Estate of Michael Vasquez v. County of Riverside

District Court, C.D. California·Decided February 21, 2024·No. 5:23-cv-00988·Unknown

Opinion

Denisse O. Gastélum, SBN 282771 Christian Contreras, SBN 330269 GASTÉLUM LAW, APC THE LAW OFFICES OF A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION CHRISTIAN CONTRERAS 3767 Worsham Ave. PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION Long Beach, California 90808 360 E. 2nd St., 8th Floor Tel: (213) 340-6112 Los Angeles, California 90012 Fax: (213) 402-8622 Tel: (323) 435-8000 Email: dgastelum@gastelumfirm.com Fax: (323) 597-0101 Email: CC@Contreras-Law.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs, ESTATE OF MICHAEL VASQUEZ, by and through successor in interest, Kathy Nigro; KATHY NIGRO, individually

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – EASTERN DIVISION

ESTATE OF MICHAEL VASQUEZ, ) CASE NO. 5:23-cv-00988-JGB-KK by and through successor in interest, ) [Assigned to the Hon. Jesus G. Bernal, Kathy Nigro; KATHY NIGRO, ) District Judge; Referred to the Hon. Kenly individually, ) Kiya Kato, Magistrate Judge] Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) DISCOVERY MATTER ) COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a public ) entity; RIVERSIDE COUNTY ) [PROPOSED] STIPULATED SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; ) PROTECTIVE ORDER SHERIFF CHAD BIANCO, in his ) individual and official capacities; ) EDWARD DELGADO; JAMES ) KRACHMER; DAVID HOLM; and ) DOES 1 through 10, individually, ) jointly and severally, ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) ) Discovery Cutoff: TBD ) Trial: TBD

PURSUANT TO THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES (“Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order re Confidential Documents”), and pursuant to the Court’s inherent and statutory authority, including but not limited to the Court’s authority under the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the United States District Court, Central District of California Local Rules; after due consideration of all of the relevant pleadings, papers, and records in this action; and upon such other evidence or argument as was presented to the Court; Good Cause appearing therefor, and in furtherance of the interests of justice, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation would be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to a confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. Plaintiffs and the individual Defendants may produce certain documents in this case that contain personal medical, employment or financial information. Such information may implicate the privacy interests of the party and are properly protected through a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) protective order. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (“Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a ‘party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense.’ Although the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (a party’s privacy rights are to be protected through a “carefully crafted protective order.”). Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the following reasons. First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third- party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Estate of Michael Vasquez v. County of Riverside, (C.D. Cal. 2024).

Estate of Michael Vasquez v. County of Riverside (Estate of Michael Vasquez v. County of Riverside) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Wayman v. Southard
23 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1825)
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
435 U.S. 589 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)