Estate of Grant v. Commissioner

1999 T.C. Memo. 115, 77 T.C.M. 1762, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 137
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedApril 6, 1999
DocketNo. 13427-98
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 1999 T.C. Memo. 115 (Estate of Grant v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Grant v. Commissioner, 1999 T.C. Memo. 115, 77 T.C.M. 1762, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 137 (tax 1999).

Opinion

ESTATE OF CHARLES B. GRANT, JR., DECEASED, CHARLES B. GRANT, III, EXECUTOR,
Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Estate of Grant v. Commissioner
No. 13427-98
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1999-115; 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 137; 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1762; T.C.M. (RIA) 99115;
April 6, 1999, Filed
*137 Jo Karen Parr, for petitioner.
Linda K. West, for respondent.
GERBER, JUDGE.

GERBER

MEMORANDUM OPINION

[1] GERBER, JUDGE: We consider here petitioner's motion to amend the petition. Respondent has objected on the ground that the subject matter of the proposed amendment is not relevant. We therefore consider whether the relevance of the matter pleaded is prerequisite to our granting leave to amend a pleading.

[2] Unless otherwise stated, all Rule references are to the Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

[3] In response to a notice of deficiency dated May 1, 1998, the petition contained allegations of error concerning respondent's valuation of stock and concerning respondent's determinations that the decedent made gifts to the shareholders of a corporation and that life insurance proceeds are includable in his gross estate.

[4] Petitioner now seeks leave to amend the petition to include facts learned from Freedom of Information Act requests approximately 5 months after the original petition was filed. The facts alleged in the proposed amendment were derived from the examining agent's report on the valuation of the stock at issue in the deficiency notice. Respondent objects to petitioner's*138 proposed amendment on the ground that such matters are irrelevant.

[5] Rule 41(a) provides: "A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. * * * Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of Court or by written consent of the adverse party". Rule 41(a) further provides that leave to amend "shall be given freely when justice so requires." This Court has looked to cases decided under rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance on the interpretation of Rule 41(a). See Kramer v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1081, 1084-1085 (1987). Like Rule 41(a), rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires."

[6] In this case, the motion for leave was not filed before the responsive pleading, and respondent has not consented to the motion. The Court may use its discretion to grant petitioners leave to amend. See Kramer v. Commissioner, supra at 1085. In exercising that discretion, the courts consider various factors, including the timeliness of the motion, the reasons for the delay, *139 and whether granting the motion would result in issues being presented in a seriatim fashion. See Daves v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 661 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981). Leave to amend may be inappropriate where there is undue delay, bad faith, prejudice resulting from the amendment, or a dilatory motive of the movant. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222, 83 S. Ct. 227 (1962); Russo v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 28, 31 (1992).

[7] The liberal attitude towards amendment is reflective of the liberal policy generally applied to pleadings. "The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). Rather, pleadings should be construed to do "substantial justice." Id. Even where, as here, the complaint may contain unnecessary detail and evidentiary matter, the most important requirement of the pleadings is that the opposing party be made aware of the claims he will be called upon *140 to meet. See Kamen Soap Prods. Co. v. Struthers Wells Corp., 159 F. Supp. 706, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Though certain evidentiary facts may be unnecessary to a complaint, they may remain in the complaint unless they are prejudicial. Groves v.

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1999 T.C. Memo. 115, 77 T.C.M. 1762, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 137, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-grant-v-commissioner-tax-1999.