The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY August 4, 2022
2022COA89
No. 20CA1125, In re Estate of Chavez — Crimes — Civil Theft — Rights in Stolen Property — Treble Damages
As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of
appeals concludes that in awarding treble damages under section
18-4-405, C.R.S. 2021, a trial court must treble the actual damages
awarded by the jury before offsetting any amounts already repaid.
The civil theft judgment is reversed and remanded for the trial court
to recalculate treble damages. The judgment is affirmed in all other
respects. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA89
Court of Appeals No. 20CA1125 Douglas County District Court No. 18PR30128 Honorable Michael J. Spear, Judge
In re the Estate of Marie M. Chavez, deceased.
Gilbert M. Chavez,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
v.
Teresa Chavez-Krumland, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marie M. Chavez,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Fox and Gomez, JJ., concur
Announced August 4, 2022
Anne Whalen Gill, L.L.C., Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado; Gill & Ledbetter, LLP, H.J. “Jay” Ledbetter, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee
Wade Ash Woods Hill & Farley, P.C., Jody J. Pilmer, Zachary D. Schlichting, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant ¶1 In this probate matter, Gilbert M. Chavez appeals the breach
of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and civil theft orders entered
in favor of Teresa Chavez-Krumland, conservator to Marie M.
Chavez and personal representative to Marie’s1 estate (collectively,
the Estate), after a jury trial.2 The Estate cross-appeals the court’s
ruling denying treble damages on the civil theft claim. This claim
presents an issue of first impression — whether a trial court may
offset a defendant’s repayment against a jury’s damages award
before determining treble damages. We conclude that it may not
and that a court must first treble the jury’s damages awarded for
civil theft and then deduct any amounts already repaid.
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 After her husband died, Marie lived by herself on their ten-
acre ranch (the Ranch). At various times over the years, her
1 Because multiple parties share the same last name, we use first names to distinguish them and mean no disrespect to the parties. 2 During the course of this appeal, Marie died and Teresa was
appointed personal representative of Marie’s estate. Teresa was then substituted for Marie for purposes of this appeal.
1 children, including her son Gilbert, and grandchildren temporarily
lived on the Ranch with her. As part of the distribution of her
husband’s estate, Marie received monthly pension payments from
her husband’s family-run auto body shop. Marie used this money
to support herself and also to help her children.
¶3 Beginning in March 2005, Marie executed the following powers
of attorney designating Gilbert as her agent:
a March 2005 general power of attorney;
an April 2007 special power of attorney designating
Gilbert as her agent in fact for her bank account;
a July 2008 general durable power of attorney and
medical durable power of attorney; and
a February 2014 power of attorney for her bank account.
¶4 In September 2014, Marie, with Gilbert’s help, hired an
attorney to complete her estate planning. Marie executed a will
that, as relevant here, devised the Ranch to Gilbert and his wife.
Marie also executed a general durable power of attorney and a
medical durable power of attorney designating Gilbert as her agent.
¶5 In late 2015, Marie’s physician told the family that she needed
twenty-four-hour care due to her declining health following a series
2 of falls. Based on this recommendation, the family agreed to place
Marie in a rehabilitation and retirement facility that offered the
recommended care.
¶6 As the person acting with power of attorney, Gilbert managed
Marie’s finances and maintained the Ranch. Over time, Gilbert
became increasingly concerned about Marie’s financial stability and
his sisters’ taking advantage of Marie’s generosity. He expressed
these concerns to his sister Teresa and to Marie’s estate attorney.
¶7 On July 29, 2016, Gilbert drove Marie to her bank, where she
executed a quitclaim deed transferring the Ranch to Gilbert and his
wife without consideration. At Marie’s request, Gilbert drafted and
recorded the deed, and he kept the transfer a secret from the rest of
the family. Gilbert then changed all the locks at the Ranch and
donated most of Marie’s personal property inside the house. But he
continued to use Marie’s money to maintain the Ranch.
¶8 Gilbert ultimately told Marie’s estate attorney about the
quitclaim deed in May 2017. In July 2017, he changed his status
on Marie’s bank account from agent to joint owner. All of Marie’s
bank statements were mailed to the Ranch, where Gilbert and his
wife were then living.
