Estate of Louis Campagnone, By and through its Administrator, Dana Martinelli v. The State of Rhode Island

• Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 2024-0263-Appeal.
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court

No. 2024-263-Appeal. (PC 15-5550)

Estate of Louis Campagnone, By and : through its Administrator, Dana Martinelli

v. :

The State of Rhode Island. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court

Estate of Louis Campagnone, By and : through its Administrator, Dana Martinelli

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Long, for the Court. The plaintiff, the Estate of Louis Campagnone

by and through its Administrator, Dana Martinelli (the Estate or plaintiff), appeals

from an order and judgment of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in

favor of the defendant, the State of Rhode Island (the state or defendant), in this

negligence action involving a slip-and-fall accident in a bathroom at Scarborough

South State Beach (Scarborough) in Narragansett, Rhode Island. 1 This case came

before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and

1 Mr. Campagnone filed the underlying complaint in this action. After he died of unrelated causes in 2022, his daughter and court-appointed administrator, Dana Martinelli, became his successor in interest in this case. -1- show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided.

After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record,

we conclude that cause has not been shown and that we may decide this case without

further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the

judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Procedural History

The following facts are not in dispute. Scarborough is a public beach in

Narragansett owned and operated by the state; the Department of Environmental

Management (RIDEM) maintains the state’s parks and beaches. On August 31,

2014, Louis Campagnone entered the bathroom at Scarborough after spending the

day with his family. Mr. Campagnone, who was using a cane, fell when his cane

slipped as he walked into the bathroom. He sustained injuries to the left side of his

body, including his hip, face, elbow, knee, shoulder, and ankle. After calling for aid,

his nephews helped him up and out of the bathroom. Beach personnel called EMS,

which transported him to South County Hospital, where doctors diagnosed him with

a fractured hip.

Mr. Campagnone filed his complaint on December 21, 2015, alleging that he

slipped and fell due to an accumulation of sand and water on the floor of the

bathroom. As a result, he posited that the state breached its duty to him by (1)

negligently allowing the bathroom to remain in a dangerous condition, (2) failing to

-2- warn him of this dangerous condition, and (3) failing to clean or maintain the

bathroom to avoid such a condition. He alleged that he suffered injuries, medical

expenses, loss of enjoyment of life, and lost earning capacity as a direct and

proximate result of this breach of duty. He sought compensation for his injuries and

expenses.

After three years of discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment,

asserting immunity from liability under Rhode Island’s Recreational Use Statute,

G.L. 1956 chapter 6 of title 32 (RUS). The state argued that Mr. Campagnone did

not demonstrate that RIDEM “willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn

against a known dangerous condition. In fact, the evidence demonstrates that

RIDEM had no knowledge of any supposed ‘dangerous condition’ in the public

restroom prior to plaintiff’s alleged accident.” The state also asserted immunity

from liability under the public duty doctrine.

In support of this argument, the state cited the depositions conducted by

plaintiff’s counsel of Roger Monfette, a regional manager with RIDEM, and

Brendan Quigley, who worked as a park ranger at Scarborough in 2014. These

individuals denied having any knowledge about any past injuries in the bathrooms

at Scarborough.

In response, Mr. Campagnone asserted that there remained issues of fact as to

whether the state breached its duty, thus triggering the exception to the RUS, and

-3- that the public duty doctrine was inapplicable. In support, he relied in part on a

Providence Journal article that discussed the unclean conditions in the bathrooms of

Rhode Island’s state beaches and a 2018 RIDEM study on Rhode Island’s state

parks.

A justice of the Superior Court heard arguments on the motion for summary

judgment on November 20, 2019, and reserved her ruling to allow Mr. Campagnone

time to conduct further discovery. After a nearly three-year delay resulting largely

from the COVID-19 pandemic, plaintiff filed an additional memorandum in support

of his objection to the state’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff attached

to this memorandum a transcript of the deposition of Jennifer Ogren, an associate

administrator within RIDEM; the beach operations manual for Rhode Island state

parks; and emails from beach patrons from 2016 to 2020 lamenting the cleanliness

of the bathrooms at Scarborough (none of which discussed injuries at the facilities).

Ms. Ogren testified that she had no knowledge of any other incidents involving

people slipping and falling in the bathrooms at Scarborough between 2014 and 2019.

The trial justice heard arguments on the supplemental briefing in February 2023.

She once again reserved her decision in order to review the materials further.

Mr. Campagnone died of unrelated causes in March of 2022; his attorneys

moved to substitute his daughter and court-appointed administrator, Dana Martinelli,

as his successor in interest on March 28, 2023. The plaintiff then filed an amended

-4- complaint on April 18, 2023, which reflected the substitution of the Estate in place

of Mr. Campagnone but is otherwise identical to the original complaint.

