Estate of Kaushal Niroula v. Riverside County Sheriffs Department

District Court, C.D. California·Decided February 23, 2024·No. 5:23-cv-01739·Unknown

Opinion

DGeAnSisTseÉ LOU. GMa sLtéAluWm,, ASBPNC 282771 CThHrEis tLiaAn WCo OntFreFraICs, ESSB NO F3 30269 3767 Worsham Ave. PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION Long Beach, California 90808 360 E. 2nd St., 8th Floor Tel: (213) 340-6112 Los Angeles, California 90012 Fax: (213) 402-8622 Tel: (323) 435-8000 Email: dgastelum@gastelumfirm.com Fax: (323) 597-0101 Email: CC@Contreras-Law.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, ESTATE OF KAUSHAL NIROULA, by and through successors in interest, Radha Niroula and Krishna Niroula; RADHA NIROULA, individually; KRISHNA NIROULA, individually

ESTATE OF KAUSHAL NIROULA, ) CASE NO. 5:23-cv-01739-JGB-SK ) [Assigned to the Hon. Jesus G. Bernal, by and through successors in interest, ) District Judge; Referred to the Hon. Steven Radha Niroula and Krishna Niroula; ) Kim, Magistrate Judge] RADHA NIROULA, individually; ) KRISHNA NIROULA, individually, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER ) v. ) ) ) COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a public ) entity; RIVERSIDE COUNTY ) SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; ) ) SHERIFF CHAD BIANCO, in his ) individual and official capacities; ) EDWARD DELGADO; JAMES ) ) KRACHMER; DAVID HOLM; ) RONALD SANCHEZ; and DOES 1 ) through 10, individually, jointly and ) ) severally, ) Defendants. ) ) ) )

1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3 (Filing Protected Material), below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to a file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT Plaintiffs and the individual Defendants may produce certain documents in this case that contain personal medical, employment or financial information. Such information may implicate the privacy interests of the party and are properly protected through a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) protective order. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (“Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a ‘party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense.’ Although the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (a party’s privacy rights are to be protected through a “carefully crafted protective order.”). 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: This pending federal law suit, Estate of Kaushal Niroula v. 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of how it is generated, stored, or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above in the Good Cause Statement. 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as their support staff). 2.5 Designating Party: a Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.6 Disclosure or Discovery Material: all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 2.7 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this Action. 2.8 House Counsel: attorneys who are employees of a party to this Action. House Counsel does not include Outside Counsel of Record or any other outside counsel. 2.9 Non-Party: any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity not named as a Party to this action. 2.10 Outside Counsel of Record: attorneys who are not employees of a party to this Action but are retained to represent or advise a party to this Action and have appeared in this Action on behalf of that party or are affiliated with a law firm which has appeared on behalf of that party, including support staff. 2.11 Party: any party to this Action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, consultants, retained experts, and Outside Counsel of Record (and their support staffs). 2.12 Producing Party: a Party or Non-Party that produces Disclosure or Discovery Material in this Action. 2.13 Professional Vendors: persons or entities that provide litigation support services (e.g., photocopying, videotaping, translating, preparing exhibits or demonstrations, and organizing, storing, or retrieving data in any form or medium) and their employees and subcontractors. 2.14 Protected Material: any Disclosure or Discovery Material that is designated as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.15 Receiving Party: a Party that receives Disclosure or Discovery Material from a Producing Party. 3. SCOPE The protections conferred by this Stipulation and Order cover not only Protected Material (as defined above), but also (1) any information copied or extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their Counsel that might reveal Protected Material. Any use of Protected Material at trial shall be governed by the orders of the trial judge. This Order does not govern the use of Protected Material at trial. 4. DURATION Once a case proceeds to trial, all of the information that was designated as confidential or maintained pursuant to this protective order becomes public and will be presumptively available to all members of the public, including the press, unless compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings to proceed otherwise are made to the trial judge in advance of the trial. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing “good cause” showing for sealing documents produced in discovery from “compelling reasons” standard when merits-related documents are part of court record). Accordingly, the terms of this protective order do not extend beyond the commencement of the trial. 5. DESIGNATING PROTECTED MATERIAL 5.1 Exercise of Restraint and Care in Designating Material for Protection. Each Party or Non-Party that designates information or items for protection under this Order must take care to limit any such designation to specific material that qualifies under the appropriate standards. The Designating Party must designate for protection only those parts of material, documents, items, or oral or written communications that qualify so tha

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Estate of Kaushal Niroula v. Riverside County Sheriffs Department, (C.D. Cal. 2024).

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Related

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
467 U.S. 20 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu
447 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)