Estate of Harper v. Commissioner

2000 T.C. Memo. 202, 79 T.C.M. 2232, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 242
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJune 30, 2000
DocketNo. 19336-98
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2000 T.C. Memo. 202 (Estate of Harper v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, 2000 T.C. Memo. 202, 79 T.C.M. 2232, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 242 (tax 2000).

Opinion

ESTATE OF MORTON B. HARPER, DECEASED, MICHAEL A. HARPER, EXECUTOR, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Estate of Harper v. Commissioner
No. 19336-98
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 2000-202; 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 242; 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2232; T.C.M. (RIA) 53939;
June 30, 2000, Filed

*242 An appropriate order will be issued.

Warren J. Kessler and Joan B. Kessler, for petitioner.
Donna F. Herbert and Steven M. Roth, for respondent.
Wells, Thomas B.

WELLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WELLS, CHIEF JUDGE: The instant case is before us on respondent's motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121(a)1. The issue to be decided is whether, pursuant to section 2704(b), restrictions on the right to liquidate certain limited partnership interests in Harper Financial Co., L.P., should be disregarded to the extent that such restrictions are more restrictive than the default provisions of California law.

Summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings and other materials demonstrate that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that a decision may be entered as a matter*243 of law. See Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). Partial summary judgment may be granted with regard to a single issue if the conditions for summary judgment are otherwise satisfied, notwithstanding that all of the issues in the case are not concluded. See Rule 121(b); U.S. Bancorp v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 231, 236 (1998). The record shows and the parties do not dispute that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact with respect to the issue presented by respondent's motion for partial summary judgment. Accordingly, we may render judgment on the issue as a matter of law. See Rule 121(b).

For the purpose of ruling on the instant motion only, we adopt the following facts set forth in the parties' moving papers. On December 18, 1990, Morton Harper (decedent) created a revocable inter vivos trust (trust). The trust instrument named decedent as original trustee and designated his children Michael A. Harper (Mr. Harper) and Lynn H. Factor (Ms. Factor) as successor trustees. The assets held by the trust consisted of marketable securities and mutual funds, plus a note receivable*244 for a $ 450,000 loan which the decedent had made to an unrelated individual (the portfolio). Decedent reserved a life estate in both the income and corpus of the trust and directed that upon his death the assets should be distributed 40 percent to Mr. Harper and 60 percent to Ms. Factor.

On January 1, 1994, decedent, Mr. Harper, and Ms. Factor entered into an agreement entitled, Agreement for Limited Partnership for Harper Financial Co., L.P. (partnership agreement) that created a California limited partnership. Under the terms of the partnership agreement, Mr. Harper and Ms. Factor became general partners with interests in the partnership of 0.4 percent and 0.6 percent respectively, and the trust became the sole limited partner with an interest of 99 percent in the partnership. The trust made an initial capital contribution of the portfolio to the partnership.

On July 1, 1994, the parties entered into an amendment to the partnership agreement that divided the trust's limited partnership interest into two classes of limited partnership interests, consisting of: (1) A Class A limited partnership interest of 39 percent which the trust retained, and (2) a Class B limited partnership*245 interest of 60 percent which the trust assigned to Ms. Factor and Mr. Harper.

Section 20.1 of the partnership agreement provides that:

   The Partnership shall be dissolved upon the earlier of:

     (a) January 1, 2034.

     (b) The retirement, withdrawal, death or insanity

   of any General Partner or any other event or condition,

   other than removal, which, pursuant to the Act and

   unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, results in

   a General Partner ceasing to be a General Partner,

   unless (i) at the time there is at least one remaining

   General Partner to continue the business of the

   Partnership and such remaining General Partner chooses

   to do so, or (ii) all the Partners, as provided in

   Paragraph 12.5(l), above, agree in writing within 60

   days thereof to continue the business of the

   Partnership and, if necessary, to the admission of one

   or more additional General Partners.

     (c) An election to dissolve the Partnership made

   in writing by the General Partners and the Limited

   Partners, all as provided in Paragraph 12.5(f), *246 above.

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Related

U.S. Bancorp v. Commissioner
111 T.C. No. 10 (U.S. Tax Court, 1998)
Kerr v. Commissioner
113 T.C. No. 30 (U.S. Tax Court, 1999)
Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner
98 T.C. No. 36 (U.S. Tax Court, 1992)

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2000 T.C. Memo. 202, 79 T.C.M. 2232, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 242, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-harper-v-commissioner-tax-2000.