Estate of Eldred v. Commissioner

1989 T.C. Memo. 293, 57 T.C.M. 721, 1989 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 293
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJune 15, 1989
DocketDocket No. 10547-87.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 1989 T.C. Memo. 293 (Estate of Eldred v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Eldred v. Commissioner, 1989 T.C. Memo. 293, 57 T.C.M. 721, 1989 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 293 (tax 1989).

Opinion

ESTATE OF EUGENE A. ELDRED, DECEASED, LOUISE LEE ELDRED, EXECUTRIX, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Estate of Eldred v. Commissioner
Docket No. 10547-87.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1989-293; 1989 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 293; 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 721; T.C.M. (RIA) 89293;
June 15, 1989.
Clarence E. Fleming, Jr., for the petitioner.
Marilyn Devin, for the respondent.

FAY

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FAY, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal estate tax in the amount of $ 60,378.46. After concessions, the issue for decision is the determination of the correct estate tax marital deduction to which petitioner is entitled.

The parties submitted this case fully stipulated pursuant to Rule 122. 1 The stipulation of facts and attached exhibits are found accordingly and are incorporated herein by this reference.

*295 Petitioner is the Estate of Eugene A. Eldred. Louise Lee Eldred is both the executrix of petitioner and the surviving spouse of Eugene A. Eldred (decedent). At the time of his death, decedent resided in California. At the time the petition was filed in this case, Louise Lee Eldred resided in Pasadena, California.

Decedent had been a banker for 27 years, and had been employed by Security Pacific Bank as a trust officer up to the time of his death on May 3, 1982. Decedent executed his will on February 12, 1982, and did not amend or revoke his will prior to his death.

In his will, decedent made a specific bequest to his wife of all "household furniture and a furnishing (sic) and personal furnishings as well as any automobiles in which I may have an interest." Decedent's will also provided a bequest of property to the Eugene A. Eldred Trust (the Trust) for the benefit of his wife in accordance with a formula as follows:

I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate to the successor Trustee under the EUGENE A. ELDRED TRUST declared by me in 1982, to be held, managed and distributed in accordance with the terms and provisions thereof as a part*296 of said Trust and not as a separate or testamentary trust.

For purposes of distribution to said Trustee, my Executrix shall divide the residue of my estate into two shares as follows:

A. Share No. 1 shall consist of my wife's share of community property, if any, if she shall consent that such share pass under the provisions of this Will as well as property qualifying for the marital deduction, of a value (less encumbrances) which when added to the value (less encumbrances) of all other property so qualifying and included in my gross estate which passes or has passed to my wife under any other provision of this Will and otherwise than under this Will, shall equal but not exceed in value one-half of my (so qualifying) adjusted gross estate as the term is defined in the Internal Revenue Code. [Emphasis added.]

* * *

B. Share No. 2 shall consist of all of the remainder of the residue of my estate. In distributing the residue of my estate, consisting of shares No. 1 and 2, my Executor shall identify the two shares in the instrument of transfer with instructions that Share No. 1 be added to Trust A and that share No. 2 be added to Trust B.

Accordingly, pursuant to*297 decedent's will, decedent's assets which do not become the corpus of Trust A become the corpus of Trust B.

Article II of the Trust sets forth the provisions relating to "Trust A" and "Trust B" referred to in decedent's will quoted above. With respect to Trust A, the surviving spouse is granted a life estate in Trust A assets coupled with a general power of appointment, inter vivos and testamentary. The parties agree that the value of the property passing pursuant to decedent's will to Trust A (hereinafter referred to as the marital trust) qualifies for the marital deduction pursuant to section 2056(b)(5). The parties disagree, however, in interpreting decedent's will, as to the value of the property that was intended by decedent to be distributed to the marital trust. Thus, the parties dispute the value of that part of decedent's gross estate which qualifies for the marital deduction.

With respect to Trust B, Article II of the Trust provides that decedent's wife is granted a life estate in the Trust B assets. The trustee of Trust B was granted a discretionary power, subject to certain limitations, to invade corpus for the benefit of the wife. Upon the death of the wife, the*298 principal of Trust B is to be divided into separate trusts for the benefit of the children of decedent and his wife. The parties agree that the value of the property distributed pursuant to decedent's will to Trust B does not qualify for the marital deduction.

The dispute in this case centers around the meaning of decedent's use in his will of the phrase "one-half of my (so qualifying) adjusted gross estate as the term is defined in the Internal Revenue Code" to describe the amount decedent intended to pass to the marital trust. Petitioner asserts that the term "adjusted gross estate" used by decedent in his will in bequeathing an amount to the marital trust, is synonomous with and refers to decedent's "gross estate" unreduced by the value of decedent's one-half share of the community property included in decedent's gross estate. Petitioner asserts that since the undisputed value of decedent's gross estate is $ 1,227,787.64, one-half of that amount or $ 613,893.82, is equal to the amount passing to the marital trust and thus the amount qualifying for the marital deduction.

Respondent asserts that "adjusted gross estate" is a term of art familiar to decedent as a bank trust officer*299 and that such term is defined in section 2056(c) and is not synonomous with the value of decedent's gross estate. 2 However, as petitioner correctly points out, section 2056(c) was repealed by section 403(a)(1)(A), Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 305, effective with respect to estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1981.

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1989 T.C. Memo. 293, 57 T.C.M. 721, 1989 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 293, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-eldred-v-commissioner-tax-1989.