O’KEEFE, AJ.,
By decree dated 28 December 2001, the register of wills appointed petitioner, Theresa Owen, as the administratrix of the estate of [295]*295Carmen DiCesare (the decedent), who died intestate on 13 June 2001.
On 8 January 2002, Theresa Owen (petitioner or the estate) in the court of common pleas, orphans’ court division filed a petition for citation to show cause why assets should not be turned over. On the same day, the petition was assigned to the Hon. Joseph D. O’Keefe, A.J. (the court). Respondents are: Prudential Savings Bank (the bank), a state chartered savings and loan association; Frances Mazzei, the manager of the bank’s 19th and Snyder Avenue branch; and Lucia Squitieri, the assistant manager of the same branch.
On 22 February 2002, the bank filed its answer to the petition. On 7 March 2002, Mazzei and Squitieri, filed their answer to the petition as well as a cross-claim for contribution and indemnity against the bank.
The trial in this matter commenced on 4 November 2002, continued through 7 November 2002, and reconvened to hear final testimony on 9 and 28 January 2003, after which petitioner and respondents rested.
FACTS
Carmen DiCesare was bom on 24 January 1917. From 1917 until September 2000, decedent lived at 2023 South 18th Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.1 Decedent held [296]*296different accounts at both the bank and Sharon Savings Bank.2 Before the onset of dementia, decedent visited Sharon Savings once a month, and visited the bank’s Snyder Avenue branch once a week.3
The bank is a mutual savings and loan association.4 Mazzei is the branch manager at the bank’s Snyder Avenue office.5 Squitieri is the assistant manager.6 The Snyder Avenue branch is six blocks from the bank’s headquarters, where the bank’s president and CEO, Thomas Vento; CFO, Joseph Corrato; and vice president of branch operations, Maria Botta have offices.7
Occasionally, both Mazzei and Squitieri perform teller functions. When acting as tellers, they must comply with the bank’s teller manual, P-19.8 Mazzei and Squitieri also must follow the bank’s employee manual, P-20. The bank prohibits tellers from handling transactions in their own accounts.9
Despite the fact that 70-75 percent of the Snyder Avenue branch’s customers are senior citizens, the bank has [297]*297not trained Mazzei, Squitieri, or any other employees on:
• interacting with senior citizens;
• recognizing signs of mental impairment;
• transacting business with persons whom they believe, or have reason to suspect, are mentally impaired;
• bank ethics; or
• recognizing and resolving potential conflicts of interest.10
As of 7 August 2000, the bank had no consistent, written, or distributed conflict of interest policy.11 By the date of testimony, Mazzei admittedly still did not know whether the bank has a conflict-of-interest policy.12
The bank does not re-certify or test its employees on policies and procedures after their initial training.13 Consequently, the bank has not tested Mazzei or Squitieri on policies or procedures since Mazzei began her employment with the bank in 1964, and Squitieri in 1987.14
As an adult, Mazzei’s interactions with decedent resulted from her employment with the bank.15 Mazzei did [298]*298not know decedent’s nickname, nor did she ever visit decedent’s home until the events at issue.16
Squitieri first met decedent in late 1998, solely as a result of her employment at the bank.17 Decedent was then suffering from progressive irreversible dementia.
Neither Mazzei nor Squitieri socialized with decedent outside of the bank’s Snyder Avenue branch.18 Decedent never mentioned Mazzei or Squitieri to Albert Johnson, his friend of 65 years.19
From November 1997 through January 2000, Dr. Vincent Renzi treated decedent.20 In January 1998, decedent complained to Dr. Renzi of forgetfulness, which decedent attributed to his prostatism medication, Flomax.21 Dr. Renzi discontinued the Flomax, but decedent’s cognitive deficits persisted.22
On 12 March 1998, Dr. Renzi prescribed Aricept for decedent.23 The FDA had then only approved Aricept for treating Alzheimer’s dementia.24
[299]*299On 8 December 1998, more than 21 months before the ITF account’s creation, Dr. Renzi diagnosed decedent with “progressive dementia.”25By the end of 1998, decedent began to visit the bank as many as four times per week.26 During which visits, decedent allowed only Mazzei and Squitieri to conduct his transactions.27
On 19 January 1999, more than 20 months before the ITF account’s creation, Dr. Renzi observed decedent as disheveled, unshaven, and with decreased attention to bathing.28 Dr. Renzi gave decedent a Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE).29 Decedent’s score correlates [300]*300with the “mild” stage of dementia, and was six points below average for his age.30
On 24 September, Dr. Renzi spoke with decedent about the MMSE score and decedent’s progressive forgetfulness.31 Dr. Renzi offered to prescribe Aricept again for decedent, who had discontinued its use. Decedent refused the medication.32
On 6 January 2000, eight months before the ITF account’s creation, Dr. Renzi’s physician’s assistant (PA) observed decedent to be a “poor historian,” with “speech tangential @ times,” and “distractable [sic].”33 The PA noted that decedent continued to pay his monthly bills.34