3 ¶9 In November 2017, Teresa learned about the deed transferring
the Ranch to Gilbert. She confronted him, and he assured her that
he was following Marie’s wishes. Gilbert then reached out to
Marie’s estate attorney in December 2017 with concerns about
Marie’s mental capacity and memory and family members
pressuring her.
¶ 10 Around the same time, Teresa noticed that Marie was
depressed and uncomfortable. When she asked what was
happening, Marie said that Gilbert was not listening to her. Marie
had asked to return home to the Ranch, but Gilbert had refused. In
January 2018, Marie met with the estate attorney to discuss her
request to return to the Ranch. Marie told her attorney that she
wanted the Ranch back. She said she had not expected the
transfer to be permanent and she had believed that if she asked
Gilbert to return the Ranch, he would do so. Marie’s attorney asked
Gilbert to allow Marie to return to the Ranch, and Gilbert again
refused. Marie then executed a general durable power of attorney
and a medical durable power of attorney designating both Teresa
and Gilbert as co-agents. These powers of attorney were later
revoked in March 2018, and Teresa was designated the sole person
4 with general durable power of attorney and medical durable power
of attorney.
¶ 11 Because Gilbert refused to provide Teresa with Marie’s bank
records, Teresa requested the bank records from the bank after she
became Marie’s sole agent. Teresa discovered that, from December
2016 through March 20, 2018, Gilbert had transferred in excess of
$59,000 from Marie’s account into his commercial bank account.
He said that the transfers were to prevent his sisters from getting
Marie’s money. Teresa asked Marie if she knew about the bank
transfers and Marie said no. Marie wanted her money to remain in
her own bank account.
¶ 12 Teresa then filed a petition to appoint herself as special
conservator for Marie. The trial court granted the petition and
limited her authority to “(1) securing and applying [Marie’s] assets
and income for [Marie’s] health, maintenance, and support; (2)
investigating Marie’s estate plan; and (3) filing a Notice of Lis
Pendens on [the Ranch].” As special conservator, Teresa demanded
the return of funds that were used for expenses associated with the
Ranch and transferred from Marie’s bank account into Gilbert’s
commercial bank account. Gilbert complied with the demand and
5 paid Teresa’s attorney $70,901.17. The court later ordered Gilbert
to allow Teresa access to the Ranch to prepare an inventory of any
and all of Marie’s personal property. But when she arrived, Teresa
was unable to locate any of Marie’s personal property because
Gilbert had already donated most of it.
¶ 13 The Estate filed a petition to void the quitclaim deed
transferring the Ranch from Marie to Gilbert. The Estate also
brought claims against Gilbert for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, and civil theft related to the transfer of the Ranch and
the money transfers from Marie’s bank account. It requested, as
remedies, a surcharge for the breach of fiduciary duty claim, a
constructive trust for the unjust enrichment claim, and the voiding
of the quitclaim deed. In his response, Gilbert asserted a cross-
claim of promissory estoppel for the quitclaim deed and demanded
a jury trial. The Estate raised the affirmative defense of unclean
hands, among others.
¶ 14 On the morning of trial, the Estate, through counsel, objected
to treating jury verdicts for the breach of fiduciary duty and unjust
enrichment claims as binding because those claims were equitable
in nature. But the Estate agreed that the civil theft claim should be
6 presented to the jury. Gilbert responded that the Estate had
consented to a jury trial under C.R.C.P. 39(c) and that all claims
should be presented to the jury. The trial court denied the Estate’s
objection, concluding that the breach of fiduciary duty and unjust
enrichment claims could be tried to a jury. The court did, however,
agree that the claims for a surcharge and a constructive trust, as
well as the defense of unclean hands, were equitable issues to be
decided by the court after the trial.
¶ 15 The jury returned verdicts in the Estate’s favor on the breach
of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment claims. The jury also
returned a verdict in the Estate’s favor on the civil theft claim but
only for the money transferred out of Marie’s account. It then made
the following damages findings:
Gilbert received $775,000 from breaching his fiduciary
duty and Marie lost $775,000 in property or assets as a
result of the breach.
Gilbert was unjustly enriched in the amount of
$845,901.17.3
3This value represents the combined value of the Ranch and the value of the money transferred out of Marie’s bank account.
7 Marie lost $70,901.17 as a result of the civil theft.
However, the jury returned a verdict in Gilbert’s favor on the
promissory estoppel claim and declined to rescind or void the
quitclaim deed.
