ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by and through his successors in interest; MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem

District Court, C.D. California·Decided October 20, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-02588·Unknown

Opinion

TONY M. SAIN, SB# 251626 E-Mail: Tony.Sain@lewisbrisbois.com TORI L. N. BAKKEN, SB# 329069 E-Mail: Tori.Bakken@lewisbrisbois.com ABIGAIL J. R. McLAUGHLIN, SB# 313208 E-Mail: Abigail.McLaughlin@lewisbrisbois.com 633 West 5th Street, Suite 4000 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: 213.250.1800 Facsimile: 213.250.7900

Attorneys for Defendants, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (erroneously sued as SIMI, SHANE QUESADA, and NOEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by Case No. 2:25-cv-02588-MWC (AGR) and through his successors in interest; [Hon. Michelle Williams Court, Dist. MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, Judge; Hon. Alicia G. Rosenburg, M. individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ Judge] NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem ADRIANA HERNANDEZ; A.N.2, a [DISCOVERY MATTER] minor, by and through their guardian ad litem, ADRIANA HERNANDEZ; F.N., a minor, by and through their guardian PROTECTIVE ORDER RE VANESSA RODRIGUEZ; B.N., a CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS minor, by and through their guardian VANESSA RODRIGUEZ; ALEXUS ROUGHFACE, individually; Trial Date: November 30, 2026 MARIANNA NUNEZ, individually,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, a public entity; LOS ANGELES COUNTY, a public entity; LOGAN SIMI, an individual; SHANE QUESADA, an individual; NOEL WITTY, an individual; DOES 1 through 10, individually, Defendants. 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation would be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to a confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the following reasons. First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12- 13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033–34; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092–95 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613 & n4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668–71 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176–77 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged any remedial measures that may be required. Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828–30 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does result in litigation. Plaintiffs do not agree with and do not stipulate to Defendants’ contentions stated above. Plaintiffs agree, however, that there is good cause for a Protective Order so as to preserve the respective interests of the parties. Plaintiffs recognize that, absent this Stipulated Protective Order, the parties' respective privilege interests may be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulated Protective Order may mitigate such harm by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery with reduced risk that confidential information will become matters of public record. The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records and autopsy photographs, because of the privacy interests at stake therein. Plaintiffs A.N.1, A.N.2, F.N., and B.N. are minors, and there may be a need to protect certain records pertaining to them. Because of these sensitive interests, a Court Order should address these documents 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: this pending federal law suit. 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information

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ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by and through his successors in interest; MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by and through his successors in interest; MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem (ESTATE OF FRANCISCO NUNEZ by and through his successors in interest; MERCEDES SALINAS DE NUNEZ, individually; FRANCISCO NUNEZ NINO, individually; A.N.1, a minor, by and through their guardian ad litem) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)