On November 21, 2023, the trial justice issued a bench decision granting the

state’s motion for summary judgment. The justice noted that this Court has not

limited the application of the RUS to natural occurrences, but rather has interpreted

the statute to afford “broad immunity to landowners who open their land to the public

free of charge for recreational use.” She observed that the evidence in this case does

not involve any disputed issues of fact, so deciding this case on the state’s motion

for summary judgment was appropriate. The key question, she posited, related to

defendant’s duty of care, and whether the state had the requisite level of knowledge

as to the alleged danger of sand and water on the bathroom floor so as to trigger the

exception to the RUS. The trial justice concluded that plaintiff had failed to prove

that the state had notice of a dangerous condition in the bathroom at Scarborough

and thus was entitled to immunity under the RUS.

The trial justice emphasized that the focus of the RUS analysis is not on

whether the landowner has theoretical knowledge about a dangerous condition, but

rather “whether the defendant was put on notice of a specific dangerous condition

and was required to take protective action as a result.” She concluded that the Estate

failed to prove that the state had notice of this dangerous condition. Viewed in the

light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence in this case could be proof of general

-5- notice of a potentially hazardous condition; but, in her view, this was not enough to

overcome the presumption of immunity under the RUS. The trial justice did not

reach the issue of whether the public duty doctrine applied.

The Superior Court entered an order on July 2, 2024, granting the state’s

motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. Judgment in

favor of the state was entered on the same day. The Estate then filed its notice of

appeal on July 9, 2024.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.

Newport and New Road, LLC v. Hazard, 296 A.3d 92, 94 (R.I. 2023). In doing so,

this Court utilizes “the same standards and rules used by the trial justice.” DeCurtis

v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell Ltd., 252 A.3d 765, 770 (R.I. 2021) (brackets

omitted) (quoting Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin, 46 A.3d 835, 838 (R.I. 2012)).

The question upon reviewing the grant of summary judgment is, in viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether “there are no

genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law * * *.” Commerce Park Realty, LLC v. HR2-A Corp., 253 A.3d 1258,

1266 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Moore v. Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher

Education, 18 A.3d 541, 544 (R.I. 2011)). If so, then this Court will affirm the

judgment of the trial court. Id. The party opposing the motion for summary

-6- judgment has “an affirmative duty to set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting Sauro v. Lombardi, 178 A.3d 297, 303

(R.I. 2018)). They “cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings,

mere conclusions or mere legal opinions.” DeCurtis, 252 A.3d at 770 (quoting

Credit Union Central Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1267 (R.I. 2009)).

Analysis

We consider whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether

the state’s failure to warn Mr. Campagnone of a dangerous condition rose to the level

of willfulness or maliciousness required to defeat the presumption of immunity

under the RUS. After viewing the extensive evidentiary record in this case in the

light most favorable to the Estate, we determine that no genuine issues of material

fact exist to demonstrate that the state willfully or maliciously failed to warn Mr.

Campagnone of a dangerous condition.

The RUS limits the liability of landowners who authorize persons to use the

landowners’ property for recreational purposes. See G.L. 1956 § 32-6-3. The RUS

creates an exception, however, “[f]or the willful or malicious failure to guard or warn

against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity after discovering the user’s

peril * * *.” Section 32-6-5(a)(1). To define the terms “willful” and “malicious,”

this Court has turned to Black’s Law Dictionary. See Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d

1038, 1052 (R.I. 2010). “Willful” means “[v]oluntary and intentional,” and

-7- “malicious” means “[s]ubstantially certain to cause injury.” Id. (quoting Black’s

Law Dictionary 1043, 1737 (9th ed. 2009)). Unless a landowner’s conduct reaches

such a disregard for safety, they are entitled to immunity under the RUS. See

§ 32-6-5.

Only once has this Court concluded that evidence of a governmental

defendant’s conduct might support a finding that there was a willful or malicious

failure to warn of a dangerous condition such that the exception to immunity under

§ 32-6-5(a)(1) applies. That case, Berman v. Sitrin, involved a young man who

plummeted almost thirty feet from Newport’s Cliff Walk after the ground beneath

his feet gave way. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1042. In so deciding, the Court noted the

ample evidence of the Cliff Walk’s “latent dangers, including the eroding cliff edge

[and] the drainage defects,” several past incidents of serious injury or death over

several decades, and written documentation of numerous warnings from the

president of Salve Regina University, the National Park Service, and the Army Corps

of Engineers. Id. at 1049-50. The Court emphasized the city’s “actual or

constructive knowledge of the perilous circumstances” and its failure to rectify the

conditions despite “having been afforded a reasonable amount of time to eliminate

the dangerous condition” as key in its conclusion that the statutory exception was

triggered. Id. at 1050.

