Estate of Chris Rogers v. Naphcare, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 19, 2024
• Docket: 23-35316
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 19 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ESTATE OF CHRIS ROGERS, No. 23-35316

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-0467-TOR

v. MEMORANDUM* NAPHCARE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 9, 2024 Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** District Judge.

Following the death of inmate Christopher Rogers at the Spokane County Jail

(“SCJ”) from asphyxiation by hanging, Rogers’s Estate (“the Estate”) filed suit

against NaphCare, Inc., (“NaphCare”), a private medical company that contracted

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. with Spokane County (“the County”) to provide mental health services to inmates.

The Estate raised three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging in various respects

that NaphCare maintained a policy of denying treatment to mentally ill inmates, like

Rogers, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also raised corporate

negligence1 and wrongful death claims under Washington state law.

On appeal, the Estate challenges the district court’s dismissal of its claims on

summary judgment. Specifically, the Estate challenges the district court’s grant of

NaphCare’s motions for partial summary judgment, as well as the district court’s

corresponding summary denial of the Estate’s partial motion for summary judgment

as moot. This Court reviews the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to

determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact.” See DeFries v.

Union Pac. R.R. Co., 104 F.4th 1091, 1104 (9th Cir. 2024). We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability

under § 1983 must identify a municipal policy or practice that violated his

constitutional rights. See Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th

1 The Estate has abandoned any argument based on a respondeat superior theory of liability.

2 Cir. 2016). To that end, the plaintiff must prove that “(1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to

deliberate indifference to [his] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the

moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d

892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011)). The parties agree that these standards apply to NaphCare

in its capacity as the County’s contractee.

The Estate has failed to demonstrate that NaphCare maintained a policy of

denying treatment to mentally ill inmates. To establish the existence of such a policy,

the Estate points to the failure of NaphCare’s nurses to complete Rogers’s mental

health screening form upon his arrival at SCJ. However, the record clearly

demonstrates that although a NaphCare nurse was initially unable to complete the

screening (because Rogers either refused to or was unable to cooperate with her),

another nurse successfully completed and documented the screening the following

day. The Estate also points to the failure of NaphCare’s nurses to monitor inmates’

symptoms, prescribe medications, and make referrals to SCJ’s psychiatrist as further

evidence that NaphCare maintained a policy of denying treatment to mentally ill

inmates. However, NaphCare’s nurses were neither responsible for performing nor

qualified to perform those tasks. Indeed, pursuant to NaphCare’s agreement with the

County, those tasks were assigned to SCJ’s psychiatrist and the County’s mental

3 health professionals. In any event, the record demonstrates that NaphCare provided

mental health treatment to Rogers by conducting his initial screening, obtaining his

medical records, administering and modifying his psychiatric prescriptions, and

placing him on suicide watch on three separate occasions. On this record, the district

court did not err in granting summary judgment on the Estate’s § 1983 claims.

Nor did the district court err in granting summary judgment on the Estate’s

state law claims. Under Washington state law, “[a] successful [corporate] negligence

claim requires (1) the existence of a duty owed to the complaining party, (2) a breach

of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) proximate cause between the breach and

the injury.” Est. of Essex v. Grant Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 546 P.3d 407, 413

(Wa. 2024) (citing Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168 (1984) (citing Hansen v.

Wash. Nat’l Gas Co., 632 P.2d 504, 505 (1981))). A wrongful death claim based on

negligence, like the one at issue here, carries the same requirements. See Eylander

v. Prologis Targeted U.S. Logistics Fund, LP, 539 P.3d 376, 380 (Wa. 2023) (citing

Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 914 P.2d 728, 731 (1996)). Even if the Estate

had demonstrated that NaphCare breached a duty to Rogers, it still failed to establish

that any such breach was the proximate cause of his death. Under Washington law,

in cases such as this, plaintiffs must usually establish proximate causation by putting

forth expert testimony. Est. of Essex, 546 P.3d at 414 (quoting Douglas v. Freeman,

814 P.2d 1160, 1165 (Wa. 1991) (citing McLaughlin v. Cooke, 774 P.2d 1171, 1175

4 (Wa. 1989))). Here, none of the Estate’s experts concluded that NaphCare’s

supervision of its employees was the proximate cause of Rogers’s death.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing either the Estate’s corporate

negligence claim or its derivative wrongful death claim.

Finally, the Estate argues that the district court erred by failing to consider its

partial motion for summary judgment. However, the district court’s decision

specified that three matters “were submitted for consideration,” that it “ha[d]

reviewed the record and files [t]herein,” and that it was “fully informed.” The district

court thus made clear that it had fulfilled its obligation to consider both of

NaphCare’s motions and the Estate’s motion. Because the Estate’s motion

concerned the same duty and breach issues as NaphCare’s motions and because the

Estate has not pointed to any new evidence raised in its motion that would have

created a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to either issue, the district

court did not err in dismissing the Estate’s motion for partial summary judgment as

moot.

AFFIRMED.