Estate of Chargualaf

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: February 3, 2023
• Docket: PR0119-07
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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6 IN TIIE SUPERIOR COURT OF au:~' "' "'f c~m - 7 ) PROBATE CASE NO.: PROl 19-07 ) 8 ) 9 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING ) IN PART AND DENYING IN PART JO ) PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED II OF ) PETITION FOR FINAL DISTRIBUTION; 12 ) AND GRANTING SOON'S ESTATE JAMES RALPH CHARGUALAF, ) ADMINISTRATIVE FEES 13 ) 14 ______________) 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 This matter came before the Honorable Judge Maria T. Cenzon on October 27, 2022 for 17

18 a hearing on the Second Amended Petition for Final Distribution (the "Petition") filed on August 19 19, 2022 by Administrator Rick Allan Cruz (the "Petitioner"), and to address the Partial Objection 20

21 by the Estate of Soon Dae Chargualaf (hereinafter "Soon" or "Soon 's Estate"). Soon was the 22 former administrator of the Estate of James Ralph Chargualaf (the "Estate") and is now deceased. 23 Attorney William Benjamin Pole appeared on behalf of Soon. The Petitioner was present along 24

25 with his attorney Peter F. Perez. The Court took the matter under advisement pursuant to Supreme 26 Court of Guam Administrative Rule 06-001 and CVR 7.l(e)(6)(A) of the Local Rules of the 27

28 Superior Court of Guam. After reviewing the Petition, the Partial Objection, the parties' oral

arguments, the underlying record, and the case law and statutes, the Court hereby issues the

following Decision and Order.

Page I of9 In the Matter of the Estate o.fJames Ralph Chargualaf, PRO 119-07 Decision & Order II. BACKGROUND 2 James Ralph Chargualaf (the "Decedent") and Soon married on January 23, 2001. 3

4 Decedent died intestate on December 3, 2006. Soon was appointed administrator of the Estate on 5 November 7, 2007. Before the Decedent's estate could be distributed, Soon died intestate on 6

7 September 12, 2010. Subsequently, on July 14, 2011, Rick Allan C. Cruz was appointed the

8 administrator of the Estate. The Administrator is the husband of Denise Chargualaf Cruz, sister 9 of the Decedent. In addition to Soon and the Decedent's sister, two other siblings (or their estate) 10

11 assert claims over the Estate: Jeffrey William Chargualaf and the Estate of Paul Vincent 12 Chargualaf. 13

14 Petitioner requests that the Estate's assets, consisting of undivided '!., interests in two 15 pieces of real property and the proceeds from a land sale be apportioned and distributed. The 16 Petition also calls for the statutory administrative fee in the amount of $5,602.19 be paid 17

18 exclusively to the current Administrator. Soon does not object to the distribution set forth in the 19 Petition, only to the apportionment of the administrator's fee. The sole objection is that the 20

21 administrative fee should be split equally between the current Administrator and Soon since she 22 was a previous administrator. For support, Soon points to 15 GCA § 2803 and this Court's 23

24 previous Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter the "FFCL") issued on March 23,

25 2021 that found in pertinent part: 26 f. In its previous Decision and Order Re: Objection to Petition for Final 27 Distribution (Oct. 28, 2013) in this case, this Court held that "[a]s a matter of law, 28 the Estate of Soon Dae Chargualaf is entitled to a share of the fee owing to the personal administrators" because she "served as administrator of Decedent's Estate from November 7, 2007 until her death on September 12, 2010. After her death and since July 14, 2011, Petitioner has served as the successor administrator." Decision and Order at p.6.

Page 2 of9 In the Maller of the Estate ofJames Ralph Chargualaf, PRO 119-07 Decision & Order g. Also in its previous Decision and Order, the Court rejected Han's request to 2 either allocate the full amount of the administrator's fee to the Estate of Soon Dae Chargualaf or to impose sanctions upon Petitioner under Guam R. Civ. P. 11. The 3 Court determined that there was insufficient evidence to support either a sanction 4 or a denial of Petitioner's right to statutory administrator's fees. Therefore, Petition is entitled to his share of the Statutory Commission as set forth in section h, below. 5

