Estate of Bardwell v. Perry Timber Co.

77 So. 2d 708, 222 Miss. 854, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 677
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 7, 1955
DocketNo. 39467
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 77 So. 2d 708 (Estate of Bardwell v. Perry Timber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Bardwell v. Perry Timber Co., 77 So. 2d 708, 222 Miss. 854, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 677 (Mich. 1955).

Opinion

Kyle, J.

This case is before us on appeal by Mrs. Nora Mae Bardwell, surviving widow, and the three minor children of Willie M. Bardwell, deceased, from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County affirming an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, denying the appellants’ claims for workmen’s compensation benefits under the Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation Act, Chapter 354, Laws of 1948, and amendments thereto.

The record shows that the deceased, Willie M. Bard-well, was fatally injured in an accident which occurred about three o’clock p. m. on August 29, 1952, at the Laird sawmill, about eight miles west of Brookhaven, on U. S. Highway No. 84, at a time when the deceased was unloading a truck load of logs belonging to the Perry Timber Company. Bardwell was the driver of the truck and was preparing to unload the logs, and as he unloosed his binder three of the logs fell off on him. His body was crushed by the weight of the logs, and he died about one hour later.

The appellants’ claims for death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act were denied by the attor[858]*858ney-referee and the compensation commission on the ground that the proof showed that Bardwell was employed by H. L. Dunaway, an independent contractor, and was not an employee of the Perry Timber Company, and that Dunaway at the time of Bardwell’s death had only five employees including the deceased a.nd did not have compensation insurance.

The facts in the case, as shown by the testimony of the witnesses, were substantially as follows :

The Perry Timber Company was the owner of a large sawmill in the City of Brookhaven. R. T. Perry was the manager and president. On July 28, 1951, the company purchased from Mrs. Marjorie Brown all timber, 12 inches or more in diameter, on a 210-acre tract of land in Section 25, Township 7 North, Range 8 East, in Lincoln County, known as the “Marjorie Brown tract.” By the terms of the timber deed the grantee was allowed sixteen months within which to cut and remove the timber. Perry made arrangements with EL L. Dunaway, a logger of considerable experience, who had been working for Perry much of the time since 1943 or 1944, to cut and haul the timber. Dunaway owned a truck and tractor, also mules and a pair of tongs, axes and other tools and equipment necessary for the cutting and hauling of timber. Dunaway testified that he had bought timber at times in small tracts for himself, paying stumpage therefor, and had produced it himself. Ele employed three or four helpers and paid them himself, even when he was working for Perry. Dunaway testified that his agreement with Perry for the cutting and hauling of the timber on the Marjorie Brown tract was that he was to produce the poles and piling and deliver them at the mill for a sum equal to 45 per cent of their value and that he was to cut and haul the logs for $20 per thousand feet, log scale.

At the time Perry purchased the Marjorie Brown tract of timber Dunaway was engaged in cutting timber on another tract owned by Perry Timber Company near Eta[859]*859zlehurst; and Perry testified that at the time he was negotiating with the owner for the purchase of the Marjorie Brown tract of timber he and Dunaway had agreed that Dunaway should cut the timber if Perry succeeded in buying it. Perry also confirmed Dnnaway’s statement that it was agreed that Dunaway should receive 45 per cent of the market value of the poles and piling produced, and $20 per thousand feet for the logs as compensation for his services in cutting and hauling the timber on the Marjorie Brown tract. Dunaway went to work on the Marjorie Brown tract about two weeks after the timber deed had been delivered, and was still engaged in cutting and hauling timber from the Marjorie Brown tract at the time Bardwell was killed.

Bardwell had been working for Dunaway about three months at the time of his injury. Bardwell’s regular job was running the loader, a logger’s dream, which had been loaned to Dunaway by the Perry Timber Company. In addition to Bardwell, Dunaway had working for him three colored helpers. Dunaway usually drove the truck himself; but on the day Bardwell was killed Dunaway had a case of sickness in his family and could not drive the truck. For that reason Bardwell drove the truck with the load of logs to the Laird mill. Dunaway stated that Perry had nothing to do with Dunaway’s hiring of Bard-well or any of his other employees. Dunaway and his helpers were the only timber cutters and loggers on the Marjorie Brown tract.

Dunaway stated that while nothing was said about Perry’s right to fire him or about his right to quit when he started to work on the Marjorie Brown tract he went there with the intention of cutting the tract of timber, and it would have been wrong for Mr. Perry to have said to him that he would not be allowed to finish the job. But Dunaway stated that if Mr. Perry had told him to quit he would have quit, and if he had got ready to quit himself he would have just quit. Perry stated that while they had no written agreement about the matter, and [860]*860while Dunaway could have quit any time he wanted to quit, the company did not have the right to stop Dun-away as long as he fulfilled his obligation. There was nothing said in the agreement about the company having the right to stop him. “He had a perfect right to produce until that timber contract expired.”

As to Perry’s right to control Dunaway’s operations, Dunaway stated that Mr. Wilson, Perry’s representative, was in the woods pretty often, but did not undertake to boss him. Mr. Wilson told him where to deliver the logs, which were not to be delivered at the Perry Timber Company yard. The hardwood timber, and, perhaps, the large pine logs were sold to other sawmill operators; and Dunaway said that he understood that it was a part of the agreement that he should take the logs to whatever point Mr. Wilson told him to. Dunaway stated that he was in the woods working and did not have time to make arrangements for selling the logs. Some of the logs were delivered to the Laird mill eight miles west of Brookhaven; other logs were delivered at mills at Monticello and Oma. Perry stated that the pine logs were sold to Allen Smith because Smith’s mill was conveniently located, and'that the hardwood was sold wherever a buyer could be found.

The main point argued by the appellants’ attorneys as ground for reversal of the judgment of the lower court is that the attorney-referee and the full commission erred in their finding that Dunaway was an independent contractor at the time of Bardwell’s death, and that Bard-well was an employee of Dunaway and was not an employee of Perry Timber Company, and that the learned circuit judge erred in affirming that finding.

But we think that it cannot be said that there was error in the finding of the attorney-referee and the commission on that point, or in the judgment of the lower court approving that finding.

The facts in this case are very similar to the facts in the case of Carr v. Crabtree, 212 Miss. 656, 55 So. 2d 408; [861]*861and we think that the decision rendered in that case is controlling here.

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Bluebook (online)
77 So. 2d 708, 222 Miss. 854, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 677, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-bardwell-v-perry-timber-co-miss-1955.