In spring 2000, decedent asked Mrs. Destra if she had seen “people going in and out of his house, stealing his money.”35 Decedent now visited Sharon Savings every day, instead of just once per month.36 Sharon Savings Assistant Manager Roxanne Rivera became concerned about decedent’s mental well-being.37 Sharon Savings
[301]*301employees now spent upwards of an hour explaining decedent’s finances to him, and assuring him that no one was taking his money.38
More than once around this time, decedent locked himself out of his house. In one such instance, Mrs. Destra told decedent that she had telephoned a locksmith to assist him. After a short wait, decedent stated, “You people didn’t call anybody,” and walked away.39
During this time, decedent lost his passbook for the bank account number 17699, an account which he had held since 1993 40 The bank’s policy requires, and each page of the bank’s passbooks states that a customer may not conduct transactions in a passbook savings account without the passbook.41 Nonetheless, Mazzei and Squitieri violated the bank’s policy by repeatedly allowing decedent to withdraw funds without his passbook.42
By July 2000, decedent stopped visiting Mr. Johnson.43 Previously, decedent had visited Mr. Johnson five to six times per week.44 By August 2000, decedent:
[302]*302• had diminished cognitive abilities compared to other persons;
• would be expected to have an MMSE score of 18 or 19, nine to 10 points below the average score for his age; and
• would have been subject to the influence and persuasion of persons whom he trusted.45
Most laypersons, particularly those who had observed decedent over an extended period of time, by then would have noticed distinct changes in decedent’s behavior and mentation leading them to question decedent’s mental well-being.46
On 8 August 2000, decedent allegedly stated that he wanted to switch his social security direct deposit from Sharon Savings to the bank.47 Mazzei told decedent that she could not arrange direct deposit on account 17699 because decedent had lost his passbook. She told decedent that to set-up direct deposit, decedent needed to open a new account.48 Yet, to establish direct deposit, a bank requires only the account number and bank routing number.49
Rather than opening a new account of the same type as account 17699, Mazzei and Squitieri opened account 31273 in trust for (ITF) themselves.50 Despite decedent’s already having an ITF account with Sharon Savings, as well as several other accounts between the two banks, [303]*303Mazzei had to explain to decedent what an ITF account was and how it worked.51
Mazzei telephoned Vento for permission to open the account.52 A conference ensued between Mazzei, Vento and Corrato, who was in Vento’s office.53 Vento suggested that decedent obtain an attorney to draft a will.54 Mazzei did not relay this advice to decedent.55 Instead, Mazzei told Vento that decedent did not want an attorney.56 Vento did not verify this representation.57 Neither Corrato nor Botta offered to, or did, meet with decedent.58
[304]*304Vento suggested that Mazzei speak with the bank’s counsel.59 Vento hoped that counsel would convince decedent to have drafted a will.60 Although the bank’s counsel is available to the bank on an “as-needed basis,” there was no follow-up to Vento’s hopes for decedent.61 Nonetheless, Vento authorized Mazzei and Squitieri to open the ITF despite his awareness that they should not have personally handled the transaction.62
The court counts at least six documents created upon opening, or related to, the ITF account that violated the bank’s policy and procedure, as follows:
First, the bank’s customer account agreement, P-25, contains general terms and conditions governing all of the bank’s accounts.63 The agreement refers customers to an account card that contains the specific terms applicable to the account being opened.64
With ITF accounts, the bank requires the customer to sign both sides of an account card, P-8. One side of P-8 is entitled “Trust account,” while the other side is entitled “Discretionary revocable trust agreement.” 65 The discretionary revocable trust agreement contains the ITF [305]*305account’s terms and conditions.66 Although decedent signed the account card for account 31273, P-8, he did not read it.67
Second, either Mazzei or Squitieri created a passbook for the ITF account, P-11.68 They kept the passbook at the Snyder branch because they thought decedent would lose it.69 P-11 bears the ITF account number on every page, and contains decedent’s signature.70
Either Mazzei or Squitieri also created a duplicate passbook.71 The duplicate passbook did not bear an account number. Mazzei and Squitieri gave decedent the duplicate passbook, but decedent could not use the duplicate passbook to deposit or to withdraw funds from the ITF account, or to enter another of the bank’s branches and change the ITF designations.72 The duplicate passbook violated the bank’s policy.73
Third, at Mazzei’s direction, decedent signed a document which Mazzei typed, P-7, as follows:
“I [decedent] on 8-8-00 open new account #01-90-31273.1 wish to put the account in trust to Frances Mazzei and Lucia Squiieri [sic].”74
P-7 is the only plain-English description of what decedent was doing on 8 August 2000.75 P-7 clearly states [306]*306decedent’s understanding that he was putting his “account in trust to,” and not leaving funds in trust “for,” Mazzei and Squitieri.76
Fourth, Mazzei told decedent that he needed to create a new account to directly deposit his social security check. Yet, Mazzei could not close and move account 17699 funds into the ITF account without a passbook. Mazzei and Squitieri, thereafter, completed a lost passbook affidavit for account 17699.77
