Estate of Jung v. Commissioner

1990 T.C. Memo. 5, 58 T.C.M. 1127, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 5
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJanuary 3, 1990
DocketDocket No. 20221-88
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1990 T.C. Memo. 5 (Estate of Jung v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Jung v. Commissioner, 1990 T.C. Memo. 5, 58 T.C.M. 1127, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 5 (tax 1990).

Opinion

ESTATE OF MILDRED HERSCHEDE JUNG, DECEASED, RUTH J. CONWAY, EXECUTRIX, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Estate of Jung v. Commissioner
Docket No. 20221-88
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1990-5; 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 5; 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1127; T.C.M. (RIA) 90005;
January 3, 1990; As corrected January 11, 1990
Michael E. Neiheisell, for the petitioner.
Joseph P. Grant, for the respondent.

PANUTHOS

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

PANUTHOS, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's Motion for an Order Compelling the Petitioner to Produce Documents or to Impose Sanctions Under Rule 104. 1 This case was heard pursuant to section 7443A and Rule 180.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Petitioner in this case is the estate of Mildred Herschede Jung. At the time of filing the petition herein, the executrix resided at Cincinnati, Ohio. At the time of her death, *6 Mildred Herschede Jung (hereinafter decedent) owned 168,600 shares of Jung Corporation, a closely held corporation. At issue in this case is the value of that stock on the date of decedent's death. In December 1986, nearly 27 months after decedent's death, the assets of Jung Corporation were sold to a third party as a going concern.

Respondent informally sought documents related to the sale of the corporation's business and other records of the corporation prepared after the date of decedent's death, but counsel for petitioner informed respondent that those documents would not be produced. Respondent also requested production of Federal income tax returns filed by petitioner and Federal income tax returns filed on behalf of Jung Corporation. Thereafter, respondent served his Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories on counsel for petitioner. Petitioner objected to respondent's request for production of documents on several grounds, and respondent filed his motion for an order compelling production or for sanctions.

Petitioner objected to the production of any documents created after decedent's date of death concerning the Jung Corporation, its subsidiaries,*7 and its shareholders on the grounds that they are irrelevant to valuation of the Jung Corporation and its stock at the date of her death, and they are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Petitioner objected to producing copies of its Federal income tax returns on the grounds that the originals have previously been filed with respondent, they are in his possession, and they are not relevant. Petitioner objected to producing copies of the Federal income tax returns filed on behalf of Jung Corporation on the ground that they are not relevant.

OPINION

Rule 70 provides in part:

(b) Scope of Discovery: (1) The information or response sought through discovery may concern any matter not privileged and which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending case. It is not ground for objection that the information or response sought will be inadmissible at the trial, if that information or response appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence, regardless of the burden of proof involved. * * *

*8 "The standard of relevancy in a discovery action is liberal. Zaentz v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 469, 471-472 (1979)." Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 105, 112 (1984). As the objecting party, petitioner bears the burden of establishing that its objections to respondent's request for production should be sustained by the Court. Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, supra at 112; Rutter v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 937 (1983); Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 191, 193 (1975); P.T. & L. Construction Co. v. Commissioner , 63 T.C. 404, 408 (1974).

Respondent contends that evidence related to the sale of the assets of Jung Corporation as a going concern is relevant to valuation of the stock held by decedent at her death and relies on Estate of Hillebrandt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-560. In Hillebrandt, we held that a sale of property after the date of death may be considered evidence of the property's value at the date of death so long as it occurs within a reasonable time after death and intervening events*9 have not changed the value of the property.

Sales occurring after the date of decedent's death are relevant and do not fall within the normal proscription against consideration of events subsequent to the valuation date. First Nat. Bank of Kenosha v. United States

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1990 T.C. Memo. 5, 58 T.C.M. 1127, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 5, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-jung-v-commissioner-tax-1990.