6 h. 15 G.C.A. § 2803 states that "if there are two or more personal 7 representatives, the compensation shall be apportioned among them by the Superior Court according to the services actually rendered by each." Neither party has 8 proffered any support to deviate from the provisions of Section 2803; therefore, the 9 Court apportions the Statutory Commission equally between the Petitioner and the Estate of Soon Dae Chargualaf, as permitted in 15 G.C.A. § 2803(a). IO

ll FFCL at 11-12 (Mar. 23, 2021). 12 At the hearing, the Petitioner argued that "all the first administrator did was open up th 13

14 estate and that was it" and pursuant to 15 GCA § 2803, that "doesn't justify" the 50% allocation 15 Hr'g Tr. at 2:34 PM (Oct. 27, 2022). Instead, the Petitioner asserts, Soon "should not be entitle 16 to any apportioned fee of the administrator." Pet'rs' Reply Br. at 2 (Oct. 17, 2022). Soon countere 17

18 that the FFCL and its above-quoted language became "a final appealable judgment" pursuant t 19 15 GCA § 3433 for the purposes of this issue and that the Petitioner's time to appeal expired. Id 20 21 at 2:42 PM. Soon also disputed the Petitioner's claim that there was no value to her opening th 22 estate. See Hr'g Tr. at 2:37 PM. 23 At its crux, Soon's argument is that this Court's FFCL allocating the administrator's fee i 24

25 binding and settled. The Court turns first to address this issue and then, if appropriate, whether 26 different allocation of the statutory administrative fee is indeed warranted. 27

28 III. DISCUSSION

Trial courts in the Superior Court of Guam exercise only "a limited probate jurisdiction

when convening as probate courts." Zahnen v. Limtiaco, 2008 Guam 5 i 17. As such, "[a] probate

Page 3 of9 In the Matter of the Estate ofJames Ralph Chargualaf, PRO 119-07 Decision & Order court has only those powers granted by the probate code as well any legal or equitable powers 2 necessary to exercise its function." Id. Upon "the petition of the personal representative," this 3

4 Court has jurisdiction to determine and direct the instant deposition of the Testator's estate by 5 settlements of accounts and final distribution. 15 GCA § 2221. It is generally appropriate to seek 6

7 guidance from California case law when interpreting Guam's probate code since Guam's probate

8 code was adopted from California's probate code. Zahnen v. Limtiaco, 2008 Guam 5 ,i 17 9 ("Because the Guam Legislature enacted a probate code substantially similar to the California 10

11 Probate Code in 1953, we look to California case law for interpretation."); Matter of Estate ()j' 12 Ulloa, 2020 Guam 1, n. 6 ("As we have done previously, we look to California case law to aid in 13

14 our interpretation of Guam's probate code."). !5 A. The Court's FFCL is not yet binding and the Court is free to reconsider the 16 issue of apportionment of the administrator's fees at its discretion. 17 Soon's argument that this Court's FFCL is a final judgment and therefore binding upo 18

!9 this Court seems contrary to Guam Supreme Court precedent. The Guam Supreme Court addresse

20 a similar issue in In re Estate of' Ulloa, 2020 Guam I. There, the probate court had previous! 21 issued an Order After Hearing and a Decision and Order and the party argued that the filings wer 22

23 final on that particular issue, a no-contest clause, and since the opposing party had not time! 24 appealed them, the issue was time-barred. See id. at ,i 13. Like Soon with the statuto 25 26 administrator's fees, the party there was "effectively insinuat[ ing] that the probate court ha 27 decided how the no-contest clause should be interpreted." Id. The Guam Supreme Court discarde 28 the argument-pointing out that the orders did not relate to the no-contest clause-but that even i

they did, the orders were not final and appealable. See id. at ,i 14. The court clarified tha

"[o]rdinarily, for an order to be final it must 'dispose[] of the entire case by determining the right Page 4 of9 In the Matter of the Estate of.James Ralph Chargualaf, PRO 119-07 Decision & Order in an action'" and since "that [was] not the case [t]here," then the issue had not been conclusive! 2 adjudicated and thus neither was it time-barred. Id. (quoting Portis Int 'l, LLC v. Marquardt, 201 3

4 Guam 22 ,i 5). Similarly, the FFCL here is not a final judgment because it does not dispose ofth 5 entire case by determining all the rights in the action. That occurs whenever this Court issues th 6