P-9a contains a box for notary attestation.78 The bank’s policy requires such notarization.79 Mazzei and Squitieri did not comply with this bank policy, and consequently, a third-party notary did not witness the transaction.80
Fifth, for all new accounts, the bank requires customers to read and sign a customer account agreement.81 Normally, the bank obtains customer information, enters that information into a computer, and then prints a customer account agreement containing the customer information. The customer then signs this pre-printed document.82
The customer account agreement for the ITF account, P-25, is handwritten, not typed.83 Squitieri hand-wrote all information appearing on P-25.84
[307]*307Sixth, on 9 August 2002, Squitieri completed and typed P-26, a form authorizing direct deposit of decedent’s monthly social security check, which previously had been deposited into his Sharon Savings account, into the ITF account, as opposed to decedent’s checking account.85 The ITF account then grew each month by $709, the amount of decedent’s social security deposit.86
The ITF account initially contained $247,165.34 as transferred from account 17699.87 Sometime on 8 August 2000, after the ITF account was opened, $311,263.24 was withdrawn via check from Sharon Savings and deposited into the ITF account.88 The ITF account then contained roughly $558,426.89
On 9 August 2000, $122,026.05 was withdrawn via check from Sharon Savings and deposited into the ITF account.90 The account balance was $680,424.63.91 Mazzei wrote the ITF account balance in large black marker numbers on a piece of paper so that decedent would know his account balance.92
In violation of bank policy, Mazzei or Squitieri accepted the checks from Sharon Savings without decedent’s endorsement.93 Mazzei informed Vento that [308]*308the account had swelled by several hundred thousand dollars.94 Vento still did not speak with decedent.95
In early September 2000, a police officer brought decedent to Mr. Johnson’s home. The police officer said that decedent had been wandering, and had locked himself out of his home. Mr. Johnson helped decedent re-enter his home. Later that day, decedent again locked himself out of his home and returned to Mr. Johnson’s home.96
On Monday, 18 September 2000, decedent was found wandering and in a confused state within St. Agnes Hospital.97 He was admitted to St. Agnes with a diagnosis of dementia.98 This was the fourth time that week that decedent had visited St. Agnes.99
On 19 September 2000, decedent left St. Agnes Hospital against medical advice and unnoticed by the staff.100 Decedent now suffered from a delirium superimposed upon pre-existing dementia.101
[309]*309On Thursday, 21 September 2000, decedent withdrew $40 from the ITF account.102 Decedent’s delirium superimposed upon a dementia would have been apparent to any lay observer who saw him that day, including Mazzei, with whom he spoke.103 Decedent told Mazzei that he had been treated at St. Agnes Hospital, but that he did not know what he had been treated for, or why he went to St. Agnes.104
On Friday, 22 September 2000, decedent wandered into the Cambridge Retirement Center. He presented as disheveled, dirty, unshaven, confused, disoriented, and with dirty clothing.105 Decedent told Cambridge administrator Florence Curley that he needed a place to stay; that people were stealing from him and were coming into his home at all hours; and that his neighbors were coming through his walls.106 Decedent asked to stay at Cambridge with assurances that he could afford the facility. He presented Mrs. Curley with the duplicate passbook which reflected a $681,000 balance as of 15 September 2000.107 He asked Mrs. Curley not to cheat him.108
Mrs. Curley photocopied the duplicate passbook, and kept a copy in Cambridge’s records.109 Mrs. Curley arranged for decedent to stay in a room, and Cambridge placed decedent under 24-hour surveillance.110
[310]*310On or about 23 September 2000, decedent left Cambridge.111 Mrs. Curley and her son went to decedent’s home, where they found him attempting to enter through a window.112 Mrs. Curley and her son helped decedent enter his home. The home smelled of urine, and unopened mail was strewn about the house.113 While Mrs. Curley was assisting decedent, Mr. Johnson arrived. Decedent spoke with Mr. Johnson, who convinced decedent to let Mrs. Curley care for him.114
Upon decedent’s return to Cambridge, a doctor told Mrs. Curley to contact Roxborough Hospital about decedent.115 She subsequently arranged for decedent to travel to Roxborough Hospital.116 Thereafter, Roxborough transferred decedent to Friends Hospital’s Crisis Response Center (CRC).117 A Friends Hospital CT scan of decedent’s head showed atrophy with enlarged sulci.118
[311]*311On 29 September 2000, Friends Hospital transferred decedent to Kirkbride Center.119 For six weeks, Kirkbride treated decedent with antibiotics.120 Kirkbride also prescribed Exelon, a drug used to treat Alzheimer’s.121 Although decedent’s urinary tract infection resolved, his memory was only fair and he required supervised living.122 His diagnosis upon discharge from Kirkbride was “dementia with delusions.”123
From 21 September 2000 through 16 November 2000, while the above was taking place, Mazzei and Squitieri neither saw decedent nor knew where he was.124 They continued to hold his ITF passbook.