¶ 16 After trial, the trial court issued an order addressing the jury’s
verdicts and the remaining equitable claims. First, the court found
that Marie intended to give the Ranch to Gilbert by signing the deed
and that Gilbert had not acted “in any manner to overcome her will
to the extent that she was prevented from voluntary action and was
deprived of free agency.” Thus, it rejected the Estate’s unclean
hands defense and gave effect to the jury’s promissory estoppel
verdict. And second, consistent with its unclean hands ruling, the
court declined to impose a constructive trust on the Ranch. Finally,
the court offset the $70,901.17 Gilbert had repaid the Estate before
trial from the jury’s damages award for civil theft. Because the
order was then zero, the court denied treble damages. Therefore,
the court entered an order in the Estate’s favor for breach of
fiduciary duty and civil theft, and it awarded the Estate $775,000 in
damages. It then entered an order for Gilbert on the promissory
estoppel claim and ruled that he could retain title to the Ranch.
8 The court declined to enter an order in the Estate’s favor on the
unjust enrichment claim and found that the award duplicated the
awards on the breach of fiduciary duty and civil theft claims.
¶ 17 Later, the court held a hearing on the parties’ requests for
attorney fees and costs. The court found that the Estate and
Teresa, as special conservator, were entitled to surcharges under
section 15-10-605(1), C.R.S. 2021, and awarded them attorney fees
and costs on all their successful claims. It denied Gilbert’s request
for attorney fees and costs under section 15-10-602(1)-(6), C.R.S.
2021. Because Gilbert had engaged in a self-interested transaction
when transferring the Ranch to himself, the court found that he
had defended the breach of fiduciary duty claim in bad faith and
was, therefore, ineligible for fees and costs.
II. Jury Instructions
¶ 18 Gilbert first contends that the trial court erroneously rejected
his attorney’s proposed jury instructions on (1) undue influence; (2)
capacity; (3) knowledge of an agent imputable to the principal;
(4) acknowledged deeds; (5) multi-party accounts; and (6) nominee
accounts. Specifically, he argues that he was entitled to these
9 instructions because they embodied his theory of the case. We
disagree.
A. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 19 We review a trial court’s decision to tender a particular jury
instruction for an abuse of discretion. Schuessler v. Wolter, 2012
COA 86, ¶ 10. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or is based on a
misapprehension or misapplication of the law. Core-Mark
Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 2016 COA 22, ¶ 28.
¶ 20 The Estate contends that this issue is unpreserved because
Gilbert’s counsel did not object to the district court’s rejection of the
proposed instructions. An alleged instructional error is
unpreserved when the “trial court requests input from the parties
on the proposed instructions, and a party affirms that it has no
objections to any of them.” Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transp., Inc,
2012 COA 88, ¶ 31. However, absent these circumstances,
tendering a jury instruction is sufficient to preserve the alleged
instructional error for appeal. Id.; see also People v. Tardif, 2017
COA 136, ¶ 10 (“An alleged instructional error is preserved if the
defendant tenders the desired relevant instruction even if the
10 defendant does not object or otherwise raise the issue during the
jury instruction conference.”).
¶ 21 Here, the trial court requested input on one of the proposed
instructions — undue influence. Gilbert’s counsel argued that this
instruction should be submitted to the jury because all claims
should be submitted to the jury. Because Gilbert’s counsel asked
the court to tender the undue influence instruction, and because
the court did not ask for input on the remaining proposed
instructions before rejecting them, we conclude this issue is
preserved. Cf. Hendricks, ¶ 32 (concluding the instructional error
was waived because the party agreed to the challenged instruction).
¶ 22 We review preserved instructional errors under the harmless
error standard. Waneka v. Clyncke, 134 P.3d 492, 494 (Colo. App.
2005), aff’d, 157 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2007). We will reverse only if any
erroneous refusal to give requested instructions resulted in
substantial, prejudicial error. Schuessler, ¶ 11. “Prejudicial error
exists when the record shows that a jury might have reached a
different verdict if a proper instruction had been given.” Id.
