Estate of Miguel Chavez v. Santa Ana Police Department

District Court, C.D. California·Decided January 21, 2025·No. 8:24-cv-01899·Unknown

Opinion

JILL WILLIAMS - State Bar No. 221793 CARPENTER, ROTHANS & DUMONT LLP 500 South Grand Avenue, 19th Floor Los Angeles, California 90071 (213) 228-0400 / (213) 228-0401 (Fax) jwilliams@crdlaw.com Attorneys for Defendants, Officer Mark Shifflett, Officer Jonathan Chavez, and Officer Sean Anthis and Specially Appearing City of Santa Ana (dismissed)

ESTATE OF MIGUEL CHAVEZ ) Case No. 8:24-cv-01899-FWS-ADS by and through his successor in ) interest, MARIA DE LA PAZ ) STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER CHAVEZ; MARIA DE LA PAZ ) CHAVEZ, individually, CARMEN ) ALVAREZ, individually, ) Individually, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) DEPARTMENT, a public entity; ) CITY OF SANTA ANA, a public ) entity; OFFICER MARK ) SHIFFLETT, an individual; ) SERGEANT MICHAEL ) GONZALEZ, an individual; ) OFFICER JONATHAN CHAVEZ, ) an individual; OFFICER SEAN ) ANTHIS, an individual; and DOES ) 1 – 10, inclusive, ) ) ) Defendants. ) ) )

I. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS A. Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section XIII(C), below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the Court to file material under seal. There is good cause and a particularized need for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records. A. Peace officers have a right of privacy in their personnel file records; a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Unrestricted disclosure of such personnel file information could potentially threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. Second, municipalities and law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney- client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision- making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to evaluative / analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, evaluative / analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice Defendants further contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies have duties to respect the privacy rights of officers and third parties to this litigation, and such duties may bear on the course of discovery in this matter. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. Third, because peace officers do not have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. Accordingly, without a protective order preventing such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially impair and harm the public entity’s interests in candid self- critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information — as }can and often does result in litigation. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. 44 Acknowledgment of Procedure for Filing Under Seal. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even _A.

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