The bank’s policy prohibits transactions in an ITF account unless the customer is physically present or specifically requests a transaction in his absence. In addition, Mazzei testified that she personally does not update passbooks for interest.125 Nonetheless, in decedent’s ab[312]*312sence Mazzei recorded numerous transactions in the ITF account.126
On 15 November 2000, Mazzei, who had not seen decedent in almost two months, asked several police officers then conducting business at the bank to help locate decedent.127 A bank customer, John Palmieri, saw Mazzei talking to the police officers and offered his assistance. Within a day, Mr. Palmieri learned that decedent was at Kirkbride.128
On 16 November 2000, Kirkbride transferred decedent to Cambridge.129 In Kirkbride’s “Continuing care/ discharge planning” document, Dr. Mark Novitsky reflects an Axis I diagnosis of “Dementia = Delusion.”130 The problem areas marked for continuing care are “Psychosis.” 131
Mrs. Curley completed a Resident/Profile transfer sheet reflecting that “resident at admission has private duty home aide — 24 x 7.”132 Decedent tried three times to sign Cambridge’s admission agreement for personal care homes.133
On 16 November 2000, Mr. Palmieri, Squitieri and Mazzei visited decedent at Cambridge. Decedent did not know where he was.134 He looked like a “street person.”135
[313]*313On 17 November 2000, Mazzei helped decedent withdraw $ 11,860 to pay Cambridge. Mazzei and Mr. Palmieri witnessed the withdrawal slip.136
Sometime before 6 December 2000, Mr. Palmieri involved himself in decedent’s affairs. Mr. Palmieri asked decedent if he had a doctor, and decedent said that he did not.137 On 6 December 2000, Palmieri, his counsel, and Mazzei took decedent to decedent’s 18th Street home.138 Decedent’s home had not been cleaned, mail and trash were piled up, and unsanitary and unhealthy conditions existed.139 Mr. Palmieri found unpaid bills dating to at least August 2000.140
On 7 December 2000, Kirkbride re-admitted decedent for emergency psychiatric care.141 On 19 December 2000, Dr. Julius Mingroni examined decedent and found him to be “totally incompetent” and “unable to take care of his own personal needs and assets, as well as any personal monetary obligations.”142 On 3 January 2001, Dr. Novitsky told Mr. Palmieri that decedent was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease.143
On 19 January 2001, Mr. Palmieri petitioned the court for appointment as decedent’s guardian. Mr. Palmieri represented that decedent was “totally unable to manage [314]*314his financial affairs, property and business, or to make and communicate responsible decisions relating thereto, including the ability to communicate his need for assistance in these areas.”144
On 8 February 2001, Kirkbride transferred decedent to Methodist Nursing Home. Dr. Novitsky noted “[Decedent’s] memory is still poor, but as part of a dementing process, I do not expect this to resolve.”145
The court held a guardianship hearing on 7 March 2001. Decedent who was then 84 years old testified that he was 55 years old, and that he did not know where he was.146 By order dated 9 March 2001, the court adjudicated decedent incompetent.
On 13 June 2001, decedent died. Six days hence, Mazzei and Squitieri received $698,566.72 from the ITF account.147 As the bank’s policy requires management approval of any withdrawal, whether by check or cash, of over $1,000 and as Mazzei and Squitieri cannot conduct transactions in their own accounts, Botta came to the Snyder Avenue branch to approve and to conduct the transaction.148 Mazzei and Squitieri deposited the funds with the bank into account #4964, held jointly in their names.149.
The bank’s policy prohibited Mazzei or Squitieri from conducting transactions in account #4964.150 Despite this [315]*315prohibition, over the next three months, Mazzei and Squitieri used at least eight separate accounts to move money within, and eventually out of the bank.151
To circumvent the bank’s policies, Mazzei approved and conducted Squitieri’s transfers.152 Squitieri, in turn, approved and conducted Mazzei’s transfers.153 Mazzei and Squitieri’s quid pro quo violated the intent of the bank’s prohibition on employees handling transactions in their own accounts.154 Someone other than Mazzei or Squitieri should have conducted these transactions.155
Sometime before 24 September 2001, Mazzei learned that decedent’s relatives had contacted Mr. Palmieri.156 Approximately $408,000 of the funds originally in decedent’s ITF account then remained in the bank in various accounts subject to the design of Mazzei and Squitieri.157
During the two days after being informed that decedent’s heirs were represented by counsel, Mazzei and Squitieri removed the remaining $408,000 from the bank.158 Mazzei and Squitieri should have obtained Botta’s approval for each withdrawal.159 Instead, Mazzei [316]*316counter-signed the checks issued to Squitieri, and Squitieri counter-signed the checks issued to Mazzei.160
Mazzei moved funds which she withdrew into a Police Fire Credit Union account held with her husband.161 Mazzei’s husband then systematically wrote checks averaging $9,000 to various of Mazzei’s friends and relatives.162 At least six such checks were for exactly $9,000.163 Mazzei and Squitieri both have used funds which originated from decedent’s ITF account to pay their counsel in the present matter.164
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The estate seeks the turnover of ITF account proceeds. The estate clearly and convincingly has proven that Mazzei and Squitieri both directly and indirectly unduly influenced decedent to open the account, and to name them as beneficiaries of the account. The estate has proven by a preponderance of evidence that the bank must answer for its employees’ actions under the respondeat superior doctrine. Moreover, the bank must account for negligently supervising Mazzei’s and Squitieri’s opening of the ITF account, and ultimate asset dissipation.