7 order of decree of final distribution that, "when it becomes final, is conclusive as to the rights o

8 heirs, devisees, and legatees." 15 GCA § 3013. 9 Until then, "[i]nterlocutory orders are subject to reconsideration by the court at any time.' IO

II Guam Housing and Urban Renewal Authority v. Pacific Superior Enterprises Corp., 2001 Gua 12 8 ,i 13. "An interlocutory order is one 'which does not finally determine a cause of action bu 13

14 instead decides only an intervening matter.' " In re Magno, 216 B.R. 34, 38 (9th Cir. BAP 1997 15 (quoting In Re Kashani, 190 B.R. 875, 882 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995)). Much like the Guam Suprem 16 Court in Ulloa, the Ninth Circuit found that "[t]o become final, the order must end the litigatio 17

18 or dispose of a complete claim for relief, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute th 19 judgment." Id. The California Supreme Court similarly determines when a filing is mere! 20

21 interlocutory. See Erickson v. Boothe, 216 P. 2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1950) ("It is manifest that th 22 judgment is merely interlocutory and was so intended because the court contemplated that furthe 23

24 judicial proceedings would be necessary in this action before there would be a final adjudicatio

25 of the matter."). Upon these confines, it is clear that the Court's FFCL was merely interlocutory 26 The Court concluded its FFCL by ordering inter alia "that the Administrator resolve the Cru 27

28 claim" and "submit legal authority to this Court" for a distinct issue. See FFCL at 17. The Cou

then advised the parties that a "hearing may be set by this Court for oral argument, or the Cou

may take the matter under advisement as appropriate." Id. at 18. The Court's contemplation o

Page 5 of9 In the Matter of the Estate ofJames Ralph Chargualaf, PRO 119-07 Decision & Order further proceedings demonstrated that the litigation was anything but over. As such, the FFCL wa 2 not a final judgment but merely interlocutory and the Court is free to reconsider the apportionmen 3

4 of the administrators' fee. 5 B. The splitting of the Administrator's fee equally is appropriate pursuant to 15 6 GCA § 2803. 7 15 GCA § 2803 states that "[i]f there are two or more personal representatives, the 8

9 compensation shall be apportioned among them by the Superior Court according to the services 10 actually rendered by each." The Petitioner argues Soon is entitled to nothing because of "her II mismanagement" on one hand and, on the other hand, because she did not perform any 12

13 administrative duties other than open up the probate. Pet'r's Reply Br. at 2. Meanwhile, Soon 14 argues she's entitled to "no less than 25% but will agree to 50%" because "to say that there is no 15

16 value of opening the probate and working on it would not be true." Hr' g Tr. at 2:3 7 PM, 2:40 PM. 17 The Petitioner cites to Ord v. Little, 3 Cal. 287 (Cal. 1853) in support of his argument that 18 Soon should receive zero dollars. He claims that the case, in "[e]xamining the California Probate 19

20 Code§ 902 that is the source of 15 GC[sic] §2803," establishes "[t]he standard for this issue of 21 any apportionment." Pet'r's Br. at 2. (Oct. 17, 2022). However, Ord was not examining CPC § 22

23 902 as said statute did not even exist in 1853, when the opinion was published. Neither is CPC § 24 902 the source for 15 GCA § 2803. That honor falls to CPC § 901. Therefore, the more persuasive 25 26 cases are those where California Courts interpret that statute. People v. Camacho, 2015 Guam 37

27 ,i 25 ("We may look to the persuasive authority of case law interpreting similar statutes for 28 guidance."); Amerault v. Intelcom Support Servs., Inc., 2004 Guam 23 'II 16 ("Guam courts have

considered courts of other states interpreting statutes similar to the law of Guam to be persuasive

authority."). Page 6 of9 In the Matter of the Estate ofJames Ralph Chargualaf, PRO 119-07 Decision & Order One such case is In re Roberts' Estate, 162 P. 2d 461 (Cal. 1945), a California Supreme 2 Court case that soundly rejects Petitioner's argument that the Soon deserves nothing because of 3

4 an alleged mismanagement of the estate. "It is settled ... that an executor does not lose his right 5 to the statutory compensation because he is guilty of mismanagement of the estate. He 'should be 6

