose of conferral is to afford a responding party the opportunity to respond and be heard. And although courts should liberally construe a pro se party’s pleadings, “pro se parties must comply with procedural rules to the same extent as parties represented by attorneys.” Adams v. Sagee, 2017 COA 133, ¶ 10. ¶ 29 Despite Olivares’s argument to the contrary, nothing in C.R.C.P. 121 exempts a party from the conferral requirement because conferral would be “futile.” If conferral has not occurred, the rule requires the party filing the motion to explain the reason why and state the efforts made to confer. C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(8). Olivares’s motion to set aside and first motion to reconsider don’t reference conferral at all. The court properly applied C.R.C.P. 121,
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and we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of Olivares’s motions on this basis.
V. Motion for Sanctions ¶ 30 The district court denied the motion for sanctions on July 14, 2025. A portion of Olivares’s second motion to reconsider requested that the district court reconsider the denial of the motion for sanctions. We construe that request as a timely filed C.R.C.P. 59 motion. Thus, the appellate clock began running on August 26, 2025, when the district court denied the second motion to reconsider. See C.R.C.P. 59(k). We apply the same jurisdictional analysis as in Part IV.A of this opinion and, therefore, consider Olivares’s contentions regarding the denial of the motion for sanctions. ¶ 31 Olivares argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for sanctions because the record shows “concealment of [the] $10,000 reserve, coercive conditioning of its return, and unauthorized attorney payments revealed only after court order.” ¶ 32 We review a court’s order on a motion for sanctions for an abuse of discretion. See Kallas v. Spinozzi, 2014 COA 164, ¶ 19; Nagy v. Dist. Ct., 762 P.2d 158, 160-61 (Colo. 1988). A court
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abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on a misunderstanding of the law. Gold Hill Dev. Co., L.P. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 2015 COA 177, ¶ 65. ¶ 33 The $10,000 holdback was for the express purpose of paying final fees and costs related to estate administration. The accounting shows that the funds were used to pay the attorney who represented Goodwin in connection with the estate administration and for taxes or tax preparation. Olivares doesn’t explain — and we can’t discern — how these payments were “unauthorized” or otherwise improper. To the extent Olivares argues that the court should have sanctioned Goodwin for the delayed accounting or “coercive” behavior, his argument is undeveloped, and we decline to consider it. Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12, aff’d, 2021 CO 56. ¶ 34 In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of Olivares’s motion for sanctions.
VI. Bias
¶ 35 Finally, Olivares argues that the district court was biased because of comments it made regarding his pro se status and
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uneven application of the conferral requirement. We aren’t persuaded. ¶ 36 We review claims of judicial bias de novo. See Sanders v. People, 2024 CO 33, ¶ 25. A trial judge must be free of any bias, prejudice, or interest directed toward any party, including pro se parties. See People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 92. We will only question the result of a proceeding if the judge was actually biased. People v. Garcia, 2024 CO 41M, ¶ 21. “[A]ctual bias is a bias ‘that in all probability will prevent [a judge] from dealing fairly with a party.’” People in Interest of A.G., 262 P.3d 646, 650 (Colo. 2011) (citation omitted). ¶ 37 In various orders, the court “acknowledged [Olivares’s] . . . frustration . . . which arise[s] from his pro se status [and] incomplete knowledge of probate law and procedure” and urged him to obtain counsel. At one point, the court referred to Olivares as a “prolific filer from outside Colorado who is [requesting] relief in a case long since closed.” None of these comments reflect actual bias that prevented the judge from dealing fairly with Olivares. While the reference to Olivares as a “prolific filer” may reflect a tinge of frustration, remarks that are “critical or disapproving of, or even
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hostile to, . . . the parties . . . do not support a bias or partiality challenge.” People v. Dobler, 2015 COA 25, ¶ 26 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). To the contrary, the record reflects that the court was generally patient and accommodating, given the vast number of motions and supplements Olivares filed and the significant procedural challenges they generated. ¶ 38 Olivares also argues that the court was biased because it inconsistently applied the conferral requirement. In support, he contends that the court granted Ethridge’s petition for appointment of a special administrator at the outset of the case “without any documented conferral with [Olivares’s] counsel.” The record belies this contention. The first line of the petition certifies that Ethridge’s counsel conferred with Olivares’s counsel and that Olivares objected to the petition. ¶ 39 Accordingly, we perceive no bias on the part of the court.
VII. Disposition
¶ 40 The appeal is dismissed in part and the orders are affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING concurs.
JUDGE BERNARD concurs in part and dissents in part.
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JUDGE BERNARD, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 41 I concur with the majority’s decision in Part III, “Reopening the Estate,” to dismiss the portion of Olivares’s appeal dealing with his contentions concerning setting aside the stipulation and reopening the estate. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s decisions in Part IV, “Supplemental Information and Conferral”; in Part V, “Motion for Sanctions”; and in Part VI, “Bias.” I think we lack jurisdiction to consider any of these issues because Olivares filed an untimely notice of appeal, and the record does not establish excusable neglect to accept his late filing. ¶ 42 The trial court’s last order in this case was issued on August 26, 2025, and Olivares subsequently filed two notices of appeal, one on November 3, 2025, and one on November 14, 2025. By my count, sixty-nine days elapsed between the last order and the first notice of appeal. ¶ 43 Under C.A.R. 4(a)(1), an appellant must file a notice of appeal in the appellate court within forty-nine days of the order being appealed. The general rule is that, if a notice of appeal in a civil case, such as this one, is filed more than forty-nine days after the order being appealed, we lack jurisdiction, and we cannot review
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the merits of the appeal. Martinez v. LHM Corp., TCD, 2020 COA 53M, ¶ 15, aff’d on other grounds, 2021 CO 78. ¶ 44 There is an exception to the general rule: An appellate court may proceed to resolve an appeal in a civil case such as this one based on an untimely notice of appeal if the appellant shows “excusable neglect” for the late filing. C.A.R. 4(a)(4). “Excusable neglect” occurs when “the failure to act results from circumstances which would cause a reasonably careful person to neglect a duty.” Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo. 1973). Failing to act because of carelessness and negligence is not excusable neglect. Id. “On the other hand, ‘excusable neglect’ occurs when there has been a failure to take proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of carelessness, but as the result of some unavoidable hindrance or accident.” Id. ¶ 45 The record does not contain anything to show Olivares filed an untimely notice of appeal due to some unavoidable hindrance or accident. See id. In this case, it appears Olivares did not file a timely notice of appeal because he initially filed his notice in the district court, which was the wrong court. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1). Simply filing a notice of appeal in the wrong court does not amount
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to excusable neglect; rather, the record in this case indicates filing the notice of appeal in the wrong court was careless and negligent. See Riggs Oil & Gas Corp. v. Jonah Energy LLC, 2024 COA 57, ¶ 66 (cert. granted Jan. 13, 2025). ¶ 46 As the majority recognizes in Part III, “Reopening the Estate,” we are not bound by the decision of the motions division to allow this appeal to proceed. Riggs Oil & Gas Corp., ¶ 72, in which the division concluded filing an appeal in the wrong court was not excusable neglect, says the same thing. This statement is particularly true in this case, I think, because I have “serious questions regarding our own jurisdiction” despite the motions division’s previous ruling. Id. (quoting FSDW, LLC v. First Nat’l Bank, 94 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Colo. App. 2004)). ¶ 47 I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with prejudice.