[317]*317I. The Estate Clearly and Convincingly Proved Both Direct and Indirect Undue Influence
A. The Estate Has Proven Indirect Undue Influence
In Estate of Clark165 the Supreme Court created a three-part test for establishing proof of indirect undue influence, the satisfaction of which test creates a presumption of undue influence in the respondent. The presumption arises when, as in the present matter, the estate shows: (1) that respondents were in a “confidential relationship” with decedent; (2) decedent had a “weakened intellect” when the account in question was opened; and (3) that respondents received a “substantial benefit” by their actions. The estate has met its burden under the Clark test, as follows:
(1) Testimony by the treating physician, lay witness, and expert witness proved “weakened intellect”
In Paolini Will,166 Judge Taxis defined weakened intellect as:
“A mind which, in all the circumstances of a particular situation, is inferior to normal minds in reasoning, power, factual knowledge, freedom of thought and decision, and other characteristics of a fully competent mentality. It should be viewed essentially as a relative state as the term is applied to cases of undue influence, as these cases always involve the effect of one intellect upon another; if the intellect of the testator is substantially [318]*318impaired in comparison to that of the proponent or beneficiary it must be regarded as weakened since there could be no equal dealings between the two parties.”
In the present case the treating physician, eyewitness observations, and expert opinion167 clearly and convincingly establish that decedent suffered from a weakened intellect.
At least four physicians who examined decedent in the last three years of his life diagnosed him with chronic irreversible dementia. Decedent’s primary physician, Dr. Vincent Renzi, unofficially168 diagnosed decedent with dementia in March of 1998, more than 27 months before the ITF was created.169 Subsequently, Dr. Renzi officially diagnosed dementia in December 1998, more than 21 months before the ITF’s creation.170 Additionally, Dr. Joseph Morgan of St. Agnes Hospital diagnosed decedent with dementia; Dr. Ramesh Eluri of Friends Hospital diagnosed decedent with dementia with agitation and psychosis;171 and Dr. Mark Novitsky diagnosed decedent as suffering from dementia with delusions.172 These diagnoses clearly and convincingly establish weakened intellect.173
[319]*319Further, given the similarities of circumstance under which decedent interacted with Roxanne Rivera, the assistant manager of Sharon Savings, and with Mazzei and Squitieri at the bank, the court places significant weight upon the non-medical testimony of Ms. Rivera. Like Mazzei, Ms. Rivera had known decedent before his mental difficulties openly manifested themselves.174 From 1997 through the beginning of2000, Ms. Rivera observed decedent during his monthly visits to Sharon Savings. Ms. Rivera observed that during the spring of 2000, decedent was noticeably not quite himself. Ms. Rivera detailed decedent’s erratic behavior, including: uncharacteristically visiting Sharon Savings nearly every day; uncharacteristically requiring significant time to have his finances explained to him; and a distinct change in his physical appearance, amongst others.175 These statements powerfully evidence weakened intellect and the medical records and expert testimony corroborate their accuracy.176
[320]*320The estate presented Dr. Joel Streim’s expert testimony and introduced his expert report.177 In summary, Dr. Streim concluded that:178
• decedent was suffering from progressive irreversible dementia;
• decedent’s progressive dementia was clinically apparent in 1998;
• decedent’s dementia had progressed to the mild stage by January 1999;
• decedent’s dementia worsened throughout 2000;
• in August 2000, decedent would have been vulnerable to undue influence or persuasion by people in whom he trusted;
• by August 2000, decedent would have had difficulty with previously familiar transactions;
• by August 2000, decedent’s intellect would have been weakened;
• in August 2000, decedent would have been vulnerable to elder abuse; and
• by August 2000, decedent’s dementia would have manifested enough symptoms that most laypersons, especially those who saw him over a period of months or knew him over an extended period of time would have been able to observe changes in his behavior.
The court finds that no credible expert or lay witness has contradicted Dr. Steim.179
[321]*321(2) The estate clearly and convincingly has proven confidential relationship
A confidential relationship exists “when the circumstances make it certain the parties [did] not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence or trust, justifiably reposed.” 180
A confidential relationship exists when one person occupies a position so as to reasonably inspire confidence that he will act in good faith for the other’s interest or occupies a position over another, intellectually, physically or morally, with the opportunity to use the superiority to other’s advantage.181 Any relations “existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party and can take no advantage to himself from his acts” relating to the other party is “confidential.” 182
[322]*322In DiMaio Will No. l,183 Judge Wood held that the factors indicative of confidential relationship should not be compartmentalized, but considered altogether. Then, as a general matter, Judge Wood found the existence of a confidential relationship. The totality of circumstances here clearly and convincingly prove confidential relationship:
• Mazzei testified that decedent trusted her;184
• decedent allowed only Mazzei and Squitieri to perform his transactions.185 They, in turn, fostered this trust by allowing withdrawals without a passbook;186
• Mazzei and Squitieri worked at the financial institution, and as employees of the institution, owed decedent certain fiduciary duties, including being bound to act with the utmost good faith for decedent’s benefit and to take no advantage for themselves from their acts relating to decedent,187 which by definition is a confidential relationship;188
• decedent’s entrustment of his passbook to Mazzei and Squitieri, clearly indicated his confidence in the bank and the managers;189
• Mazzei assisted decedent with his financial affairs and in taking care of his money. Vento testified that [323]*323Mazzei stated that she had been helping decedent with his affairs;190
• decedent entrusted his funds “to” not “for” Mazzei and Squitieri;191
• decedent did trust Mazzei and Squitieri as evidenced by the fact that when they told decedent that he needed to open a new savings account to establish direct deposits, he believed them and acted on that direction;
• decedent trusted the bank and its employees as members of his own community. He believed that neither the bank nor its employees would mislead or misguide him. He trusted them as a child trusts its parents.
