Estate Of Angela Elaine Nowell

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 6, 2026
• Docket: 88154-0
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Estate of: No. 88154-0-I ANGELA ELAINE NOWELL,

Deceased, DIVISION ONE

DEBORAH OSBORNE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant,

v.

EL-FATIH PAUL NOWELL,

Respondent.

CHUNG, J. — Deborah Osborne challenges the superior court’s order

denying her motion to vacate the commissioner’s appointment of El-Fatih Paul

Nowell as administrator of the estate of his deceased wife. Osborne argues that

the superior court erred because probate was already open in a different county

and no motion to change venue was filed in that action. Osborne offers no

tenable basis to vacate the appointment. We therefore affirm.

FACTS

Angela Elaine Nowell, a resident of King County, died intestate on

November 6, 2020. She was survived by her husband El-Fatih Paul Nowell and

her sister Deborah Osborne. No. 88154-0-I/2

On May 23, 2024, Osborne, representing herself, filed a petition in King

County Superior Court to be appointed the administrator of Angela’s estate. 1

Osborne listed herself as Angela’s only legal heir. However, Angela’s death

certificate indicated that Angela was married and listed Nowell as the surviving

spouse. On May 24, 2024, the court denied Osborne’s petition without prejudice.

A hearing on the matter took place on September 30, 2024. Representing

himself, Nowell objected to Osborne’s petition. Over Osborne’s objection, the

King County Superior Court commissioner continued the hearing until October

14, 2024, to allow Nowell to file and serve a written response to Osborne’s

petition.

Nowell then retained counsel and filed a petition in Pierce County Superior

Court to be appointed administrator of Angela’s estate. A Pierce County Superior

Court commissioner entered an order appointing Nowell to serve as

administrator, and on October 7, 2024, the Pierce County Superior Court issued

letters of administration.

On October 14, 2024, Nowell and Osborne appeared at the scheduled

hearing before the King County Superior Court commissioner. On October 15,

2024, the King County Superior Court commissioner entered an order denying

Osborne’s petition because Nowell had been appointed administrator of the

estate by the Pierce County Superior Court and “this court cannot modify that

order and cannot appoint a ‘second’ administrator.” A King County Superior

1 For clarity, we refer to Angela Nowell by her first name as she shares a last name with

her surviving spouse, El-Fatih, whom we refer to as Nowell.

2 No. 88154-0-I/3

Court judge denied Osborne’s motion for revision of the commissioner’s order.

Osborne appealed to this court.

On October 18, 2024, Osborne filed a motion and supporting declaration

in Pierce County Superior Court objecting to Nowell’s appointment “due to

physical & financial abuse of a Vulnerable Adult.” Osborne attached a copy of a

complaint she filed against Nowell three years after Angela’s death alleging

vulnerable adult abuse under chapter 74.34 RCW. In response, Nowell argued

that the superior court properly appointed him as administrator of his wife’s

estate and Osborne’s unproven allegations did not justify removal. In reply,

Osborne argued that Nowell petitioned for appointment in Pierce County to avoid

facing her abuse allegations at the hearing set before the King County Superior

Court commissioner on October 14, 2024. She further argued that probate was

filed first in King County and should be void in Pierce County.

Osborne then filed a motion in Pierce County Superior Court to vacate

Nowell’s letters of administration on the ground that Nowell filed his petition

without moving to change the venue of the probate from King County. Following

a hearing on December 13, 2024, a commissioner denied Osborne’s motion.

Osborne moved for revision of the commissioner’s order. A Pierce County

Superior Court judge denied the motion and confirmed Nowell’s appointment as

administrator.

Osborne timely filed this appeal in Division Two of this court, which

transferred the appeal to Division One. A commissioner of this court linked this

appeal of the Pierce County Superior Court’s order on revision with the appeal

3 No. 88154-0-I/4

from the King County order. While the appeal was pending, Osborne filed

numerous motions, objections, and requests for relief. A commissioner of this

court referred many of Osborne’s filings to the panel for consideration.

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, Osborne challenges the Pierce County Superior Court’s

January 10, 2025, order denying her motion for revision of the Pierce County

Superior Court commissioner’s December 13, 2024, order denying Osborne’s

motion to vacate Nowell’s letters of administration. As a preliminary matter, we

note that self-represented appellants are bound by the same procedural rules

and substantive laws as attorneys. Holder v. City of Vancouver, 136 Wn. App.

104, 106, 147 P.3d 641 (2006). We need not consider arguments that a party

does not support with references to the record, meaningful analysis, or citation to

pertinent authority. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801,

809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

I. Motion for Revision

A court commissioner’s decision is subject to revision by the superior

court. RCW 2.24.050. On a motion for revision, the superior court reviews the

commissioner’s ruling de novo based on the evidence and issues presented to

the commissioner. RCW 2.24.050; In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979,

992-93, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). “[T]he findings and orders of a court

commissioner not successfully revised become the orders and findings of the

superior court.” Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546

(2017). On appeal, “we review the superior court’s decision, not the

4 No. 88154-0-I/5

commissioner’s order.” In re Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 936, 317 P.3d 1068

(2014).

