Estate of Morales v. Pavilion Rehab. & Nursing Ctr.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 7, 2026
• Docket: 115567
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Estate of Morales v. Pavilion Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., 2026-Ohio-1655.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ESTATE OF MARGARITA MORALES, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115567 v. :

THE PAVILION REHABILITATION : AND NURSING CENTER, ET AL., : Defendants-Appellees.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 7, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-24-101314

Appearances:

Seaman & Associates Co., L.P.A., David L. Meyerson, for appellant.

Bonezzi Switzer Polito & Perry Co., L.P.A., Bret C. Perry, for appellee.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

I. Introduction

This appeal arises from care provided to Margarita Morales at a

long-term care facility operated by defendants-appellees The Pavilion Rehabilitation and Nursing Center, et al., (“Appellees”) from January 22, 2020,

through June 8, 2020.

Plaintiff-appellant, The Estate of Margarita Morales (“The Estate”)

filed a timely complaint, later dismissed it voluntarily, and refiled the action in July

2024. Appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing R.C. 2305.113(C)’s four-

year statute of repose barred the refiled complaint. The trial court agreed and

entered judgment for Appellees.

On appeal, The Estate argues that the trial court misapplied

R.C. 2305.113(C) by enforcing the four-year repose period without giving effect to

the statute’s express exception for persons “of unsound mind,” as defined by R.C.

2305.16, and by failing to recognize that The Estate stands in Morales’s “shoes” for

purposes of tolling. Appellees respond that The Estate filed the refiled complaint

outside the four-year repose period, never pleaded unsound mind as a tolling theory,

and submitted no competent Civ.R. 56 evidence that would trigger the exception.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

II. Procedural History

On June 8, 2021, Margarita Morales, through her daughter and

attorney-in-fact, Lucy Torres, filed a medical negligence complaint in the Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas. She alleged substandard care at Appellees’ facility

between January 22, 2020, and June 8, 2020. The complaint also alleged that 180-

day letters extended the one-year statute of limitations for the medical claims under

R.C. 2305.113(B). Following Morales’s death on January 29, 2022, the trial court

substituted “The Estate of Margarita Morales, by and through Lucy Torres,

Administrator,” as plaintiff. The action proceeded under the original case number

until August 3, 2023, when The Estate voluntarily dismissed the complaint without

prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).

On July 29, 2024, The Estate refiled the complaint. The refiled

complaint arose from the same course of treatment and repeated the same

negligence allegations from the 2021 action, covering conduct between January 22,

2020, and June 8, 2020.

On October 1, 2024, Appellees moved for summary judgment,

arguing that the refiled complaint was untimely under R.C. 2305.113(C)’s four-year

statute of repose because it was commenced more than four years after the alleged

acts and omissions constituting the basis for the claim. They also asserted that the

saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, cannot revive a medical claim refiled outside the four-

year repose period, and that the complaint did not allege that Morales was of

unsound mind to trigger the statutory exception.

In opposition, The Estate argued, for the first time, that Morales was

of unsound mind at the time of the alleged negligence because she had dementia and

cognitive deficits. It asserted that R.C. 2305.16 tolled the repose period until her

death in January 2022 and it attached affidavits and unauthenticated medical

records in support. Appellees responded that The Estate had not pleaded the

unsound-mind theory, that the supporting materials were not admissible under Civ.R. 56(C), and that the litigation history undermined any claim of legal

incapacity.

On August 20, 2025, the trial court granted summary judgment to

Appellees. The court found no genuine issue of material fact and held that the

complaint was time-barred by R.C. 2305.113(C).

III. Assignment of Error

The Estate timely appealed and raises one assignment of error:

The trial court erred when awarding defendants summary judgment based on an improper application of O.R.C. 2305.113(C), by disregarding the explicit and unambiguous exception to the four-year repose period time-bar for claimants of “unsound mind” contained in the statute.

A. Standard of Review

We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard

as the trial court. Summary judgment is proper when (1) there is no genuine issue

of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and

(3) construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party,

reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion, adverse to that party. Gareau v.

Grossman, 2007-Ohio-5711, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.); see Civ.R. 56(C).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine

issue of material fact exists on the essential elements of the nonmoving party’s claim.

Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996). Once the moving party meets

that burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the pleadings. Instead, it must

set forth specific facts, using materials permitted by Civ.R. 56(C), that show a genuine issue for trial. Unsupported assertions and inadmissible materials are not

enough. Id. at 289, 293.

This appeal also requires us to interpret R.C. 2305.113 and its

relationship to R.C. 2305.16. We review questions of statutory interpretation de

novo. State v. Vanzandt, 2015-Ohio-236, ¶ 6. When statutory language is clear and

unambiguous, we apply it as written. Id. at ¶ 7.