All of these factors, together with the general principle, agreed to by Vento, that the bank’s customers trust the bank to act in their best interests192 prove that Mazzei and Squitieri stood in a confidential relationship with decedent.
[324]*324B. The Estate Has Proven Direct Undue Influence by Clear and Convincing Evidence
(1) Mazzei’s and Squitieri’s misdeeds at the creation of the account prove fraud
In August of 2000, decedent was paranoid and incapable of tracking his finances. In his condition, he sought Mazzei’s and Squitieri’s assistance in rerouting his social security direct deposit into his existing account at the bank. Mazzei and Squitieri misrepresented that for decedent to switch his direct deposit he would need to open a new account. Decedent believed Mazzei and Squitieri. Having no reason to doubt the veracity of Mazzei and Squitieri’s representation, decedent relied upon that representation as true. On their own part, Mazzei and Squitieri knew that decedent would not verify their representation with an attorney. The representation, however, was patently false.
Mazzei and Squitieri capitalized on decedent’s trust in them, and opened the ITF through the employ of various artifices including the lost passbook affidavit;193 and the consumer account agreement.194
[325]*325Additionally, P-7 is Mazzei’s handwritten document by which decedent purports to put “the account in trust to” not “/or” Mazzei and Squitieri.195 This discrepancy further evidences decedent’s belief that he was entrusting his funds into the care of Mazzei and Squitieri, and not leaving the funds “for” them upon his demise.196
(2) The elaborate and fraudulent asset transfers prove culpable behavior
Mazzei’s and Squitieri’s transfers, particularly those occurring after Palmieri told them that he had met with decedent’s nieces and after Mazzei and Squitieri had met with estate’s counsel, evidence their consciousness of [326]*326the weakness of their case, i.e. their fraud, and, therefore, are admissible.197 Mazzei and Squitieri violated rules and policy in absconding with the ITF funds, thereby proving their awareness that their actions and the circumstances surrounding the creation of the ITF account would not withstand scrutiny.
The fraudulent transfers also prove a common plan or scheme among Mazzei and Squitieri to defraud decedent.198 The post-death transfers prove that Mazzei and [327]*327Squitieri worked together in a common plan (1) to unduly influence or confuse decedent into naming them as beneficiaries of the ITF account, and (2) to obtain and remove ITF funds from the bank before decedent’s living relatives could discover, and pursue the account’s funds. For example, Mazzei and Squitieri cooperated with each other in conducting several transactions to move over $400,000 in two days from an account that they both held.
C. Respondents Have Not Met Their Burden of Disproving Undue Influence
Because the estate proved undue influence, respondents bear the burden of proving the absence of undue influence, and bear the risk of non-persuasion. Ordinarily, when a petitioner proves only indirect, or Clark, undue influence, a respondent “has two options: he can attack the basic facts upon which the presumption rests, and/or he can present evidence to rebut the presumption itself.”199 In the present matter, petitioners satisfactorily proved both indirect and direct undue influence. As a matter of law, therefore, respondents must affirmatively disprove undue influence. Respondents did not disprove undue influence.
[328]*328(1) Mazzei and Squitieri have no credibility before this court
In evaluating credibility, the court considers a witness’ interest or lack thereof in the outcome.200 Mazzei and Squitieri have over 560,000 obvious interests in the outcome of this case. Moreover, by virtue of their fraudulent transfers to friends and family, Mazzei and Squitieri now face great personal embarrassment should the court rule against them.
To keep the estate’s money and to avoid reversal of fraudulent transfers, Mazzei and Squitieri went to elaborate lengths. In one instance, Mazzei lied to cover a lie, which in its own course covered a previous lie. In other instances, Mazzei201 and Squitieri202 forgot earlier testi[329]*329mony, and proceeded to contradict themselves and each other on such material issues as decedent’s mental and physical well-being, and the account’s creation. These [330]*330material falsehoods lead the court to entirely disregard both Mazzei’s and Squitieri’s testimony.203
[331]*331(2) Respondents’ lay witnesses did not disprove undue influence
Respondents presented three non-party lay witnesses, as follows:
Anthony Scarpa has known Mazzei for over 30 years and visits the bank daily for coffee and cake.204 He testified that he saw decedent during the summer of 2000, that he and decedent discussed “current events,” and that decedent provided him with a general update on the neighborhood.205 Mr. Scarpa’s testimony lacks specificity. He did not provide a single, specific recollection of any topic that he discussed with decedent. Further, Mr. Scarpa admitted that he saw decedent just once per week.206 Notably, Mr. Scarpa did not address decedent’s testamentary intent vis-a-vis Mazzei or Squitieri.