-8- Without a particular showing by a plaintiff that the government defendant has

“discover[ed] the user’s peril,” this Court has refused to find that the exception to

immunity should apply. Section 32-6-5(a)(1); see, e.g., Carlson v. Town of South

Kingstown, 111 A.3d 819, 824-25 (R.I. 2015). Where the state or a municipality has

not been put on notice of a dangerous condition because of previous reports of

injuries, complaints about the dangerous condition, or actual knowledge of the

specific dangerous condition, this Court has declined to find that the exception under

§ 32-6-5(a)(1) applies. See Carlson, 111 A.3d at 824-25; see also Symonds v. City

of Pawtucket, 126 A.3d 421, 426 (R.I. 2015); Cancel v. City of Providence, 187 A.3d

347, 352 (R.I. 2018); Yattaw v. City of East Providence, 203 A.3d 1167, 1173 (R.I.

2019). Even where a plaintiff has demonstrated that the state was aware generally

of a dangerous condition at a particular park, without specific evidence of a pattern

of injury or specific complaints related to the condition, the exception to immunity

will not apply. See Roy v. State, 139 A.3d 480, 489-90 (R.I. 2016) (exception not

applicable where RIDEM was aware of the shallow water and dangers of diving at

a particular pond, but where there was only one incident of a relatively minor injury

several days before the plaintiff’s injury).

Here, plaintiff has not presented any evidence to create a question of fact with

regard to whether the state’s conduct was willful or malicious. After almost eight

years of discovery, the Estate cannot point to any evidence that the state had actual

-9- knowledge of the dangerous condition in the Scarborough bathrooms, any

complaints prior to the fall related to the bathroom floors being slippery, or any past

injuries or accidents. The plaintiff directs us to RIDEM’s bathroom cleaning

policies and the lack of evidence that RIDEM had cleaned the men’s bathroom on

the day of the fall in order to argue that the state’s conduct fell below the standard

of care. But as a statutory shield that alters the traditional common law negligence

rules, the RUS requires more than this to overcome the assumption of immunity.

Without a showing of willful or malicious conduct, dismissal via summary judgment

is appropriate.

Before this Court, the Estate continues to fault the state for poor or

inconsistent record-keeping and suggests that that is why it found no direct evidence

to support its claim. The job of this Court, however, is not to point fingers or deduce

potential obfuscation from an absence of fact. Rather, the plaintiff’s duty is to

present competent evidence establishing a question of fact. See, e.g., Sullo v.

Greenberg, 68 A.3d 404, 407 (R.I. 2013) (“[T]o avoid summary judgment the

burden is on the nonmoving party to produce competent evidence that ‘proves the

existence of a disputed issue of material fact.’” (brackets omitted) (quoting Mutual

Development Corp. v. Ward Fisher & Co., 47 A.3d 319, 323 (R.I. 2012))). We, like

the trial justice, conclude that the plaintiff has not presented evidence to meet this

- 10 - burden. Therefore, we affirm the trial justice’s grant of the state’s motion for

summary judgment. 2

Conclusion

Because we hold that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that any genuine

issues of material fact exist with regard to whether the state willfully or maliciously

failed to warn Mr. Campagnone of a dangerous condition, the state is entitled to

immunity under the RUS. We therefore affirm the Superior Court’s judgment and

remand the record in this case.

2 Although the law is clear in dictating the results in this case, the troubling consequences of the RUS again prompt us to invite the legislature to reconsider it as it relates to public land onto which the public is invited. See, e.g., Carlson v. Town of South Kingstown, 111 A.3d 819, 826 (R.I. 2015) (“A different result is only possible by revisiting the statute, a task, as we have said in the past, that is not for this Court, but for the General Assembly.”). As it stands, the RUS gives government defendants complete immunity in an entire category of negligence cases, leading to their dismissal at the summary-judgment stage. This contravenes our traditional conceptions of the role of the jury as factfinder and minimizes the state’s incentives to be a responsible landowner.

- 11 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Estate of Louis Campagnone, By and through its Title of Case Administrator, Dana Martinelli v. The State of Rhode Island. No. 2024-263-Appeal. Case Number (PC 15-5550)

Date Opinion Filed March 10, 2026

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Melissa E. Darigan

For Plaintiff:

Jessica L. Basso, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendant:

Shannon L. Haibon, Esq. Department of Attorney General