11 B. Analysis
¶ 23 At trial, Gilbert asserted that Marie wanted him to have the
Ranch and that he did not exercise any undue influence over her
decision to give him the Ranch. He also asserted that he
transferred money from Marie’s bank accounts to protect it from
being dissipated by his siblings because Marie was unable to
manage her finances. Thus, he argues, the court’s rejection of his
instructions for (1) undue influence, see CJI-Civ. 34:15 (2022); (2)
capacity, see Anderson v. Lindgren, 113 Colo. 401, 406-07, 157
P.2d 687, 689 (1945); (3) knowledge of an agent imputable to the
principal, see CJI-Civ. 8:15 (2022); and (4) acknowledged deeds, see
§ 38-35-101(2), (3)(a), C.R.S. 2021, precluded him from presenting
his theory of the case. See Schuessler, ¶ 12 (“A party is entitled to
an instruction embodying his or her theory of the case if it is
supported by competent evidence and is consistent with existing
law.”).
¶ 24 The jury was tasked with deciding four claims related to the
transfer of the Ranch and the money transfers from Marie’s bank
account — (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) unjust enrichment;
(3) civil theft; and (4) promissory estoppel. Arguably, the rejected
12 instructions were relevant to the Estate’s civil theft claim and to
Gilbert’s promissory estoppel claim. However, we conclude that any
error in rejecting the proposed instructions was harmless because
the jury found for Gilbert on the promissory estoppel claim, and he
has not explained how the absence of these instructions prejudiced
him. As the trial court noted, undue influence and capacity are not
elements of civil theft and Gilbert was not precluded from arguing
that he moved money from Marie’s account to his own account to
protect it. As well, the jury found that the Estate was unable to
rescind or void the quitclaim deed transferring the Ranch to Gilbert.
Thus, the jury agreed with Gilbert’s theory of the case that the
quitclaim deed transferring the Ranch to Gilbert was valid. And the
trial court gave effect to the jury’s verdicts when it found that Marie
intended to transfer the Ranch to Gilbert by signing the quitclaim
deed and that title to the Ranch remained with Gilbert.
¶ 25 Concerning the jury’s verdicts for the Estate on the breach of
fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment claims, we conclude that
none of the proposed instructions were relevant to the elements of
those claims. As the trial court correctly noted, the jury found that
13 there was a valid transfer, but it also rejected Gilbert’s claim that he
should not have to pay for the Ranch.
¶ 26 Next, Gilbert contends, in conclusory fashion, that the
proposed instructions on multi-party accounts, §§ 15-15-211
to -212, C.R.S 2021, and nominee accounts, § 15-1-502, C.R.S.
2021, related to the money transfers from Marie’s bank account.
But he failed to develop this argument, so we decline to consider it.
See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA
34, ¶ 41 n.12 (“We don’t consider undeveloped and unsupported
arguments.”), aff’d, 2021 CO 56.
¶ 27 Finally, to the extent Gilbert contends that the jury should
have decided all the claims asserted against him, we conclude that
any verdict on the equitable claims would have been advisory and,
therefore, not binding on the trial court. See Am. Pride Co-op. v.
Seewald, 968 P.2d 139, 142 (Colo. App. 1998). And we reject
Gilbert’s contention that the jury should have been instructed on
the trial court’s post-verdict findings because such an instruction
would have improperly invaded the independent factfinding
province of the jury. See People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 31 (“The
jury, not the court, must perform the fact-finding function when
14 conflicting evidence — and conflicting reasonable inferences — are
presented.”). As the trial court correctly noted in its post-trial
order, the court’s “findings are necessarily the Court’s findings and
are not meant, in any way, to reflect the Court’s belief as to the
facts found by the jury except as those facts might be ascertained
by the verdicts reached by the jury.”
¶ 28 Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion.
III. Inconsistent Verdicts
¶ 29 Gilbert next contends that the jury’s verdicts in the Estate’s
favor on the breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and civil
theft claims are inconsistent with its verdict in his favor on the
promissory estoppel claim. The Estate argues that this issue was
not preserved for our review. It argues that Gilbert’s attorney was
required to object to the verdict forms before they were submitted to
the jury. See Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d
1315, 1330 (Colo. 1996) (“According to our rules of civil procedure,
a party cannot seek appellate review of the propriety of a jury
instruction unless counsel tenders such an objection prior to the
court’s presentation of the instructions to the jury . . . .”). We agree
that this issue is unpreserved, but for a different reason. See
15 Taylor v. Taylor, 2016 COA 100, ¶ 31 (“An appellate court may . . .
affirm on any ground supported by the record.”).