Paul Perpiglia voluntarily came forward in this matter in November 2002.207 Mr. Perpiglia informed the court that on or about 3 August 2002, he was present in the bank, at which time he met decedent for the first and only time.208 Mr. Perpiglia claims to have spoken intermittently with decedent during a 30-40 minute period.209 They allegedly discussed decedent’s feelings toward attorneys, but Mr. Perpiglia did not “delve into [decedent’s] reasoning.”210 They allegedly discussed sports, but Mr. [332]*332Perpiglia recalls no particularities of the conversation.211 Likewise, they allegedly discussed the neighborhood, but only “in general” terms.212
Mr. Perpiglia did not witness decedent conduct any personal transactions.213 He did not see anyone else speaking with decedent.214 He and decedent did not discuss estate planning or financial concepts.215 While the court appreciates Mr. Perpiglia’s time, his testimony is of no moment.
Ms. Giacobbe’s testimony also does not disprove undue influence. This court does not doubt that she attended to decedent during his brief visit to St. Agnes on 16 September 2000. However, Ms. Giacobbe’s testimony did not address decedent’s cognitive functioning. Neither did Ms. Giacobbe’s testimony reveal decedent’s abilities in planning, sequencing, organizing, or abstracting as those tasks relate to one’s intent in disposing of one’s funds.216
[333]*333(3) Dr Scola’s expert testimony provides no plausible insight for the court
Dr. Scola proclaimed that decedent was not suffering from dementia, but rather from geriatric depression. This conclusion is contradicted by four treating physicians and two experts, Drs. Streim and Rothman.217 Dr. Scola presented as an expert on speculation and contradiction.
[334]*3342. Prudential Is Vicariously Liable for Its Employees ’ Acts
A. Standard and Burden of Proof
The respondeat superior doctrine imposes vicarious , liability upon an employer for its employees’ wrongdo[335]*335ing.218 An employer is vicariously liable for employee acts which injure a third party when the acts were committed during the course, and within the scope, of employment.219 An employee’s conduct falls within the “scope of employment”220 if: “(1) it is of a kind and nature that the employee is employed to perform; (2) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (3) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer; and (4) if force is intentionally used by the employee against another, the use of force is not unexpected by the employer.”221
The burden of proving respondeat superior or scope of employment rests with the estate.222 Unlike undue in[336]*336fluence, which requires clear and convincing evidence, a finding under vicarious liability requires only that the estate produce a fair preponderance of credible evidence.223 The estate has carried that burden.
B. Mazzei and Squitieri Acted Within the Scope of and by Virtue of Their Employment With the Bank
Mazzei and Squitieri acted within the scope of employment and not a single witness came forth to the contrary. It fell within their employment for Mazzei and Squitieri:
• to interact with, and to open accounts on behalf of bank customers;
• to create documents opening accounts;
• to duplicate and retain decedent’s passbook;
• to fund the ITF account; and
• to develop the trust that obviously existed between Mazzei and Squitieri by the time decedent ingenuously “agreed” to assign them as beneficiaries of the ITF account.
Mazzei and Squitieri’s actions and interactions with decedent took place at the bank and during business hours. But for their employment at the bank, neither Mazzei nor Squitieri would have had any occasion to interact with decedent. Further, but for their employment at the bank, Mazzei and Squitieri lack the wherewithal to hatch their scheme. The bank, therefore, is vicariously liable for the consequences of that scheme.224
[337]*337Finally, the bank profited from the relationship between decedent and the bank employees, Mazzei and Squitieri. As with all banks, profit is realized in the difference between the use of and subsequent earnings on depositors’ monies, and the interest a given bank pays out to its customers. Specifically, the bank significantly benefited by the $450,000 net increase in its deposits on decedent’s account.
3. Prudential Negligently Supervised Mazzei and Squitieri
Pennsylvania courts impose liability on employers directly when, inter aha, they negligently or recklessly:225
• give improper or ambiguous orders or fail to make proper regulations; or supervise activities; or
• permit or fail to prevent negligent or other tortious conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon the premises or with instrumentalities under his control.
The burden of proving negligent supervision falls upon the estate, which must do so by a preponderance of evidence. The estate has provided overwhelming evidence [338]*338in demonstrating that the bank negligently allowed the ITF account to be created, and negligently permitted Mazzei and Squitieri to dissipate assets.
A. Prudential’s Negligent Environment
Negligence and inconsistency permeate the bank’s environment. The bank does not train employees on interacting with the elderly or mentally impaired, and has no written or consistently applied conflict of interest policy.226 In fact, it appears to the court that many of the innovations and controls of the last, 72 years have never taken root in Prudential Savings Bank.
Throughout the trial, the court heard evidence of the bank’s selective application of account opening policies and procedures, and unwritten exceptions or modifications to nearly every bank policy applicable to the transactions and documents at issue.227 Both Mazzei and Squitieri exploited this procedurally liquid environment. Their cooperative manipulation of the bank’s internal operating systems belies their claim of innocent intent.228
[339]*339The bank’s environment, and lack of meaningful controls proved fertile soil for the undue influence at issue. Would that proper policy and restriction had first been sown thereon.
