ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by and through his successors in interest; MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedOctober 20, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-02588
StatusUnknown

This text of ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by and through his successors in interest; MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem (ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by and through his successors in interest; MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by and through his successors in interest; MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP TONY M. SAIN, SB# 251626 2 E-Mail: Tony.Sain@lewisbrisbois.com TORI L. N. BAKKEN, SB# 329069 3 E-Mail: Tori.Bakken@lewisbrisbois.com ABIGAIL J. R. McLAUGHLIN, SB# 313208 4 E-Mail: Abigail.McLaughlin@lewisbrisbois.com 633 West 5th Street, Suite 4000 5 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: 213.250.1800 6 Facsimile: 213.250.7900

7 Attorneys for Defendants, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (erroneously sued as 8 LOS ANGELES COUNTY), LOGAN SIMI, SHANE QUESADA, and NOEL 9 WITTY

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION 12 13 ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by Case No. 2:25-cv-02588-MWC (AGR) and through his successors in interest; [Hon. Michelle Williams Court, Dist. 14 MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, Judge; Hon. Alicia G. Rosenburg, M. individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ Judge] 15 NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem 16 ADRIANA HERNANDEZ; A.N.2, a [DISCOVERY MATTER] minor, by and through their guardian ad 17 litem, ADRIANA HERNANDEZ; F.N., a minor, by and through their guardian PROTECTIVE ORDER RE 18 VANESSA RODRIGUEZ; B.N., a CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS minor, by and through their guardian 19 VANESSA RODRIGUEZ; ALEXUS ROUGHFACE, individually; Trial Date: November 30, 2026 20 MARIANNA NUNEZ, individually,

21 Plaintiffs,

22 vs.

23 LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, a public 24 entity; LOS ANGELES COUNTY, a public entity; LOGAN SIMI, an 25 individual; SHANE QUESADA, an individual; NOEL WITTY, an 26 individual; DOES 1 through 10, individually, 27 Defendants. 1 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 2 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 3 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure 4 and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation would be 5 warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter 6 the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order 7 does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and 8 that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited 9 information or items that are entitled to a confidential treatment under the applicable 10 legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, 11 that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential 12 information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be 13 followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from 14 the court to file material under seal. 15 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 16 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 17 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer 18 personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the 19 following reasons. 20 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy 21 in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is 22 underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure 23 of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033–34 24 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12- 25 13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based 26 discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is 27 consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] 1 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights 2 [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code 3 §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that 4 uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of 5 non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 6 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies 7 have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information 8 privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege 9 (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace 10 officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain 11 critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or 12 communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – 13 potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal 14 Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records 15 or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of 16 obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033–34; Maricopa 17 Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092–95 (9th Cir. 1997); 18 Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613 & n4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668–71 (N.D. 19 Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176–77 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. 20 Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United 21 States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further 22 contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public 23 entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 24 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 25 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements 26 and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of 27 open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged 1 any remedial measures that may be required. 2 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights 3 as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the 4 fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 5 compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 6 828–30 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 7 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing 8 such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 9 impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, 10 frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving 11 the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ 12 families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and 13 preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 14 publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does 15 result in litigation. 16 Plaintiffs do not agree with and do not stipulate to Defendants’ contentions 17 stated above. Plaintiffs agree, however, that there is good cause for a Protective Order 18 so as to preserve the respective interests of the parties. Plaintiffs recognize that, 19 absent this Stipulated Protective Order, the parties' respective privilege interests may 20 be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulated Protective Order may mitigate such 21 harm by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery with reduced risk that 22 confidential information will become matters of public record.

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Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by and through his successors in interest; MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-francisco-nunez-by-and-through-his-successors-in-interest-cacd-2025.