7 charged with losses resulting from his default or neglect, and allowed his commissions.' " Id. at 8 465 (quoting In Re Carver's Estate, 55 P. 770, 771 (Cal. 1898)). Thus, though Petitioner fails to 9 provide any evidence of mismanagement, even if mismanagement occurred it would not be 10

11 grounds for awarding the Petitioner the full fee at Soon's expense. 12 Petitioner's next argument is that that "all the first administrator did was open up the estate 13

14 and that was it" and pursuant to 15 GCA § 2803, that "doesn't justify" the 50% allocation. Hr'g 15 Tr. at 2:34 PM. It is true that the statute "expressly states that the court shall apportion the fees 16 according to the services actually performed." Dobbins v. Title Guarantee & Tr. Co., 22 Cal. 2d 17

18 64, 67 (Cal. 1943) (emphasis added). However, the Court disagrees with the Petitioner's 19 characterization of the value of the services performed by Soon. "As the statute makes clear, it is 20 21 for the trial court ... to ascertain what services were actually rendered by each administrator and 22 to apportion the administrator's commission accordingly." Estate of Downing, 134 Cal. App. 3d 23

24 256, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). This Court does so by looking at "all the records before [it], to fix

25 and determine what fees are proper." In re Gonzalez' Estate, 209 P. 2d 21, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 26 1949). 27 28 The record demonstrates that Soon opened this probate and remained as administrator for

a period of about three years. In the interim, Soon performed many services in the interest of the

estate. Notice of hearings were posted on bulletin boards throughout Guam repeatedly. See Deel.

Page 7 of9 In the Matter of the Estate ofJames Ralph Chargualaf, PROl 19-07 Decision & Order of Posting (Oct. 17, 2007); See Deel. of Posting (Feb. 28, 2008). A notice to creditors was issued. 2 See Notice of Creditors (Nov. 7, 2007). Soon seemingly ordered a land property valuation after 3

4 there was a dispute as to the value of the property and negotiated a settlement for a claim against 5 the estate. See Hr'g Tr. (Aug. 27, 2009). The Court does not agree that these actions performed 6

7 by Soon before her death were without value. The Court has merely to analyze is its own record

8 as no evidence of expenditures or other proof of amount entitled to have been submitted by either 9 party even though the Court has been requesting them since at least 2013. See Decision & Order 10

II at 7 (Oct. 28, 2013) ("A Status hearing in this case is scheduled for December 5, 2013 at 10:00 12 a.m., during which time ... the Estate of Soon Dae Chargualaf, shall present evidence in support 13

14 of the Estate's request for fees under 15 GCA § 2803(a)."). The time to present such evidence has 15 come and gone: 16 The claim to the apportionment or a certain share of the compensation by one co- 17 executor, is the basis of his cause of action which may be determined in probate. 18 One of the grounds for his claim may be the proportion of the services performed 19 by him, another may be an agreement with his co-representative on the subject. He has only one cause of action and must present all ofhis grounds at the first hearing 20 thereon. Any grounds he fails to present, but could have. and did not, may not 21 furnish a basis.for a second action. 22 Dobbins, 22 Cal. 2d at 71 ( emphasis added). 23 Thus, without more, the Court's own records demonstrate Soon performed vanous 24

25 valuable actions on behalf of the Estate before her death, and her estate is now entitled to half of 26 the administrator's fee pursuant to 15 GCA § 2803 for her services rendered. 27

28 II

II

Page 8 of9 In the Matter of the Estate ofJames Ralph Chargualaf, PRO 119-07 Decision & Order IV. CONCLUSION 2 The Petition is GRANTED with respect to the distribution of property of the Estate a 3

4 proposed therein. However, the Petition is DENIED to the extent that seeks to apportion none o 5 the administrator's fee to Soon's Estate, as previously ordered by this Court in its FFCL pursuan 6

7 to 15 GCA § 2803. Instead, the Court GRANTS Soon's Estate her portion of the administrator'

8 fee in the amount of Fifty Percent (50%) of such fee. 9 Petitioner is ORDERED to submit a Final Decree consistent with the Court's Decisio 10

11 herein within Thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Decision and Order. 12

13 SO ORDERED this aj g {IP'l--3 14

16 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 17

24 25 26

Page 9 of9 In the Matter of the Estate a/James Ralph Chargualaf, PRO 119-07 Decision & Order