The sequence of events preceding the creation of the ITF account follow. On 8 August 2000, Mazzei effectively told Vento that a mentally-impaired, elderly customer with several hundred thousand dollars, and with whom she had formed a close friendship, wanted to name her and Squitieri as ITF account beneficiaries. Mazzei knew that Vento, over his own instincts, would ultimately accept her representation that decedent did not want to consult an attorney. Moreover, Mazzei knew that when the bank’s counsel did get around to reviewing the transaction, he would do no more than speak to her on the phone without requesting documents or asking to speak with decedent. Additionally, Mazzei and Squitieri, knew that the bank had no procedural controls to catch document irregularities, and that if the irregularities were discovered, the irregularities would be dismissed as business as usual. During the bank’s business as usual, the missing notary attestation, the handwritten consumer account agreement, and the duplicate passbook all went undetected by the authorities within the bank.
[340]*340B. Prudential Negligently Supervised the ITF Account Opening
The bank’s negligence on 8 August began with the Mazzei/Vento telephone call. At trial, Vento admitted that in that call he authorized Mazzei and Squitieri to open the ITF account even though he should not have.229 Remarkably, neither Vento nor, indeed, anyone else has explained why the bank failed to send Botta, Corrato, or anyone, including Vento, the six blocks from Oregon Avenue to Snyder Avenue to verify the transaction.230 Further, no one has explained why the transaction was not delayed by one day, or why Prudential’s counsel never met or spoke with decedent.
[341]*341Banking expert William Wagenmann testified that the bank’s failure to independently investigate and verify decedent’s intent did not comport with reasonable banking industry standards.231
The bank’s negligence extended beyond the initial telephone call. Mazzei and Squitieri violated the bank’s procedure when they handwrote the consumer account agreement. The bank, on its part, failed or had no control in place to detect this irregularity. The bank should have detected this irregularity.232 The bank’s counsel simply relied upon Mazzei’s representations in shirking its own responsibility of due diligence. This blind reliance runs contrary to reasonable banking industry standards.233
Had the bank operated according to reasonable banking industry standards, the transaction at issue either would not have occurred, or at the very least, would have been investigated and reversed almost immediately. The [342]*342court, therefore, holds the bank jointly and severally liable with Mazzei and Squitieri.234
The bank’s negligent supervision defense rests upon the testimony of Attorney Paul Adams. Mr. Adams’ testimony did not disprove the bank’s negligence. In sum, Mr. Adams endeavored to convince the court that the bank did not act negligently because there are no banking industry standards of care applicable to opening an ITF account at an institution of the bank’s size. His conclusion does nothing to persuade the court of its accuracy. In fact, during his testimony, Mr. Adams went so far as to contradict Vento’s testimony that Mazzei and Squitieri should not have opened the account in the first place.235 During testimony, Mr. Adams did concede:
• that it would have been “good practice” and “common sense” for the bank to have verified decedent’s intent; 236 and amongst others
• that he did not consider that Mazzei and Squitieri had observed changes in decedent’s behavior.237
The bank negligently supervised Mazzei and Squitieri in failing to have procedures in place to detect their quid pro quo asset transfers through, and eventually out of the bank’s system. Vento has testified that Botta should have conducted or approved all of the September 24 and 25 transfers. But Botta did not conduct or approve those transfers. The bank should have had a control in place to detect the quid pro quo. But the bank did not. Thus, [343]*343Mazzei and Squitieri moved roughly $408,000 out of the bank in two days without detection. When this court ordered Mazzei and Squitieri to place into escrow all remaining ITF funds, they deposited only $184,000. Consequentially, the estate has suffered at least a $224,000 loss owing to those September 24 and 25 transfers in addition to the nearly $156,000 that Mazzei and Squitieri had removed before September 24.238 The bank’s failure to undo these transfers after it learned of them proves the bank’s direct negligence.
CONCLUSION
After a thorough consideration of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, the court reverses the ITF account’s creation and grants the petition for turnover of assets. The court holds respondents Mazzei, Squitieri, and Prudential Savings Bank jointly and severally hable for the amount contained in the ITF account as of decedent’s death, less taxes and funeral expenses. Pursuant thereto, the court enters judgment in the amount of $563,767.40, together with interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees.
ORDER
And now May 5,2003, after a thorough consideration of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding this present matter, the court hereby orders and decrees a reversal in the creation of the ITF account at issue, that account which favored respondents Mazzei and Squitieri as beneficiaries, and hereby grants the relief sought by petitioner in approving the petition for turnover of assets.
[344]*344Further, the court holds respondents Mazzei, Squitieri, and Prudential Savings Bank jointly and severally liable for the exact and total amount contained in the ITF account upon the date of decedent’s death, less taxes and funeral expenses. Pursuant thereto, the court enters judgment in the amount of $563,767.40, together with interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees to petitioner on behalf of the estate of Carmen DiCesare, deceased.