Estate of Blythe

4 Coffey 162
Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco·Decided July 31, 1890·No. No. 2401·Published

Opinion

COFFEY, J.

The counsel for this defendant, in stating his case to the court, alluded to the very great importance of an opening statement, which used to be regarded as the chief argument, and the counsel described this controversy.intrinsically and viewed upon its merits as one of the great cases of the century. The questions are of importance to the community as well as to the litigants; the questions of law are [164]*164intricate and involved, and by no means easy of solution, and no ease has ever been presented with greater dignity and courtesy, and, it may be added to what counsel said, with greater skill of advocacy. It is a peculiar controversy, most unusual in its nature, unlike most other civil actions; the court, in a special sense, represents the state; the sole office of the court is to ascertain and establish the truth. All the defendant, Alice Edith Blythe, can claim is one-half of this estate; it may be that as to the rest no one of the claimants will have finally established a case, and that ultimately the half, if not the whole, may escheat to the state of California.

This litigation, says counsel, like all other litigation of a similar kind, grows out of irregularities; men of obscure origin who accumulate means, who have no fixed religious belief or habit, possessing strong appetites, create just such controversies as this; many men of millions die, men who have passed orderly lives, and their estates go through processes of probate without causing any clamor in the community or sensation in the press, but not so in a ease of this character.

Thomas H. Blythe was no common man; in different circumstances and with a different original education, his career would have been other than it was socially; he had no fixed religious belief; no creed or moral polity controlled his conduct, such as is necessary to establish a home or domestic environment. Under different and better auspices, a man of his intellectual caliber would undoubtedly have made for himself a name and founded a family that would have regarded with pride and respect their ancestor.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A CODE MARRIAGE ?

But counsel thought that he should be able to show that whatever irregularities, judged by a conventional or religious standard, the decedent may have been guilty of in connection with his relations with this lady defendant, Alice Edith Blythe, he always treated her affectionately, deferentially and respectfully, as a husband should treat his wife; although no ceremonial marriage was contracted, yet there was an incorporate union, a marital relation, such as comes within section 55 of the Civil Code of California and other related sections.

[165]*165Counsel said he proposed and expected to make a case which should meet the most extreme views of Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633, 22 Pac. 26, 131, and also to make a case which would constitute a valid marriage according to the majority opinion in that case; he promised to present a ease which would discriminate between the facts in that case and in this; there might be an analogy for a certain period as to the secrecy of the relation, but for the greater part of the period the conditions of the two cases were opposite. Counsel claimed that he would establish that this lady defendant and the decedent were man and wife, and became so fully and completely when they began to live together, in 1880, at 6 0 ’Farrell street; the marriage was legally complete at that time.

Whenever the measure of the statute has been filled, the fact of marriage has been thoroughly and finally established. The case of Sharon v. Sharon is founded upon an intelligible principle, sic ita lex scripta est; whether the facts justified that decision or not, it is the law; it is so written, and we must accept it: Sharon v. Sharon, decided January 31, 1889, 16 Pac. Rep. 346; see pages 350, 354, 356, 357, Mr. Justice McKinstry’s opinion; also pages 358, 360 and 361; see, also, in same case concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Temple, 75 Cal. 49. The word “manifested,” in section 57, Civil Code, goes to the fact of proof. A mere secret intimacy is not proof of marriage, but a marriage may be secret and established by evidence otherwise.

Mr. Justice Thornton, in the same case, in his dissenting opinion, stating an extreme view, is good enough, in the estimation of the counsel for the defendant, Alice Edith Blythe, for the facts of her case (75 Cal. 56), and her ease can be brought within the lines of either the prevailing or dissenting opinions in the first appeal of the Sharon case just cited. That appeal was from the judgment alone; the second appeal was on the motion for new trial, denied in the lower court, and counsel proposed to show that the defendant in this case responded to the extent of the definition, in its fullest import, of the minority opinion in the first appeal and the majority opinion in the second appeal of Sharon v. Sharon.

[166]*166THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANT, ALICE EDITH BLYTHE.

The defendant, Alice Edith Blythe, is a woman of respectable origin, born in this state, educated and accomplished, a good musician, a fine artist, an excellent housewife, a fit conjugal companion for the decedent; and upon the facts in evidence and the authorities, counsel asserted his ability to establish her claim as set forth in her answer and cross-complaint in this action, which is here inserted:

1. That on or about the fourth day of April, A. D. 1883, at the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, the said Thomas H. Blythe died intestate, then being, and for many years having been, a citizen and a resident of said city and county, and then being the owner and in possession of all and singular the real estate in said second amended complaint described and mentioned, and of a large quantity of personal property.
2. That on or about the twelfth day of June, A. D. 1883, after proceedings duly had in that behalf, the superior court of the said city and county of San Francisco, by its order and judgment of that date, in the matter of the estate of said Thomas H. Blythe, deceased, appointed Philip A. Roach the administrator of the said estate, and thereupon, to wit, on the date last aforesaid, letters of administration upon the said estate were issued to the said Philip A. Roach, who then and there qualified as said administrator, and has ever since been and now is the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the said estate.
3. That the said estate and property of the said Thomas H. Blythe, deceased, has not, nor has any part thereof, been distributed, and no proceedings of final distribution thereof have been instituted.
4. That at the time of the death of the said Thomas H. Blythe, the defendant and claimant was, and ever since the month of May, A. D. 1878, had been, the true and lawful wife of the said Thomas H. Blythe, deceased, and, upon and according to her information and belief, she then was, ever since has been, and now is, the sole heir at law of the said Thomas H. Blythe, deceased, unless, as this defendant and claimant, according to her information and belief, has alleged, he left one brother, whose name and whose residence this de[167]*167fendant and claimant does not know, and therefore cannot state, and as such was, ever since has been, and now is entitled to have and receive on distribution one-half of the whole of the entire estate and property of the said Thomas H.

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Related

Sharon v. Sharon, 11991 (Cal. 7-17-1889)
22 P. 26 (California Supreme Court, 1889)
Sharon v. Sharon
16 P. 345 (California Supreme Court, 1888)
White v. White
7 L.R.A. 799 (California Supreme Court, 1890)