IV. Law and Analysis

A. The medical statute of repose and its exceptions

R.C. 2305.113 governs the limitations and repose periods for medical

claims. A statute of repose “imposes an absolute bar to a plaintiff’s action after a

stated time,” measured from the defendant’s act or omission, regardless of when the

cause of action accrues or is discovered. Tarahfields, LLC v. Wilson, 2025-Ohio-

1337, ¶ 53 (10th Dist.); Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2016-Ohio-7432, ¶ 1. The

Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized R.C. 2305.113(C) as a true statute

of repose that limits defendants’ temporal exposure to liability by extinguishing the

underlying claim if suit is not commenced within four years of the alleged

malpractice. Id.

R.C. 2305.113(C) provides, in relevant part:

(C) Except as to persons within the age of minority or of unsound mind as provided by Section 2305.16 of the Revised Code, both of the following apply:

1. No action upon a medical claim shall be commenced more than four years after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the medical claim. 2. If an action upon a medical claim is not commenced within four years after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the medical claim, then, any action upon that claim is barred.

The Supreme Court has emphasized if a lawsuit bringing a medical

claim is not commenced within four years after the occurrence of the act or omission

constituting the basis for the claim, and no statutory exception applies, any action

on that claim is barred. Wilson v. Durrani, 2020-Ohio-6827, ¶ 28. Unlike the

statute of limitations, the statute of repose bars both accrued claims and those that

have yet to vest. Id. at ¶ 29. R.C. 2305.113(C) establishes an overall time limit.

Absent an express exception, neither equitable tolling nor the saving statute revive

claims refiled outside that period. Id.; R.C. 2305.113; Armatas v. Aultman Hosp.,

2022-Ohio-4577, ¶ 77 (5th Dist.).

The General Assembly created express exceptions to the medical

claim statute of repose for minors and persons of unsound mind. R.C. 2305.16;

Wilson at ¶ 29. One of those express exceptions appears in the prefatory clause of

R.C. 2305.113(C): “Except as to persons within the age of minority or of unsound

mind as provided by Section 2305.16 of the Revised Code . . . .” By cross-referencing

R.C. 2305.16, the General Assembly incorporated the disability-tolling framework

for minors and persons of unsound mind into the medical statute of repose. See

Wilson at ¶ 29 (recognizing that the legislature may create specific exceptions to

repose). R.C. 2305.16 generally allows a person who is a minor or of unsound mind

when a cause of action arises to bring the action within the applicable statutory period after the disability is removed. Gareau v. Grossman, 2007-Ohio-5711, ¶ 11

(8th Dist.); Bradford v. Surgical & Med. Neurology Assocs., Inc., 95 Ohio App.3d

102, 106 (9th Dist. 1994); R.C. 2305.16. However, if a person becomes of unsound

mind after the cause of action accrues and is formally adjudicated as such or is

confined in an institution or hospital under a diagnosed condition that renders the

person of unsound mind, then different timing rules apply. Id. In that case, tolling

lasts only the period ‘“during which [the] person is adjudicated as being of unsound

mind or confined under a diagnosed condition that renders [her] of unsound mind.”’

Robinson v. Kramer, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5916, *11 (8th Dist. Dec. 9, 1999),

quoting Fisher v. Ohio Univ., 63 Ohio St.3d 484, 487 (1992).

B. Tolling under the unsound-mind theory

The Estate argues that Morales fell within the unsound-mind

exception in R.C. 2305.113(C) because medical records documented diagnosed

dementia, disorientation, and severe cognitive deficits when she was admitted to

Appellees’s facility. According to The Estate, those impairments rendered Morales

legally of “unsound mind” under R.C. 2305.16 when her claim accrued in 2020,

tolling the repose period until the disability ended. On that theory, tolling continued

until Morales died on January 29, 2022, so the four-year repose period did not

become operative until that date. The Estate therefore argues that the July 29, 2024

refiling was timely.

The Estate maintains that Morales’s diagnosed dementia and

cognitive decline rendered her of unsound mind under R.C. 2305.16, thereby tolling the repose period until her death. It further asserts that the relevant inquiry is

Morales’s mental condition, not her representative’s capacity to pursue litigation,

and that upon substitution, the Estate assumed Morales’s tolling status under Civ.R.

25.

The Estate contends that a representative’s ability to retain counsel

and pursue litigation does not defeat tolling based on the principal’s unsound mind.

Otherwise, statutory protection for incapacitated persons would have little practical

effect.

Finally, the Estate argues that once it was substituted under Civ.R. 25,

it stood in Morales’s shoes for all purposes, including tolling. The Estate therefore

contends that it inherited any tolling status Morales had and that the mental status

of the heirs has no bearing on the repose calculation.

