Estate of Goldman v. Goldman

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Estate of Goldman v. Goldman

297 A.D.2d 541, 747 N.Y.2d 151, 747 N.Y.S.2d 151, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8459

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 19, 2002

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 297 A.D.2d 541 (Estate of Goldman v. Goldman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Estate of Goldman v. Goldman, 297 A.D.2d 541, 747 N.Y.2d 151, 747 N.Y.S.2d 151, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8459 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002).

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Opinion

[542]*542A fair interpretation of the evidence (see Thoreson v Penthouse Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 495), including defendants’ admissions, supports the trial court’s findings that the challenged transfers from defendant Donald Goldman to his wife and co-defendant herein were both presumptively and actually fraudulent as to his creditors, including plaintiff, which had actions pending against him at the time of the transfers (see Wall St. Assoc. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 528-529). The trial court correctly ruled, citing the definition of “creditor” in Debtor and Creditor Law § 270, that a docketed judgment is not a prerequisite to a fraudulent transfer. While the restraint stricken from one of the judgments against defendant Donald Goldman applied to transfers “made through” his law firm, contrary to defendants’ contention, Donald Goldman continued to be restrained from transferring any part of the firm itself. We have considered and rejected defendants’ other contentions. Concur — Williams, P.J., Tom, Saxe, Rubin and Friedman, JJ.

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[542]*542A fair interpretation of the evidence (see Thoreson v Penthouse Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 495), including defendants’ admissions, supports the trial court’s findings that the challenged transfers from defendant Donald Goldman to his wife and co-defendant herein were both presumptively and actually fraudulent as to his creditors, including plaintiff, which had actions pending against him at the time of the transfers (see Wall St. Assoc. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 528-529). The trial court correctly ruled, citing the definition of “creditor” in Debtor and Creditor Law § 270, that a docketed judgment is not a prerequisite to a fraudulent transfer. While the restraint stricken from one of the judgments against defendant Donald Goldman applied to transfers “made through” his law firm, contrary to defendants’ contention, Donald Goldman continued to be restrained from transferring any part of the firm itself. We have considered and rejected defendants’ other contentions. Concur — Williams, P.J., Tom, Saxe, Rubin and Friedman, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

297 A.D.2d 541, 747 N.Y.2d 151, 747 N.Y.S.2d 151, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8459, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-goldman-v-goldman-nyappdiv-2002.

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