A person who is not an in-state resident may be appointed as personal

representative “if [they] appoint[] an agent who is a resident of the county where

such estate is being probated . . . , upon whom service of all papers may be

made.” RCW 11.36.010(6). RCW 11.28.030 entitles a surviving spouse to

administer community property unless otherwise disqualified. Corporations,

minors, persons of unsound mind, or persons who have been convicted of any

felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude are disqualified to act as

personal representatives. RCW 11.36.010(1). Nowell, a resident of the state of

Georgia, appointed his attorney as his resident agent and filed the appointment

with the court. Osborne presented no evidence establishing that Nowell was

disqualified to serve as administrator or that his appointment was otherwise

improper.

Instead, Osborne argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion

for revision because Nowell did not seek or obtain a change of venue from King

County to Pierce County. She contends that King County Superior Court

controlled the proceedings because the probate case and the separate complaint

for vulnerable adult abuse were filed there first. She further contends that Nowell

unlawfully filed for appointment as administrator of his wife’s estate in Pierce

County while knowing her probate petition was pending in King County, with a

hearing scheduled for October 14, 2024. Osborne is incorrect.

5 No. 88154-0-I/6

Venue in a probate proceeding “must be in any county in the state of

Washington that the petitioner selects.” RCW 11.96A.050(4). “Once letters

testamentary or of administration have been granted in the state of Washington,

all orders, settlements, trials, and other proceedings under this title must be had

or made in the county in which such letters have been granted unless venue is

moved as provided in subsection (4) of this section.” RCW 11.96A.050(5). Here,

the King County Superior Court commissioner did not grant Osborne’s petition to

appoint an administrator, so no letters of administration were issued in the King

County matter. And nothing in the King County Superior Court commissioner’s

September 30, 2024, continuance order precluded Nowell from filing his own

probate action in a different county. Venue was properly established in Pierce

County. Accordingly, there was no need for a change of venue from King County

to Pierce County.

Osborne also argues that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that

Nowell “had no defense” because he did not file a written objection to her motion

for revision. She contends that she was denied due process because the Pierce

County Superior Court ruled in Nowell’s favor and “gave no recognition to her

records and pleadings.” But a motion for revision “shall be upon the records of

the case, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the court

commissioner.” RCW 2.24.050; see also Pierce County Super. Ct. Local Rule

7(a)(12) (“[T]he moving party shall provide the reviewing court copies of all

documents submitted by all parties that were considered by the Court

Commissioner in making the decision sought to be revised.”). The trial court did

6 No. 88154-0-I/7

not err in considering Osborne’s motion for revision without a hearing based

upon the record before the commissioner. 2

In her reply brief, Osborne alleges “procedural disparities and due process

concerns” regarding this court’s rulings on motions filed by both parties. This

court does not consider issues raised for the first time in the reply brief. Grange

Ins. Ass’n v. Roberts, 179 Wn. App. 739, 771, 320 P.3d 77 (2013). To the extent

Osborne’s arguments raised in reply are substantially similar to claims she raised

in numerous motions she filed in this court while the appeal was pending, we

consider and address them below.

II. Motions Referred to the Panel

On August 13, 2025, Osborne objected to the clerk/administrator’s

August 12, 2025, ruling granting Nowell’s first motion for extension of time to file

his brief of respondent. On August 27, 2025, Osborne moved to disqualify the

panel assigned to this case. On August 29, 2025, a commissioner of this court

ruled that Osborne’s filings would be placed in the file until briefing was complete

and a panel was been assigned, at which point Osborne’s filings would be

referred to the panel considering the merits of the appeal.

On September 8, 2025, Osborne filed a “renewed motion to compel ruling

on pending motions, clarify procedural status, strike respondent’s improper

extension, and preserve due process rights.” Therein, Osborne appeared to

2 Osborne also asserts that the verbatim report of proceedings contained inaccurate

information. But she provides no evidence or analysis in support of this claim, so we do not consider it further. See Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290 (1998) (“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.”).

7 No. 88154-0-I/8

challenge the commissioner’s July 16, 2025, ruling linking Osborne’s appeals,

the clerk/administrator’s August 12, 2025, ruling extending time, and the

commissioner’s August 29, 2025, ruling referring Osborne’s previous filings to the

panel. On September 11, 2025, Osborne filed a letter requesting immediate

action to correct the alleged procedural “disparities,” based on her belief that the

court was treating her differently from Nowell. On September 22, 2025, a

commissioner of this court referred Osborne’s pending motions to the panel

considering this appeal. On September 23, 2025, Osborne then filed a motion “to

hold appeal in abeyance due to pending constitutional concerns and unequal

procedural treatment.”