¶ 30 Contrary to the Estate’s contention, Gilbert does not challenge
the verdict forms or the propriety of the jury instructions. Instead,
he challenges the consistency of the jury’s verdicts themselves.
Thus, Gilbert’s attorney was not required to object to the verdict
forms before they were tendered to the jury to preserve this issue
for appeal. Cf. Nichols v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 148 P.3d
212 (Colo. App. 2006) (finding waiver where counsel did not object
to the order of conditions on the special verdict form before that
form was submitted to the jury).
¶ 31 Whether a party waives the right to challenge an inconsistent
verdict on appeal turns on the characterization of the verdict.
Morales v. Golston, 141 P.3d 901, 905 (Colo. App. 2005). If a party
fails to object to a general verdict or a general verdict coupled with
written interrogatories before the jury is discharged, the party
“waives any future challenge to the inconsistency because its failure
to object timely deprives the court of the option of sending the jury
back for further deliberations.” Id.; see also C.R.C.P. 49(b). But,
because any inconsistencies in a special verdict would not be
16 resubmitted to the jury, a party is not required to object to the
special verdict before the jury is discharged to preserve the right to
challenge the inconsistencies. Morales, 141 P.3d at 905; see also
C.R.C.P. 49(a).
¶ 32 We conclude that the verdicts here were general verdicts
accompanied by answers to interrogatories rather than special
verdicts. See Morales, 141 P.3d at 906 (“[T]he hallmark of a general
verdict is that it requires the jury to announce the ‘ultimate legal
result of each claim.’” (quoting Johnson v. ABLT Trucking Co., 412
F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005))). Consequently, because
Gilbert’s counsel failed to object to the general verdicts before the
jury was discharged, he waived the inconsistent verdicts issue for
purposes of appeal. See id. at 905.
IV. Sufficiency
¶ 33 Gilbert also contends that the jury’s verdict finding a breach of
fiduciary duty and the court’s equitable ruling denying the Estate’s
request to void the deed transferring the Ranch to him are
inconsistent. Specifically, he asserts that because Marie intended
to transfer the Ranch to him, he could not have violated his
fiduciary duty in carrying out her wish. As best we can discern, he
17 asks us to vacate the breach of fiduciary duty verdict by arguing
that “[t]he very nature of the Court’s determinations preclude[s] a
finding that the Transfer was a breach of a fiduciary duty.” We
construe his argument as one challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the breach of fiduciary duty verdict, which we
address below in Part IV.B. In doing so, we reject the Estate’s
contention that this claim of error was not preserved. Because the
court made its equitable findings after the jury’s verdict, Gilbert’s
post-trial motion preserved this issue for our review. See Briargate
at Seventeenth Ave. Owners Ass’n v. Nelson, 2021 COA 78M, ¶ 66
(“Objections to trial court rulings must be made contemporaneously
with the court’s actions before appellate review is afforded.”).
¶ 34 Further, Gilbert contends that there was insufficient evidence
to support the jury’s verdicts in the Estate’s favor on the breach of
fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and civil theft claims. We
A. Standard of Review
¶ 35 “When a jury verdict is challenged on the grounds that it is
unsupported by the evidence, we must review the entire record to
determine whether there is competent evidence from which the jury
18 logically could have reached its verdict.” Vititoe v. Rocky Mountain
Pavement Maint., Inc., 2015 COA 82, ¶ 34. In doing so, we must
determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, is sufficient to support the
verdict. Black v. Black, 2018 COA 7, ¶ 92.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
¶ 36 To recover on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, “a plaintiff
must prove: 1) that the defendant was acting as a fiduciary of the
plaintiff; 2) that he breached a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; 3) that
the plaintiff incurred damages; and 4) that the defendant’s breach
of fiduciary duty was a cause of the plaintiff’s damages.” Graphic
Directions, Inc. v. Bush, 862 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Colo. App. 1993).
¶ 37 A party who has been appointed as a fiduciary pursuant to a
power of attorney has a duty to
(a) [a]ct in accordance with the principal’s reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by the agent and, otherwise, in the principal’s best interest;
(b) [a]ct in good faith; and
(c) [a]ct only within the scope of authority granted in the power of attorney.
