Estate of Glenn McCrary, by and through his successors in interests, et al. v. Victorville Police Department, a public entity, et al.

District Court, C.D. California·Decided October 3, 2025·No. 5:23-cv-02602·Unknown

Opinion

1 Eugene P. Ramirez (State Bar No. 134865) eugene.ramirez@manningkass.com Yury A. Kolesnikov (State Bar No. 271173) 3 yury.kolesnikov@manningkass.com Kayleigh Andersen (State Bar No. 306442) 4 kayleigh.andersen@manningkass.com 5 MANNING & KASS 801 S. Figueroa St, 15th Floor 7 Los Angeles, California 90017-3012 8 Telephone: (213) 624-6900 Facsimile: (213) 624-6999 9 10 Attorneys for Defendant Deputy CORRIN CASSIDY

1 not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that 2 the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited 3 information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable 4 legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, 5 that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential 6 information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be 7 followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from 8 the court to file material under seal. ”n 10 This action is expected to involve the disclosure of highly sensitive and 11 || confidential information, including both (1) medical and personal records and (2) law = 12 || enforcement personnel records and related materials. The parties agree that special protection from public disclosure—and from use for any purpose other than the S 14 || prosecution of this case—is warranted. 1.1. Medical and Personal Confidential Information This case may involve the production of private medical and mental health records, autopsy reports, and other sensitive documents related to the death at issue. These records include, but are not limited to, HIPAA-protected health care information, as well as confidential information concerning third parties and non- parties. The parties further anticipate the disclosure of personal identifying jinformation, background investigation materials, and other documents generally ) unavailable to the public or protected by law. The parties agree that such materials are protected under federal and state privacy laws, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and should not be disclosed outside the litigation. The need to preserve the confidentiality of this information, particularly with respect to individuals not party to the action, supports the entry of a protective order. 1.2. Law Enforcement Personnel Records and Privileged Law Enforcement

1 Materials 2 Separately, Defendants contend that good cause exists for a protective order to 3 prevent the disclosure of peace officer personnel records and associated investigative 4 materials. These records include internal police procedures, investigative analyses, 5 and legal communications, the release of which could harm public safety, impair law 6 enforcement functions, and intrude on officers’ privacy. 7 First, Defendants assert that peace officers have a reasonable expectation of 8 privacy in their personnel records, a protection recognized under both federal law and 9 California’s Pitchess statutes. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, ”n 10 || 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, 11 || at *2—3, *12—13 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n.4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040- 1047. They argue that unrestricted disclosure of these materials could endanger officers, non-party witnesses, and their families or associates. Second, Defendants assert that these records are protected by several federal privileges, including the deliberative process privilege, the official information privilege, the law enforcement privilege, and the attorney-client privilege (and attorney work product doctrine). These privileges apply especially to materials involving internal evaluations, critical self-analysis, or legal advice, such as Internal Affairs reports, supervisory assessments, and documents prepared at the direction of )counsel. See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-71 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-95 (9th Cir. 1997); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-77 (D.D.C. 1998); Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants contend that disclosure would undermine law enforcement’s ability to obtain candid input from witnesses, conduct effective investigations, and implement necessary reforms. Third, Defendants note that peace officers may be compelled to provide statements in connection with internal investigations, unlike private citizens. They

1 /argue that the involuntary nature of such disclosures makes public release 2 fundamentally unfair. See Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 3d 822, 828-30 3 (1985); cf. U.S. Const. amend. V. 4 2. DEFINITIONS 5 2.1. Action: this pending federal law suit. 6 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation 7 of information or items under this Order. 8 2.3. “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of 9 how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection ”n 10 ||under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above in the Good 11 || Cause Statement. 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as their support staff). 2.5 Designating Party: a Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.6 Disclosure or Discovery Material: all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 2.7 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this Action. 2.8 House Counsel: attorneys who are employees of a party to this Action. House Counsel does not include Outside Counsel of Record or any other outside counsel. 2.9 Non-Party: any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity not named as a Party to this action.

l 2.10 Outside Counsel of Record: attorneys who are not employees of a party 2 to this Action but are retained to represent or advise a party to this Action and have 3 appeared in this Action on behalf of that party or are affiliated with a law firm which 4 has appeared on behalf of that party, and includes support staff. 5 2.11 Party: any party to this Action, including all of its officers, directors, 6 employees, consultants, retained experts, and Outside Counsel of Record (and their 7

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Estate of Glenn McCrary, by and through his successors in interests, et al. v. Victorville Police Department, a public entity, et al., (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Estate of Glenn McCrary, by and through his successors in interests, et al. v. Victorville Police Department, a public entity, et al. (Estate of Glenn McCrary, by and through his successors in interests, et al. v. Victorville Police Department, a public entity, et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)