On September 25, 2025, the commissioner granted Nowell’s motion for a

second extension of time to file his brief. On September 30, 2025, Osborne filed

a motion to “strike” Nowell’s “improper streamlined request for extension of time

to file,” “strike” Nowell’s “untimely” brief, and to “ensure procedural fairness by

enforcing the rules of appellate procedure uniformly.” Nowell opposed the

motion. In reply, Osborne asked this court to sanction Nowell for misconduct

under RAP 18.9(a) and for an award of costs under RAP 14.2. On October 9,

2025, the commissioner denied Osborne’s September 23, 2025, motion “to hold

appeal in abeyance.”

A. Motions to Modify

To the extent Osborne’s filings appear to challenge a commissioner or

clerk/administrator’s ruling, we treat them as motions to modify under RAP 17.7.

This category includes Osborne’s objections or motions relating to the rulings

8 No. 88154-0-I/9

entered on July 16, 2025, August 12, 2025, August 29, 2025, September 22,

2025, September 25, 2025, and October 9, 2025.

RAP 17.7 allows an aggrieved party to file a motion to modify a

commissioner's or clerk's ruling. “An appellant who makes a motion to modify

pursuant to RAP 17.7 receives, as a matter of right, de novo review of the

commissioner's ruling by a 3-judge panel.” State v. Rolax, 104 Wn.2d 129, 133,

702 P.2d 1185 (1985). We have considered Osborne’s motions to modify under

RAP 17.7 and have determined that they should be denied. We now turn to

Osborne’s remaining motions.

B. Motion To Disqualify Panel

Osborne moved to disqualify the panel assigned to this case, arguing that

her motions have been ignored in violation of her due process rights and the

appearance of fairness doctrine. We disagree.

“Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, a judicial proceeding is valid

only if a reasonably prudent and disinterested person would conclude that all

parties obtained a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.” In re Marriage of Meredith,

148 Wn. App. 887, 903, 201 P.3d 1056 (2009). “Evidence of a judge’s actual or

potential bias is required to establish a violation.” Skagit County v. Waldal, 163

Wn. App. 284, 287, 261 P.3d 164 (2011). Contrary to Osborne’s apparent

assumption, the panel hearing this appeal had not yet been assigned at the time

she moved to disqualify it. Osborne offers no evidence of actual or potential bias.

And the case files do not support Osborne’s claims of procedural unfairness

toward a self-represented litigant. “The fundamental requirement of due process

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is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v.

Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Osborne received the process to which she

was entitled. Her disagreement with this court’s rulings does not establish a due

process violation. We deny Osborne’s motion to disqualify the panel.

C. Motion to Strike

Osborne moved to strike Nowell’s brief of respondent on the ground that it

was untimely. But Nowell’s motions for extension of time to file his brief were

granted, and we have denied Osborne’s motions to modify those rulings, see

above, so his brief was not untimely. Therefore, we deny the motion to strike.

D. Motion for Sanctions and Costs

Osborne asks this court to impose RAP 18.9(a) sanctions on Nowell. RAP

18.9(a) gives the appellate court the authority to order a party who files a

frivolous appeal to pay damages, including an award of attorney fees. Kinney v.

Cook, 150 Wn. App. 187, 195, 208 P.3d 1 (2009). None of Nowell’s filings was

frivolous or otherwise improper, so we deny Osborne’s request.

Osborne also requests an award of costs under RAP 14.2. Generally, “the

party that substantially prevails on review” will be awarded appellate costs,

unless the court directs otherwise in its decision terminating review. RAP 14.2.

Osborne does not prevail in this appeal or in any of the motions discussed

herein, so she is not entitled to an award of costs.

10 No. 88154-0-I/11

III. Attorney Fees

Nowell requests reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal under RAP

18.1(a) and RCW 11.96A.150. We may grant an award of costs and reasonable

attorney fees on appeal to a party that requests it in its opening brief as long as

applicable law provides for such an award. RAP 18.1(a), (b). RCW 11.96A.150

provides that a reviewing court may award costs and fees in such amount it

determines to be equitable to any party, from any party or estate assets that are

the subject of these proceedings. We exercise our discretion and award

reasonable attorney fees and costs to Nowell under RCW 11.96A.150 subject to

compliance with RAP 18.1. 3

CONCLUSION

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

3 Nowell also asserts that Osborne’s opposition to his appointment as administrator was

frivolous, not well grounded in either fact or law, and interposed for purposes of harassment in violation of CR 11. Given our award of fees to Nowell under RCW 11.96A.150, we need not address this argument.