19 § 15-14-714(1), C.R.S. 2021. As well, the fiduciary “shall . . . [a]ct
so as not to create a conflict of interest that impairs the agent’s
ability to act impartially in the principal’s best interest.” § 15-14-
714(2)(b).
¶ 38 Relying on the jury’s verdict in his favor on the promissory
estoppel claim and the trial court’s post-verdict findings that Marie
intentionally transferred the Ranch to him and that she did so
without undue influence, Gilbert contends there is insufficient
evidence to show that he breached his fiduciary duty. However, the
valid transfer and absence of undue influence do not necessarily
negate a finding of a breach of a fiduciary duty. Instead, we
conclude the record contains sufficient evidence that Gilbert
breached his fiduciary duty by engaging in a self-interested
transaction that created a conflict of interest, and thereby impaired
his ability to act in Marie’s best interest.4
4 The jury’s verdict in the Estate’s favor on the breach of fiduciary duty claim was limited to the value of the Ranch. Thus, the jury did not find that Gilbert breached his fiduciary duty when he transferred money out of Marie’s bank account and into his commercial bank account.
20 ¶ 39 While Marie was an inpatient at the rehabilitation facility,
Gilbert drafted the quitclaim deed transferring the Ranch to himself
and his wife, drove Marie to her bank where she executed the deed,
and recorded the deed. Although we acknowledge that Marie
requested this transfer, Gilbert, as her fiduciary, did nothing to
mitigate any conflict of interest or to ascertain whether the transfer
was in Marie’s best interest. Gilbert testified that he asked Marie if
she wanted to consult her estate attorney and Marie declined. Even
if true, Gilbert communicated with Marie’s attorney regularly and
Gilbert voiced his concerns about family pressures on multiple
occasions. Thus, in carrying out his fiduciary duty, he could have
consulted Marie’s attorney before executing the deed. But he did
not reveal the transfer to Marie’s attorney until approximately ten
months after recording the quitclaim deed.
¶ 40 Further, Gilbert retained title to the Ranch without
consideration with the expectation that he would care for the
property while Marie was at the rehabilitation facility. Without her
knowledge, Gilbert continued to use Marie’s money to pay for
utilities and expenses for the Ranch. However, when Marie asked
to return to the Ranch, Gilbert refused. Marie then told her
21 attorney that she did not believe the transfer was permanent and
that she reasonably expected that she could return to the Ranch
upon request.
¶ 41 Finally, Gilbert changed the locks to the gates on the Ranch
and to the house, restricting his siblings’ access to the home. He
also donated most of Marie’s personal property, thereby precluding
Teresa from inventorying Marie’s property as special conservator.
¶ 42 As the trial court noted, the record shows that, while Marie
intended to transfer the Ranch to Gilbert, she did not intend to do
so without consideration. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports
the jury’s finding that Gilbert breached his fiduciary duty when he
retained title to the Ranch by way of the quitclaim deed.
C. Unjust Enrichment
¶ 43 Unjust enrichment is a “judicially-created remedy designed to
undo the benefit to one party that comes at the unfair detriment of
another.” Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008). To
prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must prove
that “(1) the defendant received a benefit (2) at the plaintiff’s
expense (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the
22 defendant to retain the benefit without commensurate
compensation.” Id.
¶ 44 The jury found that Gilbert was unjustly enriched by the
transfer of the Ranch without consideration and by the money
transfers out of Marie’s account. Gilbert does not contend that he
did not receive a benefit at Marie’s expense by engaging in these
transactions. Instead, he relies on the trial court’s finding that
Marie transferred the Ranch to him without undue influence. But
in doing so, he ignores the jury’s finding and the trial court’s finding
that Marie did not intend to transfer the Ranch to him without
consideration. Thus, Gilbert received the Ranch at Marie’s expense,
and, for the reasons explained in Part IV.B, he did so under unjust
circumstances.
¶ 45 We further conclude that the following trial evidence
sufficiently shows that Gilbert was unjustly enriched. Gilbert
repeatedly told Marie’s estate attorney and his siblings that he was
concerned about Marie’s finances and that she was running out of
money. But, without their or Marie’s knowledge, he transferred
more than $59,000 from Marie’s account to his. And he used
Marie’s money to maintain the Ranch that he owned.
23 ¶ 46 Additionally, the bank mailed Marie’s bank statements to the
Ranch when she lived at the rehabilitation facility, and she testified
that she had not seen her bank statements in years. Further, after
Teresa became co-agent, Gilbert withheld Marie’s bank statements
from Teresa. Teresa was unable to access the statements until she
was designated Marie’s sole agent.
D. Civil Theft
¶ 47 To prevail on a claim for civil theft, “a party must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed all of
the elements of criminal theft.” Black, ¶ 93. A person commits civil
theft when he (1) knowingly obtained, retained, or exercised control
over “anything of value of another without authorization or by
threat or deception”; and (2) acted intentionally or knowingly in
ways that deprived the plaintiff of the thing of value permanently.
§ 18-4-401(1), C.R.S. 2021; Scott v. Scott, 2018 COA 25, ¶ 26.
“Thus, civil theft, like criminal theft, requires the specific intent of
the defendant to permanently deprive the owner of the benefit of the
property.” Scott, ¶ 26. And a party’s intent is a question of fact to
be determined by the fact finder. Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
2014 COA 172, ¶ 31.
24 ¶ 48 Gilbert contends that there is insufficient evidence of civil theft
because he repaid the $70,901.17 that he had transferred out of
Marie’s bank account. However, returning funds taken from
Marie’s account is not a defense to civil theft. See People v. Pedrie,
727 P.2d 859, 863 (Colo. 1986) (“The fact that stolen property was
eventually returned is not a defense to a theft charge.”). As well,
Gilbert did not return the funds until Teresa, in her capacity as
special conservator, discovered the transfers and demanded the
return of the funds. Under these circumstances, and considering
the evidence that Marie had no knowledge of the bank transfers, we
conclude there is sufficient evidence that Gilbert obtained
$70,901.17 of Marie’s funds with the intent to deprive Marie of
those funds.
V. Trial Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 49 Gilbert last contends that, as the prevailing party on appeal,
the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs to the Estate
should be reversed. However, we have discerned no error in the
trial court’s order in the Estate’s favor and, therefore, decline to
reverse the court’s award of attorney fees and costs.
25 VI. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 50 Gilbert requests an award of attorney fees and costs incurred
on appeal pursuant to section 15-10-602. We deny the request
because he does not explain the legal and factual basis for an
award. See C.A.R. 39.1. Specifically, he does not identify which
provision of section 15-10-602 applies, nor does he explain why he
is entitled to attorney fees and costs under this statute. Herbst v.
Univ. of Colo. Found., 2022 COA 38, ¶ 20.
VII. Cross-Appeal
¶ 51 The Estate contends that the trial court erred by deducting the
returned funds from the jury’s damages award before trebling the
damages. We agree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 52 The trial court “has the sole prerogative to assess the amount
of damages, and its award will not be set aside unless it is
manifestly and clearly erroneous.” Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550,
565 (Colo. App. 2008). However, whether the district court
misapplied the law when determining the measure of damages
presents a question of law that we review de novo. Sos v. Roaring
Fork Transp. Auth., 2017 COA 142, ¶ 37.
26 ¶ 53 We also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
Garhart v. Columbia/Healthone, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 591 (Colo.
2004). When construing a statute, our primary objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Id. If
more than one statute addresses an issue, we must construe the
related provisions as a whole and read the statutes together. Foiles
v. Whittman, 233 P.3d 697, 699 (Colo. 2010). We begin with the
plain language of the statute, and “if we can clearly discern intent
from the language, we need look no further.” Garhart, 95 P.3d at
591.
¶ 54 Section 18-4-405, C.R.S. 2021, provides as follows:
All property obtained by theft, robbery, or burglary shall be restored to the owner, and no sale, whether in good faith on the part of the purchaser or not, shall divest the owner of his right to such property. The owner may maintain an action not only against the taker thereof but also against any person in whose possession he finds the property. In any such action, the owner may recover two hundred dollars or three times the amount of the actual damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, and may also recover costs of the action and reasonable attorney fees; but monetary damages and attorney fees shall not be recoverable from a good-faith purchaser or good-faith holder of the property.
27 (Emphasis added.)
¶ 55 To be awarded treble damages, a plaintiff need only prove that
the defendant committed acts constituting the statutory crime of
theft. Itin v. Ungar, 17 P.3d 129, 133 (Colo. 2000). If all of the
elements of civil theft have been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, the trial court lacks discretion to decline to award treble
damages. Franklin Drilling & Blasting, Inc. v. Lawrence Constr. Co.,
2018 COA 59, ¶ 25 n.5.
B. Analysis
¶ 56 The trial court calculated the civil theft damages by offsetting
the $70,901.17 Gilbert repaid to the Estate before trebling the
damages. Because the jury awarded the Estate $70,901.17 in
actual damages, the offset resulted in a net order of zero. Thus, the
trial court ruled that it had “nothing to treble.” We conclude, for
three reasons, that the trial court erred by offsetting the repayment
before trebling the damages.
¶ 57 First, nothing in section 18-4-405 provides for an offset to
actual damages based on the return of property obtained by theft
before trebling the damages. Instead, the statute provides for both
the return of the property obtained by theft and treble damages in
28 the amount of “two hundred dollars or three times the amount of
the actual damages sustained by him, whichever is greater.” Id.
Absent some statutory command, the statute provides no basis for
such an offset. See Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barriga, 2018 CO 42,
¶¶ 10-11 (concluding that, absent some statutory command, the
statutory penalty in section 10-3-1116(1), C.R.S. 2021, precludes a
setoff for an insurer’s prior payment of the covered benefit itself in
calculating the penalty owed).
¶ 58 Second, “the placement of the rights in stolen property statute
in the Criminal Code and its allowance of treble damages ‘strongly
suggest that [the] section was intended to serve primarily a
punitive, rather than a remedial, purpose.’” Bermel v. BlueRadios,
Inc., 2019 CO 31, ¶ 30 (quoting In re Marriage of Allen, 724 P.2d
651, 656 (Colo. 1986)). Indeed, the “availability of treble damages
and attorney fees for civil theft reflects the legislature’s displeasure
with the proscribed conduct and its desire to deter it.” Id. at ¶ 35.
Therefore, we conclude that recognizing an offset of the returned
property before the actual damages are trebled contravenes the
purpose of the statute. And because an offset for returned property
before trebling the damages verdict would result in an award less
29 than what the statute contemplates, such action risks
disincentivizing individuals from bringing civil theft claims.
¶ 59 Third, we find federal case law interpreting Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, a federal antitrust statute, instructive and persuasive.
See 15 U.S.C. § 15; see also Vining v. Martyn, 660 So. 2d 1081,
1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding federal case law persuasive,
the division concluded that any offset of settlement payments
received prior to the civil theft verdict must occur after the verdict is
trebled).
¶ 60 Like section 18-4-405, Section 4 provides that a plaintiff may
recover actual damages and “threefold the damages by him
sustained” as a result of an antitrust violation. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
Federal courts have consistently held that district courts should
first treble the amount of the jury’s verdict and then subtract any
amount already paid in settlement. See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord,
246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir. 1957); Hydrolevel Corp. v. Am. Soc’y
of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc., 635 F.2d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 456
U.S. 556 (1982); Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380,
391-92 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he . . . unbroken rule has been that any
settlement payments are deducted from the damages award after
30 trebling.”). The court in Hydrolevel Corp. identified three reasons
for trebling damages before deducting settlement proceeds: (1) the
statute provides that the plaintiff should receive three times the
proven actual damages; (2) reducing the amount of damages trebled
would weaken the incentive for private plaintiffs to file suit; and (3)
the deduction of the settlement proceeds would discourage
settlement before a verdict. 635 F.2d at 130 (citing Flintkote Co.,
246 F.2d 368). We find these reasons persuasive and applicable to
our interpretation of section 18-4-405.
¶ 61 Accordingly, we conclude the court erred by deducting the
$70,901.17 repaid to the Estate from the jury’s damages verdict
before trebling the actual damages. The trial court should first
treble the amount of actual damages and then subtract the
$70,901.17 repaid. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order on
the civil theft claim in part and remand for the court to award the
Estate $212,703.51 in treble damages on that claim.
VIII. Conclusion
¶ 62 We reverse the trial court’s award on the civil theft claim in
part and remand for the trial court to award the Estate
31 $212,703.51 in treble damages on that claim. The order is
otherwise affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.