Estate of M. Adams v. Dist. Ct. (Fallini)

Nevada Supreme Court

Estate of M. Adams v. Dist. Ct. (Fallini)

DecidedJanuary 15, 2015

Docket66521

StatusUnpublished

This text of Estate of M. Adams v. Dist. Ct. (Fallini) (Estate of M. Adams v. Dist. Ct. (Fallini)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Estate of M. Adams v. Dist. Ct. (Fallini), (Neb. 2015).

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Opinion

order does not sanction petitioner's attorney, such that the attorney could challenge it personally through a writ petition. Having considered the parties' arguments, we summarily deny the writ petition, as it challenges a substantively appealable order. See NRAP 3A(b)(8) (permitting an appeal from a special order entered after final judgment, except for an order "granting a motion to set aside a default judgment under NRCP 60(b)(1) when the motion was filed and served within 60 days after entry of the default judgment"); Lindblom v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 120 Nev. 372, 374 n.1, 90 P.3d 1283, 1284 n.1 (2004) (explaining that an order setting aside a default judgment is appealable as a special order after final judgment if the motion to set aside is made more than 60 days after entry of the judgment). In particular, real party in interest's motion for relief from the judgment was filed more than six months after entry of the judgment, and in granting the motion, the district court specifically rejected real party in interest's "excusable neglect" argument under NRCP 60(b)(1), noting that the motion was filed well beyond the six-month window for moving for such relief under NRCP 60(b)(1). While the order granting relief from the judgment based on a finding of fraud was subject to challenge by appeal, notice of that order's entry was served by mail on August 13, 2014, and petitioner did not file a notice of appeal within the 33-day appeal period. See NRAP 4(a)(1); NRAP 26(c). Instead, petitioner filed this writ petition on September 17, 2014, 35 days after the order's notice of entry was served. See Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224-25, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004) (noting that an appeal provides an adequate remedy that generally precludes writ relief, and regardless, "writ relief is not available to correct an untimely

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 19(I7A notice of appeal"). Accordingly, we decline to consider the merits of this writ petition, NRAP 21(b), and instead ORDER the petition DENIED.

arraguirre

J. Douglas

Ova Cherry

cc: Hon. Robert W. Lane, District Judge Aldrich Law Firm, Ltd. Fabian & Clendenin, P.C. (Utah) John Ohlson Nye County Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A

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order does not sanction petitioner's attorney, such that the attorney could challenge it personally through a writ petition. Having considered the parties' arguments, we summarily deny the writ petition, as it challenges a substantively appealable order. See NRAP 3A(b)(8) (permitting an appeal from a special order entered after final judgment, except for an order "granting a motion to set aside a default judgment under NRCP 60(b)(1) when the motion was filed and served within 60 days after entry of the default judgment"); Lindblom v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 120 Nev. 372, 374 n.1, 90 P.3d 1283, 1284 n.1 (2004) (explaining that an order setting aside a default judgment is appealable as a special order after final judgment if the motion to set aside is made more than 60 days after entry of the judgment). In particular, real party in interest's motion for relief from the judgment was filed more than six months after entry of the judgment, and in granting the motion, the district court specifically rejected real party in interest's "excusable neglect" argument under NRCP 60(b)(1), noting that the motion was filed well beyond the six-month window for moving for such relief under NRCP 60(b)(1). While the order granting relief from the judgment based on a finding of fraud was subject to challenge by appeal, notice of that order's entry was served by mail on August 13, 2014, and petitioner did not file a notice of appeal within the 33-day appeal period. See NRAP 4(a)(1); NRAP 26(c). Instead, petitioner filed this writ petition on September 17, 2014, 35 days after the order's notice of entry was served. See Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224-25, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004) (noting that an appeal provides an adequate remedy that generally precludes writ relief, and regardless, "writ relief is not available to correct an untimely

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 19(I7A notice of appeal"). Accordingly, we decline to consider the merits of this writ petition, NRAP 21(b), and instead ORDER the petition DENIED.

arraguirre

J. Douglas

Ova Cherry

cc: Hon. Robert W. Lane, District Judge Aldrich Law Firm, Ltd. Fabian & Clendenin, P.C. (Utah) John Ohlson Nye County Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A

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Estate of M. Adams v. Dist. Ct. (Fallini), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-m-adams-v-dist-ct-fallini-nev-2015.

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J. Douglas

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