C. Pleading and proof of unsound mind

Appellees argue that The Estate cannot rely on the unsound-mind

exception for two independent reasons. First, neither the original complaint nor the

refiled complaint alleged operative facts indicating that Morales was of unsound

mind during the relevant period. Second, even if The Estate could raise that theory

in response to summary judgment, it presented no competent Civ.R. 56(C) evidence

in support. Unauthenticated medical records, uncertified copies, and conclusory lay

affidavits do not satisfy Civ.R. 56(C) evidentiary standards and therefore cannot

create an issue of material fact. We note that Ohio is a notice-pleading state, but the complaint still

must allege enough operative facts to give the opposing party fair notice of the claim

and the grounds supporting it. When the dates alleged in the complaint show a facial

time bar, a plaintiff who seeks to avoid that bar through a statutory exception must

ordinarily plead facts supporting the exception. Gore v. Mohamod, 2022-Ohio-

2227, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). A complaint that alleges no facts supporting tolling for

unsound mind does not place the opposing party on notice that it intends to rely on

that theory. See Kelley v. Stauffer, 2010-Ohio-4522, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.).

On this record, the face of the complaint itself demonstrated that the

Estate’s claims were filed outside the four-year statute of repose, and the complaint

alleged no facts that would support an exception. Albert v. Patton, 2022-Ohio-1593,

¶ 5 (8th Dist.). The alleged negligent acts and omissions occurred between

January 22, 2020, and June 8, 2020. Under R.C. 2305.113(C)(1), a plaintiff may not

commence a medical claim more than four years after the act or omission that

allegedly caused the injury. Using June 8, 2020, as the latest possible date, the

repose period expired on June 8, 2024.

The Estate refiled the complaint on July 29, 2024, about seven weeks

after that deadline. Under R.C. 2305.113(C)(2), if a plaintiff does not commence a

medical claim within four years of the alleged act or omission, the claim is barred

unless the plaintiff falls within the statute’s exception. Wilson, 2020-Ohio-6827, at

¶ 28-29. Morales’s timely 2021 filing and later voluntary dismissal do not change

that result. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the saving statute does not revive a medical claim refiled after the four-year repose period expires. See Ruther

v. Kaiser, 2012-Ohio-5686, ¶ 21.

Furthermore, the July 2024 refiled complaint alleges negligent

treatment ending in June 2020. The complaint does not allege that Morales lacked

legal capacity, that she was of unsound mind when the claim arose, or any other facts

that would bring the claim within a statutory exception. Thus, the complaint did not

give Appellees notice or otherwise suggest that The Estate intended to invoke the

unsound-mind exception. Under those circumstances, The Estate could not avoid

the facial time bar by relying for the first time, in summary judgment briefing, on an

unpleaded tolling theory. Strother v. Columbus, 2022-Ohio-4097, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.).

The Estate does not explain how either complaint alleged facts

invoking the statutory exception. Instead, it argues that Morales was in fact of

unsound mind and that The Estate inherited any resulting tolling protection. But

that argument does not remedy the threshold defect that neither complaint alleged

operative facts supporting application of the statutory exception. A party cannot

avoid an otherwise dispositive time bar by asserting an unpleaded tolling theory for

the first time in opposition to summary judgment. Gore, 2022-Ohio-2227 at ¶ 11

(10th Dist.). And even if the theory could be considered despite the pleading

omission, The Estate failed to support it with competent Civ.R. 56 evidence.

In opposition to summary judgment, the Estate relied on medical

records and family affidavits. The records were not certified or otherwise

authenticated as Civ.R. 56(C) requires. The affidavits described Morales’s declining memory and confusion, but they did not provide specific facts establishing that she

was legally of unsound mind when the claims arose. Even construed most favorably

to the Estate, those materials did not create a genuine issue of material fact.

Furthermore, because The Estate failed to establish that Morales

qualified for the unsound-mind exception during the relevant period, we need not

decide the full scope of any protection that might pass to a substituted estate under

Civ.R. 25. See Perry v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 52 Ohio St.3d 168, 169 (1990);

LaMusga v. Summit Square Rehab., L.L.C., 2015-Ohio-5305, ¶ 54-55 (2d Dist.). On

this record, no tolling status was established for the estate to assert after

substitution.

V. Conclusion

The refiled complaint was filed outside the four-year repose period.

To avoid that bar, the Estate relied on the statutory exception for persons of unsound

mind. Even assuming the Estate could raise that theory in response to summary

judgment, it failed to submit competent Civ.R. 56(C) evidence creating a genuine

issue of material fact that Morales satisfied R.C. 2305.16 during the relevant period.

Because no statutory exception was established, R.C. 2305.113(C) bars the action.

Construing the evidence most favorably to the Estate, Appellees satisfied their

summary‑judgment burden and the Estate failed to create a genuine issue of

material fact regarding tolling. Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.

The sole assignment of error is overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellees recover appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________ ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR